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Abstract 
 
The Forgotten Fight: Waging War on Poverty in New York City, 1945-1980 
Michael Woodsworth 
 
This dissertation recounts how community groups in postwar New York City 
tapped into growing government engagement with urban problems, which culminated in 
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 1964 declaration of “unconditional war on poverty.” 
Focusing on the discourse among grassroots activists, social reformers, and city officials, 
I argue that the War on Poverty has been misunderstood by scholars inattentive to the 
rich exchange of ideas that occurred at street level. I show how local policy innovations 
flowed upward and influenced elites — intellectuals, politicians, bureaucrats — before 
being projected back downward and adapted anew. Viewing the War on Poverty from the 
ground up not only provides a fresh perspective on its well-documented failures; it also 
turns up hidden successes. 
My narrative unfolds in the Brooklyn neighborhood of Bedford-Stuyvesant, 
where the drive to end poverty dovetailed with a vibrant civil-rights movement. A 
majority-black area of roughly 400,000 people, Bed-Stuy housed a mix of desperately 
poor tenants and upwardly mobile homeowners. I emphasize the policy role played by 
members of the area’s middle class, especially women, who acted as brokers between 
politicians and the poor people whose empowerment the War on Poverty ostensibly 
promoted. In the 1950s, activists in Bed-Stuy partnered with the municipal government of 
Robert F. Wagner, Jr., to tackle pressing issues — juvenile delinquency, deteriorated 
housing, capital flight — through experimental social-work techniques and a new model 
of neighborhood-based planning. Such partnerships laid the groundwork for the federal 
    
Community Action Program, the centerpiece of the War on Poverty. Though Bed-Stuy’s 
official Community Action Agency ultimately succumbed to mismanagement, 
bureaucratization, and internal strife, it did spawn several social-uplift and educational 
programs that helped to empower local residents, especially black women. By the late 
1960s, Bed-Stuy’s poverty warriors were searching for new ways of institutionalizing the 
federal antipoverty commitment and gaining a measure of community control. They 
found one answer in an alliance with Senator Robert F. Kennedy, who helped launch the 
Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, the country’s first Community 
Development Corporation. Restoration drew unprecedented federal funds and soon 
pioneered influential strategies of brownstone revitalization and local business 
development. As it evolved in the 1970s, Restoration reflected the dual goals of 
employing low-income residents and retaining Bed-Stuy’s middle class — a difficult 
balancing act, especially in a moment of accelerating disinvestment, mounting crime, and 
waning political will. Nevertheless, Restoration provided a model that community groups 
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I am blessed to have spent six years at Columbia University, surrounded by fine 
architecture, rich library resources, smart students, and legendary scholars. My advisor, 
the incomparable Kenneth Jackson, fits into the latter category. Ken’s enthusiasm for his 
craft, even after five decades on the job, remains infectious, and the breadth of his 
knowledge is, literally, encyclopedic. Thankfully for his students, he also knows how to 
be blunt with his criticism and editorial advice. Ken carefully guided me through every 
stage of the writing process, and for that I am immensely grateful.  
I know of no busy person who is more generous with her energies than my other 
mentor at Columbia, Elizabeth Blackmar. I’m convinced Betsy practices sorcery: I 
invariably enter her office in a state of intellectual confusion and leave feeling brilliant. 
This dissertation could not have been written were it not for her awesome ability to 
anticipate students’ thoughts, make sense of them, and nudge them several steps further. 
The other members of my committee — Ira Katznelson, Dorian Warren, and David 
Rosner — each provided unique insights and pushed me to think harder about the big 
picture. Their warm encouragement at my defense left me excited for the next step. Alan 
Brinkley read an earlier version of this project and offered a characteristically gentle yet 
penetrating critique. Eric Foner was a supportive presence throughout my graduate 
studies, and I am continually inspired by his commitment to the belief that good history 
should be well-written history. Janaki Bakhle, Evan Haefeli, Robert McCaughey, Samuel 
K. Roberts, and Anders Stephanson all lent their expertise at crucial moments. Caroline 
Cardarople and Sharee Nash offered invaluable help in securing funding.  
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No work of history could be written without librarians. Thanks to Joy Holland, 
Ivy Marvel, and Ben Gocker of the Brooklyn Public Library’s Brooklyn Collection; Sady 
Sullivan at the Brooklyn Historical Society; Alix Ross and Michael Ryan at Columbia’s 
Rare Books and Manuscript Library; Allen Fisher at the LBJ Library; and the staffs of the 
JFK Library, the Schomburg Center, and New York’s Municipal Archives. Craig Gurian 
and Lori Bikson of the Anti-Discrimination Center provided a generous grant at a late 
stage in my research. The Lehman Center for American History and the Mellon 
Foundation’s Graduate Student Internship Program also offered much-needed support. 
This project originated in a seminar led by Sarah Phillips, who served up great 
portions of her time while helping me hash out the questions I wanted to ask. Suleiman 
Osman, Barbara Winslow, Steven High, and Nicole Marwell offered scholarly input as I 
refined my thinking. My clever comrades at Columbia — Jessica Adler, Melissa Borja, 
Megan French-Marcelin, Nick Juravich, Tamara Mann, Trent McNamara, Yuki Oda, 
Nick Osborne, Matt Spooner, Jude Weber, Mason Williams — kept me honest whenever 
I traveled uptown. And my grad-school years would’ve been much less enjoyable were it 
not for the warm-hearted generosity of Victoria Geduld and the wicked wit of Thai Jones.  
In moments of writerly angst, I couldn’t have asked for better buddies than Kris 
Porter and Kolby Yarnell, who made me laugh (and laughed at me) at all hours of the 
night and day. Andrew Low, Mary Wang, and Gary McKenzie offered hospitality and 
company during my research trips. Dear friends Avi Baron, Misha Franta, Alice Gordon, 
Jessica Gorman, Kristin Henderson, Petros Kolyvas, Vanessa Kolyvas, Kerry McKenna, 
Edwin Montoya, Luz Morales, David Propson, Dan Spiegelman, Andy Tang, Susanna 
Tenny, and Aoife Villafranca-West all expressed interest, support, and solidarity. I was 
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grateful for the many conversations I had about my work with aunts, uncles, cousins, and 
other fine folks in the Woodsworth, Seabrooke, Crysler, Wagner, Farley, Lewin, Kardish, 
Duruflé, and Griffiths clans. My wonderful in-laws, Kathy and Bill Farley, generously 
read portions of the work and asked penetrating questions. 
My own parents — all four of them — have showered me with love and support 
all my life. Lindsay Crysler, who long ago urged me to become a writer, has spilled red 
ink all over my copy whenever I’ve asked for comments, like the wise old pro he is. Lana 
Seabrooke, forever a joyful and adoring fan, continued to cheer me on in recent years, 
despite trying times; her tenderness knows no limits. Pat Woodsworth, who loves nothing 
more than a good debate over a good beer, has been exhorting me to stake intellectual 
claims and defend them since I was about 3 years old. Thanks to him, I stand on the 
shoulders of a giant. My biggest booster, Judy Woodsworth, closely read every single 
word and punctuation mark of this work, footnotes included — even as she raced toward 
a publication deadline of her own. She is and has always been an inspiration. 
No person contributed more to this effort than my senior editor, Amy Farley. 
Living in cramped Brooklyn apartments and, for the past three years, caring for children 
in her belly and underfoot, Amy smilingly endured the infinite clutter of a historian with 
no office. Amazingly, her emotional, intellectual, and financial support never wavered. 
I’ll never figure out what I did to deserve a companion so smart and funny and gorgeous. 
About those kids: Will has filled our lives with hilarity and wonder, and he earnestly sat 
down more than once to peruse Daddy’s book-in progress. (The pictures were a hit.) The 
impending arrival of little Eleanor gave me the deadline I needed to finish up, and she has 
radiated joy and beauty every day of her short life. As I write these words, their sweet 
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smiles greet me from across the room.  
I’ve dedicated this work to my grandfather, David Woodsworth. A social worker, 
scholar, and activist, he held his beliefs passionately and with a lifelong commitment to 
action. The themes I’ve investigated in my research were first introduced to me in his 
living room, when I was a teenager and we’d spend hours each week deep in 
conversation. Before he died in 2010, he gave valuable tips on an early version of this 
work. Though my dear grandmother, Sheila Woodsworth, was unable to do the same, I’d 
like to believe they’d both find a lot to discuss, and critique, in the finished version. My 
other grandparents, Zsuzsanna and Zoltán Weisz, didn’t live long enough to know I 
would become a historian, but I carry within me their personal histories of persecution, 
displacement, and overcoming. 
Finally, one of the great joys of this project was getting to know some of the men 
and women who lived through the events I’ve chronicled. Don Watkins offered up a rich 
trove of archival materials, rigorous edits, and sharp-edged recollections of events fifty 
years past, told over multiple coffee dates and phone conversations. Sydney Moshette, 
Jr., provided lively conversation, invitations to community events, and fascinating papers. 
Alma Carroll, Henrietta Coursey, Jitu Weusi, and Barron Tenny all sat down for long 
chats that deepened my understanding of Bedford-Stuyvesant’s past and present. And 
Elsie Richardson, though ailing, graciously allowed me to visit her nursing home for an 
interview, on the condition that I keep it short; two and a half hours later, she was still 
telling stories. Her life, and the broader activism she embodied, leave me humbled: 
humbled by what was accomplished, and humbled by the work that remains. 
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The Senator and the Secretary 
 
 
“Of prime necessity in any meaningful program for the elimination of 
poverty and the culture it sustains is the need for a total and coordinated 
commitment to its eradication. Central to this program is the elimination 
of slum conditions, the creation of job opportunities and other economic 
and social improvements which will undoubtedly result in decent, sanitary 
and safe housing.” 





                                                
1 Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council, “Program for Total Rehabilitation and Renewal of Bedford-
Stuyvesant and Central Brooklyn Area,” Nov. 1964, in Ronald Shiffman, “Strategy for a Coordinated 
Social and Physical Renewal Program: Bedford-Stuyvesant” (Pratt Center for Community Improvement, 
1966). 
Elsie Richardson and Shirley Chisholm in 1966.  
(Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation.) 
 
Prologue: The Senator and the Secretary  2 
 
Elsie Richardson stood shivering on a windy street corner in Brooklyn’s Bedford-
Stuyvesant district, one of the poorest places in New York City. A gray mid-winter sky 
hung low over a bleak streetscape; a thin layer of wet snow concealed crumbling 
sidewalks. Richardson, 43, was a mother of three who spent her days working as a school 
secretary and packed her nights and weekends with community organizing and advocacy. 
The next few hours would define her career as an activist — but the main thing on her 
mind was the cold.2  
It was February 4, 1966. That afternoon, Richardson would provide a tour of 
Bedford-Stuyvesant for an important visitor: Robert F. Kennedy, the junior Senator from 
New York. Richardson’s group, the Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council (CBCC), 
brought together more than 100 civic clubs, churches, block associations, and civil-rights 
groups. For years, they had worked to raise awareness among politicians about the plight 
of their community. Bedford-Stuyvesant was a sprawling and notoriously ill-defined area 
housing between 250,000 and 400,000 people of whom 80% were black and perhaps 
15% were of Puerto Rican descent. Prior to the summer of 1964, when anger at police 
brutality had boiled over into a riot, few outside Brooklyn had heard of the place. Since 
then, the national media had begun referring to Bedford-Stuyvesant as “America’s largest 
ghetto,” drawing analogies to bombed-out postwar Germany to sensationalize its decay. 
Many bigwigs had dropped in and some had pledged to help. None had delivered. Even 
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 1964 declaration of “unconditional war” against poverty 
had so far amounted to little beyond a flurry of studies and grant applications.  
                                                
2 Elsie Richardson, interview with author, June 5, 2011. 
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Richardson hoped this time would be different. Maybe Kennedy would be 
genuinely moved by the poverty and anger he encountered in Brooklyn. Maybe he would 
offer more than empty promises. She wasn’t holding her breath.  
Forty-four years earlier, Richardson had been born to working-class immigrants 
from the tiny Caribbean island of Nevis. As a young child she lived on Manhattan’s West 
Side, in a neighborhood later razed to make room for Lincoln Center. When Elsie was 10 
and the family was living in East Harlem, her father lost his job working in a tie factory; 
days later, the family saw everything they owned disappear in a tenement fire that killed 
five people. It was 1932 — the depths of the Depression. They’d seen the fire coming, 
suspecting that their landlord might burn the building down to collect an insurance 
payout. Elsie’s father had even placed a ladder by the back window of their third-floor 
apartment, just in case. The ladder saved Elsie and her three siblings. But they reached 
safety too late for their father to scramble back up and salvage his last paycheck, which 
sat neatly folded in the pocket of his work pants, waiting to be cashed. Elsie held 
desperately onto his legs, afraid he’d try to clamber back up into the blaze. Then the air 
filled with the screams of children — Elsie’s friends — burning to death. For the rest of 
her days, that indelible memory would stoke the flames of Richardson’s activism on 
behalf of the downtrodden.3    
Her parents revered the Jamaican-born Marcus Garvey, Harlem’s legendary 
prophet of black pride and empowerment. Elsie took up civil-rights causes as a teenager, 
during the years when Harlem crackled with political ferment; the 1941 bus boycott led 
by an up-and-coming Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., made an indelible impact on the 19-
                                                
3 Elsie Richardson, interview with author; “Fire Death Toll Now Five,” New York Amsterdam News 
(NYAN), Sept. 7, 1932. 
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year-old. She married after the war and moved to Albany Houses, an integrated public-
housing project in Crown Heights. There she began building her reputation as an activist, 
organizing tenants and doing youth-outreach work at a nearby settlement house. By the 
mid-1950s, the Richardsons had saved enough to buy the townhouse of their dreams, a 
stone’s throw from the projects. Now a mother of three and a full-time school secretary, 
Elsie became a force in local block associations and PTAs. Somehow she found the time 
to take college classes at night.4 
At the time, Brooklyn was undergoing a dramatic transformation. Thousands of 
African Americans arrived each year from the South and thousands of whites decamped 
for the suburbs. The newcomers faced grim housing options and typically paid exorbitant 
rents for shelter; they also faced routine police brutality and made do with woefully 
inadequate health, sanitation, and educational services. Further, until the 1960s, black 
Brooklynites were mostly shut out of the Democratic Party clubhouses that dominated the 
borough’s politics. To fill the gap, they built a dense network of civic clubs, block 
associations, civil-rights groups, and social-service initiatives. Many such efforts were 
led by the sons and daughters of West Indian immigrants, who tended to occupy higher 
income brackets than did their neighbors with roots in the American South.  
In 1958, the Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council emerged as an umbrella 
organization for the various groups and began serving as the de facto political broker 
between Brooklyn’s black citizens and the municipal government. The group’s original 
mandate was to oversee an outreach program for youth gangs, a major concern among 
New York’s reformers in the postwar years. But Richardson and CBCC soon began 
                                                
4 Elsie Richardson, interview with author; Elsie Richardson, Obituary (self-authored), distributed Mar. 20, 
2012. See, also, Michael Woodsworth, “Remembering Elsie Richardson,” Apr. 10, 2012, The Nation 
online. 
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lobbying Mayor Robert F. Wagner, Jr., for more concerted efforts to control juvenile 
delinquency, rehabilitate housing, and create jobs. When Johnson and Wagner jointly 
declared was against poverty in 1964, it was CBCC that stepped up to form a Community 
Action Agency (CAA) and coordinate antipoverty programs in Bedford-Stuyvesant. 
Funds, however, proved scarce.5 
Elsie Richardson had been in the middle of it all. But as 1966 dawned she, like 
many others in Brooklyn and around the country, felt a heightened sense of urgency. 
After years of half-measures and broken promises, she felt that the time had come for 
more comprehensive solutions to her neighborhood’s problems: skyrocketing crime rates, 
disappearing jobs, capital flight, failing schools, dilapidated buildings, poverty, and of 
course racial discrimination. That made Richardson an appropriate host for the junior 
Senator from New York. By early 1966, Kennedy, too, had ideas about jumpstarting a 
new antipoverty initiative that would succeed where Johnson’s much-hyped programs 
were failing. Like Richardson, he had come to believe that the War on Poverty must shift 
gears from promoting “empowerment” to creating jobs, from repairing torn psyches to 
rebuilding decrepit streets.  
Richardson’s personality also suited the moment. Eloquent, forceful, and 
uncompromising, she could be counted on to voice the community’s frustrations without 
mincing words. This was a woman who would spend 14 years earning her B.A. in night 
school, all while working 9-to-5 in public schools, raising three children, and dedicating 
her evenings and weekends to attending endless community meetings. She was not about 
to swoon at the sight of a Kennedy.  
                                                
5 Elsie Richardson, interview with the author; Elsie Richardson, in Fighting for Justice: New York Voices 
of the Civil Rights Movement, Executive Producer Patricia L. Gatling (Film series sponsored by the New 
York City Commission on Human Rights and NYC Media, 2009). 
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And so Elsie Richardson met Bobby Kennedy. Along with Donald Benjamin, a 
social worker who served as CBCC’s staff director, the school secretary led the senator 
on a 90-minute tour. Characteristically, Kennedy braved the chill hatless and scarfless. A 
10-car caravan of handlers, journalists, and local politicos trailed the senator’s vehicle. 
But it was Richardson who sat with him as he asked question after question.  
They got out to walk down a grim stretch of Atlantic Avenue, where locals could scarcely 
believe their eyes at the sight of the slain president’s kid brother. Richardson, Kennedy, 
and their entourages climbed up into a spare apartment where an obese, bed-ridden 
woman burst into tears as the senator entered her room; on her wall were pictures of 
Jesus, Martin Luther King, Jr., and John F. Kennedy.6 They rang doorbells along a 
rundown block of Gates Avenue, where the houses, according to a local saying, weren’t 
even worthy of the rats who infested them. A 5-year-old boy emerged from one such 
dwelling only to slam the front door shut when Kennedy asked where his parents were 
and why he wasn’t in school. In countless other spots, Kennedy noted litter-strewn lots, 
boarded-up stores, and rows of crumbling Victorian townhouses. But Richardson also 
insisted that he see Bedford-Stuyvesant’s tidier streets, where a striving middle class, 
much of it of Caribbean descent, had restored elegant brownstones, planted trees, and 
organized block associations. These were the places, Richardson explained, where much 
of the area’s activism took root, and where blueprints for a broader program of uplift 
were being drawn up.7 
                                                
6 Ronald Shiffman, interview with Sady Sullivan, Feb. 4, 2008, Brooklyn Historical Society/Bedford-
Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation Oral History Project (BHS/BSRC). 
7 “Brooklyn Negroes Harass Kennedy,” The New York Times (NYT), Feb. 5, 1966; Elsie Richardson, 
interview with author; Elsie Richardson, interview with James Briggs Murray, Feb. 2 1990, Community 
Development Corporations Oral History Project, (CDCOH), New York Public Library, Schomburg Center 
for Research in Black Culture (NYPL-Sch). 





Senator Robert F. Kennedy chatting with 5-year-old Ricky Taggart on Gates Avenue 
during his tour of Bedford-Stuyvesant on February 5, 1966.  
(Dick DeMarsico/World Telegram & Sun, via Library of Congress.) 
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The final stop of the tour was the Bedford Avenue YMCA, where hundreds 
crammed into an auditorium to hear Senator Kennedy — and to give him a piece of their 
mind. Many simmered with anger at government inaction. A day earlier, at a public 
meeting hosted by newly elected Mayor John V. Lindsay, a youth leader from Bedford- 
Stuyvesant’s official community-action agency (which drew federal and city antipoverty 
funds) had issued a screed against the poverty program’s architects. “I can read through 
these pseudo-liberals, and I say to Lindsay and Johnson and the rest of those yo-yos up 
there that I don’t want them to stall with my manhood anymore,” he’d shouted.8 
Elsie Richardson, chairing the community meeting with Kennedy, set a less 
confrontational tone, but her frustration was palpable. “We are tired of what we call 
‘getting the business’,” she volleyed in her opening remarks. She added that although she 
trusted Kennedy’s good intentions, she had been wary of hosting him in Bedford-
Stuyvesant when she heard he wanted to tour the area. “‘What? Another tour?’” she 
recalled asking herself. “Are we to be punished by being forced again to look at what we 
look at all the time?”  
When Kennedy stood to speak, he promised to act. He suggested that the city 
designate an official who could tie together Bedford-Stuyvesant’s various political 
factions, and he called for better leadership of the community’s antipoverty programs. In 
the meantime, his staff would get to work studying the area’s problems. His audience, 
representing the best and brightest of black Brooklyn, took that as a slap in the face. 
“We’ve been studied to death,” Richardson shot back before yielding the floor. A parade 
of speakers echoed her refrain. Ruth Goring, an assistant to the Brooklyn borough 
                                                
8 “Voice of Poverty Demands Action,” NYT, Feb. 4 1966. 
Prologue: The Senator and the Secretary  9 
 
president, demanded concrete action “now — not tomorrow, not yesterday.” Civil Court 
Judge Thomas Russell Jones, who had made his name battling Brooklyn’s Democratic 
machine, leapt to his feet with a pointed challenge: “I’m weary of speeches, weary of 
promises that aren’t kept,” he said, his voice rising. “The Negro people are angry, 
Senator, and judge that I am, I’m angry too. And I would be the unhappiest citizen and 
the most miserable judge if it doesn’t happen soon.”9 
The encounter embarrassed the senator. “Brooklyn Negroes Harass Kennedy” 
read the New York Times headline the next morning. (“I don’t have to take that shit,” he 
told an aide later that day. “I could be smoking a cigar in Palm Beach.”)10 No matter: the 
demands fell on receptive ears. Kennedy at that very moment was seeking concrete 
strategies to address the poverty and despair he knew existed in places like Bed-Stuy. 
Several years earlier, as U.S. Attorney General and head of the President’s Committee on 
Juvenile Delinquency, Kennedy had helped to popularize the model of “community 
action” that would later underpin the War on Poverty. He had since grown disillusioned 
with the federal poverty program, which he saw as ineffectual, bureaucratic, and under-
funded. But Kennedy’s urge to act had only intensified. The riots in the Watts section of 
Los Angeles in 1965 had convinced him that despite the achievements of the civil-rights 
                                                
9 The confrontation has been recounted in numerous different places, and accounts of who said what when 
differ. The quotes used here are taken largely from “Brooklyn Negroes Harass Kennedy,” NYT, Feb. 5, 
1966, and “Boro Cry To RJK, JVL: ‘We’re Tired of Waiting’,” NYAN, Feb. 12, 1966. Among the many 
published accounts of Kennedy’s involvement in Bedford-Stuyvesant, the best are to be found in Jack 
Newfield, Robert Kennedy: A Memoir (New York: Dutton, 1969); and Edward R. Schmitt, President of 
the Other America: Robert Kennedy and the Politics of Poverty (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 2010); and Mitchell Sviridoff, ed., Inventing Community Renewal: The Trials and Errors That 
Shaped the Modern Community Development Corporation (New York: New School University, 2004. 
Also useful is an unpublished Ford Foundation evaluation from 1969: Ford Foundation (R.B. Goldmann, 
author), “Performance in Black and White: An Appraisal of the Development and Record of the Bedford-
Stuyvesant Restoration and Development and Services Corporations,” Feb. 1969, Papers of the Ford 
Foundation, Box 1, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (JFKL). 
10 Evan Thomas, Robert Kennedy: His Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), p. 319. 
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movement, increasing numbers of urban blacks were angry, alienated, and disillusioned. 
Far more would have to be done — by governments, by the private sector, by society at 
large — to help them. 
Following his tense encounter with Bedford-Stuyvesant’s civic leaders, Kennedy 
assigned two young aides, Adam Walinsky and Thomas Johnston, to work with CBCC 
on designing strategies for a new front in the War on Poverty. Their experiment would 
solicit private-sector grants to supplement government funds; it would strive to combine 
grassroots energies with business expertise. It would harness the energies unleashed by 
the War on Poverty while also learning from its failures. It would pursue long-held 
community aspirations — renewing the area’s brownstones, building a college, unlocking 
access to mortgage capital, putting high-school dropouts to work — while also launching 
an ambitious program of local business development. What emerged was a novel mode of 
community development, one that despite seemingly overwhelming obstacles would offer 





Revisiting the War on Poverty 
 
“There was a war going on in the cities, a war of poverty and against poverty. 
That war tore at the fabric of urban society, and strained public confidence in 
municipal government — in New York as nowhere in the nation.”  





                                                
1 Robert F. Wagner, Jr. to Frank Lynn, draft of letter, Aug. 8, 1988, Speeches Series, Folder 31, Box 
060064W, Robert F. Wagner Documents Collection (RFW), La Guardia & Wagner Archives (LGW) online. 
The director of the federal Office of Economic Opportunity, Sargent Shriver, 
visits Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth in Action, circa 1965. (Photo from “New York 
City War on Poverty, 1965: A Report to the Citizens of New York.”) 
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“The War on Poverty,” one of its planners mused in the late 1960s, “was a story 
in superlatives.” A half-century later, after several decades of rising inequality and as the 
very foundations of the American welfare state are coming under attack, it feels almost 
fantastical to write of the U.S. government unleashing an “unconditional” fight against 
want. In the current context, Elsie Richardson’s sincere demand that the federal 
government intervene directly in her community to promote the common good seems 
almost quaint. But while the overheated rhetoric and wide-eyed idealism of the War on 
Poverty have long since subsided, its effects linger on in subtle ways.2  
Why revisit the War on Poverty? Lyndon Johnson’s crusade against want has not 
lacked for scholarly treatments. Indeed, it is precisely because of its anomalous character 
— as a rare moment in American history when the powerful pledged, seemingly in good 
faith, to empower the powerless — that the War on Poverty continues to attract attention 
among historians, sociologists, and political scientists. Yet much about the episode 
remains elusive. As a decentralized policy experiment whose main innovation, the 
Community Action Program, reached into a thousand neighborhoods around the country 
and linked up with a thousand local social movements, the War on Poverty evades master 
narratives. It’s not even clear that fighting poverty was what the poverty program was all 
about.  
This dissertation views the War on Poverty through a local lens. Focusing on New 
York City, and Bedford-Stuyvesant in particular, the work argues that the origins, goals, 
and legacies of the War on Poverty cannot be understood without grasping how street-
level activists, community-based reformers, and city officials formed coalitions and 
                                                
2 James L. Sundquist, “Introduction” in James L. Sundquist, ed., On Fighting Poverty: Perspectives From 
Experience (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 3.  
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hatched ideas. These groups engaged in multifaceted conversations not only with each 
other but also with federal policymakers. Their experiences show how policy dialogues 
conducted at the neighborhood level can flow upward and influence elites — 
intellectuals, politicians, federal bureaucrats — before being projected back downward, 
whereupon they are adapted anew to local circumstances.  
Of particular note in this process, which unfolded between the end of World War 
II and the election to the presidency of Ronald Reagan, were members of the black 
middle class. Self-proclaimed community leaders, they acted as brokers between 
government policymakers and the poor people whose empowerment the War on Poverty 
ostensibly promoted. The chapters that follow chronicle how civil-rights activists, church 
leaders, teachers, social workers, and community organizers in Bedford-Stuyvesant — 
led by the likes of Elsie Richardson and Thomas Jones — paved the way for the War on 
Poverty and, once it was launched, adapted it to serve long-cherished goals. To their ears, 
Johnson’s stated aim of eradicating poverty, though noble, sounded impossibly remote. 
While they embraced with gusto the President’s sweeping rhetoric, their objectives were 
more prosaic. Articulating their politics within the geographical confines of segregated 
neighborhoods, members of this group put forth an ideal of community stability tied to 
homeownership, safe streets, and citizen participation in planning. Theirs was a vision 
bounded simultaneously (and sometimes contradictorily) by class, space, and race.  
At a time when private capital had begun to take flight, this vision presupposed a 
massive infusion of outside resources into the urban fabric. Such resources could only 
come from the state. Beginning in the 1950s, local activists partnered with city agencies 
on a variety of social-reform initiatives that did much to mobilize community action but 
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failed to alter underlying conditions in Bedford-Stuyvesant. In the mid-1960s, the War on 
Poverty presented a new set of institutions through which to pursue their agenda, 
including a federally funded Community Action Agency (CAA). When funds proved 
scarce and bureaucratic processes stifling, Richardson et al. mobilized to the rhetoric of 
the War on Poverty to forge new partnerships (including the one with Robert F. 
Kennedy) and to create yet more institutional settings through which to tap into public 
monies. Again, their strategies reflected the dual goals of serving the poor while also 
preserving their neighborhood’s middle class. Thus emerged the country’s first 
Community Development Corporation (CDC), which in the late 1960s and 1970s would 
devise novel — and to a surprising degree successful — strategies in pursuit of 
neighborhood revitalization and economic development. By that time, however, the 
discourse in black communities had radicalized, thanks to the civil-rights struggle and the 
failures of the War on Poverty itself; many in Brooklyn increasingly regarded 
governments — and their local agencies — with suspicion. The state, meanwhile, was 
entering a period of retrenchment.  
“We fought a war on poverty,” Reagan once said, “and poverty won.” There can 
be no doubt that the War on Poverty failed to end poverty in America. This dissertation, 
though, rejects the assumption embedded in Reagan’s “we” — namely that the War on 
Poverty was merely a set of federal programs handed down from above. Rather, the 
episode deserves to be conceptualized as something closer to a social movement, which 
took root long before Johnson issued his declaration of “unconditional war” and 
continued after Richard Nixon officially declared the war over. At the local level, the 
War on Poverty grew out of and fed into several overlapping movements: the civil-rights 
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struggle, the revolt against urban renewal, the drive to purify local politics, and the 
neighborhood-conservation movement later known as “brownstoning.” Like other 
movements of the time, the antipoverty struggle featured bold experimentation tinged 
with wide-eyed idealism, a heartfelt communitarian impulse, and devastating 
disillusionment. By holding out the promise of federal support for activists in poor 
communities, the War on Poverty encouraged big thinking. 
Johnson’s poverty program redefined American federalism by funneling cash to 
grassroots groups in neighborhoods around the country, often without using state or local 
governments as intermediaries. LBJ called it “creative federalism.”3 But the New York 
story also shows how creative federalism flowed the other way, with local politics setting 
the terms on which the federal government would later formulate policy.  
In the two decades following World War II, New York served as an important 
policy laboratory. The city maintained a municipal welfare state unmatched anywhere in 
the United States, and it gave rise to unique social-reform coalitions. City agencies 
pioneered the use of neighborhood-based community action to tackle juvenile 
delinquency, poverty, and other “social problems”; the municipal government also 
experimented with novel structures to promote citizen participation in planning. Later, 
New York hosted a wide range of Great Society initiatives aimed not only at alleviating 
poverty but also at rebuilding a city many felt was disintegrating beyond repair. Mayors 
during the War on Poverty have often been portrayed as reactionaries, but this study 
emphasizes the role of New York mayors Robert F. Wagner and John V. Lindsay as 
policy innovators.  
                                                
3 Lyndon Baines Johnson to cabinet members, Nov. 11, 1966, “LG 10/1/66-12/31/66,” Box 2, White House 
Central Files, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library. 
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Wagner and Lindsay, like Johnson and the Kennedys, fashioned themselves allies 
of the civil-rights movement. The poverty program they collectively oversaw reflected 
the upsurge of black political activity in the late 1950s and ’60s. To New York’s mayors, 
neighborhood-based programs seemed like cheap and effective tools for incorporating 
grassroots activists — especially in majority-black neighborhoods — into their respective 
political coalitions. Such efforts ultimately resulted in a variety of institutions dedicated 
to community planning, community control, and community development. These new, 
quasi-governmental structures collectively left a dual legacy. On one hand, they provided 
a base from which the African-American leadership class could expand its policy 
influence, access patronage networks, and extract concessions from political, economic, 
and bureaucratic elites. On the other, such structures also disarmed grassroots movements 
by incorporating their demands into bureaucratized, ritualized channels.4 
This helps to explain why Elsie Richardson and Thomas Jones were so irked in 
February 1966. Since the 1950s, they had worked closely with the Wagner administration 
to control juvenile delinquency, improve schools, open up job opportunities, and 
rehabilitate housing. They had been promised resources — and, just as important, 
community control of those resources — that trickled down painfully slowly. Their 
concern for Bedford-Stuyvesant’s poorest residents was sincere and heartfelt. At the same 
time, they were waging a desperate struggle to protect their homes from what they called 
“slum conditions.” Sweat equity and community organizing could not by themselves roll 
                                                
4 On this point, see Ira Katznelson, City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the United 
States (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981); Nancy Naples, Grassroots Warriors: Activist Mothering in the War 
on Poverty (New York: Routledge, 1998); Richard Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, Poor People’s Movements: 
Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Vintage Books, 1977). 
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back disinvestment and decay. They demanded that first the city government, then the 
federal government, then private capital join the struggle.  
This process led to the invention of Community Development Corporations — the 
first of which, the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, Kennedy helped to 
launch in 1967. The historical literature rarely acknowledges CDCs as a key component 
of the War on Poverty; yet they emerged directly from the chaos of the Community 
Action Program, and they often adopted functions analogous to the Community Action 
Agencies while receiving funds from the same sources. While early CDCs defined 
themselves in contradistinction to CAAs, they eventually captured much of the energy 
the War on Poverty had unleashed and turned it into a concrete agenda for bricks-and-
mortar urban revitalization. The Bedford-Stuyvesant story also shows the extent to which 
CDCs were embedded in past efforts to define urban communities and empower them to 
control their own fate.  
The policy genealogy of the Restoration Corporation encapsulates some of the 
contradictions embedded in the War on Poverty. Restoration’s founders astutely 
pinpointed the campaign’s central flaw: that it urged community groups to pursue 
transformative economic and political change in partnership with liberal elites who, 
despite their rhetoric, had little interest in such change. The Community Action Program 
nurtured radical visions; political conflict was the inevitable result of the grassroots drive 
for community control of resources. Yet it remained, at heart, an exercise in incremental 
reform, designed from above. 
The leaders of Restoration dispensed with politics altogether, spoke little of 
equality, and aspired to businesslike efficiency. Rather than confront entrenched power 
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structures, Restoration sought simply to carve out a secure political space within which to 
mobilize resources, create jobs, and foster community stability. This mission echoed the 
long-held aspirations of Bedford-Stuyvesant’s activist middle class; it also represented a 
pragmatic — critics said cynical — assessment of the narrow bounds within which the 
redevelopment of African-American neighborhoods could proceed during an era of 





The Historiographical Terrain 
 
 
The idea of launching a massive federal poverty program was first mooted in 
1963 among policymakers within the administration of John F. Kennedy, but plans came 
to fruition under Johnson. “This administration today, here and now, declares 
unconditional war on poverty in America,” Johnson intoned on January 8, 1964, in his 
first State of the Union address. It was a wildly ambitious policy goal, uttered at a wildly 
ambitious moment in American history.  
Enabling legislation, the Economic Opportunity Act, passed in August 1964, and 
a new executive agency, the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), sprung up. Among 
other things, the poverty program would fund Community Action Agencies that 
encouraged the poor to pursue their own political empowerment; Head Start, which 
provided free preschool education in impoverished areas; the Job Corps, which offered 
vocational training to dropouts; Upward Bound, a program to help low-income students 
make it through college; legal services, health clinics, and welfare advocacy dispensed 
from thousands of neighborhood centers around the country; and, after Robert Kennedy’s 
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visit to Bedford-Stuyvesant, CDCs. A bevy of Great Society programs supplemented the 
assault on poverty: Medicare and Medicaid, food stamps, federal aid to education, Model 
Cities.5 Many such initiatives endured long after the sun set on Johnson’s presidency. 
Even following Nixon’s abolition of OEO in 1974, federal, state, and local governments 
continued to fund the lion’s share of 1960s poverty programs into the 21st century.6 
Most historical work on the War on Poverty has dwelt on its shortcomings, 
seeking in one way or another to account for failure. An early classic by Peter Marris and 
Martin Rein, written in 1967, located the chief obstacles to success in the “dilemmas of 
social reform,” the most vexing of which was the simple fact that the American political 
system was deliberately structured to thwart thoroughgoing change. Another popular 
explanation is that the poverty program rested on faulty intellectual premises. Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan, writing in 1969, blamed a community-action model that was 
appropriated from the realm of social-scientific theory, despite the fact that the theory 
was untested and vague; in short, “the government did not know what it was doing.”7  
                                                
5 Historians have tended not to consider these latter innovations part of the War on Poverty proper, but they arose 
from a common impulse. Indeed, Lyndon Johnson himself lumped them all together in his 1964 declaration of 
war on want. See President’s Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 8, 1964, 
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library online; also, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. For interpretations of how 
the poverty programs related to the rest of the Great Society, see Bruce Schulman, Lyndon B. Johnson and 
American Liberalism: A Brief History With Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1995); Sar A. Levitan, 
The Great Society’s Poor Law: A New Approach to Poverty (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), and Sidney 
M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur, eds., The Great Society and the High Tide of Liberalism (Amherst: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 2005). 
6 For a comprehensive look at the policy lineage of the War on Poverty, see Robert F. Clark, The War on 
Poverty: History, Selected Programs, and Ongoing Impact (Lanham: University Press of America, 2002).  
7 Peter Marris and Martin Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform: Poverty and Community Action in the United States 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967, reprinted 1982); Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible 
Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty (New York: The Free Press, 1969). Other books 
written by former poverty warriors include Levitan, The Great Society’s Poor Law; and Sundquist, ed., On 
Fighting Poverty. This latter volume contains essays by several planners of the War on Poverty, including Adam 
Yarmolinsky, Robert A. Levine, and Sanford Kravitz. A good summary of these accounts, and an early attempt 
at historiographical revisionism, is Carl M. Brauer, “Kennedy, Johnson, and the War on Poverty,” The Journal of 
American History, Vol. 69, No. 1. (June 1982), pp. 98-119. A poverty warrior who has found more to celebrate 
in both the origins and results of the War on Poverty is Joseph Califano, former domestic-policy advisor to 
Johnson. See Joseph A. Califano, Jr., The Triumph & Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson: The White House Years (New 
Introduction: Revisiting the War on Poverty  20 
 
 
More recently, Alice O’Connor has shown that the poverty programs grew out of 
an essentially conservative body of “poverty knowledge” and failed, for all their apparent 
radicalism, to challenge the characteristically American assumption that the roots of 
poverty lie in individual behavior rather than systemic flaws. O’Connor and others 
including Allen J. Matusow and Judith Russell regret that the community-action approach 
took a back seat to Keynesian principles of economic growth and rational management, 
which were incompatible with a true assault on poverty. Furthermore, the War on 
Poverty, as Michael Katz and others have argued, failed even to address the issue of 
inequality, since it ignored relative poverty and took as its measure of want an arbitrary 
number, the poverty line. Johnson himself, as David Zarefsky has argued, cursed the 
program with expectations it could not fulfill by foolishly couching it in military rhetoric. 
Meanwhile, according to Sidney Milkis, LBJ misread the meanings of community action 
and increasingly became a target of the “new politics” he hoped to lead. Nor was the 
federal government fully prepared to grapple with the racialized dimensions of poverty in 
post-New Deal cities, as Robert Self has shown. If the Great Society arose out of a 
genuine commitment on the part of 1960s liberals to bring about the full political equality 
of African Americans, as Jill Quadagno has argued, those liberals were nonetheless ill-
equipped to defend it once the inevitable racist backlash arose.8  
                                                                                                                                            
York: Simon & Schuster, 1991). For reminiscences from former policymakers, see Michael L. Gillette, 
Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History (New York: Twayne Books, 1996). A more recent work to take 
up the argument that the Johnson administration failed to understand the challenges it was confronting is John A. 
Andrew III, Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1998). 
8 Alice O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. 
History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History 
of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harper & Row, 1984). Judith Russell, Economics, Bureaucracy, and 
Race: How Keynesians Misguided the War on Poverty (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). Michael 
B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America (New York: Basic Books, 
1986); David Zarefsky, President Johnson’s War on Poverty: Rhetoric and History (University of Alabama 
Press, 1986); Sidney M. Milkis, “Lyndon Johnson, the Great Society, and the ‘Twilight’ of the Modern 
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Where most such interpretations converge is in their assumption that the basic 
goal of fighting poverty through government action was essentially sound, if doomed. In 
contrast, conservatives like Charles Murray and Fred Siegel contend that far from being a 
noble experiment gone wrong, the War on Poverty epitomized the overreaching 
tendencies of the liberal state, and that it harmed the poor and the public purse alike by 
creating a culture of dependency.9 Either way, the War on Poverty serves as a parable for 
the declension of postwar liberalism.10  
Johnson’s domestic war did score some widely acknowledged successes. Most 
chroniclers of the Great Society point out that poverty dropped by half between 1960 and 
the late 1970s. Though the dip is often attributed to Medicare rather than to the War on 
Poverty, Johnson himself argued from the outset that improving health outcomes was an 
integral part of the poverty program. Another oft-cited accomplishment of the program is 
that it created a new cadre of African-American leaders and gave them institutions in 
which to build new bases of black political power.11 Finally, Head Start, a widely 
respected program that endures today, has long been flagged as the War on Poverty’s 
signal accomplishment. But we hear little about the after-life of other antipoverty 
                                                                                                                                            
Presidency,” in Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur, eds., Great Society and the High Tide of Liberalism (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2005); Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar 
Oakland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003; Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How Racism 
Undermined the War on Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).  
9 Charles Murray, Losing Ground (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Fred Siegel, The Future Once 
Happened Here: New York, D.C., L.A., and the Fate of America’s Big Cities (New York: Free Press, 1997). 
10 See, for instance, Irwin Unger, The Best of Intentions: The Triumphs and Failures of the Great Society Under 
Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon (New York: Doubleday, 1996); Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse; Quadagno, 
The Color of Welfare; Matusow, The Unraveling of America; Nicholas Lemann, The Promised Land: The Great 
Black Migration and How It Changed America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991). For a look at the place of 
the War on Poverty in a longer tradition of urban policy, see Mark I. Gelfand, A Nation of Cities: The Federal 
Government and Urban America, 1933-1965 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).  
11 See, for instance, Thomas J. Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the 
North (New York: Random House, 2008). Also Leonard N. Moore, Carl B. Stokes and the Rise of Black 
Political Power (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002); and David R. Colburn and Jeffrey S. Adler, eds. 
African-American Mayors: Race, Politics, and the American City (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001). 
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initiatives undertaken as part of the Great Society.12 
A growing body of scholarship has begun to fill in the gaps. Recent work has 
focused on the institutional legacies of the War on Poverty, showing how it reconfigured 
American federalism, breathed new life into the participatory structures of America 
democracy, empowered women within local communities, and gave birth to a variety of 
federal and local agencies that long outlived the Nixon administration.13 Studies of New 
Orleans, Alabama, Milwaukee, and Oakland, among other places, have shown how 
federally funded community-action experiments reshaped local power dynamics even 
when they left racial and economic inequality intact.14 This dissertation adds a further 
element to this historiographical turn by showing how the War on Poverty intersected 
with previously existing community movements and helped to spawn new institutions 
that both reaffirmed and challenged the boundaries of segregated urban space. 
The point here is not to deny failure. Indeed, this dissertation chronicles many of 
the poverty program’s most salient deficiencies. The Community Action Program was 
sometimes corrupt, often chaotic, and always controversial; elaborate bureaucratic 
                                                
12 For recent assessments of Head Start’s origins and legacy, see Maris A. Vinovskis, The Birth of Head Start: 
Preschool Education Policies in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005); Nathan, Richard P., ed. “How Should We Read the Evidence About Head Start?” (Discussion 
featuring W. Steven Barnett, Douglas J. Besharov and Caeli A. Higney, and Janet Currie), Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management 26:3 (2007), pp. 673-689.  
13 See, for instance, Clark, The War on Poverty; Noel Cazenave, Impossible Democracy: The Unlikely 
Success of the War on Poverty Community Action Programs (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2007); Nicole P. Marwell, Bargaining for Brooklyn: Community Organizations in the Entrepreneurial City 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Naples, Grassroots Warriors; Felicia Kornbluh, The Battle 
for Welfare Rights: Politics and Poverty in Modern America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2007). 
14 See Kent B. Germany, New Orleans After the Promises: Poverty, Citizenship, and the Search for the Great 
Society (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007); Mark Edward Braun, Social Change and the Empowerment 
of the Poor: Poverty Representation in Milwaukee’s Community Action Programs, 1964-1972 (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2001); Self, American Babylon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Susan 
Ashmore, Carry It On: The War on Poverty and the Civil Rights Movement in Alabama (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2008); Cazenave, Impossible Democracy; Marwell, Bargaining for Brooklyn; and William 
Clayson, “The Barrios and the Ghettos Have Organized!’: Community Action, Political Acrimony, and the War 
on Poverty in San Antonio.” Journal of Urban History 28:2 (2002), pp. 158-83.   
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structures erected ostensibly to promote participation ended up stifling it. The program 
designed to stimulate urban revival, Model Cities, got caught up in pork-barrel politics 
and sputtered on the ground. OEO chose to define poverty according to an arbitrary 
income threshold and eschewed redistributive programs. What little wealth redistribution 
was attempted led to a backlash so intense as to condemn liberal Democrats to the 
political wilderness for a generation. The withdrawal in the 1970s of federal support for 
programs that were only just getting their sea legs left many cities, including New York, 
holding the bag for programs they couldn’t fund without bankrupting themselves. Even 
CDCs, which in many respects echoed the rhetoric of Nixon’s “black capitalism” 
initiatives, failed to escape the Reagan-era assault on urban programs, and many saw 
their funding slashed in the 1980s.  
 If anything, then, the War on Poverty’s failure was over-determined. Programs 
authorized by the Economic Opportunity Act at their peak drew $2 billion in federal 
funds, less than 2% of the budget at a time when approximately a fifth of all Americans 
officially counted as poor. No society has ever succeeded in disproving the Biblical 
dictum that “The poor you will always have with you.” How could Americans have 
expected to do so while spending far less fighting poverty at home than they did bombing 
peasants in faraway jungles? All that to say: the War on Poverty’s successes, including 
unintended ones, are what beg explanation. Such successes must be measured according 
to a modest standard; oftentimes, they took decades to emerge and even then left those 
who did the most to bring them about profoundly ambivalent about their effects.  
Thus this dissertation asks not “Why was the War on Poverty doomed to fail?” 
but “What did it do?” Clearly, part of the answer must come from an analysis of the  






A 1967 poster produced by a neighborhood-outreach center under the auspices of 
Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth in Action. By 1968, Youth in Action would be the best 
funded of New York City’s 16 Community Action Agencies. 
(Don Watkins papers.) 
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political goals and legacies of the poverty struggle. The key work on this subject remains 
that of Richard Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, who in 1971 argued that the political 
purposes of the War on Poverty trumped its policy goals. The poverty program, per 
Cloward and Piven, was a central component of the Democratic Party’s efforts to “reach, 
placate, and integrate a turbulent black constituency” in a moment of social and political 
upheaval; by this standard, it must be judged a success.15  
Given the discrepancy between stated goals and the weapons used to achieve 
them, it seems reasonable enough to surmise that abolishing poverty was never really the 
point of the War on Poverty. (Critics in the 1960s dubbed it a “riot insurance program.”) 
However, a more localized perspective shows that the political goals of the White House 
were not hegemonic. The War on Poverty, as a social movement and as a set of policy 
innovations, was adapted by many different actors to suit widely divergent political goals. 
As Paul Peterson and J. David Greenstone argued in a classic 1973 study, the Community 
Action Program’s “maximum feasible participation” directive in fact provided African-
American activists with a useful tool for promoting community control and challenging 
established authority in some locales, most notably New York City. More recent studies, 
including those of Noel Cazenave and Marci Reaven, have emphasized the ways in which 
Community Action Agencies helped to democratize local politics and to promote citizen 
participation in planning. This dissertation picks up on these perspectives and ties them 
into a local story with broad national implications.16 
                                                
15 Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox-Piven, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1971), pp. 249n; 281; 276.  
16 J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, Race and Authority in Urban Politics: Community Participation 
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The View From Brooklyn 
 
 
Clearly, what happened in Brooklyn, or even in New York City, cannot fully 
account for what happened nationwide. The decentralized way in which the War on 
Poverty was fought means that its history must also be decentralized, broken down into 
case studies before it can be reassembled. On the other hand, many of the political, 
intellectual, and policy processes that played out in Bedford-Stuyvesant unfolded in 
similar form at similar times in similar places. The basic contradictions at the heart of the 
War on Poverty, as well as the battles it spawned, tended to take recognizable forms in 
cities around the country — hence the speed and magnitude of the backlash against it. 
Bedford-Stuyvesant in the postwar decades was both emblematic and exceptional. 
In some ways, it epitomized the processes by which urban black communities grew in 
population, experienced capital flight, and organized to take political action. On the other 
hand, Bed-Stuy was especially big and exceptionally diverse, crisscrossed with unique 
ethnic, class, and gender divisions. The area housed a mixture of desperately poor people 
and upwardly mobile ones — of public-housing residents, tenement dwellers, and 
brownstone owners — and those socio-economic contrasts often overlapped with the 
cultural cleavages between Southerners and West Indians. These dynamics would 
profoundly affect the structure of the poverty programs that were launched there.  
Bedford-Stuyvesant also deserves special interest as an urban space where 
mapped realities were almost entirely defined by race. As this study demonstrates, the 
term “Bedford-Stuyvesant” was itself invented to describe an area inhabited mostly by 
African Americans, which was then progressively enlarged as the radius of black 
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settlement in Brooklyn expanded. Thus when War on Poverty programs targeted 
“Bedford-Stuyvesant,” and when local groups defined “Bedford-Stuyvesant” as 
synonymous with “community,” they were acknowledging that both race and segregation 
were constitutive of their efforts. This reached a point of absurdity by the late 1960s, 
when a space encompassing 450,000 people — as many as lived in Cincinnati — was 
still being spoken of as a single “neighborhood.”  
Whatever the definition used, it was clear that Bedford-Stuyvesant at mid-century 
housed a substantial middle class — some 20% of its homes were owner-occupied — 
which aspired to community leadership and took great pride in picturesque blocks lined 
with stately brownstones. Far from being a monolithic zone of suffering and blight, as 
many contemporary observers implied, the area was a diverse, sprawling collection of 
micro-neighborhoods where a multinational, multilingual population had laid down 
roots.17 Bedford-Stuyvesant also served in the postwar decades as a testing ground for a 
series of pioneering ideas about urban reform and community action. It was the site of 
social-work experiments aimed at reforming young gang members, as well as early 
attempts by the municipal government to foster (and control) community participation in 
planning. Meanwhile, an important, if largely forgotten, civil-rights struggle was 
unfolding in Central Brooklyn, alongside a citizen revolt against urban renewal and new 
forms of grassroots-led community development. 
The War on Poverty sat at the intersection of these various movements, and it 
spawned new institutions through which their goals could be pursued. But the poverty 
                                                
17 Approximately 15% of the area’s people in the early 1960s were Puerto Ricans. The black population included 
substantial numbers of first- and second-generation immigrants from every country in the Caribbean; among the 
native-born African Americans, self-conscious divisions existed between recent migrants from the South and 
those residents who’d arrived in New York City during the first two decades of the 20th century or earlier.  
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program also sent activists spinning off in new directions. In no locale was there a richer 
policy dialogue than in Bed-Stuy, where an uncommon number of important ideas were 
interacting at a time when community groups and liberal elites alike vested uniquely high 
hopes in their capacity to enact change. Bed-Stuy, then, provides a rich historiographical 
terrain on which to survey the War on Poverty from the ground-up.  
That terrain is all the more rich for being embedded in New York City. Beyond 
Bed-Stuy’s vaguely defined borders, a wide variety of grassroots movements swept 
across Brooklyn in the 1960s and ’70s, including the upwardly mobile brownstoners of 
Park Slope, the anti-urban renewal coalition of Boerum Hill, the Hispanic housing 
activists of Southside Williamsburg, and the committed parents of the Ocean-Hill 
experimental school district. Across the East River, Manhattan hosted all manner of 
social movements and policy experiments during this period, including the two best-
known Community Action Agencies, Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited and the 
Lower East Side’s Mobilization for Youth. What connects these various groups is not 
only the common context from which they all emanated but also a shared project: to 
transform and reinvent the urban landscape.  
The kind of transformation they sought would be a long time coming. But some 
of the seeds of Brooklyn’s later revival, for good and for bad, were planted during this 
time. In highlighting these linkages, this dissertation supplements the small but growing 
body of recent scholarship that has sought to rethink the so-called “urban crisis.” Writing 
about Brooklyn, the historian Suleiman Osman has argued against the “unidirectional 
narrative of decline” often applied to American cities in the era between World War II 
and the early 1980s, pointing out that many New York neighborhoods were 
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“simultaneously reviving and declining” during the postwar years. The poverty program 
contributed to both trends.18   
To account for these outcomes, it’s necessary to revisit the immediate aftermath 
of World War II. Chapter 1 of this study describes a series of experiments designed to 
address juvenile delinquency in the late 1940s. The first of these unfolded in Bedford-
Stuyvesant thanks to the initiative of the Brooklyn Council for Social Planning, which 
employed novel social-work techniques to reform teen gangs. Soon thereafter, a new 
government agency, the New York City Youth Board, expanded on these methods. The 
Youth Board’s gang-outreach programs, which harkened back to the “area approach” 
mapped out by Chicago sociologists two decades earlier, took individual neighborhoods 
as their unit of analysis. They assumed that citizens of the neighborhoods where needs 
were greatest should participate in planning and running the programs that affected them. 
Under Mayor Wagner, the Youth Board broadened its approach in the late 1950s. 
Henceforth the city government would seek not only to “control” delinquency but also to 
“prevent” it by addressing so-called “root causes”: racial discrimination, poverty, family 
breakdown, and housing left to decay by absentee landlords.  
                                                
18 Suleiman Osman, The Invention of Brownstone Brooklyn: Gentrification and the Search for Authenticity in 
Postwar New York (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 10-11. Among other recent works that have 
attempted to reposition New York’s 1960s as a prequel to urban renaissance are Samuel Zipp, Manhattan 
Projects: The Rise and Fall of Urban Renewal in Cold War New York (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010); Kenneth T. Jackson and Hilary Ballon, eds., Robert Moses and the Modern City: The Transformation of 
New York (New York: Norton & Co., 2007); and Sam Roberts, ed.; America’s Mayor: John V. Lindsay and the 
Reinvention of New York City (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). In a different vein, one of the 
earliest challenges to the idea of an “urban crisis” came from Cloward and Piven, who argued in 1968 that none 
of the conditions cited as evidence of crisis were in fact new. What was new was the way in which the Great 
Migration of African Americans out of the rural South had woven a thread of racial conflict into every dimension 
of urban poverty. “The urban crisis is essentially a political crisis produced by profound changes in the economic 
order,” they wrote. Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox-Piven, “The Urban Crisis and the Consolidation of 
National Power,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 29:1 (1968), p. 160.  
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 Activists in the city’s rapidly expanding and resource-starved African-American 
neighborhoods picked up on this vision of community action and ran with it. Such was 
the case in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Chapter 2 investigates the jarring demographic, political, 
and economic shifts Bed-Stuy was undergoing at the time, along with the intense 
community-organizing efforts that unfolded in response. In 1958, a coalition of block 
associations, civil-rights groups, churches, and social workers formed the Central 
Brooklyn Coordinating Council, with an assist from the Youth Board. As a city-funded 
agency, CBCC aimed to foster community participation in the municipal government’s 
gang-outreach programs. But the locals had their eyes on a bigger prize. Most CBCC 
leaders were active in the civil-rights movement, and many also spent their time 
organizing block associations. Though keen to see youth gangs disarmed, such activists 
also used CBCC as a vehicle with which to push the Wagner administration to take action 
on other fronts: schools, housing, jobs, and more. 
The early 1960s, as Chapter 3 chronicles, were a time of unusual fluidity in New 
York politics. Wagner broke with Tammany Hall, insurgent reformers challenged old 
county machines, civil-rights activists protested against institutionalized racism, and a 
revolt against urban renewal bubbled up in neighborhoods around the city. At the same 
time, the federal government was endorsing the Youth Board’s mode of community 
action through the President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency (PCJD) overseen by 
Robert F. Kennedy. From Wagner’s perspective, it seemed like sound politics and good 
policy to partner with the federal government to empower community-based 
organizations; indeed, the two most important PCJD efforts anywhere in the country were 
both based in Manhattan and co-sponsored by Wagner. In Brooklyn, CBCC activists 
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worked to gain federal and municipal support for a similar program — and their efforts 
paid off with the creation of a new agency, Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth in Action, in early 
1964, shortly after Johnson and Wagner each declared war on poverty.  
Chapter 4 explores the intellectual climate that surrounded the launch of Youth in 
Action and the broader War on Poverty. It shows how the federal government stressed a 
highly theorized version of the community-action approach, which stressed the cultural 
deficiencies of poor people. These ideas pushed the early Community Action Program in 
contradictory, often self-destructive directions, destroying much of its early momentum. 
At the same time, Youth in Action showed that it was possible for neighborhood-based 
organizations to adapt the theory of community action to their own purposes.  
As Chapter 5 explains, Youth in Action mirrored the flaws that commonly 
plagued CAAs around the country: chaotic managerial structures, a lack of reliable funds, 
and few immediate accomplishments. The social workers and preachers who directed 
YIA were caught between their desire to stimulate the “maximum feasible participation 
of the poor” and the dictates of good governance. Intense power struggles erupted over 
scarce resources. Under Mayor Lindsay, the erection of a massive bureaucratic apparatus 
meant ostensibly to promote community action would stifle efforts to pursue substantive 
challenges to the political-economic order. Despite it all, Youth in Action initiated 
several popular and useful programs. Its special attention to the needs of low-income 
women in Bed-Stuy — especially in the realms of education and career advancement — 
marked it as a particularly valuable resource during the mid-1960s.  
There was another side to the poverty war, too: a drive to repair the physical 
resources of the “ghetto” where community action focused on renewing its psychic 
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resources. Chapter 6 argues that the failures of community action provided a spur for new 
thinking about how neighborhood redevelopment should proceed. The Bedford-
Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation tapped into these yearnings after 1967. Restoration 
resulted from a collaborative policy dialogue among neighborhood activists, local 
politicos, advocacy planners, and the staff of Robert F. Kennedy. All of these people 
were both expanding on the community-action approach and reacting to its failures. They 
sought solutions to challenges that previous antipoverty initiatives had failed to address: 
deindustrialization, job loss, crumbling physical landscapes. The programs that emerged 
as a result in many ways reflected the longstanding concerns of Bed-Stuy’s home-
owning, middle-class, activist leadership group.  
Serious policy differences and political rivalries soon arose, as Chapter 7 
describes. Would the Restoration Corporation think big, or would it think small? Would 
it answer to elites or to the grassroots? The debates surrounding these questions brought 
into focus pre-existing class and gender divisions, and they precipitated a reconfiguration 
of power within Bedford-Stuyvesant. Under the directorship of Franklin Thomas, 
Restoration aimed to heal the wounds by taking on a bricks-and-mortar program of 
physical renewal. The corporation’s most popular programs hired young, unemployed 
men to help repair owner-occupied brownstones, rehabilitate abandoned industrial 
facilities, and tidy up historic blocks. In the late 1960s, another campaign — for a 
community controlled college in Central Brooklyn — also gained traction and promised 
to unite the various factions in the community. The extent of their collective clout, 
however, remained in question.  
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The Epilogue examines some of the War on Poverty’s long-term legacies. 
Clearly, want was not wiped out in America, though the official poverty rate did drop 
dramatically in the decade and a half that followed Johnson’s declaration of war. 
Individual programs scored notable successes and improved the daily lives of millions. 
Yet most of the neighborhoods targeted by CAAs and CDCs continued to suffer from 
disinvestment, job loss, and, increasingly, mass incarceration. Ideas and institutions once 
employed to justify and structure federal intervention in urban areas gradually came to 
underpin what Herbert Gans has called “the war against the poor.” Could it be that the 
successes of the War on Poverty also accounted for its worst failures? As it helped some 
low-income individuals move into the middle class, did it rob poor neighborhoods of 
their most ambitious citizens? Did the War on Poverty reinforce the boundaries of 
segregated spaces by taking those very spaces as the basic unit of analysis for theorizing 
social change? 
In Bedford-Stuyvesant, Restoration’s vision of urban revitalization relied on the 
area’s middle class to help counteract rampant disinvestment, inadequate city services, 
and the aftereffects of redlining. By creating a mortgage pool, extending credit to small 
businessmen, and fostering homeownership. Restoration attempted to transform Bed-Stuy 
into a more attractive environment. This approach proved surprisingly successful — as 
testified by the CDCs that emerged around the country and mimicked elements of the 
Restoration model. On the other hand, recent developments in Bed-Stuy make it 
impossible to ignore the issue of gentrification. Have efforts to make Central Brooklyn 
more livable contributed, in the long run, to making it unlivable for some of its most 
vulnerable citizens?













A map of Brooklyn, circa 2010.  








“Of all the pains that plague a modern city, none is more corrosive than 
juvenile delinquency, and the one city in the U.S. that has a giant’s share of 
pain is New York. There, in the weltering tenements and public-housing 
complexes that pimple district upon district of the city’s 299 sq. mi., roam 
the “bopping clubs,” the teen-age street-fighting gangs. […] They prowl 
the dark streets, kill and maim one another, dabble in narcotics, drink 
themselves into a rage with cheap wine called “sneaky Pete.” 







                                                
1 “Youth: The Shook-Up Generation,” Time, Apr. 07, 1958.  
Members of the Jokers gang, as photographed in 1959 by Bruce Davidson for his 
Brooklyn Gang series. (Bruce Davidson/Magnum Photos.) 
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 In the summer of 1945, as war in the Pacific reached its climax, American 
teenagers on the home front were waging a violent struggle of their own. The war years 
had brought a generalized increase in youth crime, and strife among teenage gangs 
intensified as conflict drew to a close. Nowhere was the trend more alarming than in the 
nation’s largest city. That summer, New York teenagers grabbed headlines by robbing, 
vandalizing, rampaging, and, most sensationally, staging massive “rumbles.” These 
outbreaks of hand-to-hand combat featured young men fighting with baseball bats, 
switchblades, chains, car antennas, and the handles of trashcans, improvised as brass 
knuckles; some also wielded “zip” guns, the homemade firearms cobbled together by 
teenage gangsters using curtain rods, coffee percolators, radio antennas, blocks of wood, 
rubber bands, and toy-gun parts. Often the gangs were simply getting their kicks or 
avenging minor slights. But increasingly, the worst violence followed ethnic fault lines. 
In Upper Manhattan, along the rapidly shifting frontiers dividing majority-white from 
majority-black areas, angry teenagers organized into warring factions and adopted names 
like “Irish Dukes” and “Negro Sabers.” Across the river in the Bronx, gunfire felled 13-
year-olds as posses representing Italians, Irish, Puerto Ricans, and African Americans 
vied for control of hotly disputed spaces. Amongst the stoops and steeples of Brooklyn, 
skirmishes usually broke out between gangs representing the same ethnic group and 
contesting the same streets; some of the fiercest battles pitted two all-black Bedford-
Stuyvesant gangs, the Nits and the Greene Avenue Stompers, against each other. Yet it 
was common for rival gangs to join forces in the name of ethnic solidarity. One notorious 
case involved the Brewery Boys, a cluster of majority-Italian gangs in northern Bedford-
Stuyvesant, who while not generally on friendly terms, were known to lay their 
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differences aside and wage joint attacks on African-American or Jewish youths.2 
 Most New Yorkers remained riveted to the fighting in the Pacific. Yet an increasing 
number of parents, social workers, and government officials also fretted about the 
violence in their own backyards. The teen murder rate had doubled since 1940. Many 
returning veterans, often still in their teens, were re-joining gangs and adding an element 
of paramilitary leadership to the raw enthusiasm of younger boys. Worse, the inter-group 
hostilities playing out in gang fights seemed to presage further outpourings of race-driven 
strife. This was a city where memories of the 1943 Harlem riot hung fresh in the air.  
 Parents feared for the welfare of their children. “I am a respectable American Negro 
citizen, mother of eight children,” one Brooklyn woman wrote Mayor Fiorello La 
Guardia. “In the community where I live … conditions are becoming so that our 
children’s lives are in constant jeopardy, day and night. Will you please advise us what 
we, the decent Negro mothers of Brooklyn, can do to get the protection necessary to 
shield our children?”3 
What to do about the wild youth? On August 2, 1945, the day the Potsdam 
Conference wrapped up, leading reformers in Brooklyn held a conference to address the 
question. They were particularly nervous about Bedford-Stuyvesant, an area inhabited 
mostly by working-class whites but where growing numbers of African Americans were 
settling. Spooked by what the Amsterdam News, New York’s pre-eminent black 
newspaper, dubbed a “terrifying display of gangsterism,” the group hoped to “weed out 
                                                
2 Eric C. Schneider, Vampires, Dragons, and Egyptian Kings: Youth Gangs in Postwar New York 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 65-67; “Youth Gang Wars Kill 10 in a Year,” The 
New York Times (NYT), May 8, 1950; “17 Boys Arrested in Fatal Gang Riot,” NYT, July 21, 1945; 
Brooklyn Council for Social Planning (BCSP), “Report of the Tompkins Park Leadership Project” (1950), 
Folder 9.1.023, Box 66, BCSP Papers, Brooklyn Public Library Brooklyn Collection (BPL). 
3 Quoted in Schneider, Vampires, Dragons, and Egyptian Kings, p. 51. 
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the delinquency that has engulfed many otherwise fine and respectable-familied youths.” 
Among the notables gathering in a brownstone townhouse on an elegant block of Macon 
Street were community leaders from the NAACP, the YMCA, and several black 
churches. They were joined by representatives of the city’s welfare department and of La 
Guardia’s Committee on Unity, a recently appointed group intended to foster goodwill 
and cooperation among the city’s diverse ethnic groups. All agreed that the key to 
disarming fighting gangs lay in combining outreach programs at the grassroots with a 
robust anti-delinquency program sponsored by the city government.4 
 Such action would have to wait. V.J. Day celebrations erupted a week later, and in 
the months that followed, New Yorkers turned their attention to a series of spectacular, at 
times crippling, strikes. But youth gangs soon re-emerged as a matter of concern among 
the city’s social scientists, municipal officials, social workers, community activists, and 
parents. In the efforts of these diverse constituencies to combat juvenile delinquency lie 
some of the deep roots of the federal War on Poverty launched almost two decades later. 
Beginning in 1947, Brooklyn would play host to a series of experimental 
programs aimed at disarming, controlling, and reforming teenage gangs. The social-work 
methods employed were novel and bold — as were accompanying efforts to galvanize 
grassroots support by organizing community councils in the affected neighborhoods. The 
new approach would soon be picked up by a fledgling municipal-government agency, the 
New York City Youth Board, which in the 1950s sought to suppress teen violence in a 
city suddenly transfixed by the ominous yet strangely romantic specter of the juvenile 
delinquent. By the mid-1950s, ideas about youth crime would become increasingly 
                                                
4 “Mayor Denounced by Jury for Crime in Brooklyn Area,” NYT, Nov. 16, 1943; “Brooklynites Meet to 
Fight Juvenile Problem in Section,” New York Amsterdam News (NYAN), Aug. 4, 1945. 
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racialized, and most of the city’s efforts came to target African Americans and Puerto 
Ricans. Under Mayor Robert F. Wagner, Jr., who held office for three terms between 
1954 and 1965, the city government broadened its analysis of juvenile delinquency. 
Expanded Youth Board programs would seek not only to disarm gangs but also to 
address a spectrum of social ills seen to be causing crime in poor districts inhabited 
mostly by minorities. Did such efforts reform deviant teenagers? Hardly. But by the late 
1950s the Youth Board had succeeded in creating a network of neighborhood-based 
institutions that gave local elites a stake in the government’s efforts to “prevent and 








 Marauding teenagers had terrorized New York City’s streets long before anyone 
ever heard of the Brewery Boys. In 1825 Mayor Philip Hone issued a litany of complaints 
about youth culture in Gotham:  
 
“The city is infested by gangs of hardened wretches, born in the haunts of 
infamy, brought up in taverns ... These fellows (generally youths between 
the ages of twelve and twenty-four) patrol the streets making night 
hideous and insulting all who are not strong enough to defend themselves; 
their haunts all the night long are the grog-shops in the Bowery, Corlear’s 
Hook, Canal Street and some even in Broadway, where drunken frolics are 
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succeeded by brawls, and on the slightest provocation knives are brought 
out, dreadful wounds inflicted, and sometimes horrid murder committed.”5  
 
According to the historian Christine Stansell, a new impulse to regulate the 
lifestyles of poor people emerged among the city’s bourgeoisie in the mid-19th century. 
At the time an estimated 30,000 men, most of them young, pledged allegiance to gangs 
that were plugged directly into the political system via the Tammany Hall apparatus. Elite 
reformers justified interventions in downtrodden districts by creating “a dramatic imagery 
of the fearful pathology of the ‘tenement classes’” — imagery that associated child 
poverty with dangerous streets and depraved families. A half-century later, Jacob Riis 
took a similar view of violent youths. “Every corner has its gang, not always on the best 
of terms with rivals in the next block, but all with a common programme: defiance of law 
and order,” New York’s most famous chronicler of poverty wrote in How the Other Half 
Lives. “They reflect exactly the conditions of the tenements from which they sprang.”6  
Throughout these eras, social reformers often linked juvenile delinquency with 
the deprivations of slum life. A similar set of assumptions would emerge during the 
middle decades of the twentieth century, when the impoverishment of formerly affluent 
areas of the city was seen as a key cause of youth gangs. During the middle decades of 
the 20th century, as in past times, the spike in youth crime also corresponded with a surge 
in migration to the city. Not surprisingly, public alarmism about youth behavior often 
melded with a thinly veiled hostility toward the newcomers — in this case African 
                                                
5 Quoted in New York City Juvenile Delinquency Evaluation Project, “The Planning of Delinquency 
Prevention and Control” (Feb. 1961), Folder 9, Box 060300, Robert F. Wagner, Jr., Documents Collection 
(RFW), La Guardia & Wagner Archives (LGW) online.  
6 Christine Stansell, City of Women: Sex and Class in New York, 1789-1860 (New York: Knopf, 1986), p. 
194; Irving A. Spergel, “Youth Gangs: Continuity and Change,” Crime and Justice 12 (1990), p. 172; 
Jacob A. Riis, How the Other Half Lives (New York: Penguin, 1890, revised edition 1997), pp. 164-165. 
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Americans from the rural South, as well as Puerto Ricans. As in the 19th century, elites 
and social reformers expressed suspicions about the forms of social organization 
associated with the new arrivals. The newcomers figured in wild, sensationalized press 
reports on youth violence, which further raised the specter of social disorder. Conflicts 
sprung up around the city in new urban borderlands, where industry met tenements, 
where “native” whites met blacks and Puerto Ricans, where comfort met decay. If New 
York in the immediate postwar years stood at the apex of its power — the world’s 
industrial powerhouse, the home of the United Nations, the center of global commerce — 
it was also a city whose citizens were growing uneasy about the future. Much of this 
unease arose from the behavior of the young and the poor. Stansell’s observation about 
the motivations of mid-19th century reformers seems an apt description of their 
counterparts a century later: “It was this sense of impending catastrophe that animated … 
reformers to formulate a wide-ranging program of social renewal.”7 
 In the postwar era, a fresh program of social renewal grew out of a new body of 
sociological knowledge and social-work practice that had made its appearance during the 
late 1920s and 1930s, primarily in Chicago. There, three groups of policy elites, whom 
the sociologist Noel Cazenave has broadly classified as community organizers, social 
workers, and academics, had begun to experiment with new methods of categorizing, 
measuring, and treating delinquency. One of the most influential experiments in this vein 
was designed by Clifford R. Shaw, a sociologist from the Chicago School who 
subscribed to the idea of “social ecology.” Shaw held that the breakdown of social 
structures within rapidly changing urban communities — as opposed to the pathologies of 
                                                
7 Stansell, City of Women, p. 199. See, also, Spergel, “Youth Gangs: Continuity and Change.” 
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individual youths — was the prime cause of delinquency. To test his hypothesis, and to 
try out new solutions to community problems, in 1932 he founded the Chicago Area 
Project. The effort, which operated in six high-delinquency areas, downplayed 
professional casework and instead emphasized grassroots leadership in anti-delinquency 
initiatives. Under Shaw’s guidance, neighborhood workers provided “curbstone 
counseling,” venturing out to meet gangs in their day-to-day hangouts, getting to know 
them, and, gradually helping them channel their energies into socially acceptable 
activities. A onetime student of Shaw’s, Saul Alinsky, added a further twist on the 
Chicago Area Project when he founded the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council in a 
working-class area of the windy city. Under Alinsky, community organizing became less 
focused on re-establishing social control within individual neighborhoods but on 
lobbying the outside power structure for better services.8   
 Such efforts would lay the groundwork for much of the community organizing 
and neighborhood-level reform of the decades to come. The Chicagoans pioneered many 
of the community-organizing tactics that would later become federal policy during the 
War on Poverty: involving community members in decision-making structures, fostering 
collective empowerment of low-income neighborhoods, and inducing gang members to 
participate as leaders in the efforts to change their own communities. In the meantime, 
Shaw’s “area approach” would inform experimental assaults on teen delinquency not just 
in Brooklyn but also in Detroit, Cleveland, and Los Angeles.9 
                                                
8 Alice O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century 
U.S. History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), Chap. 1; Noel A. Cazenave, “Chicago 
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9 New York City Youth Board (NYCYB), Council of Social and Athletic Clubs Annual Review, 1951-
1952, Folder 6.1.044, Box 37, BCSP Papers, BPL; Ralph W. Whelan, “Philosophy and Development of 
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 What did it mean to be a juvenile delinquent in late 1940s New York? Definitions 
varied. Sonny Carson, who would later gain fame as a black nationalist in the late 1960s, 
ranked among the leaders of the Bishops, a notorious Bedford-Stuyvesant gang made up 
exclusively of African Americans. In his telling, gang life was all about routine — to wit, 
his daily activities during the late 1940s, when he was “attending” George Westinghouse 
High School in downtown Brooklyn: 
  
“Purchasing a coconut-custard pie, then walking all the way uptown, shaking 
people down who looked like they had money (in The Black Community that 
means making them give you a nickel or a dime), buying wine, looking for the 
pushers to purchase some marijuana. Going to someone’s pad, getting high, 
winding up in bed with one of the girls. Invading the present enemy, The Beavers, 
or maybe The Robins or The Socialistic Gents. Dodging the police all the time. It 
was a beautiful life, man.”10 
 
 At war’s end, New York City had no program for dealing with juvenile 
delinquency, and police work was by far the most common response. Strictly speaking, 
the juvenile delinquent was someone under the age of 21 who had been arrested for a 
crime. But the city tabulated delinquency figures by adding arrests to the number of 
referrals handled by the NYPD’s youth division. These referrals could be for any number 
of behaviors, criminal or not, adjudged to be “antisocial.” In the 1950s, the city also 
tracked the number of cases in children’s court and divided them into categories. In 
addition to standard-issue crimes like robbery, car theft, and sexual assault, these 
                                                                                                                                            
the Youth Board Program,” in NYCYB, Reaching the Unreached: Fundamental Aspects of the Program 
of the New York City Youth Board (New York: 1952).  
10 Mwlina Abubadika (aka Sonny Carson), The Miseducation of Sonny Carson (New York: Norton, 1972), 
p. 37.  
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“delinquency types” also included running away, truancy, and the catchall “carelessness 
and mischief,” One category of delinquent listed by the city’s Youth Board was simply 
tagged “ungovernable.” A lot could get you labeled a delinquent.11  
 And what of gangs? Their pitched battles grabbed headlines and fed hysteria. But 
“rumbles” were rare, especially after 1950. (That didn’t stop gang members from 
building personas around heroic feats in battle.) Contemporary reports written by social 
workers indicate that most gang members, far from spending all their time raping and 
pillaging, in fact preferred to play cards, hang around candy stores, drink wine, and go to 
dances. By no means were all gang members criminals. Some held down jobs; others 
took their schoolwork seriously. But fine distinctions faded away when a group of young 
men suddenly wreaked havoc in a community.12  
 On a mid-November day in 1946, the Brewery Boys decided to drop in on a 
Jewish community center in nearby South Williamsburg. It was not a friendly visit. The 
Brewery Boys, a coalition of youth gangs who made their home base in an abandoned 
brewery nestled among the rundown tenements of northern Bedford-Stuyvesant, were 
sometimes known as the Brewery Rats. Most belonged to the area’s rapidly shrinking 
Italian-American community, and they had recently earned widespread notoriety by 
staging a series of violent rumbles against rival African-American gangs whose turf lay 
slightly to the south, in the majority-black portions of Bedford-Stuyvesant. Meanwhile, 
they’d begun to intimidate local Jewish youths, who generally eschewed the gang life and 
tended to congregate around the community center instead. On this particular day the 
                                                
11 Juvenile Delinquency Evaluation Project of the City of New York, dir. Robert M. MacIver, 
“Delinquency in the Great City” (July 1961).  
12 “Youth Gang Wars Kill 10 in a Year,” NYT, May 8, 1950; BCSP, “Report of the Tompkins Park 
Leadership Project” (1950), Folder 9.1.023, Box 66, BCSP Papers, BPL. 
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Brewery Boys demanded entrance to the community center on grounds that it was meant 
to serve the entire area, regardless of faith. The center’s directors, worried for their safety, 
locked the doors. The Boys forced their way in and trashed the place — a display of raw 
aggression that shocked Jews in the area. With the community center shuttered, local 
parents rounded up a vigilante committee and swore to protect their families by any 
means necessary. Clearly, though, long-term solutions were needed. What could be done? 
For answers, Jewish community leaders sought out the advice of an outfit called the 
Brooklyn Council for Social Planning (BCSP), which grouped together social reformers 
from the worlds of government, charities, settlement houses, and voluntary agencies. 





Meeting the Gang Menace 
 
 
 Brooklyn buzzed with industrial activity in the 1940s. The early-warning signs of 
deindustrialization had already appeared, but in the aftermath of World War II New York 
City remained the uncontested manufacturing capital of the world. Brooklyn’s strength 
lay in its concentration of small firms. In 1947, there were 7,298 manufacturers in 
Brooklyn, 93% of which employed fewer than a 100 laborers. Clothing, musical 
instruments, furniture, paints, potato chips, paper … the list of goods produced by the 
small firms of Kings County could fill several pages. Several major companies also 
called Brooklyn home. The borough boasted the world’s largest coffee-roasting facility. 
                                                
13 BCSP, “Outlined Proposed Leadership Project With Gang Groups,” Dec. 1946, “Neighborhood 
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The Consolidated Edison plant claimed to be the world’s biggest generator of steam 
electricity. Two Brooklyn firms produced almost all of the type used by the American 
publishing industry. Williamsburg’s Schaefer brewery was among the largest beer 
purveyors in the country. The North Brooklyn waterfront had once refined 70% of the 
sugar consumed in the U.S., and the American Sugar company still produced enough 
packaged sugar each day to supply New York’s entire population. And then there was 
shipping. Brooklyn’s long waterfront had for centuries been its lifeline. Brooklyn ranked 
first in foreign trade among North American ports, and 75 steamship companies plied 
their trade from the docks of Red Hook and Bush Terminal in Sunset Park. The Brooklyn 
Navy Yard had employed 70,000 people at the height of wartime mobilization.14 
 During the war years and in the decades that followed, African Americans flocked 
to Brooklyn in search of jobs. Most came from the rural South, where they had faced 
relentless racism and poverty and where the automation of agriculture was transforming 
the labor regime. Brooklyn’s white residents, meanwhile, were beginning a migration of 
their own. In Bedford-Stuyvesant, for instance, the 1940 census counted 73.3% of 
residents as white (most of them working-class Italians and Jews); by 1950, that figure 
would drop to 47.5%.15 The City Planning Commission reported in 1951 that for the first 
time in New York’s history, net migration out of the city exceeded new arrivals — and 
that the trend was most visible in Brooklyn, where net out-migration reached 200,000 in 
the 1940s. (Due to the high birth rates of the period, Brooklyn’s population grew slightly 
                                                
14 BCSP, “Welcome to Brooklyn: Handbook for New Workers” (1954), pp. 8-9, Folder 9.1.031, Box 66, 
BCSP Papers, BPL. Two of the most famous battleships in U.S. history were built at the Navy Yard: The 
U.S.S. Maine, whose sinking sparked the Spanish-American War of 1898, and the USS Missouri, on 
which Emperor Hirohito signed the treaty ending WWII. A third famous battleship, the USS Monitor, was 
assembled in Greenpoint during the Civil War. 
15 It’s worth noting that census figures in this era generally classified Puerto Ricans as “white,” meaning 
that African Americans and Afro-Caribbeans along with Puerto Ricans together probably constituted close 
to 60% of the population of Bedford-Stuyvesant in 1950. 
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in the forties, reaching an all-time high of 2.74 million in 1950). Many, especially the 
young, moved to the suburbs in pursuit of a middle-class American dream suddenly made 
possible by cheap housing, new highways, and government-guaranteed financing. Others 
fled to areas of the city (Canarsie, Bay Ridge, Queens) where African Americans had yet 
to settle; from there, they defended what W.E.B. DuBois once labeled the “wages of 
whiteness,” demanding that African Americans be excluded from union jobs, good 
schools, and all but the most shoddy housing.16  
 With that said, it’s also true that Brooklyn nurtured an important tradition of 
interracial amity and cooperation that emerged from the left-wing milieus of the New 
Deal and Popular Front years. Much of the social-reform agenda chronicled in this 
chapter and the next tapped into that tradition, even as the borough’s landscape became 
increasingly segregated and old alliances buckled under the weight of systemic racism. 
Bigotry was only one part of the equation driving white flight: mixed motivations 
included fear of declining property values, a desire for suburban comforts, and worries 
about overcrowded housing, overstretched social services, and failing schools in the city. 
The wartime mobilization was also giving way to a worrisome trend that would later 
become known as deindustrialization. As a trickle of blue-collar jobs began leaving the 
city, neighborhoods like Williamsburg, Red Hook, and Bedford-Stuyvesant were 
changing rapidly.17 
                                                
16 For explanations of white flight and the policies that drove it, see Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass 
Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), Thomas 
J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996); Thomas J. Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in 
Chicago, 1940–1960 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and Becky M. Nicolaides, My Blue 
Heaven: Life and Politics in the Working-Class Suburbs of Los Angeles, 1920-1965 (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2002). 
17 Pete Hamill, who grew up in Park Slope, mused about white flight, “There was racial fear involved, of 
course, but it would be too easy to explain it all away that way. It was race plus despair plus insecurity 
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 Bedford-Stuyvesant had once been an affluent area where, in the late 19th century, 
developers had thrown up row upon row of elegant brownstone and limestone 
townhouses. The houses endured, but by the late 1940s many landlords were allowing 
them to crumble and decay. The bulk of the area’s residents, white and black, lived at the 
economic margins. In 1950, 45.6% of Bedford-Stuyvesant families earned less than 
$2,500 (which was approximately the threshold, adjusted for inflation, at which the 
official federal poverty line would first be drawn in the 1960s). Comparable figures for 
Brooklyn and New York City were around 28%. Less than 6% of Bed-Stuy families 
pulled in more than $6,000 a year, as compared with 15.5% of Brooklynites. The median 
family income of $2,675 was only three-quarters of what the median New York family 
took in, and very close to subsistence levels. The share of Bedford-Stuyvesant residents 
in professional or managerial jobs was less than half that of Brooklyn or New York City. 
“[It] is general knowledge,” a 1953 study declared, “that Bedford-Stuyvesant is an 
underprivileged area with a large Negro population which is on the increase; that housing 
is substandard, inadequate, overcrowded, and old; and that incomes are in general low.” 
Amid such conditions deviant youth behavior thrived.18 
 How to cope the so-called “gang menace” was a vexing matter for those 
                                                                                                                                            
about money plus desires for the betterment of one’s children plus — the most important plus — the loss 
of a feeling of community.” Pete Hamill, “Brooklyn: The Sane Alternative,” New York, July 14, 1969. 
See, also, Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity (New York: 
Penguin, 1988), p. 295. On the tradition of interracial social reform, see Wendell E. Pritchett, “Race and 
Community in Postwar Brooklyn: The Brownsville Neighborhood Council and the Politics of Urban 
Renewal,” Journal of Urban History 27:4 (2001), pp. 445-70. 
18 Hospital Council of Greater New York, “Hospital Needs of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Area in Brooklyn” 
(December 1953). Folder 5.3.008, Box 28, BCSP Papers, BPL. For more about Brooklyn’s 19th-century 
development, see Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, especially Chap. 2; Wilder, A Covenant With Color; 
Connolly, Chaps 1-2; Edwin G. Burrows and Mike Wallace, Gotham: A History of New York City to 1898 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). For an analysis of how poverty was calculated in the decades 
preceding the federal government’s adoption of an official poverty threshold, see Gordon M. Fisher, “An 
Overview of (Unofficial) Poverty Lines in the United States from 1904 to 1965,” revised version 1997, 
posted on www.census.gov. 
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reformers who contemplated it. Traditional police work — known as “the night stick-
curfew-jail approach” — had proven ineffective and in any case held out little hope of 
helping juvenile delinquents lead productive lives. Efforts to induce the Brewery Boys 
and other gangs into community-center activities had resulted in backlash. PTA groups 
had tried and failed to craft community responses to gang violence in schools. To 
reformers affiliated with the Brooklyn Council for Social Planning, this called for nothing 
short of total mobilization. As James Callahan, chairman of the council’s committee on 
youth, explained in a Brooklyn Eagle article, “To combat juvenile delinquency we will 
have to mobilize the resources of Brooklyn. Every storekeeper, every housewife, all of 
us, will have to pitch in and do our share. [...] We have got to fight this thing just like we 
fought the war.”19  
 The Brooklyn Council for Social Planning had been founded in 1933 as a one of 
four outer-borough affiliates of the New York City Welfare Council, an umbrella group 
that brought together New York’s foremost social-welfare experts from both the public 
sector and voluntary agencies. The Welfare Council received the bulk of its monies from 
the Greater New York Fund, a precursor to the United Way. The BCSP’s local support 
network included more than 100 Brooklyn settlement houses, private charities, and 
religious groups. New Yorkers of Jewish, Italian, and Irish extraction made up the bulk of 
its directors, though a small number of African Americans joined the board in the 
postwar years, including the head of the Urban League’s New York chapter, Robert T. 
Elzy, and Maude B. Richardson, a well-known Bedford-Stuyvesant community activist 
                                                
19 “State Conference Disapproves Tough Approach to Delinquency,” NYT, Oct. 6, 1955; “Boro 
Association to Stem Ice-Pick ‘Reign of Terror’,” NYAN, Nov. 7, 1942; Brooklyn Eagle [BE], Apr. 28, 
1948, quoted in Ivy Marvel, “Rumble on the Docks: Teen Warfare Hits Brooklyn,” Jul. 12, 2011, on the 
Brooklyn Public Library’s Brooklynology blog, http://brooklynology.brooklynpubliclibrary.org.  
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(and no relation to Elsie). 
 The BCSP was a multiracial, multi-faith endeavor. Its member organizations 
hoped to make Brooklyn a more livable, more equitable, place, and they fretted in 
particular about inter-group conflict. The group commissioned studies of community 
needs, supported dozens of settlement houses and charities, organized conferences, and 
advocated for improved housing and social services in Brooklyn, particularly for blacks 
and Puerto Ricans. When, in 1943, a Kings County grand jury investigating crime in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant recommended robust police work to counter “a most unusual and 
extremely deplorable state of lawlessness” in the area — language many black 
Brooklynites interpreted as a thinly veiled racial slur — the BCSP responded by calling 
instead for better housing, schools, and hospitals. The group also undertook several 
community-organizing campaigns. Most significant was the network of neighborhood 
committees the BCSP sponsored in diverse parts of Brooklyn, including Brownsville, 
Bedford-Stuyvesant, Crown Heights, Bay Ridge, Fort Greene, Canarsie, and South 
Brooklyn. These committees worked to improve local health services and youth-outreach 
programs, among other endeavors.  
 Through such efforts, the BCSP acted as an important policy innovator — this at 
a time when voluntary groups of its ilk continued to play an outsized role in the provision 
of social-welfare services, not just in New York but across the country. Indeed, the BCSP 
and its equivalents in New York’s other boroughs were far from unique. By 1945, more 
than 300 U.S. cities depended on similar public-private welfare councils to provide 
important social services. In the wake of World War II, urban welfare councils were 
uniquely well positioned to take up a leadership role as Americans turned to reviving 
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cities and neighborhoods that had been neglected during years of Depression and war.20 
 When the directors of the Upper Williamsburg Community Center begged for 
help in disarming the Brewery Boys, the BCSP stood primed to respond. In fact, the 
BCSP had recently released a public report that warned of increasing criminality and 
racial tensions among Brooklyn youth; the report had called on the city to establish a 
youth bureau to help coordinate the fragmented landscape of community services. In the 
meantime, faced with a decision about how to act vis-à-vis the Brewery Boys, the BCSP 
would look for inspiration to Harlem. There, an experimental gang-outreach program 
under the aegis of the Welfare Council of Manhattan had been launched earlier in 1946. 
The Harlem program had taken Clifford Shaw’s area approach as a loose model, and the 
Brooklynites decided to do the same. The new initiative would be called the Tompkins 
Park Youth Leadership Project, in reference to a park — the only park — in the area 
surrounding the Brewery Boys’ turf. A slew of local agencies signed up to assist in 
planning: the Brooklyn Jewish Community Council, the Urban League, the Catholic 
Youth Organization, the Italian Board of Guardians, the Brooklyn Division of the 
Protestant Council, the Board of Education, and the 79th Police Precinct.21 
Together, these organizations raised enough funds to launch the project, though it 
                                                
20 BCSP, “Welcome to Brooklyn: Handbook for New Workers” (1954), Box 66, BCSP Papers, BPL; 
BCSP, Summary of Conference on Our Expanding Negro Population, Apr. 6, 1940, Folder 9.1.026, Box 
66, BCSP Papers, BPL; “Wide Program of Social Welfare Urged to Ease Crime in Brooklyn,” NYT, Nov. 
27, 1943; “Social Plans Offered for ‘Little Harlem,” NYT, Dec. 13, 1943;”Community Council’s Aid 
Urged to Save Borough Welfare Units,” NYT, Jan. 1, 1957; Eleanor L. Brilliant, “Community Planning 
and Community Problem Solving: Past, Present, and Future,” The Social Service Review 60:4 (June 
1986), pp. 568-589. The New York Welfare Council would later become the Welfare and Health Council 
of New York City and subsequently the Community Council of Greater New York. In 1957, when the 
Greater New York Fund stipulated that its monies no longer be used by the Community Council to fund 
borough agencies, the Brooklyn Council (and its sister organizations in Queens, the Bronx, and Staten 
Island) was forced to cease operations.  
21 “Race Tension Seen in Brooklyn Area,” NYT, Apr. 21, 1946; BCSP, Worker’s Report on Unattached 
Boys’ Groups, Sept. 9, 1947, “Williamsburg-Tompkins Park Youth Leadership Project: Reports,” Box 22, 
BCSP Papers, BPL. 
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didn’t cost much. The sole employee they hired was Leo Laughlin, a social worker in his 
20s. Laughlin came on as a “detached worker,” meaning he would operate outside the 
traditional structures of settlement houses and social-work agencies. His charge: to seek 
out gang members in their indigenous setting and, he hoped, to divert their aggressive 
urges into more fruitful pursuits. Laughlin in early 1947 began hanging out in the candy 
stores, betting shops, and empty lots near Tompkins Park. From there he quickly 
insinuated himself into the local streetscape. He threw countless coins into jukeboxes and 
spent long hours chatting on stoops. He interviewed haggard parents over coffee. He 
volunteered to coach a sandlot baseball team. He convinced people, over and over, that 
he wasn’t a cop. Most of all, he sought to ingratiate himself with the Brewery Boys.22 
Laughlin soon learned that the Brewery Boys were only the leading faction in a 
shifting network of 100 or so young men and boys who gravitated to the derelict brewery 
on Pulaski Street. Their home turf, a foreboding strip of decrepit houses, empty lots, 
abandoned storefronts, and bookie shops, was notorious as an ideal spot to “fight it out.” 
The brewery itself served as a fortress during battles; inside, a series of tunnels and secret 
passageways provided storage space for stolen loot. Often the youths were known 
collectively as the Pulaski Street Boys, though they rarely presented a unified front. 
Factions occasionally joined forces for acts of vandalism, and in rare instances they 
would band together for rumbles against outside gangs.  
Among the Brewery Boys, Italians predominated, although a small number of Puerto 
Ricans and even two Jews moved in Pulaski Street circles. Many of the boys saw 
themselves as defenders of their neighborhood and of their “kind.” They posed as  
                                                
22 BCSP, Worker’s Report on Unattached Boys’ Groups, Sept. 9, 1947, “Williamsburg-Tompkins Park 
Youth Leadership Project: Reports,” Box 22, BCSP Papers, BPL. 
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protectors of a white, Catholic, working-class milieu besieged by hostile forces, including 
an expanding Jewish population to the north in Williamsburg and, especially the growing 
numbers of African Americans to the south in Bedford-Stuyvesant. “Some boys seem to 
feel need of gangs to act as vigilantes to protect white people when Negro groups have 
uprisings,” Laughlin reported to the BCSP in 1947. He also found that most whites in the 
area stood poised to flee the area once they sensed an easing of the postwar housing 
shortage. “A common attitude among many of the older residents was that they were 
living in this neighborhood only until they could find housing elsewhere and that once the 
housing situation improved the entire section would be occupied by Negroes.”23 
 Laughlin’s initial goal was to gain the trust of the Pulaski Street Boys. Many 
“boys” were in fact men who had joined gangs some years earlier, left to serve in Europe 
or in the Pacific, and then re-joined upon returning. Gangs in postwar New York were 
often strictly hierarchical affairs; boys dreamed of climbing the ranks and gaining titles 
like “war counselor” or “combat director.” The more experienced gang members would 
recruit younger boys, including their brothers, and — perhaps inspired by Branch 
Rickey’s famous Brooklyn Dodgers farm system — organize them into feeder groups 
dubbed “Midgets” or “Juniors.” Some gangs even sponsored ladies auxiliaries: the Tigers 
of Gowanus had their Regits (“tiger spelled backward), and the Robins of Bedford-
Stuyvesant had their Robinettes. (“The distaff gangs indulge in varying degrees of 
unladylike behavior, from tomboy roughness to knife-toting and sex delinquency,” the 
Times observed.) Among the Pulaski Street gangs, the Brewery Boys made up a 
                                                
23 BCSP, Worker’s Report on Unattached Boys’ Groups, Sept. 9, 1947, “Williamsburg-Tompkins Park 
Youth Leadership Project: Reports,” Box 22, BCSP Papers, BPL; BCSP, “Report of the Tompkins Park 
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leadership nucleus of eight to ten young men aged between 17 and 21; below them was a 
faction of boys 12 to 15, named the Pulaski Street Boys, Jr. Such structures, combined 
with the strong leadership and knowledge of weaponry returning soldiers lent the groups, 
made many in Brooklyn fear an outbreak of full-on urban warfare.24 
Laughlin was less worried. As he reported back to the BCSP board, most of the 
boys engaged in combat not because they enjoyed violence but because rumbles offered 
them a way to earn status, cultivate group solidarity, and validating their sense of self-
worth. If gang members could be induced into pursuing other paths toward individual and 
collective fulfillment, Laughlin thought, the violence might peter out. Plus, he’d learned 
that several of the Brewery Boys had held jobs during the war but had since been laid off; 
they softened to the newcomer when he seemed to offer connections that might help them 
earn a few paychecks. Starting out, one of the Tompkins Park project’s main assumptions 
was that “constructive activities can be substituted for destructive ones” as long as the 
resources and leadership were available and the gang members were made to feel that 
such activities offered prestige and opened additional doors to them. Laughlin applied 
this by, in effect, institutionalizing the Brewery Boys. Having gradually gained 
acceptance within the gang, learned its slang, and gained recognition as a sincere, helpful 
adult, Laughlin sought out leaders within the group. Through them, he proposed new 
forms of non-violent, non-criminal fun to the mass of boys. Under Laughlin’s guidance, 
                                                
24 BCSP, Worker’s Report on Unattached Boys’ Groups; BCSP, Report of the Tompkins Park Youth 
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they moved out of the burnt-out brewery and into a row of abandoned storefronts on 
Pulaski Street, which they spent much of 1948 painting, cleaning, and renovating into an 
official clubhouse called Club Caliph. Laughlin encouraged the boys to collect dues and 
run the club according to democratic procedures; so they did, electing officers and 
drawing up a constitution and by-laws. They held weekly meetings where they discussed 
rules, finances, and club policies. Given a stake in their neighborhood, they quit 
vandalism and resisted rumbles on Pulaski Street. Instead, they organized baseball 
tournaments, fundraising dances, and raffles. The boys even bought a ping-pong table 
and painted a shuffleboard court on the Pulaski Street sidewalk, where fists and knives 
had once determined winners and losers. In 1950, the Brooklyn Eagle reported that 
Pulaski Street had become “a quiet spot in a normal neighborhood. … The tension and 
fear provoked by the gang has disappeared.” According to Laughlin, the project had been 
so successful that a modicum of racial tolerance prevailed. “Negro children play in the 
empty lot next to the old clubhouse,” he wrote. “A few years ago a Negro youth would 
not have been able to walk down Pulaski Street unmolested.”25 
 And so the Brewery Rats became good citizens. Their elders, meanwhile, were 
participating in a similar process. Through the Tompkins Park effort, the BCSP attempted 
to foster “indigenous leadership” not only among the gangs but also within the wider 
community. From the start, the agencies affiliated with the BCSP agreed that the project 
should “increase neighborhood planning and responsibility.” To that end, the BCSP hired 
a field worker to recruit a new body called the Tompkins Park Neighborhood Council. 
Some 25 people joined, and the number later increased to 35. Members included priests 
                                                
25 BCSP, “Report of the Tompkins Park Youth Leadership Project”; “The Brewery Rats Now Good 
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and policemen and shopkeepers and teachers and parents. Part of their work consisted of 
supervising Leo Laughlin’s outreach work and raising funds to help him organize the 
gang’s activities. After two years, Laughlin bowed out of the project, and the 
Neighborhood Council worked directly with representatives of the Brewery Boys’ 
clubhouse. They also organized community support for measures that targeted factors in 
the local environment seen to be particularly conducive to violent behaviors. Their 
proudest achievement in that vein was convincing the city to demolish the abandoned 
brewery building and fence in empty lots nearby.26  
 By 1950, the project’s sponsors were trumpeting it as an unqualified success. 
Laughlin’s efforts offered intriguing lessons for social-work professionals. As an “action-
demonstration” program, the Tompkins Park initiative had used experimental techniques 
in pursuit of a limited set of goals and, in the process, demonstrated that those techniques 
could be broadened to tackle larger problems. The Brewery Boys had gone straight, thus 
validating the social-work techniques. The citizens group had banded together to take 
action and succeeded in exerting political pressure (albeit about a relatively small matter) 
on elected officials, thus validating the community-organizing goals. The results also 
supported the project’s underlying premise that a vaguely drawn neighborhood with no 
unifying characteristics could come to see itself as a “community,” and that through such 
a process a new form of place-based political organizing could proceed.  
 The demonstration did not go unnoticed. As the Tompkins Park project unfolded, 
BCSP community coordinators began setting up what they dubbed Youth Councils 
elsewhere in Bedford-Stuyvesant, as well as in Brownsville-East New York, Brighton 
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Beach, Park Slope, and South Brooklyn. The councils acted as informal town halls where 
representatives aged 15-21 met to discuss their problems and mediate disputes. Some also 
organized non-confrontational activities such as track meets, as a way of promoting 
interracial and cross-ethnic harmony. Other groups led cleanup drives of rundown areas, 
petitioned the city to turn abandoned lots into playgrounds, and hosted dances in neutral 
venues. A special planning committee appointed by the Brooklyn Council’s chairman, 
Henry Carpenter, in 1950 recommended that the organization strive to place at least one 
community worker “in each neighborhood where intensive co-ordination and citizen 
participation are needed.”27 
 Meanwhile, the Urban League, a civil-rights organization, had begun to organize 
its own anti-delinquency project. In a 1947 report about youth problems in areas of 
Brooklyn with rapidly growing African-American populations (Brownsville, Coney 
Island, Fort Greene, and Bedford-Stuyvesant), the League argued that “young people 
roam the streets, or gather at soda fountains and beer taverns because they have no other 
place to go and no constructive outlets for their youthful energies.” In order to provide 
such outlets, the League proposed to engage African-American youth in a program 
similar to the one undertaken by the BCSP in the Tompkins Park area. (The League’s 
Robert T. Elzy was a Brooklynite who also sat on the board of the BCSP.) The teenagers 
involved, it was hoped, would “develop social responsibility” by participating in new 
social clubs, sports activities, debates, drama clubs, and the likes. In the long run, the 
joiners among them would begin to exhibit leadership skills and take an interest in 
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helping to solve community problems. Perhaps, then, it would be among the most 
troubled youngsters that the “indigenous leadership” of tomorrow would be found.  
 In the meantime, the Urban League expected adult leaders in the neighborhoods 
affected to form steering committees and consider broader reforms. “As such a 
committee considers the needs of the youth of the neighborhood, they will of necessity 
have to consider the needs of the community as a whole,” the proposal stated. “In such 
fashion the sponsorship of a youth activities program could become the springboard to 
neighborhood action for improved housing, increased health facilities, family service, et 
cetera.” In turn, this kind of community action would help to expand citizen participation 
in American democracy and promote the integration of groups on the margins.28 In the 
end, little came of the League’s grand design, other than a summer leadership camp held 
in conjunction with the 81st police precinct in Central Brooklyn. But the thinking behind 
it was not far off the theory that would underpin federally funded community-action 





To Reach the Unreached 
 
 
 The Urban League’s delinquency initiative never got off the ground largely 
because government action rendered it moot. Beginning in the late 1940s, city officials 
began to pick up and expand on the model of social reform the Brooklyn Council for 
Social Planning had pioneered. The idea of creating a municipal agency dedicated solely 
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to controlling and reforming wayward youth had first circulated in 1939. But it was in 
1948 that Mayor William O’Dwyer set up the New York City Youth Board to coordinate 
the multitudinous agencies providing services for troubled children and teenagers. Armed 
with matching state and city funds, the Youth Board was one part government agency 
and another part advisory group meant to coordinate the diverse efforts, in both the public 
and voluntary sectors, to protect and control the city’s young people. Heads of the city 
health, welfare, housing, education, and parks agencies held permanent seats, alongside a 
coterie of magistrates (including a Family Court justice, Nathaniel Kaplan, who served 
for many years as the board chairman). The rest of the board included a rotating cast of 
representatives from religious charities (the Brooklyn Catholic Youth Organization, the 
Federation of Protestant Welfare Agencies, and the Jewish Family Service), settlement 
houses, the Children’s Aid Society, and Columbia’s School of Social Work.  
The Youth Board’s animating goal was to “reach the unreached.” It promoted an 
aggressive form of social work that targeted children and families who had not requested 
help and, in some cases, resisted it. As of 1949, the city set up referral units in public 
schools and housing projects. Staffed by social workers, these units existed to track 
teenagers categorized by the Youth Board as “troubled” (as well as their families, when 
possible) and to put them in touch with private community-service agencies that had 
signed contracts with the city. Those agencies, in turn, provided vocational training, after-
school supervision, and sports programs to the youths sent their way. The Youth Board 
also devoted a sixth of its budget to child guidance centers and psychiatric counseling, 
which were often dispensed by private charities, churches, and settlement houses.29  
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 In designing such efforts, Youth Board officials looked to the work of 
criminologists Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, undoubtedly the most important intellectual 
influence on the American discourse about juvenile delinquency in the 1950s. In a 1950 
book, Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency, the Gluecks claimed to have devised a 
mathematically accurate formula for predicting which children would become 
delinquents and which ones wouldn’t. The so-called Glueck Social Prediction Table for 
Identifying Potential Delinquents was based on five different measures of parental love, 
support, and supervision. It earned the Gluecks a position of prominence among 
policymakers interested in the early 1950s youth-crime wave, and it underpinned much of 
the thinking that went into the Youth Board’s early work. (The Youth Board’s executive 
director, Ralph W. Whelan, had once worked as a research assistant for the Gluecks at 
Harvard.) On the other hand, the Gluecks’ research had been carried out in Boston among 
a racially homogenous sample of boys, and there were doubts as to its applicability in 
other contexts. Beginning in 1952, the Youth Board embarked on a longitudinal study of 
224 first-graders, which the agency hoped would validate the Gluecks’ research in a fresh 
context. A decade later, though the Youth Board was “inordinately eager to claim 
success,” no hard evidence had yet been found to support the Gluecks’ work.30  
 In the meantime, the Youth Board unveiled several pioneering attempts to “reach 
the unreached.” Foremost among them was the Brooklyn “detached worker” initiative, a 
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Table,” The Social Service Review 39:2 (June, 1965), pp. 172-182. According to Jason Barnosky, 
“Scholars considered Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency so important that the Harvard Law Review and the 
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psychological-structural link.” Jason Barnosky, “The Violent Years: Responses to Juvenile Crime in the 
1950s,” Polity 38:3 (July, 2006), p. 327. 




A map of Youth Board project areas, circa mid-1950s. (Papers of the Brooklyn 
Council for Social Planning, Brooklyn Public Library, Brooklyn Collection.) 
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gang-outreach initiative broadly modeled on Clifford Shaw’s model and directly inspired 
by the Brooklyn Council for Social Planning’s demonstration project among the Brewery 
Boys. Launched in 1950, the new detached worker program stationed social workers in 
the city’s most turbulent neighborhoods and tasked them with infiltrating and reforming 
fighting gangs. Like Leo Laughlin, these workers were given considerable autonomy and 
urged to take an improvisational approach to their street-level work. Just as Laughlin 
carried out much of his work through the new club the boys had set up, so too would the 
Youth Board staff aim to establish structured spaces — sports teams, youth groups, 
sponsored dances, safe hangouts — where they could introduce gang members to 
nonviolent leisure activities and mainstream social norms. Thus the new program would 
become known as the Council of Social and Athletic Clubs.31  
 By 1950, despite the success of the Tompkins Square project, violent clashes 
among teen gangs had escalated around the city and especially in Brooklyn. According to 
the Youth Board, “anti-social activity reached an unprecedented peak,” in early 1950. 
“Warfare among teen-age street gangs has risen to fever pitch,” the Times reported from 
Bedford-Stuyvesant later that year. New outfits proliferated while existing gangs grew 
ever larger, as their farm systems continued to bring younger boys into their midst. Gangs 
waged pitched battles in Prospect Park, where a gently sloping meadow near the park’s 
western edge was christened Massacre Hill. And on Easter Sunday, 1950, the NYPD 
youth squad only barely managed to pre-empt an epic rumble in which multiple Brooklyn 
gangs were to have fought a Manhattan confederacy on the boardwalk of Coney Island.32  
                                                
31 Whelan, “Philosophy and Development of the Youth Board Program”; James E. McCarthy and Joseph 
S. Barbaro, “Re-Directing Teen-Age Gangs,” in NYCYB, Reaching the Unreached.  
32 “Teen-Age Fighting Rises in Brooklyn,” NYT, Oct. 11, 1950; “Big Fight Planned by Teen-Age Gangs,” 
NYT May 11, 1950; “Youth Gang Wars Kill 10 in a Year,” NYT, May 8, 1950. 
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 Such violence clearly exceeded the capacity of the BCSP or any other voluntary 
organization. Indeed, the Youth Board’s decision to fund the program owed in no small 
part to lobbying by the BCSP. During the spring and summer of 1950, the Council’s 
chairman, Henry Carpenter, and its executive secretary, Louise Simsar, hashed out a plan 
with the Youth Board’s chairman, Nathaniel Kaplan, and the Kings County Assistant 
District Attorney to put government resources to work on Brooklyn’s youth gangs. In 
November, Kaplan announced that the Youth Board would work in four broadly drawn 
Brooklyn areas: Bedford-Stuyvesant, Williamsburg, Brownsville, and South Brooklyn 
(which covered Brooklyn Heights, Red Hook, Gowanus, parts of Park Slope, and areas 
later known as Carroll Gardens, Cobble Hill, and Boerum Hill).33  
 The Youth Board depended on a relatively small budget: $2.3 million in fiscal 
1950. Thus targeted, experimental projects in specific neighborhoods made sense. But the 
Brooklyn detached worker initiative would soon expand into a citywide effort. Also 
served were four areas of Manhattan (East and Central Harlem, the West Side of Central 
Park, Washington Heights), the South Jamaica neighborhood of Queens, and Morrisania 
and Mott Haven in the Bronx. Combined, those areas and the selected Brooklyn 
neighborhoods were said to account for about a third of the city’s youth population but 
almost two-thirds of delinquency cases. In each of these areas, large numbers of African 
Americans or Puerto Ricans had recently taken up residence, resulting in strained social 
services. Overcrowded schools in Harlem, Bedford-Stuyvesant, and the Bronx often were 
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forced to run double shifts, leaving children with half a day to kill. Increasing numbers 
began drinking, smoking marijuana, or falling under heroin’s spell. Meanwhile, bouts of 
inter-ethnic conflict flared up, often provoked by teen gangs. If for most poor and 
working-class New Yorkers, including the majority of African Americans, daily life in 
the postwar years involved less hardship than it had during the Depression, rebellious 
youth gave the impression that an epic social crisis was brewing.34 
The Youth Board’s responded by employing a “saturation” method whereby each 
of the major fighting gangs in each of the target areas, beginning with Bedford-
Stuyvesant, would be assigned its own detached worker. “The New York City Youth 
Board will invade Bedford-Stuyvesant in the near future with a small army of workers to 
break up the juvenile gang menace,” was the Amsterdam News’ description. 35  
 That “small army” in Bedford-Stuyvesant was small indeed when the detached-
worker program launched on December 15, 1950. It numbered only three souls — though 
the number would soon rise to a dozen. One of the original trio to hit the ground was a 
25-year-old social worker named Kenneth Marshall who epitomized the role of the 
“indigenous leader” that had been central to Clifford Shaw’s area approach in Chicago. 
Although he would go on to a successful academic career, Marshall, who was black, had 
himself belonged to a youth gang less than a decade earlier. Having grown up on the 
streets of Bed-Stuy, he knew his way around: he knew where to find gang members, he 
knew what parties to crash, he knew how to handle a zip gun, and he knew who spoke 
what slang. The Youth Board assigned him to work with one of Brooklyn’s most 
                                                
34 “New Approach Set To Aid ‘Waywards,’ NYT, Apr. 24, 1949; “Citizens’ Drive on Delinquency,” NYT, 
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notorious fighting gangs, the Greene Avenue Stompers, and he was up to the task. 
Marshall made himself popular among neighborhood youths both in and out of gangs by  
organizing large dances in rented halls on neutral territory, which helped to keep a lid on 





A New York Times article about the Youth Board’s Kenneth Marshall, 
following his appearance before Congress on Nov. 20, 1953. 
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other’s turf. More significant, he used his government contacts to help find jobs for gang 
members, which earned him a nickname: “The Job Man.” Three years on, Marshall 
would find himself testifying before a titillated Senate Judiciary Committee, telling tales 
of gang hangouts infiltrated and rumbles averted. His account of life on the mean streets 
of Brooklyn, told with wide-eyed intensity and while waving a zip gun by way of 
demonstration, was the first many legislators had heard of the pioneering work going on 
in New York City. For Marshall, it proved the first step in a long career as a social-policy 
leader. He later wrote M.A. and Ph.D. theses about youth gangs; while a graduate student 
and later a professor at Columbia’s School of Social Work, he became an associate of 
professor Richard Cloward, the main intellectual architect of Mobilization for Youth. Not 
only did Marshall work with Cloward on the Mobilization project, which became the 
most influential community-action experiment in the country and would serve as the de 
facto blueprint for the War on Poverty’s Community Action Program. He also 
collaborated with the psychologist Kenneth Clark in founding another important War on 
Poverty precursor, Harlem’s Youth Opportunities Unlimited program, of which Marshall 
eventually became executive director.36  
 Most of the detached workers hired by the Youth Board didn’t try to break up the 
gangs with which they worked, fearing that would demonstrate bad faith. They also 
recognized that their very presence among a given gang lent it prestige by signaling that 
the gang in question was a menace to society. Like Laughlin, detached workers hired by 
the Youth Board tried to divert boys’ energies away from “anti-social” or criminal 
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activities like rumbles, vandalism, sexual violence, and drugs. Instead, they emphasized 
social and athletic clubs. The principles behind these interventions were spelled out in a 
1957 Youth Board report:  
 
 The Youth Board recognizes that membership in a gang is a 
normal thing. The Youth Board knows that for these deprived youngsters, 
the gang means a great deal. The Youth Board is aware of the many 
factors operating which tend to lead a gang into the wrong kind of 
activities. In some way, then, the energies of these youngsters must be re-
directed into more constructive channels — within the gang framework. 
We must somehow reach out to these young gang members and help them 
achieve in more socially acceptable ways the recognition and status they 
need and crave. We must make them aware of their responsibilities to 
themselves, to their families and to the community. Their horizons must 
be broadened, individual personal and social adjustments must be 
improved and there must be increased democratic participation within the 
gang itself.37 
 
 Some Youth Board workers managed to reorganize gangs into straight-laced “street 
clubs” dedicated to sports, dances, and sometimes theater; others took boys to amusement 
parks or on field trips as a way of introducing them to alternative pursuits. But workers 
who managed to find jobs for the boys were always most popular. In the meantime, each 
worker was expected to keep an ear to the ground for rumors and murmuring about 
upcoming rumbles. If he heard anything that foreshadowed imminent violence, he was 
expected to take a stab at mediation and, if necessary, call the cops.38 
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 The Youth Board’s approach contrasted with anti-gang strategies being adopted in 
other major American cities during the 1950s. Where Chicago and Los Angeles 
pioneered policing tactics aimed at suppressing gang violence but employed little in the 
way of social work, New York stood out for its efforts to mitigate the repressive aspects 
of policing with neighborhood-specific planning. True, some Youth Board workers 
resented having to inform the police of impending gang fights because it undermined 
their status among the gangs they were serving, and resentment simmered between the 
Youth Board and the NYPD. Yet the city’s creative mix of social work and relatively 
inconspicuous policing did seem to help reduce the number of deadly rumbles.39 
 Only a few short years into its existence, the Youth Board was taking credit for a 
dip in the youth crime rate. In 1953, the city government reported that there had been a 
9.5% drop in delinquency rates citywide over the previous five years, and a 12.5% drop 
in arrests and referrals in the areas being targeted by the Youth Board. Still, rates of 
delinquency in New York remained much higher than they were anywhere else. In 1953, 
Manhattan’s delinquency rate was three times the average in other big American cities — 
and sections of Brooklyn had even higher numbers. In any case, the seeming drop in 
youth crime would prove to be a fleeting lull. In February 1955, the Youth Board 
released shocking statistics. In the previous year, the number of 16- to 21-year-olds either 
arrested or named in complaints had shot up an eye-popping 52.7%. Ralph Whalen, 
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executive secretary of the Youth Board, called for more government action, more 
community action, and more individual initiative against youth crime. Otherwise, he 
warned, more and more young people would become “enemies of society.”40  
 Such rhetoric conjured up the hyperventilated language 19th-century reformers had 
used to describe the fighting gangs of that period. It was a sign of the times. In the mid-
1950s, juvenile delinquency turned into a national obsession, which author Elizabeth 
Wells has described in retrospect as “an overwhelming and terrifying unknown, on par 
only with communism as a threat to the very fabric of American society.” The press, 
smelling good copy, abounded in tales of young toughs marauding the streets of the 
country’s ageing cities. Yet teen gangs were springing up not just in “slums” but also in 
affluent suburbs, raising the possibility that violent youth might just as well be motivated 
by boredom and alienation as they were by poverty or racial discrimination. 
Congressional subcommittees heard endless hours of testimony about youth crime and 
the Eisenhower administration thought about getting involved. In 1955, a Senate 
subcommittee on delinquency demanded that publishers of comic books stop portraying 
“depraved acts” that might inspire violence among teens. That same year, the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare set up a Division of Juvenile Delinquency Service, 
which funded research and demonstration projects. In Albany, a group of state 
assemblymen from Brooklyn pushed through legislation banning zip guns. Also in 1955, 
the New York City Council voted to ban realistic-looking toy handguns, while a 
Brooklyn grand jury recommended that all teens be required to carry identification cards. 
Finally, it was in 1955 that Steven Sondheim, Leonard Bernstein, and Arthur Laurents 
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began collaborating on West Side Story. Teen gangs, objects both of fear and of romance, 





A Suitcase Full of Knives 
 
  
 If one man emerged as the public face of the national response to teenage gangs, it 
was New York Mayor Robert F. Wagner, Jr., who served three terms in office between 
1954 and 1965. Wagner gave voice to a collective obsession with juvenile delinquency. 
Despite Youth Board efforts, Wagner often warned that his city could explode in an orgy 
of racially motivated youth violence, and in 1958, he declared the anti-delinquency drive 
to be “the Number One project for the city.” “Mayor Wagner would bring down his 
suitcase full of knives and things,” one observer quipped of the mayor’s repeated 
appearances before Congress to lobby for a federal anti-delinquency initiative. “I think he 
just left the suitcase here each year and opened it up at the hearings.”42 New York’s youth 
programs under Wagner embodied the mayor’s alarmist discourse about declining social 
order. But they also reflected his peculiar brand of liberalism as well as the city’s 
changing political terrain.43  
 Wagner was the only child of the celebrated liberal Senator from New York, Robert 
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F. Wagner, Sr., who made his name synonymous with such landmark pieces of New Deal 
legislation as the 1935 National Labor Relations Act and the Housing Act of 1937. The 
younger Wagner, whose mother died when he was nine, grew up immersed in politics, 
surrounded by icons of the New York Democracy: Tammany boss “Silent” Charles 
Francis Murphy, Governor Al Smith, Mayor Jimmy Walker. He idolized his father and 
vowed to follow in his footsteps as a defender of the working man. If Wagner Sr. was 
known for his titanic legislative triumphs, he passed along to his son a creed of 
forbearance and caution. “When in doubt, don’t,” went the senator’s advice — and the 
younger Wagner would remain true to the motto. Later, as New York lurched from one 
crisis to another in the 1960s, Wagner would come in for intense criticism because of his 
belief, as the Times put it, that “delay could allay.” Delay could in fact be deadly — as 
the city learned the when the fiscal crisis hit in the mid-1970s.44 
 Wagner graduated Yale Law School in 1937. Only weeks later he ran for the State 
Assembly as the Democratic candidate from Manhattan’s Yorkville district on the East 
Side. He served in office until resigning to join the Army Air Corps in North Africa 
during World War II. Upon his return, Wagner earned an appointment from Mayor 
O’Dwyer as a tax commissioner before moving into successive positions as the Housing 
Commissioner and chairman of the City Planning Commission.45 In 1949, Tammany Hall 
endorsed Wagner’s candidacy for Manhattan Borough President, thus guaranteeing his 
                                                
44 On his death bed, Wagner the mayor offered his take on the family motto by jotting down some 
thoughts for his own son: “When in danger, ponder. When in trouble, delegate. And when in doubt, 
mumble.” “Mayor Wagner’s Gift,” NYT, Feb. 13, 1991; “Mourners Recall Wagner as Man of Subtle 
Grace,” NYT, Feb. 17, 1991. On Wagner’s contributions to New York’s fiscal imbalance, see Fred Siegel, 
The Future Once Happened Here: New York, D.C., L.A., and the Fate of America’s Big Cities (New 
York: Free Press, 1997), pp. 31-35. Siegel argues that the fiscal crisis grew directly out of Wagner’s 
fudging of the budget during his final years in office in order to avoid a day of reckoning. 
45 Chris McNickle, “Wagner, Robert F. (ii),” The Encyclopedia of New York City, Kenneth T. Jackson ed. 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), p. 1371. 
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election. At the time borough presidents retained significant appointive powers and held a 
voting seat on the city’s powerful Board of Estimate, which was tasked with setting 
budgetary priorities. From this perch, Wagner spoke out against poverty, slum housing, 
and racial prejudice. He campaigned for mayor in 1953 with the support of Democratic 
Party bosses Carmine DeSapio and Ed Flynn (chairmen of the county committees of 
Manhattan and the Bronx, respectively), who had recruited him to take on anti-Tammany 
incumbent Vincent Impellitteri in the mayoral primary. Wagner, then, arrived in Gracie 
Mansion with a reputation both as a Tammany man and as a true-blue progressive. He 
proudly presented himself as his father’s son, a man devoted to “fighting for schools, for 
hospitals, for a fair shake for labor” in a conservative age. He also arrived in office 
vowing to curtail the enormous powers the city’s master builder, Robert Moses, had 
amassed during Mayor Impellitteri’s term.46   
 The city Wagner took over in 1954 was still near the height of its success, despite 
troubling trends. In the quarter-century since the great crash of 1929, New York had, as 
the Times put it, “strained almost to the bursting [and] struggled out of black depression’s 
pit to her greatest opulence.” By mid-century New York was the world’s pre-eminent 
manufacturing center, as well as the global capital of finance and diplomacy, not to 
mention publishing, advertising, and, increasingly, the arts. The projects of Moses stood 
as symbols of triumphant modernism and the postwar liberal order: majestic expressways 
thrusting through yesterday’s slums, gleaming public spaces replacing gang-ridden 
alleys, imposing housing projects where rat-infested rookeries once slouched. Supporting 
such growth was a powerful alliance of developers, institutions such as hospitals and 
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universities, liberal planners, and the federal, state, and city governments.47 
 Blessed with seemingly bottomless pockets, City Hall had increased its annual 
budget to almost $1.8 billion by the mid-1950s — more than the amount spent by all but 
two states. To most New Yorkers this spending was a sign of the city’s strength. The 
historian Joshua Freeman has argued that New York City in the postwar years came 
closer to erecting a social-democratic state than any other polity in American history.48 If 
this characterization minimizes the effects of racial segregation and income inequalities 
in New York, it nonetheless captures the incredible array of services Gotham’s citizens 
had come to expect from the governments to which they paid taxes. Under Wagner, New 
York City also became the first place in the country to allow collective bargaining for its 
municipal employees — a measure known as the “Little Wagner Act.” By the end of 
Wagner’s second term in office, New Yorkers had built an imposing — some said 
European — municipal welfare state.49 
 For Wagner, as for his father, the attainment of democratic freedoms was 
premised on firm and decisive action by a benevolent state. As he put it in 1954, 
“America grew to be the mightiest nation in all the world because its people have learned 
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to expect their government to be an ever increasing source of public service.”50 At the 
same time, Wagner recognized the limitations of centralized bureaucracies and 
encouraged individual citizens and grassroots groups to participate in governing 
processes. In 1951, as borough president, Wagner sponsored a pioneering exercise in 
political decentralization when he divided Manhattan into 12 community-planning 
districts and urged the formation in each one of a neighborhood council. These semi-
official bodies were meant to encourage citizen participation in government policy, and 
Wagner asked them for feedback and advice about housing issues, social services, 
schools, parks, and libraries. The politics were good too: the planning councils created a 
pipeline that linked the young politician directly to his constituents at a time when regular 
Democratic Party structures had yet to open up to the city’s minority groups.51 Of the new 
planning boards, Wagner called Harlem’s “the most effective and the most active” after it 
presented detailed plans to the Board of Estimate requesting some $150 million worth of 
housing, hospitals, and infrastructure projects. The experiment in community planning 
was also notable as what the political scientist Seth Forman describes as “a prescient 
response to a well-articulated postwar fear that, to an ever increasing extent, people’s 
lives were controlled by large, faceless bureaucracies.” 52  
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 Indeed, faceless bureaucracies were daily transforming the way many New 
Yorkers lived. More than any other city, New York embraced the federal urban-renewal 
program authorized by the federal Housing Act of 1949. Urban renewal was couched as a 
way of clearing low-income neighborhoods — which were routinely written off as 
“blighted” — and relocating poor families into modern housing. The vision underpinning 
the program arose both from old progressive notions of maintaining urban order and from 
a modernist faith in the efficiency of new forms of dwelling. In the hands of Robert 
Moses, however, one man’s utopia was the nightmare of thousands. Title I of the 
Housing Act, which provided federal funds for slum clearance, gave Moses an efficient 
tool with which to destroy vibrant working-class communities and to displace low-
income New Yorkers. Urban renewal came to be known colloquially as “Negro 
removal,” and not only in New York. People across the country saw their homes 
bulldozed, watched as the stoops and stores they loved were demolished, and mourned 
the scrambling of social networks that had sustained them only yesterday. Slum clearance 
left deep wounds.53 To compound the problem, cities never erected anything approaching 
an adequate supply of new housing to accommodate the people displaced. In New York’s 
tight postwar housing market — the citywide vacancy rate in 1955 was the lowest in the 
U.S., and one study found the rate in tenements to be just 0.1% — displaced people had 
few places to go. This was especially true for African Americans, who faced extensive 
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Robert F. Wagner, Jr., enjoying photo ops with civil-rights heroes: Coretta Scott King 
and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1964; and the Little Rock Nine, in 1958.  
(La Guardia and Wagner Archives.) 
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 housing discrimination. Many had no choice but to move into overcrowded, poorly 
maintained rooming houses in areas like Bedford-Stuyvesant.54   
 Wagner, then, presided over an urban-renewal regime that traumatized, uprooted, 
and ghettoized poor New Yorkers, many of them black or Puerto Rican. In other words, 
the mayor helped to bring about the very conditions he himself blamed for juvenile 
delinquency. Meanwhile, the federal government promoted capital flight to the suburbs 
and the segregation of urban space, thanks to the New Deal programs Wagner’s father 
had done so much to create. In response to such outcomes would flow much of the 
community organizing and also much of the rage of the 1960s.  
 During his final years in office, with the so-called “urban crisis” in full bloom, 
Wagner would desperately try to contain the attendant protest and political ferment. And 
yet the mayor’s commitment to civil rights was longstanding and genuine. Wagner 
proudly wrote to A. Philip Randolph in 1961 that “we in New York have moved further 
and faster toward the goal of equal rights and equal opportunities than in any other period 
of our city’s history.” If such claims were dubious, it was undeniable that Wagner had 
attempted to do more than any previous New York City mayor — and more than all but a 
handful of elected officials anywhere in the United States during the 1950s and ’60s — in 
support of the civil-rights movement. In the words of historian Clarence Taylor, Wagner 
had aimed to accomplish nothing less than “to make New York a place of racial and 
ethnic tolerance by taking direct action to eliminate racial, ethnic, and other forms of 
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discrimination.” In many ways, Wagner incarnated a central paradox of postwar 
American liberalism. Even as African Americans flocked to a Democratic Party whose 
northern wing ostensibly embraced civil rights and equal opportunities, they also faced an 
urban landscape growing steadily more unequal thanks to the discriminatory effects of 
the New Deal state.  
 During Wagner’s time in office, the City Council passed the Brown-Sharkey-
Isaacs Law, which upon taking effect in 1958 became the first piece of legislation 
anywhere in the country to ban discrimination in housing, not merely within public 
buildings but also the private market. During Wagner’s mayoralty, the city also created 
the Commission on Intergroup Relations, which among other things helped broaden 
African Americans’ access to private housing; passed Public Law 55, which banned 
racial discrimination among firms contracting with the city; and erected a network of 
low- and middle-income housing projects unmatched anywhere in North America for 
both quantity and quality. A supporter of the black freedom struggle from the 1930s 
onward, Wagner promoted African Americans and Puerto Ricans in city government, 
promised to empower community groups at the neighborhood level, and more broadly, 
pledged “to uproot once and for all the viciousness of prejudice, bigotry, discrimination, 
and intolerance” in New York.55  
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Wagner had long been convinced that high crime rates among African Americans 
resulted primarily from racism. “The rise recently of criminal activities in Harlem and 
other predominantly Negro centers in New York City,” he wrote in 1941,”finds its roots 
in the years of employment discrimination practiced against the Negro, in the over- 
crowding and deplorable housing conditions in Negro areas, and in the inadequacy of 
health, social and recreational facilities.” According to Wagner, then a state assemblyman 
representing Yorkville on Manhattan’s East Side, a “vast amount of discrimination” had 
condemned black laborers to permanently marginal status. Last hired, first fired: so the 
expression went, and it was sadly true for thousands of black workers in 1940s New 
York. At home, they made do in cramped, often unsanitary conditions, and many took in 
extra lodgers just to make rent each week. For their children, prospects seemed bleak. 
“Harlem is a poor town,” Wagner wrote. “It has little to spend on food and less on 
recreation. ... Little wonder then that the combination of these factors has made the Negro 
delinquency rate the highest in the city.” The solution? Government, the private sector, 
and voluntary agencies must come together to create jobs, increase relief payments, build 
houses and playgrounds, and, more generally, offer hope for black youth.56 
 Wagner took office as mayor only months before the Supreme Court handed 
down its decision in the Brown v. Board of Education case, which outlawed the “separate 
but equal” doctrine underpinning the Jim Crow system. In a speech delivered to the 
National Committee on Discrimination in Housing only three days after the Brown 
decision, Wagner declared it a “magnificent opinion which will strengthen the 
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wellsprings of democracy here and vastly improve our position with all people in the 
world-wide struggle for expanded freedom.” Two months earlier, in March, the mayor 
had promised to combat racial inequalities in New York with a program of low-income 
public housing, new educational facilities, and desegregation of schools, along with 
concerted action to promote job opportunities for blacks and Puerto Ricans in the city. 
“The depressed and segregated areas of our city are an affront to our principles of 
equality in a democracy,” he said.57  
 Obviously, such statements should be — and were — read with a dose of 
skepticism. At times cynical and opportunistic, at others idealistic and visionary, Wagner 
was a keen student of political behavior and a brilliant campaigner. Despite his pedigree, 
he cultivated an earthy charm; even as urban renewal in his city beggared the poor to pay 
the rich, even as he surrounded himself with real-estate men who gloried in Manhattan’s 
orgiastic building boom of the 1950s and early ‘60s, Wagner fashioned himself a friend 
of the common man. He had a seeming desire to personally touch every single New 
Yorker. (The writer Gay Talese reported that Wagner once managed to shake 515 hands 
in a single hour during a rally at Madison Square Garden, after which “his hand hung 
there like a dead fish.”) He excelled at speeches delivered from the back of sound trucks; 
through decades of practice, he became a master at spontaneously tailoring his words to 
the ethnic or class makeup of the neighborhood he was driving through. Wagner 
recognized that migration in and out of New York in the postwar decades was changing 
how votes were won. Meanwhile, he presided over a Democratic Party that was quickly 
splitting into two irreconcilable camps — reformers and regulars — and he was mindful 
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of binding citizens’ loyalties to his person rather than his party.58  
 That said, Wagner’s pledges to encourage citizen participation in government, to 
combat segregation, and to increase the government resources available to New York’s 
poor cannot be written off merely as political theater. Wagner brought about important 
shifts in Gotham’s political system, about which more in Chapter 3. Beginning in 1958, 
he gradually moved to sideline Moses, putting the brakes on his bulldozers for a brand of 
urban renewal that stressed community participation in planning, rehabilitation, and code 
enforcement. He pushed through a reform of the city’s charter that largely curtailed the 
prerogatives of once-powerful borough presidents. At the height of his power, in the early 
1960s, he would take on Tammany Hall and win.  
 Wagner also married action to his belief that “special efforts must be exerted to 
develop citizen participation in the various neighborhoods throughout the city.” The 
second half of his mayoralty coincided with a rising tide of grassroots protest in 
neighborhoods around the city, especially in reaction to the intrusions of the urban 
renewal program. As citizen movements demanded a greater say in how their 
communities were rebuilt, the Wagner administration put in place programs to promote 
this process — and to co-opt it. A similar dialectic would prevail in the field of 
delinquency, where new efforts at applying the old Chicago-school area approach would 
sprout up during Wagner’s mayoralty.59  
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 “Prevention” and “control” were the dual goals of delinquency policy under 
Wagner. Soon after his election to the mayoralty, Wagner put Deputy Mayor Henry 
Epstein to work crafting a new approach to delinquency in the city, and a major report 
landed in 1955. The following year, Wagner asked the august sociologist Robert M. 
MacIver to put together an academically inclined research group, named the Mayor’s 
Juvenile Delinquency Evaluation Project. The initiative, under MacIver’s guidance, 
would run through the early 1960s and produce 19 studies.  
 During his latter years in office, Wagner would become fond of announcing that the 
city was spending upward of a billion dollars annually on youth. Though the bulk of that 
money went to the general education budget, programs aimed at reforming young 
criminals and the environments in which they lived expanded markedly during Wagner’s 
mayoralty. For instance, the number of detached workers in the Youth Board stable 
swelled from 40 in 1955 to 150 a decade later. The number of guidance counselors in 
public schools increased from 100 to 600 in the eight years after 1955; government 
expenditures for the care and treatment of young drug addicts increased fourfold. Wagner 
also brought together a committee of “industrial leaders” tasked with creating jobs and 
scholarships for youth. The city built hundreds of playgrounds, community centers, and 
recreation rooms in schools and housing projects to alleviate what Wagner called “the 
conditions under which delinquent tendencies develop.”60  
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 But the city wasn’t only serving up carrots. There were sticks aplenty: stepped-up 
law enforcement, expanded incarceration facilities, and the institutionalization of 
delinquents. During the election year of 1957, Wagner ratcheted up the law-and-order 
rhetoric to new heights, calling for “vigorous police action” to deal with “hard-core 
problem children.” That September Wagner announced that the city would be stepping up 
its assault on “menace of irresponsible adolescent delinquency.” Among the get-tough 
measures Wagner floated was an archipelago of camps modeled on the old Civilian 
Conservation Corps, where troublemakers would be sent to undergo work training and 
disciplinary training. “Mayor Mobilizes Full City Attack on Teen Violence,” read the 
Times headline.61 
 Wagner linked youth behavior to broader cultural shifts. “There has been a 
serious breakdown in the moral fiber of our society and this has been a major 
contributory factor to many of the ills that now beset us,” he said in 1959. This moral 
breakdown was particularly salient among what he and others in the late 1950s termed 
“multi-problem families.” Wagner himself chaired a Committee on Multi-Problem 
Families, which he asked to “work with the hard core families who produce the majority 
of our delinquents.” Such families, the theory went, had suffered a “breakdown of family 
life and the resultant weakening of the authority of the home.” It was in large part due to 
this breakdown, Wagner believed, that teenagers turned to gangs and, eventually, to 
crime. In this, the mayor reflected the continuing influence of the Gluecks’ 
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psychologically focused interpretation of delinquency and its causes.62 
 By the mid-1950s, however, Wagner and the city’s policymaking elite had by and 
large embraced an environmentalist interpretation of delinquency’s origins. Why did 
teens join gangs? Lax parental discipline and tumultuous family dynamics no doubt 
played a role, as the Gluecks claimed. But the social workers, social scientists, and 
policymakers within the Youth Board’s orbit increasingly expressed the conviction that 
social conditions, more than family values, explained youth crime. “Much of the criticism 
attributing to parents responsibility for juvenile delinquency is essentially uncharitable,” 
Deputy Mayor Henry Epstein wrote in his landmark study “Perspectives on Delinquency 
Protection,” presented to the city’s Board of Estimate on May 12, 1955. Epstein and 
others held that gang members were just like other adolescents, except that they lacked 
access to “constructive channels” through which to find a sense of belonging and play out 
their urges and fantasies. Growing up where they did, they found themselves “deeply 
entangled in a multitude of social problems” — poverty, discrimination, automation, poor 
housing — and for those reasons journeyed into gangland.63 
 According to a 1957 booklet about gangs published by the Youth Board, the origins 
of delinquents’ behaviors lay in their physical and socio-economic surroundings: 
 
For the most part, their homes may be found in rundown areas of the city. 
Apartments here are overcrowded; every room is a bedroom. Privacy is all 
but impossible. Family sociability is difficult at best. Schools are in poor 
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condition and overburdened. […] It’s not an atmosphere to inspire even 
the most eager pupils. The less interested ones become truants and drop 
out as soon as possible. Whatever health and welfare services exist in 
these neighborhoods are also overtaxed. Moreover, by force of 
circumstances, these areas are composed of many minority groups — so 
that the destructive influence of discrimination is at work early in the lives 
of the area’s young inhabitants. It would be surprising if all family groups 
in such areas could survive the terrible effects of these many pressures. 
Miraculously, many families do. But some don’t.64 
 
 Clearly not all children in poor areas of the city became gang members; nor did 
all members of discriminated-against minority groups. Yet the Youth Board was prepared 
to assume, for policy purposes, that the vast majority of delinquents shared at least one of 
those two characteristics and, most often, both. In essence, this racialized the issue of 
delinquency. Though Irish- and Italian-American youth gangs endured throughout the 
1950s, the anti-delinquency efforts in Wagner-era New York mostly targeted black and 
Hispanic teenagers. And since delinquency was assumed to arise from the poor quality of 
life and raw frustration that prevailed in low-income neighborhoods, mostly as a result of 
discrimination, then correcting the behavior of black and Hispanic teenagers also implied 
addressing a whole range of social issues that specifically affected racial minorities.  
 Looking back in 1962, Wagner would summarize the evolution of the Youth 
Board’s thinking about delinquency:  
 
Once we thought that juvenile delinquency was the result of poor housing. 
Once we thought that juvenile delinquency was the result of no 
playgrounds. Once we thought that juvenile delinquency was the result of 
                                                
64 NYCYB, “Teenage Gangs” (1957), pp. 8-9, BPL. 
Chapter 1: Who’s Afraid of the Brewery Boys?  88 
 
 
poverty. Today […] we know from our experience in New York City that a 
combination of under-privilege, discrimination and frustration provides an 
ideal soil for juvenile delinquency — and for adult delinquency, too — in 
all the worst manifestations, including narcotics addiction and crimes of 
extreme violence. It is also true that when we are talking about the root 
causes of delinquency, we must include unemployment; we must include 
lack of educational opportunity; we must include the decreasing demand for 
unskilled labor; we must include the lure of easy money through crime.65  
 
But how to act on this interpretation? These “root causes” reflected economic and 
political realities that could scarcely be addressed at the municipal level, let alone the 
neighborhood level. Segregation, racial discrimination, the shifting patterns of industrial 
development, the inadequacy of health and education systems — these were hard things 
to change by targeting individual neighborhoods. Even a government as energetic as 
Wagner’s lacked the resources to take meaningful remedial action on each of those 
fronts. But that didn’t stop New York’s reformers in the late 1950s from trying. Under 
Wagner they crafted an anti-delinquency policy that simultaneously aimed to pre-empt 
young people from becoming criminals and to alter the socio-economic circumstances in 
which they lived. This implied, on the one hand, enlightened interventions specifically 
tailored to “at-risk” youth — remedial reading instruction, improved recreational 
facilities in housing projects, vocational training for high schoolers, and the likes — and, 
on the other, macro-scale programs aimed at improving housing, creating jobs, fostering 
healthier living conditions, and legislating against racial discrimination.  
 As for the detached-worker program that remained the centerpiece of the Youth 
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Board’s efforts, evidence began to emerge in the late 1950s that it had scored some 
notable successes in helping to avert large-scale rumbles and inducing some gang 
members to go straight. The Wagner administration claimed that there had been only one 
serious outbreak of group combat between March 1956 and September 1959 among the 
gangs serviced by the Council of Social and Athletic Clubs. The summer of 1958 was 
notable for having witnessed no gang killings. By 1959, the Youth Board claimed to be 
working with 80 of the city’s 110 known youth gangs, although it was difficult to tell for 
sure just how many were active at any given moment.  
 But the street-club program was not a cure-all. “The street club worker cannot 
change the living conditions of teenage gang members,” a 1957 Youth Board report 
argued. “He cannot give a member a better home life. He cannot hope to eliminate 
discrimination in a neighborhood nor can he modify other social and economic pressures 
which act on these young people and their families.”66 The question facing Wagner-era 
reformers, then, was what could address such “social and economic pressures.” One 
answer they came up with was citizen participation in planning. As funding continued to 
grow, the Youth Board stepped up its efforts to promote grassroots participation in each 
of the neighborhoods it was serving. “[C]ivic groups have an invaluable part to play in 
overall welfare planning and in encouraging constructive social action on the part of 
youth,” Epstein wrote.67 Like the Brooklyn Council for Social Planning in years past, the 
Youth Board nurtured community councils through which neighborhood-level leaders — 
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churchmen, organizers, settlement-house workers — could talk to city officials and 
soften some of the suspicion with which minority communities often viewed government 
agencies. The councils were encouraged to take on both the nuts-and-bolts task of 
coordinating gang-outreach programs and the broader policy function of advising the city 
on how it might assess and address the root causes of delinquency.  
 These community councils heralded a new phase in the relationship of the state to 
minority communities. By erecting an institutional framework that promoted community 
participation in the delinquency program, the Wagner administration forged close ties to 
neighborhood groups and provided the mayor with reliable partners and political allies at 
the grassroots. In the process, the city managed to channel some of the energies 
unleashed by the civil-rights movement into governmental programs and in so doing 
exerted a moderating effect on those interested in pursuing a more comprehensive brand 
of social change. At the same time, the devolution of state power to locally based 
decision-making bodies opened up a whole new set of possibilities in minority 
neighborhoods. Such institutions could easily be transformed into incubators of more 
radical visions — and that’s exactly what would happen in the 1960s.  
 Youth Board programs also represented the governmentalization of a particular 
set of social-work techniques that had sprouted from the voluntary sector’s gang-outreach 
programs. The Youth Board was self-consciously aware of its role as a policy innovator, 
as testified by its sponsorship of academic research and commitment to “demonstration 
programs.” Most such programs took individual neighborhoods as their basic unit of 
analysis and adopted community action as an important component of social policy. The 
Youth Board was not alone in essaying such ideas; the Ford Foundation in the late 1950s 
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was funding a series of community-action experiments aimed at tackling delinquency and 
other urban problems, under the rubric of the Gray Areas program. But what happened in 
New York mattered in a special way: because of the city’s size, because of its mayor’s 
prominence, because of national interest in Gotham’s gangs, and because of the 
influential neighborhood-based coalitions that arose in the city around the goal of 
changing youth behavior.68  
 Such a coalition emerged in late-1950s Bedford-Stuyvesant when a network of 
civic groups, civil-rights organizations, churchmen, settlement houses, and block 
associations banded together in support of the Youth Board’s efforts. This coalition, 
though committed to fighting juvenile delinquency, simultaneously clamored for more 
comprehensive government aid in overcoming the legacies of racism and poverty. 
Activists in Bed-Stuy implicitly challenged Wagner’s policies with a simple question: If 
juvenile delinquency arose from “root causes,” as the Youth Board claimed, why was the 
city so eager to reform their children’s behaviors and so slow to address the social, 
political, and economic causes of those behaviors? In asking such questions, they laid the 
basis for a new brand of neighborhood-based social policy that would transform 
Brooklyn, and America, in decades to come.  
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“Bedford-Stuyvesant is not the slum so often depicted by ignorant 
outsiders and newspaper reporters who rarely stay here long enough to get 
even a superficial impression. Nor is it the idyllic paradise that old 
families, well-heeled dwellers, the sizable “middles” and respectable 
church folk fondly think. ... It is a community of great personal resources 
on the one hand and of marked social disorganization on the other. It is a 
community which has all the factors to deal with the tremendous human 
and physical problems it faces provided it can reach some consensus about 
them and move in concerted fashion to resolve them.”  
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 As 1958 dawned, the Youth Board’s Brooklyn branch was plotting what the 
Amsterdam News dubbed an “all-out fight against Bedford-Stuyvesant juvenile 
delinquency.” It had been 12 years since the launch of the Brooklyn Council for Social 
Planning’s delinquency initiative in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Seven years had passed since 
the chairman of the Youth Board, Nathaniel Kaplan, first announced that a “small army” 
of Youth Board workers would “invade” the area. The Youth Board had largely 
succeeded in its efforts to prevent gangs like the Nits and the Greene Avenue Stompers 
from staging bloody rumbles in local streets and parks. But groups of armed (and often 
drug-addled) teenagers continued to haunt the city’s streets, schoolyards, parks, and 
subways, occasionally fighting for turf and pride and revenge.2  
 A wave of violence during the winter of 1957-58 spurred the Youth Board to step 
up its efforts in Brooklyn. Within a single week in late January, two members of a 
Flatbush gang, the Gremlins, shot and killed a 21-year-old from the rival Ditmas Dukes; 
two high-school girls were stabbed in Bed-Stuy; and a 13-year-old girl was raped at a 
junior high school in Crown Heights, where students subsequently assaulted a policeman 
and a school administrator. Meanwhile, police in South Brooklyn were rounding up 
young gangsters after the Red Hook Dukes beat up a Youth Board worker outside a bar 
on New Year’s Eve. Muggings, stabbings, and robberies abounded. Youth violence — 
not just in Brooklyn, but all over New York City — seemed to be morphing into 
something more chaotic, more random, and in many ways more vicious than the staged 
rumbles that had spurred reformers into action a decade earlier. So acute was the concern 
among New York’s governing elites about juvenile delinquency that when the Times 
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published Harrison E. Salisbury’s penetrating seven-part series about Brooklyn gangs in 
March 1958, the chief inspector of the NYPD ordered all commanding officers in the city 
to read the series and submit reports to him (within five days, and in duplicate) about 
anti-gang activity in their precincts.3 
 How exactly the Youth Board’s new fight would differ from the ongoing efforts of 
the Council of Social and Athletic Clubs remained unclear. But it was clear that 
community groups would take center stage in planning the local undertaking. “The Youth 
Board is not going to impose any ideas on the cooperating groups,” declared the agency’s 
point man in Bedford-Stuyvesant, Charles A. Ward. “We feel that many community 
groups have ideas of their own on methods of combating delinquency, and that these 
groups are able to initiate their programs.” Such sentiments meshed with Mayor 
Wagner’s belief that “community leaders share with municipal officials the responsibility 
for formulating a program for improving conditions in their own neighborhood.”4  
 This commitment to community participation in planning anti-delinquency 
initiatives drew heavily on the model of Clifford Shaw’s Chicago Area Project, which, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, influenced the Brooklyn Council for Social Planning’s Tompkins 
Park initiative and similar gang-outreach programs in postwar New York. What was 
novel about the Youth Board’s work in this vein was that it put the municipal 
government, rather than private agencies, in the position of leading community-
organizing efforts in selected neighborhoods. At the same time, a few keen observers 
                                                
3 “Coincidence Seen in Youth Violence,” New York Times (NYT), Jan. 30, 1958. For more on the gang 
violence of this period, see Eric C. Schneider, Vampires, Dragons, and Egyptian Kings: Youth Gangs in 
Postwar New York (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). Salisbury’s series was later turned 
into a well-received book titled The Shook-Up Generation (New York: Harper and Row, 1958). 
4 “Map Full-Scale Drive on Teenage Hoodlums,” NYAN, Feb. 1, 1958; Robert F. Wagner, Jr., Press 
Release, Apr. 13, 1948, Folder 36, Box 060039W, Robert F. Wagner, Jr., Papers (RFW), La Guardia & 
Wagner Archives (LGW) online. 
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raised the interesting hypothetical question — which turned out, in the 1960s, not to be 
hypothetical at all — of how the city government might respond if at some point it found 
itself challenged by the very community groups it had helped to organize and fund. What 
if state-sponsored community organizing veered off in unexpected directions?  
In Bedford-Stuyvesant, a more pressing set of questions loomed. Who would the 
Youth Board recruit to lead the new community-action effort? How would the 
participants come together? The complex ethnic and class dynamics of 1950s Bedford-
Stuyvesant made it a difficult political terrain for municipal policymakers to navigate. 
Furthermore, the long legacy of racism within the Kings County Democratic Party had 
largely precluded patronage ties linking Wagner’s City Hall to black Brooklynites. Yet 
Bedford-Stuyvesant was a highly organized neighborhood, bubbling with block 
associations, church groups, voluntary agencies, political clubs, and social networks. At 
one time or another, all had lobbied for more government services. How to determine 
which groups best represented community sentiment and deserved to be tabbed as 
intermediaries for city funds? The answer would soon be provided by a grand coalition 





A Neighborhood in Crisis 
 
 
Brooklyn in the postwar years comprised a collection of ill-defined 
neighborhoods, many more foreign to each other than each was to Manhattan. As the 
writer Alfred Kazin once pointed out, each Brooklynite’s knowledge of the vast borough 
tended to encompass only that part of it separating his own home from the East River. 
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Where Manhattan had some 600 streets, most of them neatly laid out along the island’s 
iconic grid pattern, Brooklyn had 1,800. “A visitor studies the layout of streets in 
Brooklyn neighborhoods in a kind of dazed silence,” one observer wrote in 1946. The 
Brooklyn Council for Social Planning, in its 1955 handbook for newcomers to the 
borough, advised buying a street map before doing anything else. “[P]lot your course 
before you start out. Everyone gets lost at least once in Brooklyn.”5  
Like villagers of bygone days, Brooklynites in the 1950s defined their geographic 
locales according to “a palimpsest of memories, symbols, and imagined places,” as 
historian Suleiman Osman puts it. Many of the “historic districts” that today dot 
Brooklyn maps — Cobble Hill, Boerum Hill, Carroll Gardens, Lefferts Gardens, and so 
on — had yet to be named at midcentury, let alone defined as objects of belonging and 
affection. Meanwhile, the traces of forgotten villages, like Weeksville or Bedford 
Corners, were in the process of vanishing. “If one asked a Brownstone Brooklyn resident 
in 1950 where he lived,” Osman writes, “he or she would most likely not refer to a 
neighborhood name like Park Slope. Instead, he would refer to a variety of places, each 
overlapping, partially intersection, and in some cases contradictory.” A series of local 
affiliations defined these places: social clubs, union locals, gang turfs, churches, ethnic 
groups, parks, block associations, political clubhouses, and the likes.6 
                                                
5 BCSP, “Welcome to Brooklyn: Handbook for New Workers” (1955 edition), p. 7, Folder 9.1.032, Box 
66, BCSP, BPL. 
6 Suleiman Osman, The Invention of Brownstone Brooklyn: Gentrification and the Search for Authenticity 
in Postwar New York (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 23. As Osman shows, it was in the 
1960s that so-called “brownstoners” — the mostly white, mostly middle-class transplants who began 
buying up Brooklyn’s historic row houses — began affixing new names to the areas in which they were 
settling, most of which had previously been lumped together under the designation “South Brooklyn.” In 
an attempt to add historical cachet to declining areas that were often targeted for urban renewal, they 
unearthed colonial-era names and attempted to conjure up Brooklyn’s bucolic past. In an area southeast of 
downtown, for instance, brownstone revivalists sought an alternative to the little-used (and unloved) name 
of North Gowanus, which honored the pungent, polluted canal nearby. Upon discovering that the Boerum 
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That there even existed a neighborhood called “Bedford-Stuyvesant” was a 
relatively recent idea. The double-barreled name only entered common usage in the late 
1930s, when population growth and demographic change rendered moot what differences 
had once prevailed between the old towns of Bedford and Stuyvesant Heights. Though 
long-established residents clung to the old nomenclatures, “Bedford-Stuyvesant” was a 
more attractive tag than “Little Harlem,” the designation outsiders sometimes used in the 
1940s to denigrate an area where black residents were flocking by the thousands. In the 
1950s, “Stuyford” would briefly come into vogue, and area residents sometimes called 
themselves Stuyfordites. But it was Bedford-Stuyvesant — Bed-Stuy — that stuck.  
The generally agreed-upon borders of the neighborhood were Broadway to the 
Northeast, Flushing Avenue to the North, Classon Avenue to the West, and Atlantic 
Avenue to the South, although these boundaries would push outward as definitions of 
what constituted Bedford-Stuyvesant expanded.7 By most calculations, some 250,000 
people lived in Bed-Stuy in the 1950s, although expansive readings of the area’s borders 
during the 1960s would often count 400,000 residents, sometimes 450,000. The reason 
for this discrepancy, a 1964 study explained, was that Bedford-Stuyvesant’s borders 
gradually became racial rather than geographic. “The definition most commonly used, 
both by the daily press and by some residents and leaders of the community,” one study 
                                                                                                                                            
family had operated a farm there during the 18th century, they happily dubbed their new neighborhood 
“Boerum Hill.” So it went for a succession of once-anonymous streetscapes that mimicked Brooklyn 
Heights with “historic” names.  
7 Given this blurriness, planners and government officials during the 1960s often included parts of what 
today are known as Crown Heights, Fort Greene, and Clinton Hill in their discussions of Bedford-
Stuyvesant. Demographic figures vary widely depending on where the neighborhood’s boundaries are 
drawn. The data cited here are from the U.S. Census Bureau, as quoted in Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth in 
Action (B-S YIA), “The Bedford-Stuyvesant Proposal for a Research and Planning Project to Develop a 
Comprehensive Youth Services Program for Bedford-Stuyvesant,” revised second edition, Aug. 20 1964, 
Don Watkins Papers; and B-S YIA, “Planned Intervention to Halt and Reverse the Vicious Cycle,” Mar. 
11 1965, Watkins papers. 





A map of Brooklyn, circa 1950. Several neighborhoods that would be familiar to 
future generations had yet to be named: Cobble Hill, Carroll Gardens, Lefferts 
Gardens, Prospect Heights, Boerum Hill, Ditmas Park, etc. Nor had the term 
“Bedford-Stuyvesant” come into widespread use. (Papers of the Brooklyn Council for 
Social Planning, Brooklyn Public Library, Brooklyn Collection.) 
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declared, “is that Bedford-Stuyvesant is ‘wherever Negroes happen to live.’”8 
 The implication was that African Americans were intruders, whose very presence 
required a redefinition of boundaries. In fact, African Americans had inhabited Brooklyn 
from the dawn of European settlement. Most early black Brooklynites were exploited as 
slave labor on Dutch farms, though a proud few did hold land of their own. By the close 
of the 17th century, Africans and their descendants made up an estimated 15% of the 
population of Kings County, which approximated the future boundaries of Brooklyn. At 
the time of the first U.S. census, in 1790, Kings County had become one of the 
slaveholding capitals of the North. Though 20% of New York State’s black population 
was free at the time, only 3% of Kings County’s blacks were so lucky; by contrast, 60% 
of the county’s white families held fellow humans in bondage.9  
 In the years following the 1827 abolition of slavery in New York State, many free 
blacks moved to an area of Brooklyn named Weeksville, which was wedged between the 
towns of Bedford and Flatbush. The first notable African-American institution in Kings 
County, the Bridge Street African Methodist Episcopal church, which was founded near 
the heart of old Brooklyn in 1766, moved to Weeksville in the 1830s. Three miles north, 
in Williamsburg, freed slaves established the African Free School in 1841, and Colored 
School No. 2 opened in Weeksville six years later. Faced with overwhelming racism 
from without, Weeksville’s plucky residents funded a variety of community institutions, 
including the Howard Colored Orphanage Asylum, the Zion Home for Aged Relief, and 
                                                
8 According to historian Harold X. Connolly, the first published mention of the hyphenated “Bedford-
Stuyvesant” designation was in a 1931 edition of the Brooklyn Eagle. For more on neighborhood 
nomenclatures, see Connolly, “Bedford-Stuyvesant,” in Charlene Claye Van Derzee, ed., An Introduction 
to the Black Contribution to the Development of Brooklyn (Brooklyn: New Muse Community Museum of 
Brooklyn, 1977), pp. 91-97. 
9 Connolly, A Ghetto Grows in Brooklyn (New York: New York University Press, 1977), p. 5.  
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the Berean Baptist Church. During the draft riots of 1863, the community sheltered black 
New Yorkers fleeing the wild violence gripping Manhattan; after arsonists torched the 
Colored Orphan Asylum on Fifth Avenue, many of the traumatized survivors were 
spirited to Brooklyn. 10   
 Weeksville’s independent identity, however, was soon swept away amidst mass 
European immigration to Brooklyn. By the late 19th century, Brooklyn had transformed 
from a muddy village of 2,378 into the fourth most populous city in America. In 1900, 
shortly after being absorbed into New York City, the “City of Churches” boasted a 
population of almost 1.2 million.11 By that time, Brooklyn had developed into an 
attractive residential enclave for Manhattan’s affluent classes. The once-bucolic rolling 
landscape was becoming crisscrossed with streets, laid out gridlike to maximize real-
estate values. Elegant Brooklyn Heights led the way. During the first third of the 19th 
century, the Heights emerged as America’s first commuter suburb, thanks in large part to 
Robert Fulton’s steam ferry. A half-century later, opulent mansions began to rise along 
the “Gold Coast” bordering magnificent Prospect Park, designed by Frederick Law 
Olmsted and Calvert Vaux. The opening of the Brooklyn Bridge in 1883 encouraged 
Manhattan’s moneyed classes to flock across the river. Merchants and other members of 
the expanding middle class built stately brownstone and limestone houses in Fort Greene, 
                                                
10 Joan Bacchus Maynard and Craig Steven Wilder, “Weeksville,” in The Encyclopedia of New York City, 
Kenneth T. Jackson ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), p. 1392; Joan Maynard, “Weeksville 
Revisited,” in Van Derzee, ed., An Introduction to the Black Contribution, pp. 85-89. For more about the 
early history of African Americans in Brooklyn, see Connolly, A Ghetto Grows in Brooklyn, Chaps 1-2; 
Craig Steven Wilder, A Covenant With Color: Race and Social Power in Brooklyn (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000); Wilhelmena Rhodes Kelly, Images of America: Bedford-Stuyvesant (Charleston, 
S.C.: Arcadia Publishing, 2007).  
11 For most of the 19th century, the area that later became the borough of Brooklyn was made up of six 
independent towns that dated back to the era of Dutch rule: Brooklyn, Bushwick, Flatbush, Flatlands, 
Gravesend, and New Utrecht. Brooklyn, chartered as a city in 1834, was by far the most populous and 
prosperous, especially after absorbing Bushwick and Williamsburg in 1855. By 1890, when Brooklyn’s 
population had surpassed 800,000, the combined population of the remaining four towns was only 32,000.  
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South Brooklyn, and Crown Heights; wealthy bankers and industrialists dominated the 
Northwestern periphery of Prospect Park and toney Brooklyn Heights. The years 
following the Civil War also saw Brooklyn mature into an industrial powerhouse, and 
development was most intense along the East River and the Gowanus Canal. Nearby 
areas of Sunset Park, lower Park Slope, Williamsburg, and Red Hook bustled with 
manufacturing and warehousing. The families of immigrant longshoremen and factory 
workers crammed into tenements and rows of hastily erected, plain-faced brownstones, 
which Suleiman Osman has called the “suburban tract houses of the 19th century.”12 
 Turn-of-the-century Brooklyn knew its share of poverty. Yet, as its elegant 
Victorian building stock could attest, it was also a place where dreams of upward 
mobility and comfortable urban living abounded. Nor was Brooklyn a stylish place for 
whites alone. A small but prominent black bourgeoisie lived in Stuyvesant Heights and 
the area later known as Clinton Hill. In fact, of the wealthy black families living in New 
York at the time of the city’s 1898 amalgamation, most called Brooklyn home. “It will be 
news to many white persons to learn that many negro men own and occupy brownstone 
dwellings in fashionable neighborhoods, employ white servants, and ride in their own 
carriages behind horses driven by liveried coachmen,” the Times wrote in 1895. “As soon 
as negro men amass a comfortable fortune they move … across the East River.”13  
 Stuyvesant Heights, founded in the 1640s by Dutch governor Peter Stuyvesant, 
gained fame in the 1890s for its tidy rows of solid houses inhabited by Irish and German 
                                                
12 Osman, The Invention of Brownstone Brooklyn, p. 28; Edwin G. Burrows and Mike Wallace, Gotham: 
A History of New York City to 1898 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 972-73. For more 
about Brooklyn’s 19th-century development, see Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The 
Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), especially Chap. 2; 
Wilder, A Covenant With Color; and Connolly, A Ghetto Grows in Brooklyn, Chaps. 1-2.  
13 “Wealthy Negro Citizens,” NYT, July 14, 1895. 
Chapter 2: Inventing a Community  102 
 
merchants, shopkeepers, and professionals. By 1900, those blacks who inhabited the area 
generally lived within the long, thin corridor between Atlantic and Fulton Avenues. The 
town of Bedford, which neighbored Stuyvesant Heights, was during this time attracting 
thousands of German, Scottish, and Irish immigrants. Boosters promoted the area as 
prime real estate for “genteel suburban residences.” The elevated railway along Fulton 
Street, built in the 1880s, connected Bedford to Manhattan and attracted an affluent group 
of new residents, who moved into some of Brooklyn’s most opulent brownstones.14  
 During the early decades of the 20th century, the wealthy began pushing out 
farther into suburban landscapes. The neighborhoods of Central Brooklyn — Bedford, 
Stuyvesant Heights, and Crown Heights — became home mostly to Jews and Italians of 
modest means, though the area continued to house a small black middle class. Brooklyn’s 
African-American population, as a percentage of the whole, had declined significantly, 
thanks to the mass migration of European immigrants in the half-century following the 
Civil War. By 1920, Brooklyn’s 32,000 African Americans accounted for a small fraction 
of the borough’s two million people.  
 The black population of Brooklyn more than doubled in the 1920s, heralding the 
start of a long period of growth. (Black Brooklynites would number 900,000 by the end 
of the 20th century.) Organized white resistance to the newcomers flared up sporadically 
during the interwar period, but Bedford-Stuyvesant nonetheless drew increasing numbers 
of blacks. The recently completed A-Train made Bedford-Stuyvesant an accessible 
destination for Harlemites of all classes escaping Manhattan’s crowded tenements and 
filthy, dangerous streets. The Depression also coincided with a generational shift, as 
                                                
14 Connolly, “Bedford-Stuyvesant,” in Van Derzee, An Introduction to the Black Contribution, pp. 91-97. 
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many original homeowners grew too aged or too poor to hold onto their houses. In some 
cases, cash-strapped landlords began to subdivide brownstones that had once housed 
single families, subsequently renting them out to as many families as there were floors or 
turning them into rooming houses for the poor, the elderly, or the transient. This process 
would accelerate in the postwar years as increasing numbers of white homeowners 
decamped for the suburbs and absentee landlordism became commonplace.15   
 The 1930s also marked the beginning of a mass migration out of the American 
South. Brooklyn loomed as an especially attractive destination for African Americans 
from the Carolinas and Virginia. The Southerners, by and large, were poor, poorly 
educated, and lacking in non-agricultural job skills. They ventured north to escape Jim 
Crow but soon found themselves facing stubborn discrimination in New York schools, 
workplaces, and housing markets. They also had to grapple with the condescension with 
which many of their more refined black neighbors greeted them. A 1940 study of 
Brooklyn’s newly arrived African Americans found that “[s]ocial and educational 
facilities have not kept pace with the needs and there has been exploitation, expressions 
of hostility, and indifference not only by white citizens but on the part of the older Negro 
population. There appears to be a concerted effort to keep living conditions as 
undesirable as possible, particularly in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area, where there is the 
greatest concentration, in order to discourage further increases.” The African-American 
social worker and activist Anna Arnold Hedgeman, who worked at the Brooklyn branch 
of the YWCA during the 1930s, later recalled how the black elite women who dominated 
social institutions like the YWCA were more inclined to identify with white women of 
                                                
15 See Connolly, A Ghetto Grows in Brooklyn, Chapter 2. For an insightful discussion of the causes and 
consequences of brownstone conversions into rooming houses, see Osman, The Invention of Brownstone 
Brooklyn. 
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their own social class than with poor blacks. Class-conscious though “kindly in intent,” 
they viewed newcomers with suspicion. “These white and Negro women of ‘Old 
Brooklyn,’” Hedgeman writes, “had worked together for nearly twenty-five years, and 
shared a common gentility and determination to maintain the status quo.”16 
 Bed-Stuy, with its tree-lined streets and sturdy brownstones, promised 
comfortable lifestyles to some residents. But many black Brooklynites found themselves 
living in crowded, decrepit, rat-infested dwellings. Worse, they often paid above-market 
rents for such housing, as slumlords sought to squeeze every possible penny of profit out 
of tenants whom they knew to be penned in by the geography of racism. A 1938 survey 
found that “over half the Negro citizens [in Brooklyn] are living in tenements over 40 
years old.” Though Bedford-Stuyvesant was fast becoming a choice destination for 
blacks from all over the U.S., the study found that that presumptive black tenants would 
be barred from all but 270 out of 4,100 vacancies surveyed across the borough.17 
 Nonetheless, Southerners continued to arrive en masse in Brooklyn, and they were 
joined by increasing numbers of former Harlemites.  One factor drawing them in was the 
network of low- and middle-income housing projects the New York City Housing 
Authority erected in Central Brooklyn during the 1940s and ’50s. Kingsborough Houses 
in Crown Heights, built in 1941, added some 1,100 units to the housing supply; the city 
built almost 4,000 more apartments in Bed-Stuy and Crown Heights between 1949 and 
1957, when the Albany, Brevoort, and Marcy Houses were erected. The black population 
                                                
16 BCSP, Summary of Conference on Our Expanding Negro Population, Apr. 6, 1940, p. 1, Folder 
9.1.026, Box 66, BCSP Papers, BPL; Anna Arnold Hedgeman, The Trumpet Sounds: A Memoir of Negro 
Leadership (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964), pp. 74-75 & 125-126. 
17 “200 Brooklyn Citizens Plan Housing Fight,” NYAN, Aug. 13, 1938; “Brooklyn Federation Ready To 
Demand Immediate Clearance of Local Slums,” NYAN, Sept. 3, 1938; BCSP, Summary of Conference on 
Our Expanding Negro Population, p. 3, BPL. 
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of Brooklyn almost doubled in the 1940s, to 213,032, of whom some 122,240 lived in the 
area known as Bedford-Stuyvesant. By 1950, African Americans made up just shy of a 
tenth of New York City’s citizens — a 50% increase in a decade. Close to 750,000 black 
people lived in New York, more than in any other American city. Whereas traditionally 
the boundaries of African-American life in New York had been virtually synonymous 
with Harlem, by 1950 about half the city’s black population lived outside of Manhattan.18 
 Another group whose numbers were quickly growing were Puerto Ricans. Between 
1940 and 1970, the number of Puerto Ricans living in New York City rose from 61,000 
to 817,712, or 10% of the city’s total population. In Brooklyn, Puerto Ricans gravitated to 
the North Brooklyn areas of Williamsburg, Greenpoint, and Bushwick, where industrial 
jobs abounded and where churches, stores, and sidewalks increasingly took on a Hispanic 
flavor. The northern sections of Bedford-Stuyvesant, which bordered Williamsburg and 
Bushwick, also began to attract significant numbers of Puerto Rican newcomers.    
 World War II gave the borough’s ever-expanding black working class a rare 
chance to get ahead. Wartime mobilization created enormous job growth in the borough, 
especially in and around the Brooklyn Navy Yard, which sat on Wallabout Bay, near the 
northwestern fringe of Bedford-Stuyvesant. Black New Yorkers, who had suffered 
catastrophic unemployment rates during the Depression, jumped at the jobs, and they 
were joined by tens of thousands of hopeful migrants from the South. But with the return 
to peacetime many found themselves out of work: a study of 25 New York area war 
plants found that between mid-August and mid-September of 1945, some 45% of black 
                                                
18 BCSP, “Growing Up in Brooklyn: Report of Brooklyn’s Little White House Conference on Children 
and Youth” (1951), Folder 3.2.016, Box 16, BCSP Papers, BPL. For more on African-American migration 
to Brooklyn, see Connolly, A Ghetto Grows in Brooklyn; Craig Steven Wilder, A Covenant With Color; 
and Van Derzee, ed., An Introduction to the Black Contribution. 
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employees lost their jobs.19 
 A bounty of industrial and white-collar jobs remained in the immediate postwar 
years, and wages were good thanks to the city’s booming economy and thriving labor 
movement. The Little Wagner Act of 1955, which instituted collective bargaining for 
municipal employees, further empowered the city’s workers. But black Brooklynites 
often found themselves written out of the city’s social-democratic contract. As historian 
Craig Wilder has written, they “suffered not just discrimination, but total labor market 
segmentation.” Many companies refused to hire African Americans, and powerful trades-
unions — most notably in the job-rich construction industry — often excluded black 
workers altogether. African Americans on average earned far less than whites for 
comparable work, and this was all the more true for black women. Even in those 
industries that consented to hire them, they were most often forced to take up low-paying 
menial and unskilled positions. Thus unemployment rates in black Brooklyn tended to be 
almost double those that prevailed among whites. Brooklyn in the 1950s, far from a 








 As a “neighborhood” that was in fact the size of a city, Bedford-Stuyvesant 
increasingly stood out for its poverty. Yet Central Brooklyn at mid-century was also 
beginning to rival Harlem as a hub of African-American culture. In many ways, Bedford-
Stuyvesant’s crisis years were also a golden age. Brooklyn in the 1950s was home to “the 
                                                
19 Martha Biondi, To Stand and Fight: the Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New York City 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 21-22. 
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greatest concentration of remarkably gifted black preachers America’s ever seen,” 
according to Gardner C. Taylor, the longtime minister of Concord Baptist Church in Bed-
Stuy. Sandy Ray of Cornerstone Baptist Church, Archie Hargraves of the Nazarene 
Congregational Church, Claude Franklin of Mount Lebanon Church, and Milton 
Galamison of Siloam Presbyterian Church counted among the most prominent 
clergymen. On Sunday mornings, the streets would lie quiet, then suddenly come alive 
when services concluded, throngs pouring out of dozens of churches in colorful hats and 
bespoke suits. At night, supper clubs and jazz joints such as the Arlington Inn on Fulton 
Ave., the Verona Café on Verona Place, or the Continental on Nostrand Ave., featured a 
parade of bop giants, including Dizzy Gillespie, Miles Davis, Max Roach, and local 
legend Randy Weston. Thelonious Monk was a regular at Tony’s, an unassuming bar on 
Dean Street. And the most famous Brooklynite of them all, the Dodgers’ electrifying 
Jackie Robinson, made his home on McDonough Street in Bedford-Stuyvesant shortly 
after breaking baseball’s color barrier in 1947.20  
 By the mid-1950s, Bedford-Stuyvesant, with its elegant housing stock, cultural 
attractions, and long-established middle class, had turned into a trendy hub for New 
York’s flourishing black elite. “Society here is based on tradition, old families, and a 
quiet elegance,” a local columnist opined in 1959. “Club life is intense with many 
organizations and clubs with full programs.” Judges, doctors, lawyers, realtors — their 
names crammed the society columns of the Amsterdam News, which reported in great 
detail on their good looks, snappy clothes, and glamorous gatherings. They attended the 
lavish balls of the Comus Club, which claimed to be “the oldest social club in Negro 
                                                
20 Gardner C. Taylor, Oral History interview, undated, National Visionary Leadership Project, 
www.visionaryproject.org/taylorgardner; Rhodes Kelly, Images of America: Bedford-Stuyvesant, pp. 100, 
108; “Brooklyn Banker Defends Bedford Stuyvesant Area,” NYAN, Dec. 9, 1961.  
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America” and which was also billed as “Brooklyn’s snootiest.” Others kept up with old 
contacts from the influential Alpha Phi Alpha fraternity. Many collected club 
memberships like they were lapel pins, dividing their time and donations among Greek 
societies, professional guilds, social-uplift organizations like the YWCA and the 
Salvation Army, and moderate civil-rights groups like the NAACP and Urban League. 
The linkages among these institutions would drive much of the reform activity in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant during the 1950s and early ‘60s.21 
Studies of 20th-century black elites, sometimes described as the “talented tenth” 
(W.E.B. DuBois’s term) or as the “black bourgeoisie” (E. Franklin Frazier), have turned 
up ambivalent attitudes toward the black working class. Noblesse oblige based on notions 
of racial solidarity intermingled with a thinly veiled disdain for the social morays of 
recent arrivals from the agricultural South. According to historian Robin D.G. Kelley, 
mass migration to northern cities during and after World War II “exacerbated cultural 
tensions between longtime urban residents and the newly arrived rural folk. African 
Americans born and raised in the North, particularly those who owned property and 
maintained a steady income, looked down on these newcomers and blamed them for 
neighborhood deterioration.”22 This dynamic was certainly at work in postwar Bed-Stuy. 
Yet among the new arrivals in the era of the Great Migration were not only poor “rural 
folk” but also a large numbers of urbane Southern preachers, social workers, and teachers 
                                                
21 “Big Season Flourishes With Elegant Events, NYAN, Jan. 12, 1957; “Navy Ball Opens Social Season,” 
NYAN, Oct. 15, 1960; “‘Deep Are the Roots’ in Brooklyn Society,” NYAN, Mar. 28, 1959; “2,000 at 40th 
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who quickly took their place among Bedford-Stuyvesant’s home-owning and 
increasingly politicized elite. This group would produce many of the civil-rights leaders 
of the early 1950s and early ’60s, as well as some of the more radical political voices of 
the later 1960s and the ’70s.23  
Bedford-Stuyvesant in the postwar years also attracted thousands of West Indians, 
many of whom were well-educated and employed in skilled trades or specialized 
professions and eager to pour their small savings and considerably greater sweat equity 
into the area’s spacious and elegant brownstones. Some arrived in Brooklyn directly from 
the Caribbean; still more took the A Train from Harlem and chose to stay in Kings 
County. What was know as “buying house,” according to the novelist Paule Marshall, 
who grew up in Brooklyn, became “an obsessive pursuit” among West Indian families 
during the Depression. “By the early 1940’s,” Marshall writes, “a good part of Bedford to 
the west and almost all of Stuyvesant Heights to the east had become a relatively stable, 
well-kept community of proud black homeowners who treated the brownstones they had 
purchased with the same loving care as the whites whom they had replaced.”24 
 Many West Indian women toiled as domestic day laborers: in the mornings, they 
would gather on street corners in affluent neighborhoods and wait for housewives to pick 
them up and offer them a few hours’ work. The working conditions were often 
                                                
23 Many of the churchmen most active in New York’s civil-rights movement were born in the South. For 
instance, the Rev. Gardner C. Taylor, who led Concord Baptist Church as of 1948, was born in Baton 
Rouge, La.; the Rev. Herbert Daughtry, a legendary preacher and activist beginning in the 1950s, was 
born in Savannah, Georgia; the Rev. William A. Jones, of the 5,000-member Bethany Baptist Church, was 
born in Louisville, Ky.; the Rev. Sandy F. Ray, who took over Cornerstone Baptist Church in 1944, was 
from Texas; and the Rev. Walter Offutt, Jr., also of Bethany Baptist Church, was from Kentucky. 
24 Paule Marshall, “Rising Islanders of Bed-Stuy,” NYT Magazine, Nov. 3, 1985. According to the 
political strategist Wesley MacDonald Holder, a native of Guyana best known for his affiliation with 
Shirley Chisholm, many West Indians in the 1930s and ’40s abandoned Harlem for Bedford-Stuyvesant 
not only because they wanted to own houses but also because — ironically, in light of future events in 
Brooklyn — they worried that their children were not safe in Harlem. See F. Donnie Forde, Caribbean 
Americans in New York City, 1895-1975 (Charleston, S.C.: Arcadia, 2002), p. 79. 
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humiliating, but the jobs were, as Marshall recalls, “simply a means to an end: the end 
being the down payment on a brownstone house, a college education for their children, 
and the much coveted middle-class status these achievements represented.” The second-
generation strivers growing up in West Indian households included many who would rise 
to prominence in 1960s Bedford-Stuyvesant: Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm; Judge 
Thomas Jones; Assemblyman William Thompson, Sr.; the President of the Bedford-
Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, Franklin Thomas; community organizer Elsie 
Richardson; the publisher of Black Enterprise magazine, Earl Graves, and many others.25  
 Chisholm, a schoolteacher who in 1968 would become the first black woman 
elected to Congress, described Barbadian immigrants, including her parents, as “bright, 
thrifty, ambitious people.” Chisholm recalled in her 1970 autobiography that “[t]he 
Barbadians who came to Brooklyn all wanted, and most of them got, the same two 
things: a brownstone house and a college education for their children. Indeed, to speak of 
a singular “black community” in this era ignores not only class and gender stratifications 
but also the divisions between people with roots in the Caribbean and others with roots in 
the American south. Ethnic differences sometimes crystallized as class differences. 
Because of their work ethic and obsession with their children’s education, the 
Barbadians, according to Chisholm, were dubbed the “Black Jews” — a moniker they 
took on proudly. Such divisions often spilled over into the political arena, threatening the 
kinds of racial unity advanced by black nationalists, including the Jamaican Marcus 
Garvey. Chisholm herself recalled in her memoir that “there was no such thing as a black 
community” in Brooklyn while she was growing up. Though West Indians were often at 
                                                
25 Paule Marshall, “Black Immigrant Women in Brown Girl Brownstones,” in Constance R. Sutton and 
Elsa M. Chaney, eds., Caribbean Life in New York City: Sociocultural Dimension (New York: Center for 
Migration Studies, 1987), p. 89; Forde, Caribbean Americans in New York City.  
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the forefront of black political organizing in the postwar years, it was not unknown for 
them to express disdain for working-class African-American culture. Yet immigrants 
from the Caribbean soon found that, despite their claims to ethnic distinctiveness, in 
color-coded America they would be lumped in with African Americans. “Through 
individual pursuits or family connections, many had distinguished themselves in their 
native lands as members of the privileged class and were more than a bit surprised and 
disappointed to discover that all their special privileges were abrogated by the policies 
and practices of segregation once they set foot in the United States,” the journalist F. 
Donnie Forde (an Aruba native) has written.26  
 Within the electoral realm, American blacks with roots in the South continued to 
view the Democratic Party with a measure of mistrust well into the 20th century. Even 
after FDR won the lion’s share of black voters nationwide in 1933, many African 
Americans in New York continued to hold the local Democratic organization at arm’s 
length, and vice versa. Not surprisingly, the first blacks to carve out niches within the 
Democratic county organizations in New York City tended to be immigrants from the 
English-speaking Caribbean, most notably Nevis-born Bertram Baker, elected to the State 
Assembly from Brooklyn in 1948, and Hulan Jack, a Saint Lucia native who in 1953 
succeeded Robert Wagner, Jr., as Manhattan Borough President.27 West Indians, per the 
                                                
26 Shirley Chisholm, Unbought and Unbossed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), pp. 4-5; Constance R. 
Sutton and Susan R. Makiesky-Barrow, “Migration and West Indian Racial and Ethnic Consciousness,” in 
Constance R. Sutton and Elsa M. Chaney, eds., Caribbean Life in New York City: Sociocultural 
Dimension (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1987), pp. 94-95 & 104-105; Forde, Caribbean 
Americans in New York City, p. 33. See, also, Yndia S. Lorick-Wilmot, Creating Black Caribbean Ethnic 
Identity (El Paso: LFP Scholarly Publishing, 2010). A 1973 study remarked that, “Taken collectively, the 
Bed-Stuy West Indians would be among the most ambitious and hard-working people one would find 
anywhere.” Mary H. Manoni, Bedford-Stuyvesant: The Anatomy of a Central City Community (New York: 
Quadrangle, 1973), p. 16. 
27 As Shirley Chisholm tells it, whereas West Indian men like her father, a well-read Barbadian unionist 
who worked in a bakery, participated actively in union politics and embraced the ideas of Marcus Garvey, 
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historian Calvin B. Holder, “received a large share of the patronage dished out to the 
black community by the Democratic Party, and they were also elected to public office 
repeatedly: Thus, the period 1930-1952 witnessed the emergence of West Indians as a 
powerful political force in the black community of New York City.”28 
 The West Indians of Brooklyn also created a network of self-help groups, 
fraternal organizations, and mutual-aid societies to tend to their economic needs and cope 
with life in a segregated society. The most important of these was the Paragon 
Progressive Credit Union, a relic of the Depression. Scrapped together in 1939, it started 
with a war chest of $2.25. Its early members, almost all of them men born in the 
Caribbean, were influenced by Garvey, whose model of racial uplift through business 
enterprise and ethnic pride continued to resonate long after Garvey himself had passed 
from the scene. By the early 1950s, Paragon was managing some $750,000; among its 
leaders were such powerbrokers as Wesley “Mac” Holder and Charles Kellar, the latter a 
civil-rights lawyer for the NAACP. Despite its early roots in the West Indian community, 
the group chose not to target its efforts exclusively or even predominantly toward 
Caribbean-Americans. Adopting the motto “Not for profit, but for service,” Paragon 
donated to the NAACP, the YMCA, and the Negro College fund, and it offered 
scholarships to many future Bedford-Stuyvesant doctors, lawyers, teachers, and social 
workers. Thus it was an important factor in the creation of the middle-class element that 
                                                                                                                                            
the newcomers from the South “were passive and accommodating in the face of discrimination.” This 
description verges on caricature, but the fact that it comes from a woman who when she wrote it was the 
most visible black politician in America is telling of the deeply felt distinctions among Brooklynites of 
African descent. Chisholm Unbought and Unbossed, pp. 14-15, 18. 
28 Calvin B. Holder, “The Rise of the West Indian Politician in New York City, 1900-1952,” Afro-
Americans in New York Life and History 4:1 (Jan. 1980), p.45. For more on the inter-ethnic political 
conflicts within black Brooklyn, see Evrick Brown, “Fried Chicken or Ox Tail: An Examination of Afro-
Caribbean and African-American Conflict in New York City” (PhD Thesis, SUNY-Albany, 2005). See, 
also, Jim Sleeper, The Closest of Strangers: Liberalism and the Politics of Race in New York (Norton: 
New York, 1990), pp. 57-60.
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would later provide much of the impetus for urban-redevelopment and antipoverty 
programs in Central Brooklyn. Clyde Atwell, in his 1976 memoir-cum-history of 
Paragon, wrote: “Good community organizations must never permit all of the resources 
to be taken out of the community only to be exhausted in another that is already more 
prosperous. The inner city is our base. Either we find a way to control it and survive or 
content ourselves with the status quo and perish.” Paragon funded many early efforts at 
historic preservation in Bed-Stuy, underwriting the upwardly mobile “brownstoners” who 
bought 19th-century townhouses and set about renovating them.29 
 Such investors paid unusually steep prices to brokers who’d only recently 
scooped up the very same properties for pennies on the dollar, in some cases after using 
blockbusting techniques to scare white residents into selling cheap and fleeing to the 
suburbs. Because the federal government was beginning to redline the urban 
neighborhoods where a variety of minority groups, and increasingly African Americans, 
made their homes, few prospective homebuyers in Brooklyn’s older neighborhoods were 
able to gain access to federally guaranteed mortgages. Those who decided to take the 
                                                
29 During the War on Poverty, Paragon would provide seed money to local entrepreneurs with assistance 
from the federal Small Business Administration. By the mid-1970s, Paragon had some 9,000 members 
and close to $7 million in assets — this at a time when some 70% of the 23,000 credit unions nationwide 
had assets under $1 million. Yet these numbers masked the outfit’s decline, a process accelerated by the 
growing clout of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation and, thanks to federal legislation like 
the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, African Americans’ increasing 
access to lines of credit long denied them. In 1981, Paragon closed its doors in ignominious fashion, with 
a team of federal examiners packing up its records into cardboard boxes and shipping them to Boston for 
examination by officers of the National Credit Union Administration. Thanks to the credit-union deposit 
insurance program passed in 1970, Paragon’s 6,000 shareholders saw their investments up to $100,000 
refunded. Interestingly, the president of Paragon in 1980 was Lionel Payne, a former president of the 
Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council and a major player in the founding of the Restoration 
Corporation. Beverly Jensen, “Credit Unions: The Story of Do-It-Yourself Banking,” Black Enterprise 
7:3 (Oct. 1976), pp. 47-53, 87-91; Stephen Gayle, “Paragon Hits Bottom,” Black Enterprise 11:8 (Mar. 
1981), p. 19; C. Gerald Fraser, “The ‘Union’ Immigrants Built,” Black Enterprise 10:9 (Apr. 1980), p. 31; 
“Paragon Credit Union Honors 12 Founders at Achievement Dinner,” NYAN, Apr. 26, 1952; “Paragon 
Marks 25th Yr.,” NYAN, July 25, 1964; Clyde Atwell, A Passion to Survive: A Credit Union Grows in 
Brooklyn (New York: Pageant-Poseidon Press, 1976).  
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plunge often borrowed at usurious terms from storefront lenders, loan sharks, and other 
middlemen — the Paragon credit union could only help a small number — and many 
soon found themselves trapped in a cycle of debt that ended either in foreclosure or in a 
painful decision to convert their dream home into yet another rooming house. Restrictive 
covenants and other forms of discrimination further stifled the geographical and social 
mobility of most African Americans, especially as the federal Homeowners Loan 
Corporation teamed up with the near-totality of private banking and mortgage institutions 
to withhold credit from any neighborhood where blacks lived. Nor was paying off the 
house the end of the new homeowners’ challenges. Half-century-old homes often 
required extensive renovations and restoration — projects that, again, black homeowners 
often faced without being able to borrow the necessary cash except at exceedingly high 
interest rates. Even a home in tip-top shape was never safe from plummeting in value. 
Judge Thomas Jones, a son of West Indian immigrants who grew up in Bedford-
Stuyvesant during the 1920s and ‘30s, later recalled that homeowners in the interwar 
years, “had to buy in a market that had been set aside for certain predatory elements, and 
pay fantastic moneys for mortgages. Yet they struggled for this, and because of these 
struggles and the home ownership, they have been able to maintain a pride and dignity 
which is unparalleled, I think in America.”30 
                                                
30 Minutes, Meeting of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Development and Services Corporation, Jan. 12, 1967, 
“Planning 1966–1967, Vol. 1” folder, Burke Marshall papers, Box 44, John F. Kennedy Library; see, also, 
Adelaide Sanford, interview with Laurie Cumbo, Jan. 24, 2008, Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration 
Corporation Oral History Project, Brooklyn Historical Society. The exploitative real-estate transactions that 
accompanied Bedford-Stuyvesant’s transformation into a majority-black neighborhood are described in 
Wilder, A Covenant With Color, Chap. 9. For more on how federal policies contributed to residential 
segregation elsewhere in the U.S., see Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for 
Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the 
Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); and 
Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940–1960 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983). For a long-view analysis, see Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier. An 
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To many homeowners in postwar Bedford-Stuyvesant, the solutions to these 
dilemmas lay in collective action. According to various estimates (most dating from the 
1960s), between 15% and 25% of the neighborhood’s residences were owner-occupied. 
But since many homeowners rented out one or more units within their own brownstones, 
an even higher proportion of structures in the area — perhaps as many as 30% — had a 
property owner living in at least one unit. In Stuyvesant Heights, there were many blocks 
where a majority of residents owned their homes. The high homeownership rates, which 
contrasted markedly with Harlem (and indeed with most other areas that earned the 
“ghetto” label in the wake of the Great Migration), gave a peculiar quality to community 
organizing in Bedford-Stuyvesant. “Many streets are organized into block associations 
which combine to form powerful area-wide and community-wide organizations,” one 
study observed. “The high proportion of ownership has helped produce a deep 
commitment to, and involvement with, the community’s future.”31   
For the most part, owner-occupied dwellings in Bed-Stuy were sturdy, elegant 
brownstone and limestone townhouses, three- or four-stories high, which lined block 
after block on the district’s leafy east-west streets. Some blocks featured dozens of plain-
faced houses standing shoulder to shoulder, unified in their quiet dignity. Other streets  
                                                                                                                                            
excellent account of how race was inscribed in New Deal-era social legislation and labor relations is Ira 
Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-
Century America (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005). On the gendered dynamics of this cleavage, see Linda 
Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890–1935 (New York: Free 
Press, 1994).  
31 Ford Foundation (R.B. Goldmann, author), “Performance in Black and White: An Appraisal of the 
Development and Record of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration and Development and Services 
Corporations,” Feb. 1969, Papers of the Ford Foundation, Box 1, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library 
(JFKL); Ronald Shiffman, “Strategy for a Coordinated Social and Physical Renewal Program: Bedford-
Stuyvesant” (unpublished draft, 1966), courtesy of New York State Library. Raymond & May Associates, 
“Vest Pocket Housing in Bedford-Stuyvesant: A Summary Report to the Community and City on Some of 
the First Steps in New York’s Model Cities Program” (1968), Avery Architectural & Fine Arts Library, 
Columbia University. 
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Two views of Jefferson Avenue in Bedford-Stuyvesant in 1954, above  and next page. 
The sign above, erected by a block association, reads “This is your block. Keep it clean, 
safe, beautiful.” (Brooklyn Public Library, Brooklyn Collection.) 




came alive with gorgeous, often ornate, architectural detail — Grecian columns, stone 
faces, Romanesque archways, stained-glass bay windows, intricate brickwork in the 
Queen Anne–revival style. The north-south avenues, meanwhile, tended to house taller 
(four to six stories) tenement buildings, many of which were owned by absentee 
landlords who let them fall into an advanced state of decay. Not all brownstones were 
elegant, of course, nor were they all owner-occupied. An increasing number housed 
either too many people (in the case of those converted into single room–occupancy 
dwellings) or too few (in the case of those simply abandoned and left to rot).32  
Life in rowhouses also encouraged residents to come together in efforts to 
                                                
32 Raymond & May Associates, “Vest Pocket Housing in Bedford-Stuyvesant.” 
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preserve and beautify their blocks. The more modest brownstones often stretched in an 
uninterrupted chain from one end of the block to the other, with little in the way of 
architectural detail to distinguish them from each other. Physically, aesthetically, and 
spiritually connected, they demanded a communal effort from owners keen on 
maintaining property values. Further, lacking lawns, driveways, and spacious backyards, 
the houses continually propelled their inhabitants out onto stoops and sidewalks; with 
parks scarce, the street became a place to be honored and nurtured and celebrated.33 
This impulse was not limited to homeowners. Tenants often participated in the 
activities of block associations, and former tenant organizers (such as Elsie Richardson) 
sometimes graduated into organizing block groups once they’d bought their own homes. 
Still, the backbone of the block associations were the men and women who had poured 
their savings and sweat into buying house and, in many cases, fixing up and preserving 
the Victorian relics they’d grown to love.  
Ironically, some of the earliest block associations and homeowner coalitions in 
Bed-Stuy had been white supremacist outfits geared toward keeping blacks out. The 
Midtown Civic League, for example, organized resistance and occasional vigilante 
violence against black newcomers during the Depression. During the late 1930s and 
early’40s black homeowners began to come together in block-based organizing, often in 
cooperation with their white neighbors.34 Their early aims were prosaic: to ensure timely 
garbage pickup, restore eroding brownstone façades, clean up empty lots, and provide 
what Jane Jacobs later called “eyes on the street.” Some planted maples and sycamores; 
                                                
33 Forde, Caribbean Americans in New York City. 
34 Thomas R. Jones claimed in a 1990 oral history that his father had organized one of the first block 
associations, on Hancock Street, in 1935 or 1936. Thomas R. Jones, interview with James Briggs Murray, 
Feb. 10, 1990, CDCOH, Sch-NYPL. 
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some trimmed hedges and tended to flowering window boxes. The model caught on fast. 
“When tired, a walk through an association block provides a refreshing atmosphere,” the 
Amsterdam News reported in 1948. “Here and there are found new trees planted along the 
streets that were bought through the block association. Yards are kept; homes look 
inviting with trim, neat windows. Radios are always tuned low; all is serene. Dogs travel 
on leash, and are curbed. Refuse and garbage cans are covered and placed on the 
sidewalks only a short time before the disposal truck makes its collection.”35 
 Before long, block associations began to come together in larger groups, the most 
active of which was the Bedford-Stuyvesant Neighborhood Council. Founded in 1939, 
the Neighborhood Council was an explicitly multiracial group that emerged amidst 
worries about racial strife in Central Brooklyn. (The Midtown Civic League was then at 
the height of its influence.) By the mid-1950s, it represented more than 100 block 
associations and had begun organizing around social issues like access to public transit, 
juvenile delinquency, and the withdrawal of city services from majority-black areas. The 
Council also organized annual beautification drives during which residents painted their 
homes, cleaned up front yards and vacant lots, and organized to oppose the opening of 
new bars in the neighborhood, which, the Neighborhood Council claimed, “could be 
breeding places for juvenile delinquency.” Signs posted around Bedford-Stuyvesant read, 
“This Is Your Block. Please Help Keep It Clean,” “Take Pride in the Appearance of Your 
Home and Neighborhood,” or “Shhh! Watch Your Language, Your Mother May Be 
Passing.” In holiday season, the elegant stretches of MacDonough Street and Decatur 
                                                
35 “Brooklyn’s Block Program Progresses,” NYAN, Oct. 2, 1948; “Stuyvesant’s ‘Clean-Up’ Drive,” NYAN, 
Feb. 19, 1949; “‘Beautify Your Block’” Is Aim of Boro Associations,” NYAN, Sept. 25, 1948; 
“‘Terrorism’ Is Laid to Brooklyn Group,” NYT, Dec. 17, 1937; “Candidate for Assembly Reveals Odd 
Information,” NYAN, Sept. 17, 1938; Banker Defends Bedford Stuyvesant Area,” NYAN, Dec. 9, 1961. 
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Street and Putnam Avenue would twinkle with incandescent bulbs, each block vying for 
bragging rights in the Neighborhood Council’s annual Christmas decoration contest.36 
 Block associations, then, represented an attempt to preserve comfortable living 
standards and property values in Bed-Stuy. Their activism can be read as an attempt to 
shield an anxious middle class from the poverty and violence threatening to engulf it. 
According to Steven Gregory, an anthropologist who has studied the block associations 
that sprung up during the 1950s in the well-heeled and predominantly African-American 
neighborhood East Elmhurst, Queens, “[t]he emergence of a form of activism tied to the 
interests of homeowners and organized into a block and civic associational structure gave 
institutional form to class divisions within the community, creating an effective 
organizing base for the growing middle class, one that linked their activism directly to 
their interests as property owners.”37  
 Bedford-Stuyvesant’s network of block associations would exert a strong influence 
on the government programs that unfolded in the area during the 1960s, including the 
War on Poverty. Their activism imbued a middle-class flavor to initiatives like the 
Restoration Corporation, but it was more than a narrow expression of class privilege. 
Block associations supported assertive campaigns for improved city services in Bedford-
Stuyvesant — more frequent garbage collection, for instance, or increased access to 
health care — that promised to benefit the entire population. Block-based activism was 
intimately tied into the broader struggles of the age: for civil rights, for political reform, 
                                                
36 “Merger of Groups in Bedford Area Planned,” NYAN, May 20, 1939; “Bedford-Stuyvesant Council 
Backbone of the Community,” NYAN, July 16, 1960; “Council Plans for Annual Cleanup Drive,” NYAN, 
Aug. 20, 1955; “Salute Stuyford Council, NYAN, Nov. 26, 1955; Thomas R. Jones, Interview with Jeffrey 
Gerson, June 10, 1993, courtesy of LGW; Banker Defends Bedford Stuyvesant Area,” NYAN, Dec. 9, 
1961. 
37 Steven Gregory, “The Changing Significance of Race and Class in an African-American Community,” 
American Ethnologist 19:2 (May 1992), p. 260. 
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and for urban revitalization. The future State Assemblyman and Civil Court Judge 
Thomas R. Jones, for instance, gained his entry into political organizing by helping his 
father, a doctor, organize block associations in the 1930s. At that time, Jones was also 
active in the New York Youth Congress, a group affiliated with the Communist Party; 
when he began to practice law in the 1940s, his early clients included block associations, 
victims of police brutality, and communists. By the late 1950s, when Jones began to 
organize a political response to deteriorating conditions and diminishing city services in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant, he founded both a reform club (the Unity Democratic Club) and a 





In Search of Empowerment 
 
 
If there was a rallying point that brought the different ethnic, occupational, and 
class groups of Bedford-Stuyvesant together, it was the civil-rights struggle. Bedford-
Stuyvesant’s churches, civic clubs, and civil-rights groups nurtured a long tradition of 
grassroots action in pursuit of economic empowerment, equal access to educational 
resources, jobs, and fair housing. Indeed, New York City was one of the few places in the 
country wherein there was no major break between the upsurge of civil-rights activity of 
the 1930s and ‘40s and that of the late 1950s and early ‘60s.  
                                                
38 As chronicled in later chapters, Jones in the 1960s would successfully take on the Kings County 
Democratic machine and subsequently become Robert F. Kennedy’s choice as chairman of the new 
Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, Thomas R. Jones, Interview with Jeffrey Gerson, June 10, 
1993, courtesy of LGW. On disputes over cutbacks in city sanitation services in Bedford-Stuyvesant, see 
Brian Purnell, “‘Taxation without Sanitation is Tyranny’: Civil Rights Struggles Over Garbage Collection 
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Historians in recent years have rightly emphasized a “long black freedom 
struggle” in place of traditional narratives of the civil-rights struggle that begin in 1954 
with the Brown v. Board of Education decision and culminate in the landmark legislation 
of 1964-65. New periodizations take in the period of Reconstruction, the first Great 
Migration of the early 20th century, the Garvey movement of the 1920s, the civil-rights 
unionism of the 1930s, and the “Double-V” campaign of World War II.39 Such 
perspectives have served not only to challenge the chronology of civil rights but also its 
geography. The North, as Thomas Sugrue has written, until recently was viewed as “the 
spoiler in an otherwise uplifting story of racial redemption.”40 But in the context of a 
“long” civil-rights struggle, the North becomes a critical battleground. New York, 
especially, figures prominently: it was where Garvey, A. Phillip Randolph, and Malcolm 
X made their home, where activists organized bus boycotts and lunch-counter sit-ins and 
“Don’t buy where you can’t work” campaigns years before they became common in the 
South. The civil-rights movement, rather than having “moved North” in the mid-1960s, 
had been deeply rooted there all along. It was in the North that activists could organize, 
raise funds, make interracial connections, and test the waters of electoral politics without 
fearing for their lives. If anything, the movement moved South after 1954.41  
                                                
39 See, for example, Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the 
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 As historian Martha Biondi has shown, New York City was a central battleground 
in the early phase of the modern civil-rights movement, which was born during the 
Depression and World War II: 
 
The agenda of the New York civil rights movement, or as activists called 
it, “the struggle for Negro Rights,” was more expansive than the agenda of 
the southern civil rights movement. In this regard, it is critical to 
remember that the northern civil rights movement began before 
McCarthyism and Cold War liberalism shut the door on more 
thoroughgoing critiques of American society. African American activists 
in the 1940s struggled and theorized over police violence and defendants’ 
rights, economic restructuring and job flight, affirmative action, 
colonialism, poverty, inferior and exclusionary housing, Black 
representation in government, racist textbooks, and discriminatory 
banking policies, to name only a few.42 
 
 During the years of economic crisis and war, Brooklyn activists tested New 
York’s anti-discrimination statutes, some of which had been on the books for a half-
century but were routinely flouted.43 Among other actions, they filed suit against Jim 
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and all other places of public accommodation or amusement.” “Signed on the Last Day,” New-York 
Tribune, June 16, 1895; “To Influence Colored Voters,” NYT, Jan. 13, 1896. See, also, Evan Friss, 
“Blacks, Jews, and Civil Rights Law in New York, 1895-1913,” Journal of American Ethnic History 24:4 
(Summer 2005), pp. 70-99. 
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Crow restaurants that refused to seat them and protested segregated swimming pools; the 
National Negro Congress in 1941 accused the owners of Coney Island’s Luna Park of 
“Hitler-like action” for barring a group of black schoolboys. PTA groups mobilized to 
protest overcrowded schools, indifferent teachers, and, most troubling, of “zoning with a 
strong suspicion of Jim Crow intent, whereby children who were Negro had to walk or 
ride long distances to schools almost wholly Negro, while white children from equal 
distance came to a more modern desirable school nearby.” The Brooklyn Inter-Racial 
Assembly, led by future political rivals Ada B. Jackson and Maude B. Richardson, was 
particularly active in trying to expand the New Deal state to include African Americans; 
the group lobbied for desegregated health facilities, daycares catering to working 
mothers, after-school programs, enforcement of tenants’ rights, consumer protection, and 
an end to racist mortgage-lending policies. In December 1943, at the height of wartime 
civil-rights activism, the Inter-Racial Assembly took advantage of Eleanor Roosevelt’s 
visit to Bed-Stuy to unveil a 10-point program that endorsed the demands of A. Philip 
Randolph’s March on Washington movement, namely equal employment opportunities 
and an end to segregation in the armed forces.44 
 With the uptick in civil-rights activity came an increased focus on the relationship 
of Brooklyn’s booming black population with a police department overwhelmingly 
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staffed by whites.45 During the war years, a notorious Grand Jury report about crime in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant had touched off a firestorm of recriminations because it raised the 
possibility that the police department might crack down specifically on teenagers in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant. In the late 1940s and early ‘50s, police officers shot several 
unarmed black New Yorkers and meted out countless beatings.46 At a 1949 rally 
sponsored by the NAACP, Jewish groups, and church leaders, the civil-rights attorney 
Charles Kellar cited four recent beatings of local black men, each of whom had been 
hospitalized following his encounter with New York’s finest. One of the men ended up 
dead and another permanently incapacitated. Said future judge Lewis Flagg, then the lead 
lawyer for the Brooklyn branch of the NAACP, “No one, so long as his face is black, is 
immune to such treatment.”47 
 Another pressing issue was the lack of health services in Bedford-Stuyvesant. The 
drive for an “interracial” hospital dated back to the 1940s. At the time, many African-
American physicians in Brooklyn complained of not being granted access to private 
hospital facilities. Rates of infant-mortality and venereal disease were catastrophically 
high in Bed-Stuy. For instance, a 1955 study found that among African Americans in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant, 52 out of every 1,000 babies were dying — a shocking figure when 
                                                
45 Even further back the National Negro Congress had led a drive against police violence during the late 
1930s and early ‘40s. “Open War on Police Brutality” blared an Amsterdam News headline on June 15, 
1940, following an incident in which a Brooklyn cop had smacked two black schoolgirls, apparently 
without provocation, near a school crossing in Bedford-Stuyvesant. The article reported that the left-
leaning NNC was preparing an all-out assault on “the enormous police brutality that is evident in the 
uptown Brooklyn area.” “Open War on Police Brutality,” NYAN, June 15, 1940. 
46 In February 1953, a City Councilman from Harlem, Earl Brown, called for a public investigation into 
what he estimated to have been “hundreds” of beatings meted out against black men by the police. Brown 
charged that “what amounts to a conspiracy” linked the NYPD and the Magistrates court in an effort to 
discourage victims from pressing charges in criminal court. “Brutality Inquiry by Council Asked,” NYT, 
Feb. 25, 1953. 
47 “Rally to Stop Brutality Is Held by NAACP,” NYAN, Apr. 9, 1949; “Stuyford Group Protests Police 
Brutality Here,” NYAN, Sept. 11, 1948. 
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compared to the national average of 23 per 1,000.48  
 In 1949, the mayoral administration of William O’Dwyer issued vague promises 
that a new public hospital would open in Bedford-Stuyvesant within five years. Nothing 
came of it. In 1950, a left-wing group calling itself the Bedford-Stuyvesant Health 
Congress gathered some 15,000 signatures in favor of a 750-bed, city-funded hospital in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant. During the years that followed, the hospital fight became a cause 
célèbre. Leaders of the drive made clear the linkage with the national civil-rights 
struggle. In 1955, after the City Planning Commission decided to yet again put off plans 
for a public hospital in Bed-Stuy, the Rev. Benjamin Lowry wrote: “This decision 
condemns to death more of our babies and mothers in childbirth, who make up the 
highest mortality toll of any community in the United States. [....] Thus a straight line is 
drawn from the dramatic outrage of judicial sanction in Mississippi of the murder of 
young Emmett Till to the more subtle form of murder by omission of the hospital project 
emanating from City Hall.”49 
These campaigns were unfolding as events in the American South thrust the civil-
rights struggle onto the national stage. In 1954, the Brown decision handed down by the 
Supreme Court declared “separate but equal” schools — the linchpin of the Southern Jim 
Crow system — to be unconstitutional. As a result, activists immediately set out to test 
the court’s decision in a variety of settings, most famously the bus system of 
Montgomery, Alabama. On the arrival of Martin Luther King, Jr., in Brooklyn on March 
24 1956, the Amsterdam News urged all New Yorkers “to come out and support morally 
                                                
48 “City Budget Held to Neglect Young,” NYT, Apr. 12, 1955. By way of comparison, the U.S. rate in 
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and financially the greatest Negro movement in our history — the boycott!” One of the 
lessons drawn by Brooklynites from the Montgomery bus boycott was that the road to 
civil rights could be pursued through economic pressure and independence. “Trade with 
pride” was one slogan heard on the streets of Bedford-Stuyvesant as activists organized a 
community savings-and-loan association and a local insurance agency.50 
 Throughout the 1950s, civil-rights activists in New York also worked to end 
discrimination by sending out “testers” to hundreds of restaurants known to exclude black 
clientele. These challenges were less provocative than the wave of lunch counter sit-ins 
that would re-energize the Southern civil-rights struggle after 1960, and they gained 
much less media attention. The problem for activists in New York and across the North, 
as many historians have pointed out, was that segregation ran counter to the law of the 
land and yet it persisted. Unlike in the South during the 1960s, New York civil-rights 
activists could not hope that their challenges would deal a fatal blow to the Jim Crow 
system, since the Jim Crow system did not officially exist. That Jim Crow-type 
discrimination endured in so many restaurants and hotels and construction sites and 
housing developments, despite laws to the contrary, made the task of assailing it all the 
more complex, requiring hundreds upon hundreds of individual challenges.51  
 Meanwhile, Brooklyn’s African Americans were facing up to the overarching 
political problem they confronted. Despite growing numbers, they found themselves 
shockingly underrepresented in the electoral arena. Prior to redistricting mandated by the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, parts of five carefully carved Congressional districts 
overlapped Bedford-Stuyvesant, but African Americans made up a minority of voters in 
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each one. The first black member of Congress from Brooklyn (Shirley Chisholm) would 
not be elected until 1968. In fact, prior to 1960, Brooklyn had elected all of two African 
Americans to legislative posts at any level of government. Compounding this was the 
racism of many Brooklyn Democratic clubhouses and low rates of registration among 
minority Brooklynites. Thus unlike Harlem, which regularly returned Adam Clayton 
Powell to Congress and tapped into city patronage through the formidable Democratic 
boss J. Raymond Jones, Bedford-Stuyvesant’s black majority was largely mute in 
Washington, D.C., and in City Hall. As the Rev. H. Carl McCall, who began his long 
political career working within the New York City poverty bureaucracy, put it in the 
1960s: “Harlem is the seat of the black establishment. … Bedford-Stuyvesant is inchoate. 
It offers little leadership opportunity to the black man.”52 
 The Depression years had touched off an exodus of African Americans from the 
Republican Party, to which they’d pledged their loyalties since the Civil War. That 
development, combined with the ongoing migration of blacks to Northern cities and the 
Supreme Court ruling against all-white primaries (in the 1944 case Smith v. Allwright), 
made African Americans an increasingly potent force in national politics. President Harry 
Truman’s decision in 1948 to embrace a civil-rights platform that alienated many in his 
Democratic Party testified to this newfound clout. The political empowerment of African 
Americans was an uneven process, however, and it proceeded slowly in Brooklyn. The 
Kings County Democratic organization, which ruled the borough, kept the distribution of 
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political spoils remained firmly in white hands, even in majority-black areas, well into 
the 1960s. Though the machine had in the past succumbed to processes of “ethnic 
succession,” with Jews and later Italians managing to penetrate what had once been an 
Irish stronghold, change had only come after decades-long challenges by disempowered 
white minority groups.53  
 Shirley Chisholm, in her 1970 autobiography, recalled the scene three decades 
earlier at the “club nights” held every Monday and Thursday by the local Democratic 
organization:  
 Those were the nights people came in with their problems. In the old 
Seventeenth Assembly District Democratic Club, the leader, Vincent 
Carney, used to sit with his flunkies on a dais at the far end of the room, 
while the voters came in and took high-backed chairs to wait their turns for 
an audience.  
 The blacks sat at one side, the whites on the other. There was no sign 
that said ‘Colored Side.’ It was an unwritten law. In many clubs even in the 
1940s blacks were not welcome, unless they were brought in by a white 
member. In the 17th A.D. club, they came but they stayed in their place. You 
could feel the men on each side daring those on the other to cross the 
invisible line. The blacks did not go to club nights because they felt wanted, 
or because they hoped to make any real inroads in the organization. They 
went because they needed help. 
 The 17th A.D. at that time was probably two-thirds black, but the all-
white (mostly Irish) organization ran the district. It elected the state senator, 
assemblyman, city councilman, and other local officeholders and, by treaty 
with the similar clubs around it, picked the men for congressional seats, 
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judgeships, and other big-bore political jobs.54  
  
 Beyond outright bigotry, black reformers in Brooklyn had to grapple with 
obstacles embedded in the political geography of New York City. Unlike Chicago, for 
example, where a unitary Democratic machine ruled city politics, in New York each of 
the county Democratic organizations constituted a machine unto itself. That African 
Americans in Harlem had begun to consolidate a measure of political power brought few 
immediate benefits to the African Americans of Brooklyn, who were facing a Kings 
County Democratic machine bent on pre-empting any independent bases of black 
political power. “The struggle for black empowerment in New York entailed a series of 
separate struggles in the boroughs of Brooklyn, the Bronx, Manhattan, and Queens,” the 
historian Martha Biondi has written. “Moreover, the city’s growing Black middle-class 
neighborhoods in Queens were spatially and politically cut off from the largest Black 
neighborhoods in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant.”55  
 In 1946, a high point in the city’s postwar civil-rights struggle, two black women, 
Ada B. Jackson and Maude B. Richardson, ran for election in Brooklyn’s 6th Assembly 
District. Jackson, a left-leaning activist, earned the nomination of the American Labor 
Party, which at the time was enjoying a flush of success. Richardson was a Republican, 
though she too was active in a variety of civil-rights causes and often teamed up with 
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radicals to advance her goals. Neither woman stood much of a chance against the 
clubhouse Democrat, John Walsh, but together they pooled enough votes to give the 
machine a scare. Two years later, the Democrats, fearing for their hold on an increasingly 
black district in which Republicans like Richardson could rally serious electoral support, 
nominated Bertram Baker for the Assembly seat. Baker became the first black 
Brooklynite elected to a legislative post; he was followed in 1957 by J. Daniel Diggs, 
who was elected to City Council from Bedford-Stuyvesant.56  
 Black reformers in Bed-Stuy wasted little time celebrating. Baker had been 
handpicked by the Brooklyn Democratic machine and proved to be a loyal soldier who 
controlled a patronage-dispensing “sub-machine” and for the next 22 years “wielded 
Tammany-like clout.” Diggs, whom Baker promoted, had come up through the ranks 
working for Borough President John Cashmore, the kingpin of the Kings County 
Democratic machine. Though both men did carve out a new space for African Americans 
within the Brooklyn Democracy, they did little to democratize the political system.57  
In 1951, another West Indian immigrant, Wesley Holder, founded a political club 
he called the Bedford-Stuyvesant Political League. This was nominally a reform group 
aimed at fostering good government and expanding access to the political system, though 
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Holder later turned out to be a formidable broker of patronage in his own right. Holder 
had left his native Guyana in 1920 so he could join the Garvey movement, and by the 
1950s he thought the time had come to harness the incipient political power of 
Brooklyn’s growing black population. In 1953, he launched his first insurgent campaign 
when he backed Lewis S. Flagg, Jr., a black lawyer, in a race for a civil-court judgeship 
against a white candidate from outside the district backed by Cashmore and the 
Democratic regulars, including Bertram Baker. Not only did the Flagg campaign win 
over the majority of black voters; it also earned the support of the American Labor Party 
and several white-dominated unions including the United Electrical Workers Union and 
the United Auto Workers, as well as the largely Jewish American Labor Party. Flagg 
became Brooklyn’s first nonwhite civil-court judge, and his supporters celebrated a 
triumph both for racial equality and good government.58  
The Flagg campaign energized a generation of young black activists in Brooklyn. 
The experience of defeating a machine-backed candidate inspired two young reformers 
from Holder’s club, Thomas Jones and Shirley Chisholm, to pursue high-profile political 
careers. Each in their own way, Jones and Chisholm gave voice to an upbeat, idealistic 
vision of politics and social reform. During the 1960s, each would score spectacular 
electoral victories against entrenched interests and, as will be detailed in later chapters, 
each would help to dictate the course of antipoverty programs in Bedford-Stuyvesant.   
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A Community in Action 
 
 
 All this activity put a lie to any notions that Bedford-Stuyvesant was an 
undifferentiated “slum” lacking the leadership, energy, or intellectual capacity to 
organize in pursuit of collective solutions to collective problems. What Bedford-
Stuyvesant did lack was power: access to the political system, influence over the 
allocation of government resources, and economic resources. In 1958, that deficit began 
to shrink, albeit in a small way, thanks to the Youth Board’s efforts to mobilize a 
community council that would help coordinate youth programs in the area. The citizens 
of Bedford-Stuyvesant took their community organizing seriously. They would quickly 
come together in an unprecedented coalition.  
 The Youth Board employees who organized the community council were Walter 
Pinkston, the planning coordinator of the Youth Board’s Brooklyn borough office, and 
his assistant, Charles Ward. Both were African-American social workers in their 30s. 
Both had held jobs as civil-rights organizers before moving into city government, and 
both would wind up working within the War on Poverty apparatus during the 1960s — a 
career trajectory common to numerous social workers of their generation.  
 Pinkston had gained a reputation as a serious, driven man who imbued his work 
with a strong sense of moral purpose. (He would figure prominently in the poverty battles 
of the 1960s, serving for many years as executive director of Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth 
in Action, a community-action agency that drew federal and city funds and which is 
discussed at length in Chapters 4 and 5.) A Florida native, Pinkston had earned a 
Master’s in social work at Atlanta University and begun his career in 1949 as a civil-
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rights organizer with the Miami branch of the Urban League; from there he’d moved into 
a job with the New York City Housing Authority. Along with his wife, Anne, who had 
once been his boss at the Housing Authority and subsequently founded a creative-arts 
academy in Crown Heights, Pinkston also devoted a good portion of his time and 
energies throughout the 1950s to the American Council for Human Rights, a civil-rights 
lobby rooted in black fraternities and sororities. The couple, impeccably educated and 
ensconced in stable government jobs, for a time counted among the very few black 
residents of Manhattan’s Stuyvesant Town, a middle-income housing development 
originally intended to house whites only. Ward, meanwhile, had attended Columbia 
University’s School of Social Work and had worked for the New York City Bureau of 
Child Welfare and the New York State Training School for Boys, in addition to 
overseeing the Bronx branch of the Urban League. He was a dynamic and stylish man 
known as an indefatigable community activist — he claimed at one point to be active in a 
dozen different organizations. Like Pinkston, he would go on to occupy a prominent post 
in the antipoverty apparatus of the 1960s. (Ward’s job was with the Harlem Domestic 
Peace Corps, an ill-fated offshoot of the War on Poverty-funded Associated Community 
Teams initiative.)59  
 Ward and Pinkston, working out of the Youth Board office on Pierpont Street in 
downtown Brooklyn, had a mandate to combat juvenile delinquency in Kings County. 
But even as they organized community support for the Youth Board’s work, they knew 
that the ambitions of local leaders extended beyond troubled children. As Ward put it, 
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“We want to stimulate people, stir up interest, develop fruitful programs, initiate social 
action — in short, mobilize our Bedford-Stuyvesant forces and improve our community.” 
Both men were rooted in the civil-rights struggle, street life, and civic clubs of Brooklyn. 
So were the local people they chose as collaborators.60 
 During the winter of 1957–58, Ward began meeting with neighborhood activists in 
brainstorming sessions about new youth initiatives in Bedford-Stuyvesant. The energetic 
response impressed him. In January 1958 he put together an informal steering committee 
to help recruit a broad swathe of community representatives. The group soon tapped into 
the constellation of grassroots organizations in the area and also worked to publicize its 
mission among individual citizens who showed even a hint of interest. By March, some 
17 organizations in Bedford-Stuyvesant had joined together with the city to form a group 
called the Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council for Youth (CBCC). Block associations 
were represented, as were churches, fraternities, business and professional groups, 
community centers, and civil-rights organizations. The group had no executive staff to 
begin with; its ostensible purpose was to advise the Youth Board and, where possible, 
develop youth programs to be carried out by community centers and church groups in the 
area. By and large, those who sat on CBCC’s board were leaders of pre-existing 
organizations. They represented the well educated, home-owning, professionals — 
doctors, real-estate brokers, teachers, lawyers, social workers, ministers — of Bedford-
Stuyvesant, and almost all of them were black. CBCC did, however, consider itself to be 
an interracial group, and a small number of whites participated in its affairs.61 
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 In this process, Ward and Pinkston occupied a new position in the emerging 
social-welfare polity: that of the bureaucrat as community organizer. Soon after the 
founding of CBCC, the Youth Board would assign Ward to a full-time position as 
CBCC’s executive secretary; later, in 1962, Pinkston would become CBCC’s executive 
director. In so doing both men blurred the lines between their jobs within city 
government and their work as grassroots advocates. For Pinkston, that turned out to be 
perfect training for his future gig running Bedford-Stuyvesant’s federally funded 
Community Action Agency during the War on Poverty, when local organizing became a 
preferred tool of the antipoverty bureaucracy.62 
 The official liaison between the Bedford-Stuyvesant community and the Youth 
Board was Maude B. Richardson, who would serve as CBCC’s president and 
spokesperson for two years. Like most others involved in CBCC, Richardson had long 
worked to improve social conditions in Brooklyn — but to describe her simply as an 
activist would be akin to calling Jackie Robinson an infielder. The woman affectionately 
known to thousands as “Maude B” was among the most ubiquitous and energetic black 
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Brooklynites in the 1950s. She was a former schoolteacher and journalist who had also 
operated a job-placement agency, dabbled in real estate, and once owned a teashop on 
Fulton Street. Dozens of civic, fraternal, and religious groups proudly listed her as a 
member during her 40-odd years of activism: the Urban League, the NAACP, the 
Bedford-Stuyvesant Real Estate Board, the New York City Council of Churches, the New 
York State Commission Against Discrimination, the Brooklyn Bureau of Social Service, 
the Brooklyn Home for the Aged, and so on. In 1945, at the height of Richardson’s 
activism and (not coincidentally) at a moment of intense civil-rights protest across New 
York City, it was reported that she actively participated in 23 different groups. She 
presided over her local PTA as well as the 77th Police Precinct community council, 
through which she’d worked to combat the wartime crime wave by mobilizing grassroots 
enthusiasm for an anti-delinquency drive in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Lest anyone accuse her 
of laziness, Richardson also wrote a column for the Amsterdam News and served as a 
district leader for the Republican Party. In 1946, when she joined Ada Jackson as the first 
black women to run for the state assembly in Brooklyn, Richardson had come within only 
70 votes of beating the regular Democrat. Though a lifelong Republican, she was no 
conservative. Indeed, her civil-rights work included the kinds of direct-action campaigns 
usually associated with the left. For instance, as chair in the late 1940s of the Brooklyn 
Provisional Committee on Jobs, she used boycotts and protests to force local businesses 
to hire black workers.  
 By the late 1950s, Richardson’s frenzied activity had made her a local icon. There 
was simply nobody better equipped to draw together the overlapping organizing efforts 
among Brooklyn’s African Americans in the realms of electoral politics, civil rights, 
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social-welfare provision, real-estate development, and community representation. Those 
various impulses came together under the rubric of CBCC. In years to come, the group 
would shift its focus from youth crime to root causes. In the process, it would come to 
represent the kind of eclectic activism Richardson herself had practiced.63  
 Richardson was also the face of a new kind of women’s activism in Brooklyn. 
Like Ada Jackson and Anna Arnold Hedgeman, she had come of age during the New 
Deal years, when New York became the main front in a national civil-rights struggle. All 
three women had walked picket lines and joined boycotts of stores that refused to hire 
black clerks; at the same time, they’d tried to penetrate the formal political arena, running 
for office and at times gaining favor among formidable political allies. (In 1954, Wagner 
called on Hedgeman to serve as the first ever black woman in the municipal cabinet, 
though she would quit at the end of the mayor’s first term out of frustration at his aloof 
and indecisive leadership.) “Grassroots activists and clubwomen,” the historian Julie 
Gallagher has written of Richardson, Jackson, and others leaders of the postwar struggle 
for black rights, “… operated outside the halls of formal political power. Yet they 
understood the necessity of engaging the state, and they frequently endeavored to wrest 
power from it — the power that made life more bearable, that made the streets safer, that 
kept the roofs over their heads, that kept the food in stores safe for consumption.”64  
 CBCC represented an important institutional vehicle by which grassroots women 
activists engaged the state in order to improve community conditions. Following Maude 
                                                
63 “They Buried Maude B. in Her Beloved Boro,” NYAN, June 5, 1976; “Maude Richardson, 82, Dead,” 
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B. Richardson, a younger generation of women, including Elsie Richardson and Shirley 
Chisholm, would rise to political prominence in black Brooklyn. CBCC provided them 
with a venue in which to pool their organizing energies and address problems — racial 
discrimination, failing schools, crime, disinvestment — that begged a concerted 
approach. As a Ford Foundation study put it, the women of CBCC “worked in and for the 
total community at a time when few others saw beyond the confines of their block, their 
church, or their club.” Their intimate connections to grassroots social networks would 
lend the council’s efforts a particular strength and poignancy.65 
 For all that, the immediate impact of CBCC in the late 1950s was modest. At the 
outset, even some of the community leaders who signed up to participate in the CBCC 
planning process remained skeptical of the state’s intervention in Bedford-Stuyvesant. 
How much could such a vaguely defined, small-scale experiment hope to accomplish in 
the face of stark segregation, rising unemployment, and mass impoverishment, they asked 
How much did the city government in fact wish to accomplish? Was this merely a tactic 
to defuse latent discontent? The skeptics included, most prominently, J. Archie 
Hargraves, the pastor of the Nazarene Congregational Church. In matters religious and 
political, Hargraves was a radical. A native of North Carolina who was raised by his 
grandmother, he’d worked his way through college (he went to North Carolina 
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Agricultural and Technical) before moving north to attend Union Theological Seminary 
in Harlem. In 1948, he’d co-founded a network of storefront churches known as the East 
Harlem Protestant Parish, which delivered what Hargraves called “hard-working practical 
religion.” The churches, in addition to seeking interfaith and interracial unity, also 
dispensed health services and food aid and organized residents to tackle community 
problems such as abusive landlords and garbage-strewn empty lots. Hargraves had then 
moved to Chicago, where he helped to found another interdenominational church, the 
West Side Christian Parish. Hargraves believed that at a time when urban churches were 
fleeing to the suburbs, inner-city ministers must live amongst their flock, advocating for 
the poor, the oppressed, and the outcast. In the midst of wrenching social change, too 
many ministers were watching from the sidelines. “The church is not simply sleeping 
through a revolution, it is too often pussyfooting through it,” he wrote in 1963.66 
 Fresh off his experiences in Harlem and Chicago, Hargraves took up leadership of 
a well-off Brooklyn congregation that traced its roots back to the 1870s. Nazarene 
numbered some 475 members (including Maude B. Richardson) who donated an average 
of $57 each year, reported to be the highest giving rate of any Congregational Church in 
America. Under Hargraves’s guidance, in the mid-1950s, the church began 
experimenting with what the pastor dubbed the “Halfway House” technique. Instead of 
trying to lure new members to the church itself, Hargraves had leased a storefront 
property that he converted into a community-outreach center and staffed with enthusiastic 
congregants. Most of the activities coordinated there focused on youth: summer field 
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trips and museum visits for young children, talent shows featuring gifted teenagers, and a 
“godparent” program whereby so-called “problem boys and girls” received reading help, 
mentoring, and occasionally food and shelter from adults other than their parents. The 
church later hired full-time outreach workers to help locals with housing problems and to 
forge links with Brooklyn’s Puerto Ricans.67  
 In 1956, Hargraves set out to organize a more ambitious anti-delinquency drive. 
Calling it the Bedford-Stuyvesant Area Project, he solicited the backing of three-dozen 
block associations, civic clubs, and PTA groups, along with a number of preachers. 
Churches and their congregations remained the most powerful institutions in Bedford-
Stuyvesant, and Hargraves hoped to turn them into a support network that might coax 
teen gang members to put down their weapons, stay in school, and forswear the street 
life. Hargraves believed that great reserves of untapped talent and potential resided in 
juvenile delinquents themselves.  
 And what of the Youth Board’s street-club programs? Hargraves was 
unimpressed. To his mind, municipal agencies were too fragmented, too over-burdened, 
and too understaffed to craft a comprehensive, flexible response to delinquency. Further, 
he argued, the people of the community knew a lot more about delinquency and its 
specific causes than any so-called experts trained in schools of social work. He was 
especially suspicious of those within government and the academy who continued to 
attribute delinquency to individual disorders or family failings. “Teen-agers tend to 
commit crimes not as individuals, but as members of delinquency gangs,” he wrote in a 
pamphlet that circulated at a 1956 meeting. “What is needed is an organization of local 
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people which will devote its attention and energies exclusively to the challenge offered 
by our children and teenagers.” Such an organization, he hoped, would at once strengthen 
families, churches, and community ties; improve schools; provide vocational guidance; 
and help to mobilize scarce resources in an increasingly poor community.68 
 Hargraves further distrusted outside experts because of their continual emphasis 
on the “slum conditions” that prevailed in Bedford-Stuyvesant. “Bedford-Stuyvesant is 
not the slum so often depicted by ignorant outsiders and newspaper reporters who rarely 
stay here long enough to get even a superficial impression,” he wrote. “Nor is it the 
idyllic paradise that old families, well-heeled dwellers, the sizable “middles” and 
respectable church folk fondly think. ... It is a community of great personal resources on 
the one hand and of marked social disorganization on the other. It is a community which 
has all the factors to deal with the tremendous human and physical problems it faces 
provided it can reach some consensus about them and move in concerted fashion to 
resolve them. A problem like juvenile delinquency we can handle ourselves.”69  
 In February 1958, Hargraves joined a slew of prominent Stuyfordites in 
denouncing sensationalized press accounts of violence among black youths, which 
Milton Galamison of the NAACP called “racist propaganda.” Hargraves consented that 
same month to join Maude B. Richardson in leading CBCC’s efforts. In so doing, he 
tacitly admitted that the dimensions of delinquency in Bedford-Stuyvesant had grown 
beyond what the community could handle. Hargraves continued to argue that “outsiders” 
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should take a back seat to community leaders in directing any future delinquency 
program in Bedford-Stuyvesant. And he remained wary of cooperating with the 
municipal government’s campaign for social control at a time when Mayor Wagner was 
mouthing increasingly muscular law-and-order rhetoric. But he recognized that Youth 
Board funds, knowledge, and expertise could help jump-start indigenous efforts. That 
Ward, who had roots in Brooklyn and in the civil-rights movement, was the man assigned 
by the Youth Board to organize Bedford-Stuyvesant may also have disposed Hargraves to 
soften his anti-outsider stance.70 
 The Youth Board’s sponsorship of CBCC was of a piece with a broader, citywide 
shift in juvenile-delinquency policy. In August 1957, in the midst of the mayoral election 
campaign, Wagner had announced that he was asking Ralph Whelan, the Youth Board’s 
executive director, to accelerate the fight against youth crime “with particular emphasis 
on local community action programs.” Citywide, this meant a greater reliance on 
voluntary agencies. In individual neighborhoods, the Youth Board would hold occasional 
town-hall meetings and help to convene permanent community councils made up of local 
luminaries. In other words, Wagner was calling on city agencies to form alliances with 
grassroots groups. That’s just what happened in Central Brooklyn.71  
 The Youth Board launched its collaboration with CBCC by training Bedford-
Stuyvesant residents to do youth-outreach work on the streets of their own neighborhood. 
The program, the first of its kind in the city, created a pool of 30-odd volunteers who, 
equipped with both street smarts and an understanding of the “problems of teenagers and 
the complexities of their behavior,” could be assigned by CBCC itself to coordinate youth 
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programs or mediate violent flare-ups. The first initiative planned and run by CBCC was 
a three-year pilot program dubbed Teens in Industry. Archie Hargraves took charge. In 
June 1958, he carefully selected 25 “brainy teenagers” to take summer jobs being offered 
by the group of banks, law firms, insurance companies, retail outlets, and factories that 
had agreed to participate in the program. Hargraves also required his charges to volunteer 
at community centers and to undergo a leadership-training course that he taught himself. 
At the end of their training, it was hoped, they would form the core of a new youth 
leadership council for Bedford-Stuyvesant.72 
The project attracted high-profile backers including the Brooklyn Chamber of 
Commerce, the AFL-CIO, Borough President John Cashmore, Municipal Court Judge 
Franklin W. Morton, and Assemblyman Bertram L. Baker. A local banker, Richard 
Brennan of the Brevoort Savings Bank on Fulton Street, donated money, wrote 
newspaper editorials trumpeting the approach, and hired interns. Maude B. Richardson 
and Charles Ward further publicized the project when each won a “Good Neighbor” cash 
award handed out by Brooklyn-based Rheingold Beer Company (and announced with 
full-page ads in Ebony magazine and black newspapers around the country), and donated 
the proceeds to Teens in Industry.73 
 The number of enrollees rose steadily, peaking at 200 high-school students per year 
in the early 1960s. For a time the New York State Employment Service assigned a full-
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time professional to Bedford-Stuyvesant with the charge of finding placements for Teens 
in Industry graduates. But summer internships were just the start. The program also laid 
out a long-term vision of how to motivate talented youngsters who, the theory went, 
would otherwise have fallen into despondency and delinquency. In addition to vocational 
training, the young would be encouraged to take up activism. After 1960, when lunch-
counter sit-ins staged by college students launched a fresh phase in the civil-rights 
movement and ushered in an era of youth-led protest, Teens in Industry sought to capture 
the spirit of the black freedom struggle. The Youth Board hired four full-time counselors 
to meet with enrollees between the ages of 16 and 19 and “inculcate training in 
citizenship and interracial and inter-faith ideals.” Morton, chairman of the Teens in 
Industry advisory board, explained the new thrust: “Events in the South have highlighted 
the great contributions young people are making in equality for us all.”74 
Launched against a background of mounting youth unemployment, Teens in 
Industry proved popular. Though small in scale, it offered a constructive response to the 
hysteria about wayward youth emanating from politicians and the press. Prefiguring the 
“long hot summers” rhetoric of years to come, the Amsterdam News wrote in August 
1960 that, “It has been established that this is the time of year when tempers and tensions 
soar right along with the temperature and humidity. The Teens-in-Industry program has 
made an effort to solve these hot weather outbursts of violence and crime in the Bedford-
Stuyvesant community.” The program would last into 1964, when the War on Poverty 
inaugurated a much larger drive to “unlock opportunities” through vocational training 
and youth-leadership programs. 75 
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 The Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council got off to a promising, if modest, 
start as a sponsor of youth programs in Bedford-Stuyvesant. CBCC was hardly a panacea 
for the area’s problems — but its very existence began a process that would profoundly 
influence the way social policy was crafted at the neighborhood level. This influence was 
felt primarily in three ways.  
 First, CBCC marked one of the first institutional linkages between black 
Brooklynites and the municipal government, at a time when black New Yorkers outside 
of Harlem were mostly frozen out of formal political structures. Through men like Ward 
and Pinkston, the city had tried its hand at community organizing, fostering new forms of 
citizen participation in planning. CBCC created a venue wherein street-level policy 
innovators like Archie Hargraves could come together with city officials to exchange 
ideas and set priorities. CBCC’s early years corresponded to the moment when New York 
City’s government declared community groups to be viable decision-making units in 
various policy arenas: physical planning, urban renewal, and of course delinquency. 
During the 1960s, the federal government, too, would assign an unprecedented policy 
role to neighborhood-based organizations, which became hotbeds of innovation and 
conduits for government funds. At that time, the pre-existence of CBCC would make 
Bed-Stuy one of the primary testing grounds for new ideas about community action and 
development. In that sense, the founding of CBCC marked a milestone on a policy path 
that would wind its way through the Great Society years and into the 1970s: the 
devolution of funds and policymaking responsibilities to individual neighborhoods. 







 Second, the creation of CBCC represented a new way of thinking about the 
boundaries and meanings of community in a rapidly changing area. Wagner recognized 
CBCC as a representative body for the people of Bedford-Stuyvesant, and the new 
A 1961 advertisement for brewed-in-Brooklyn Rheingold beer, 
recognizing the community service of Charles A. Ward, Jr., an 
employee of the New York City Youth Board and one of the founders 
of the Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council. 
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coalition could credibly claim to represent “community sentiment.” Embedded in these 
claims, however, were latent class, ethnic, and gender tensions — tensions that would 
surface during the 1960s, when the meanings of community and the boundaries of 
community participation in planning were repeatedly challenged. That CBCC, with its 
mostly middle-class, middle-aged leadership group, took up the cause of reforming the 
behaviors of poor youth would have important consequences going forward.  
 Indeed, the new partnership linking Bed-Stuy’s activist elite to the Wagner 
administration was primarily forged around a common commitment to reforming 
standards of teen behavior and preserving social order in a broader sense. This was the 
third significant aspect of CBCC’s founding: it was part of a broader process by which 
juvenile delinquency came in the late 1950s and early ’60s to serve as a proxy for all 
manner of debates about social conditions in low-income communities, not only in 
Brooklyn but across urban America. As a public-policy issue, the matter of how young 
people should be raised, nurtured, and disciplined was intimately tied into individual and 
community self-perceptions: nothing struck closer to home. (It was for similar reasons 
that schools would become the staging ground for the most visceral debates over 
community control in the late 1960s.)  
 Prior to the founding of CBCC, some of its activists had paid close attention to 
youth crime, as had Maude Richardson in the mid-1940s and Archie Hargraves in the 
mid-1950s. Others took up the issue of juvenile delinquency in the late 1950s as a 
strategic choice: they recognized that talking about wayward youth was a good way of 
getting politicians to pay attention to their otherwise underserved streets. At the same 
time, there was reason for concern that governments were making a fetish of juvenile 
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delinquency in majority-black neighborhoods, thus institutionalizing a portrait of young 
African Americans as deviants and criminals.  
 Bedford-Stuyvesant activists of various stripes would spend much of the early 
1960s demanding that the Wagner administration deal with issues other than 
delinquency. In so doing, they would use CBCC as a platform from which to organize 
grassroots political pressure. This was notable given CBCC’s origins as an adjunct to the 
Youth Board, as well as its continuing dependence on the city for staff and operating 
expenses. Increasingly Maude Richardson and her colleagues would insist that all 
branches of the city government partner with CBCC when it came time to direct services 
to Brooklyn’s African-American population.76 Meanwhile, Wagner’s administration was 
voicing its solidarity with the leadership class of New York’s black communities just as 
the civil-rights movement was vaulting onto the national stage. The rotating cast of 
activists affiliated with CBCC would respond by lobbying for a wide variety of programs 
in their increasingly desperate efforts to gain funding and to shore up an area they 
worried was rapidly spinning out of control. The sincerity of Wagner’s promises to 
revitalize Bed-Stuy, CBCC activists maintained, would be verified not through street 
clubs and detached workers but through schools, health services, and housing programs.77
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Clubhouse Meets White House 
 
 
This community needs a leadership that will fight for its fair share of 
democracy, a leadership that will see to it that the community obtains the 
jobs, the city services, the schools, and the police protection it both needs 
and deserves. I hope that the people in the community and from all over 
the City of New York will join with us in our fight to end the political 
plantation system in Bedford-Stuyvesant. 
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A mid-1960s poster mapping the five Congressional Districts overlapping the 
neighborhood known as Bedford-Stuyvesant. Though African Americans made  
up more than 80% of Bed-Stuy’s population at the time, each of its  
Representatives — Hugh Carey, John Rooney, Eugene Keogh, Emmanuel Celler,  
and Edna Kelly — was white. (Don Watkins papers.) 
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 The early 1960s in New York City were “days full of tension and danger, but also 
of infinite promise,” in the words of Mayor Robert F. Wagner, Jr. This was the moment 
when deindustrialization picked up steam and the middle class quickened its flight to the 
suburbs; the moment when New York began to fracture into a “dual city” 
disproportionately inhabited by the very rich and the very poor; the moment when crime 
embarked on its seemingly inexorable ascendancy; the moment when the city’s finances 
started slouching toward disaster. The city where the New Deal had reached its apogee 
seemed suddenly to be coming apart, battered by what Wagner called “forces beyond the 
control of any municipal government and, in many ways, beyond the control of even 
national governments.” New York during the 1960s lurched from one crisis to the next — 
and the 1970s would be worse.2 
 And yet, there was the promise. Migrants flocked to the city from the American 
South, Puerto Rico, and, after the immigration reform of 1965, all over the world. The 
newcomers dreamt big dreams: of tasting success in the “sweet land of liberty,” of living 
lives free from poverty and discrimination. Civil rights activists ambitiously assailed the 
structures of de facto segregation, mobilizing some of the largest protest actions America 
had yet seen. In neighborhoods around the five boroughs, citizens stood up to defend 
their homes against faceless bureaucracies and rapacious developers — and they seemed 
to be winning. On dozens of rundown yet historic residential blocks, increasing numbers 
of middle-class homeowners were repairing foundations and building communities. 
Everywhere, citizen movements were sprouting up from cracked sidewalks, invoking 
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Jane Jacobs, and laying siege to deeply rooted institutions. Even Wagner, long a friend of 
Tammany Hall, mounted the barricades, joining forces with an upbeat reform coalition to 
take on the machines. Among once-excluded groups, accessing the halls of government 
suddenly seemed possible. 
 This sense of possibility reflected a broader impulse coursing through American 
culture in the early 1960s: participatory democracy. The term was popularized by 
Students for a Democratic Society, who in 1962 made it the animating principle of their 
iconic Port Huron manifesto. As a cri de coeur born both of alienation and of optimism 
— as a critique of bureaucratic power, as a hopeful call for the reinvigoration of 
community — participatory democracy reflected ambivalence about suburbanization, 
militarization, automation, and racism. The revolt against urban renewal, the movement 
to purify politics, the assault on segregation, the sexual revolution: each reflected, in its 
own way, the spirit of participatory democracy. A thousand flowers bloomed and a 
thousand edifices crumbled as citizens demanded power over the decisions that affected 
their daily lives. School boards and planning boards, patronage machines and political 
parties, universities and police departments, statehouses and the White House would all 
come under assault.3 
This is not to say that elites lost their sway — on the contrary. The 1960s sowed 
the seeds of a decades-long insurgency by corporate elites, who would mobilize to cut 
taxes, gut government spending, and take control of the urban-redevelopment agenda. 
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The Cold War alliance of soldiers and capitalists that departing President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower in 1961 dubbed the “military-industrial complex” became ever more 
entrenched in the firmament of American prosperity. Even the revolt against authority 
was to some extent dictated from above. Intellectual elites, peering down from their 
perches in universities, foundations, and government, at once sought to re-articulate the 
grievances of outsider groups and to devise new ways of incorporating grassroots politics 
into the structures of an expanding welfare state. New York’s municipal government had 
been a pioneer in this domain, unveiling neighborhood planning boards and community 
coordinating councils amidst the rumble of bulldozers. By 1961, the federal government 
was following suit, applying a new ideal of “community action” in a series of 
experiments dedicated to reforming juvenile delinquents. Lyndon Johnson’s declaration 
of war against poverty in 1964 would spring from a similar impulse; the infamous 
“maximum feasible participation” mandate of the federal Community Action Program 
(about which more in Chapter 5) was a riff on the idea of participatory democracy, 
conceived among presidential task forces and inter-departmental meetings. 
 Therein lies one of the central paradoxes of the era. The very power structures 
being assaulted as undemocratic proved all too willing to accommodate demands from 
below — or at least to pay them enough lip service to defuse the radical edge of such 
demands. Citizen movements tamed the state, but the state tamed them back. In the end, 
radical impulses were softened, citizen participation ritualized. Yet the innovative 
structures set up to incorporate grassroots energies were also adaptable. Both the 
municipal and federal governments provided political spaces in which community groups 
could press for further devolutions of power. This gave the have-nots access to 
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government resources and gave them the green light to take up policymaking roles and 
imagine different outcomes.4 
So it was with the coalition of grassroots activists, social workers, churchmen, 
civic groups, and block associations that had come together in 1958 as the Central 
Brooklyn Coordinating Council. Though founded to help coordinate the municipal 
government’s youth programs in Brooklyn, CBCC also represented, in the words of 
Thomas R. Jones, “the response of the people of Bedford-Stuyvesant to the civil 
rights movement that then was breaking out all over the country.” Inspired by the new 
mood of the 1960s, CBCC would expand its sights beyond the immediate 
manifestations of juvenile delinquency. In short order, the group organized to end 
gerrymandering, to desegregate public schools, to rehabilitate homes, to spark job 
creation, to draw urban-renewal funds, to bring a college to Central Brooklyn, and, 
eventually, to launch a public-private corporation tasked with stemming capital flight 
from the area. But how would CBCC capture the money and political capital needed 
to carry out such goals? In the short term, juvenile delinquency remained the issue 
most likely to arouse the concern of policymakers — especially given the sudden 
interest emanating from the White House.5  
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(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). 
5 Thomas R. Jones, interview with James Briggs Murray, Feb. 10 1990, Community Development 
Corporation Oral History Project (CDCOH), Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York 
Public Library (Sch-NYPL); Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth in Action, “The Bedford-Stuyvesant Proposal,” 
Aug. 20, 1964, Don Watkins Papers; Elsie Richardson, interview with James Briggs Murray, Feb. 2, 1990, 
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The President’s Committee 
 
 
 March 5, 1961, brought an unusual burst of warmth to New York City. It was a 
Sunday. A winter chill lingered at dawn, but temperatures hit 70 in the late afternoon. In 
the streets people peeled off layers of clothing, baring sun-starved skin to the hopeful 
springtime sun. Ice-cream trucks came out of hibernation, filling the air with summertime 
jingles. Mothers gathered on stoops after church; boys in t-shirts tore in packs down 
chalked-stained sidewalks; clusters of men crackled with talk of Maris and Mantle and 
the season to come.6  
 That day the new president’s younger brother, Robert F. Kennedy, was in town to 
tape a TV show. He decided to take advantage of the balmy weather and go for a walk, a 
long walk. Less than two months into his tenure as attorney general, Kennedy wanted to 
meet some of the city’s notorious youth gangs in their native setting. Juvenile 
delinquency was to be a major focus of the administration’s law-enforcement strategy — 
but what did he, a son of privilege, know about the delinquents themselves? Kennedy had 
his aides call up the city’s Youth Board and arrange a tour of the city’s meanest streets. 
They started on East 66th Street and marched 40 blocks north, into East Harlem. There, 
street workers had lined up appointments with a dozen members of the Viceroys, a Puerto 
Rican gang; later 15 or 20 Redwings — Italian boys — materialized. (That the local 
youth workers could convoke such posses on short notice no doubt impressed the 
attorney general.) Kennedy whiled away the warm afternoon chatting with the boys. He 
                                                
6 “Crocuses and City Bloom on 70 Day,” NYT, Mar. 6, 1961; “Weather Reports Throughout the Nation,” 
NYT, Mar. 6, 1961. 
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was shocked by their casual attitude toward drugs and mesmerized by tales of violence. 
He wanted to know why they fought. But they lacked for answers. “We just like to get 
into it,” one said.7  
 Two days later, on March 9, 1961, the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile 
Delinquency opened hearings on a proposed $10 million federal program to counter 
youth crime. The first witness, fittingly, was the mayor of New York. Over the years, 
Robert Wagner had testified repeatedly about youth violence in his city. On this day he 
bore his usual collection of machetes, zip guns, and knives, all seized from the clutches of 
gang members. But the silver-haired solons seemed to be paying him more attention than 
usual. As Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut, the committee’s chairman, pointed out, youth 
crime had leapt 177% nationwide since 1948; indeed, what was known as “white collar” 
juvenile delinquency was increasingly raising alarm in affluent suburbs.8  
 “It cannot be overemphasized that delinquency is a national problem,” Wagner told 
the senators, “and no section, no state, and no community is immune.” Though keen to 
praise his city’s Youth Board, Wagner admitted that the problems bearing down on New 
York surpassed his government’s ability to respond. Federal action was critical. Among 
                                                
7 “Youth Gangs, Attorney General Talk,” The Sun, Mar. 9, 1961. David Hackett, the executive director of 
the President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime under John F. Kennedy and a 
childhood friend of his brother’s, later recalled that “We were very green in understanding the problems 
… We had a tendency to think of young people as like when we were young and sort of looked upon the 
solutions of their problems as like the solutions to our own. So, the conversations at the beginning were, 
perhaps [,] naïve.” Quoted in Edward R. Schmitt, President of the Other America: Robert Kennedy and 
the Politics of Poverty (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010), p. 69.  
8 In New York, total arrests for minors increased 125% during the 1950s. Though some of this increase 
could be written off as the result of the increased policing of relatively minor offenses that resulted from 
the mounting public hand-wringing about delinquency, the fastest growing category of juvenile arrests 
was for “injury to person,” which quadrupled between 1950 and 1959. All told, the number of youth 
arrests for crimes defined as “major” almost doubled during the same period. Yet it was also true that 
arrests of adults for the same categories of crimes had risen 110% during this period. In other words, 
delinquency was of a piece with a generalized rise in crime in New York City. Juvenile Delinquency 
Evaluation Project of the City of New York, directed by Robert M. MacIver, “Delinquency in the Great 
City” (July 1961). 
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other things, Wagner asked the subcommittee to move against drug trafficking and the 
interstate weapons commerce, and to fund a Youth Conservation Corps. But jobs 
programs would be the key. As Ralph Whelan, New York’s Commissioner of Youth 
Services, explained to the subcommittee, experts had concluded that fighting juvenile 
delinquency would require, first and foremost, addressing the high unemployment rates 
that prevailed in those urban neighborhoods where youth crime was most common.9  
 Juvenile delinquency had for years been a hot-button issue in New York, inspiring 
scores of hysterical speeches and dozens of breathless news reports. But with the release 
of the Oscar-winning West Side Story in 1961, the street gangs of New York (albeit a 
romanticized version of them) became a national obsession. That same year, the first of 
the baby boomers would turn 16, and the culture was suddenly registering the 
implications of that epochal generational shift. The old saw signs of youth rebellion 
everywhere. The lunch-counter sit-ins that began in February 1960 had marked not only 
the dawn of a new decade, but also the new assertiveness of youth in setting the country’s 
moral agenda. The sit-ins, of course, were nonviolent political protests led by buttoned-
up college students — the very antithesis of the nihilistic violence Attorney General 
Kennedy detected among the toughs of East Harlem. And yet, the sit-ins were 
unmistakable acts of rebellion carried out by young people. Unlike their 1950s forbears, 
the rebels of the 1960s had a cause — many causes. And men like Wagner and Kennedy 
increasingly suspected that the causes behind the lunch-counter sit-ins were not all that 
different from those driving youth gangs into the streets of New York. 
                                                
9 Robert F. Wagner, Speech before the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency, Mar. 9, 1961, 
Folder 22, Box 06046W, RFW, LGW online. “City’s Gang Wars Ascribed to Girls,” New York Times 
(NYT), Mar. 10, 1961. 
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 By the time Kennedy toured East Harlem, a consensus had coalesced in policy 
circles around the idea that young people turned to deviant behavior in response to 
systemic factors: poverty, joblessness, poor housing, and, above all, racial discrimination. 
“The world in which they were born was stony hard, cruel, and demoralizing,” Wagner 
once said of his city’s young criminals. “Even at birth their horizons were limited. Before 
they learned to walk, they joined the ranks of the disadvantaged. … We have learned one 
fact: that of all the problem syndromes, racial injustice and discrimination have the 
sharpest cutting edges, contribute the most to social pathology, and are the most resistant 
to the approaches or remedies available to a city government.”10 
It made sense, then, that anti-delinquency efforts should be national in scope. 
Now the federal government was ready to act. The new President, John F. Kennedy, had 
taken office six weeks earlier calling for a fresh spirit of national sacrifice. Himself an 
emblem of youthful energy, Kennedy had also promised on the campaign trail to address 
the problems of youth. Congress, however, was in no mood to pass a sweeping new 
federal delinquency program. So the administration’s campaign against youth crime 
would unfold quietly, overshadowed by foreign-policy issues, fiscal policy, and the 
cresting civil-rights movement. On May 11, 1961, Kennedy established by executive 
order the President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (PCJD). The 
initiative brought together the Attorney General; the secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, Abraham Ribicoff; and Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg, along with a gang 
of delinquency wonks from the academy and from public and private agencies. The 
presence of the three agency heads reflected the prevailing diagnosis that tackling youth 
                                                
10 Robert F. Wagner, Speech at Brandeis University, Nov. 16, 1965, Folder 7, Box 060249, RFW Papers, 
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misbehavior was no simple question of law and order but also a matter of mental health, 
social services, and unemployment.  
Social scientists and historians have treated the President’s Committee in great 
detail. Though lightly funded and little remarked-upon during John Kennedy’s lifetime, it 
stands today as one of his best-known domestic initiatives. Scholarly interest owes less to 
what the PCJD accomplished than what it inspired. The Committee’s work foreshadowed 
a certain style of federal policymaking — decentralized, experimental, hostile to 
traditional bureaucracies — that would reach full flower during the War on Poverty. It 
also brought together within the federal bureaucracy a network of academics, 
bureaucratic dealmakers, and foundation officials who together would prove instrumental 
in transferring a body of what Alice O’Connor calls “poverty knowledge” to the new 
poverty initiative during its planning phases in late 1963 and early 1964. Though 
officially focused on curtailing youth crime, the PCJD quickly became a clearinghouse 
for ideas about how to tackle the conditions that structured delinquents’ lives: poverty, 
racial discrimination, community breakdown. Most significantly, it gave the federal seal 
of approval to a nebulous concept known as community action, which after 1964 would 
become the centerpiece of War on Poverty.11 
                                                
11 On the delinquency program and its antecedents, see, among others, Marris and Rein, Dilemmas of 
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 The President’s Committee sponsored a series of local experiments, many of 
which also received funding from municipal governments. The Ford Foundation also 
participated in the PCJD’s work; Ford, through its Gray Areas program and other 
experimental urban projects, had since the late 1950s been exploring the applicability of 
the community-action idea in poor neighborhoods. (The most substantial Ford project 
unfolded in New Haven under the supervision of Mitchell Sviridoff, who would later 
direct New York’s Human Resources Agency during the mayoral administration of John 
Lindsay.12) The projects PCJD sponsored fit several criteria. First, each was confined to a 
relatively small geographic area. Second, each took a “comprehensive” approach, which 
meant addressing juvenile delinquency as a collective rather than an individual problem 
and, in so doing, bringing people together to come up with common solutions to their 
problems. Third, anti-delinquency programs undertaken by each project were meant to 
provide social learning and capacity for addressing social issues other than delinquency 
(poverty, for instance). Fourth, given the meager resources the federal government was 
willing to dedicate to any given project, each local group was expected to secure financial 
commitments from other sources, most notably the Ford Foundation. Finally, in keeping 
with the “demonstration” nature of the program, each local project was rooted in social-
scientific theory and subject to systematic evaluation.13  
Though the delinquency program was an interagency enterprise, Robert Kennedy 
emerged as its most committed patron. To the Attorney General’s mind, the fight against 
                                                
12 On the Gray Areas program, see Alice O’Connor, “Community Action, Urban Reform, and the Fight 
against Poverty: The Ford Foundation’s Gray Areas Program,” Journal of Urban History 22:5 (July 
1996). 
13 President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, Criteria for evaluating applications for Grants to 
Conduct Demonstration Action Projects (Draft), May 1, 1963, “Key Documents, 1961-1965,” Box 4, 
Daniel Knapp Papers, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (JFKL). 
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youth crime was both a moral crusade and a matter of law and order. Along with his 
deepening involvement in the civil-rights struggle, it provided something of a bridge 
between the early Kennedy — tough, anticommunist — and the compassionate Kennedy 
of later years who became a devoted ally of the poor and the oppressed. Though not 
involved in day-to-day planning, the president’s brother kept a close watch on the 
delinquency initiative and personally visited several of the projects unfolding in 
impoverished parts of the country. He also enlisted his childhood friend David Hackett, a 
former McGill University hockey star with no relevant policy experience, as the project’s 
executive director. The delinquency program brought Kennedy face to face with the 
ravages of poverty, racism, and unemployment and led him toward an environmental 
understanding of juvenile delinquency.14  
A 1962 speech to the Citizens Advisory Committee of the PCJD eloquently laid 
out the Attorney General’s views. Kennedy began by pointing out that the national 
delinquency rate had risen for a dozen straight years; given the enormous growth of the 
youth population during this time, that also meant a dramatic rise in the absolute numbers 
of young criminals. “Delinquency is steadily spreading throughout our society,” he told 
the committee. With school-dropout rates and youth unemployment on the rise, an “army 
of out-of-school, unemployed youth” was looming. This alienated mass of actual and 
potential criminals glorified instant gratification — violence, casual sex, drugs, drinking 
— and exerted intense pressure on straight peers to drop out themselves.15  
Beyond youth culture, Kennedy blamed structural problems in the economy for 
                                                
14 Schmitt, President of the Other America, pp. 71-72.  
15 Robert F. Kennedy, Remarks to the Citizens Advisory Council of the President’s Committee on 
Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (PCJD), Sept. 21, 1962, “Presidents Committee File, Undated,” 
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Chapter 3: Clubhouse Meets White House  162 
 
the spike in the delinquency. The flight of unskilled migrants from the countryside to 
urban centers was exacerbating the stiff competition for jobs; meanwhile, automation was 
eliminating the kinds of jobs typically claimed by young urbanites with minimal skills. 
Some 26 million young people were expected to join the workforce during the 1960s, of 
whom 7.5 million would not have graduated high school. The numbers were staggering. 
Based on Kennedy’s calculations, somewhere between three and four million teenagers 
would “become delinquent in this decade.”16  
What was to be done? Kennedy called for a combination of individual 
remediation and structural change. He hoped federal programs could “offer new and 
expanded opportunities to young people, opportunities in education and employment 
and recreation, opportunities to overcome barriers based on race and religion.” This 
meant jobs programs, improved social services, more and better schools, modernized 
youth-outreach bureaucracies, and civil-rights legislation. Specific communities would 
be targeted for experimental programs tailored to the context in which deviant 
behaviors were learned. Still, there was no guarantee that dismantling barriers to 
opportunity would eradicate delinquency; after all, the vast majority of young people, 
even in the most benighted communities, lived lives free of crime and violence and did 
their best to join the affluent society. Individual choices mattered. Perhaps, then, the 
best the government could do was, as Kennedy put it, to “help these young people so 
that they will want to lead decent, useful lives, rather than lives of crime and self-
destruction.” But what did that mean in practice? Was education the ticket? “The best 
education in the world is not enough if there are no jobs waiting for a boy,” Kennedy 
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said, “or if he cannot get a job because of his race or background.” Solutions, in other 
words, must be comprehensive, coordinated at all levels of government and in concert 




Mobilization for Youth 
 
 
The model for such action was Mobilization for Youth (MFY), an experiment 
unfolding on Manhattan’s Lower East Side, only a short walk from Robert Wagner’s 
office at City Hall. As a demonstration program, MFY was meant to test the validity of 
social-scientific assumptions about juvenile delinquency and show what kinds of 
remedies might be crafted. Its blueprint, according to Kennedy, foresaw “an integrated 
program of job opportunities, improved education, increased social services, new 
recreational activities, and improved community organization.” Yet the agency would 
shortly articulate a more political, confrontational mission for itself.18 
 Often cited as the most important precursor to the War on Poverty’s community-
action effort, Mobilization for Youth resulted from cooperation among federal agencies, 
the New York City Youth Board, settlement houses and community groups, the Ford 
Foundation, and Columbia University professors. It owed a primary debt to ideas of the 
Chicago sociologist Leonard Cottrell. An erstwhile contributor to Clifford Shaw’s 
landmark 1929 study of delinquency in Chicago, Cottrell would become an advisor to the 
PCJD in 1961. He had trained under Robert Park and other Chicago-school proponents of 
“social ecology.” According to the social ecologists, urban communities inhabited by 
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large numbers of newcomers became “disorganized”; the trauma of rapid change resulted 
in “pathological” mindsets. For Cottrell, the key to remedying such pathologies was to 
foster “competent communities” in which local citizens, newly confident of their ability 
to act, actively participated in collective action aimed at solving their own problems and 
assimilating deviant behaviors. Yet MFY would push this idea of community competence 
still further. Simply helping the “indigenous” residents of the Lower East Side to 
organize and reform their own community would be insufficient: they must also be 
trained to confront outside power structures.19  
 This model of community action to some extent echoed what Saul Alinsky had been 
practicing and preaching in Chicago for two decades. But it acquired theoretical heft 
thanks to the work of two Columbia social-work professors, Richard Cloward and Lloyd 
Ohlin. In a 1960 book, Delinquency and Opportunity, Cloward and Ohlin argued that 
low-income youths engaged in self-destructive behavior not because they were 
pathological deviants but because they lacked opportunities in mainstream society. 
Cloward and Ohlin posited that delinquency stemmed from “anomie,” a concept they 
borrowed from the French sociologist Emile Durkheim and which they defined as 
meaning “lawlessness, or normlessness … a state in which social norms no longer control 
men’s actions.”20 Delinquents, they argued, came to disregard social norms out of 
frustration at the disparity between their aspirations and the pathways to achievement; 
their behavior reflected “not a lack of motivation to conform but quite the opposite.” If 
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gang members could be introduced to widened opportunities, they might change their 
behavior and, in so doing, begin to break the self-perpetuating “circle of poverty” that 
ensnared them. But in order for new opportunities to emerge, structural barriers must first 
be overcome — and that could only happen through well-planned community agitation, 
preferably in cooperation with a coterie of enlightened experts, “insiders” who were 
familiar enough with the system to know where its vulnerabilities lay.21 
 Despite its theoretical underpinnings, Mobilization’s institutional roots lay in the 
social-reform traditions of the Progressive Era and in the gang-outreach programs of the 
postwar years. A volatile mix of ethnic groups coexisted uneasily on the Lower East Side, 
and in 1954 a coalition of settlement houses, churches, and civic groups had banded 
together in hopes of softening mounting strife between the Sportsmen (an African-
American teenage gang), the Dragons (Puerto Ricans), and the May Roses (whites). 
Dubbed the Lower Eastside Neighborhood Association (LENA), this reform coalition 
harkened back to Shaw’s Chicago Area Project, which had pioneered the community-
based approach to juvenile delinquency later picked up by New York’s Youth Board. 
LENA, together with the venerable Henry Street Settlement and a crew of Youth Board 
workers, strove to avert the most explosive gang conflicts while also working with 
younger children to steer them away from gangs. Initially, this approach didn’t differ 
markedly from what the Brooklyn Planning Council had tried to do with the Brewery 
Boys some years earlier — although LENA did try to intercede on a broader scale than 
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had the effort surrounding Tompkins Park.22 
 In 1957, the Lower East Side initiative gained the attention of Cloward and Ohlin. 
The professors had begun working with the Ford Foundation, which was planning a small 
number of community-action programs in impoverished urban areas around the country. 
In conversations with the most influential of the Lower East Side agencies, Henry Street 
Settlement, Cloward and Ohlin proposed to help expand the LENA project into a more 
ambitious program of social change, one that might earn grant monies from either Ford or 
federal agencies. The locals concurred, though there were tensions from the beginning. 
Cloward argued that social workers should help poor people launch rent strikes, picket 
City Hall, and fight the welfare bureaucracy; that was a far cry from the moderate 
reformism espoused by Henry Street’s longtime director, Helen Hall. “The idea of 
rousing up the people themselves to start raising hell about their housing conditions, 
having sit-ins in welfare waiting rooms, and things like that just blew their minds,” 
Cloward recalled years later. “It threatened to disrupt these long established relationships, 
which the heads of the settlements had with leading political figures in the city.”23  
 In the ensuing years, the Lower East Side became a “great natural laboratory” for 
the study of delinquency and its cures. Mayor Wagner officially launched Mobilization 
for Youth under the auspices of the city’s juvenile-delinquency program in February 
1959. The agency’s board at the time reflected the intensely local concern of 
Mobilization in its original iteration: 20 city officials sat alongside 11 members of 
Columbia’s School of Social Work and 23 representatives of Lower East Side social 
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agencies.24 Later that year, the National Institute of Mental Health provided the first 
federal grant, and in 1961 both the Ford Foundation and the President’s Committee on 
Juvenile Delinquency followed suit. Finally, on May 30, 1962, Wagner and the brothers 
Kennedy stood shoulder to shoulder in the White House garden to announce the official 
unveiling of a reborn MFY as a joint city-federal project. The project would receive a 
hefty $12.6 million (the equivalent of $92 million in 2011) over the next three years, with 
the largest share of funds coming from Wagner’s coffers. President Kennedy proclaimed 
it “the most advanced program yet devised to combat delinquency on a broad scale.”25 
Thus did Mobilization for Youth become the standard bearer for a new kind of 
theory-driven community action. Following on its example, future PCJD grantees would 
be asked to demonstrate the validity — or lack thereof — of a set of hypotheses about 
delinquency’s causes and solutions. These were to be place-based hypotheses, rooted in 
specific neighborhoods and targeted at local power structures. It was only after a 
theoretical outlook had been established and a mass of data gathered that specific “action 
programs” could be launched. Social science aside, demonstration projects were also 
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politically expedient, at least from the Kennedys’ point of view. Because they were 
jointly funded and locally run, they were partly sheltered from a Congress largely hostile 
to Kennedy’s domestic initiatives.26  
 Mobilization fell far short of proving Cloward and Ohlin’s ideas about 
opportunity structures. The agency nonetheless wielded enormous influence on federal 
policy, especially after 1964, when the community-action approach was written into law 
as part of the War on Poverty. Ohlin himself would end up working for the PCJD, as a 
research consultant. The Cloward-Ohlin theory, however, was not hegemonic: as one 
PCJD planner, Leonard Stern, later recalled, “we really worked like hell to fight off the 
accusation that we were trying to develop all of the cities around the Ohlin and Cloward 
book.” Federal funders encouraged local planners to consult the sociological literature 
and come up with their own theoretical perspectives. The problem was that it was hard 
work tailoring theory to a particular neighborhood. A program named Harlem Youth 
Opportunities Unlimited, launched with federal and city funds in 1962 under the tutelage 
of the psychologist Kenneth Clark, was the exception that proved the rule. Clark set aside 
the Cloward-Ohlin thesis and devised an original analysis of delinquency, one more 
attentive to the legacies of racism (and about which more in Chapter 4). But not every 
neighborhood had a Kenneth Clark. In the years to come, as community-action agencies 
sprouted up by the hundreds, most local reformers read from either the Cloward-Ohlin 
playbook or Clark’s — regardless of whether those theories matched local realities.27  
 By end of 1963, the PCJD had funded projects in 16 different cities. Mobilization 
for Youth was the only one to have run a full-scale demonstration project, and it dwarfed 
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other agencies in terms of funding with $1.9 million in PCJD monies and more than $9 
million from other sources. (The next-best funded PCJD projects were in New Haven and 
the Cleveland neighborhood of Hough, each of which had received approximately $1 
million from the federal government and support from the Ford Foundation.) Still, the 
mere fact of having birthed a network of agencies through which federal dollars could be 
disbursed directly to citizen groups in poor localities was significant. So was the fact that 
most of the projects were unfolding in minority neighborhoods. At a moment when 
activists in such places were casting about for ways of translating the promise of the 
civil-rights struggle into concrete gains, the PCJD programs, like the Youth Board 
experiments before them, signaled the possibility that the state might prove an ally.  
 By the time planning for a federal assault on poverty began, in late 1963, the 
PCJD’s executive director, David Hackett, among others, was insisting that the 
community-action strategy used to combat delinquency could be transferred to future 
antipoverty efforts. Hackett observed that the PCJD projects increasingly focused on 
enhancing opportunities for youth rather than pursuing reactive steps against criminal 
behavior. Such a pre-emptive approach meant not merely targeting remedial programs at 
a relatively small number of known delinquents but creating social interventions meant to 
tie entire communities into the “opportunity structures” of American life.28 Wagner, too, 
welcomed the new experiments in “community-wide social planning” as keys to 
addressing the major structural obstacles facing New York’s poor youths. “Today,” he 
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told a meeting of the PCJD in January 1963, “we clearly realize that we must devote 
increasing energies to creating new jobs and to training our young people in new skills, 
and to breaking down the barriers of discrimination. Unless we do this, we will be 
compelled to meet the steadily mounting costs of public assistance, rehabilitation 
services, and of police activity.”29 
 This new brand of place-based policymaking would have both salutary and 
malignant effects in years to come. On one hand, it validated democratic ideals: that the 
solutions to local problems could only be found by tapping into local expertise and by 
empowering community groups with access to the political system. On the other hand, 
there was something illogical about the federal government using neighborhood-based 
initiatives — ones that operated within narrow geographic constraints, no matter how 
“comprehensive” their theoretical outlook — to tackle enormous structural problems. 
Putting community organizing at the core of policy processes in low-income areas 
entailed risks. What if the promised funds fell short of expectations? What if the weapons 
of the weak proved lacking? Would newly organized community groups rise up against 








 Yet another outburst of violence shook Brooklyn in the spring and early summer of 
1961, when gang skirmishes in Williamsburg, Crown Heights, and Bedford-Stuyvesant 
left five teens dead. The rumbles of old also seemed to have returned, as rival crews 
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representing different housing projects faced off in turf wars. The press pounced on the 
story, and the Times even dusted off the Depression-era “Little Harlem” designation to go 
alongside an unflattering description of Bedford-Stuyvesant.  
 The Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council, inaugurated three years earlier to 
tackle gang violence in the area, began holding public meetings at the Bedford Avenue 
YMCA to discuss the violence. CBCC’s president, Maude B. Richardson, and her second 
in command, a physician named Robert Palmer, begged the city government to intervene. 
“An emergency situation exists in Bedford-Stuyvesant, requiring the introduction of 
emergency corrective measures,” Palmer told the mayor.30  
 Wagner apparently concurred. On July 19, 1961, he convened a public meeting at 
Junior High School 258 in Bedford-Stuyvesant to solicit community viewpoints. Some 
500 residents packed into the school’s sweltering auditorium and inundated the mayor 
with complaints big (Jim Crow unions) and small (sour milk in local grocery stores). A 
week later, Wagner hosted an hour-long meeting at City Hall with 15 Bedford-Stuyvesant 
leaders, who presented him with a series of recommendations. The mayor, in an election 
year, showed himself to be receptive, no doubt mindful of cultivating support among 
black New Yorkers. (That same week, the city’s most powerful black politician, 
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., had come out for Wagner’s opponent in the 
Democratic primary, Arthur Levitt, decrying the mayor’s civil-rights record as little more 
than tokenism.) Wagner followed up by unveiling a plan for Bedford-Stuyvesant that 
included eight additional Youth Board group workers, increased police presence, and 
money to keep schools open at night and on weekends. In addition, the Commission on 
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Intergroup Relations, the city agency tasked with investigating charges of racial 
discrimination, would open an office in Bed-Stuy. The mayor also promised to consider 
launching a physical-renewal program aimed at revitalizing Bedford-Stuyvesant’s 
declining housing stock. Community leaders responded with cautious enthusiasm. The 
reliably pro-Wagner Amsterdam News lauded the mayor’s consultative approach, writing 
that he had set “the example of how to launch a good community program.”31 
 Results lagged behind rhetoric. More than a year later, in September 1962, the 
Youth Board’s Walter Pinkston would call together CBCC leaders to discuss what was 
described as an “emergency situation” in areas of Bedford-Stuyvesant and Crown 
Heights surrounding the Albany, Brevoort, and Kingsborough housing projects, where, 
according to Pinkston, “too few recreational facilities and youth workers” existed.32 By 
that point, leaders of CBCC were forced to admit that there was precious little to show 
for four years of organizing activity. Across the East River in Lower Manhattan, millions 
of dollars in foundation and federal dollars had been lavished on Mobilization for Youth; 
up in Harlem, a bold new community-action program was in the works. Efforts in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant, meanwhile, had bogged down. Partly this owed to the lack of 
political power wielded by Brooklyn activists; Bed-Stuy had no Adam Clayton Powell, 
and it had yet to attract the attention of the President’s Committee on Juvenile 
Delinquency. But CBCC had so far proven a flawed vehicle for exerting political 
pressure. A self-selecting group from the start, it claimed to speak for the entire 
community but was run almost entirely by (and, arguably, in the interests of) Bedford-
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Stuyvesant’s middle-class. Its focus on controlling youth behavior kept it aloof from the 
broader concerns of area residents. Equally problematic was the group’s dependence on 
the city government, which proved better at making promises than at executing them.33   
 In the years to come, CBCC would not only take up a wide range of social and 
economic campaigns; it would also learn how to simultaneously work within the city 
bureaucracy and campaign in opposition to it — a model of community action with great 
potential and great pitfalls. CBCC during the early 1960s would reinvent itself as a social 
movement, one capable of wielding influence in the policy arena. Several developments 
in the city’s political culture paved the way for this transformation. It was a heady time. 
Reformers were mounting a political insurgency against the entrenched Democratic Party 
machine in Brooklyn, which unfolded against the dramatic backdrop of a citywide reform 
movement. A wave of civil-rights protests crested in Brooklyn just as the black freedom 
struggle was washing over the national stage. Meanwhile, neighborhood groups were 
bubbling up across the city, seeking to protect aging landscapes from rapacious 
developers and the bulldozers of the urban-renewal regime. These various revolts were in 
many ways intermingled, and in Bedford-Stuyvesant they came together under the 
auspices of CBCC.34 
 In 1961, Wagner made a historic break with Tammany Hall. Only a few short 
years earlier, Tammany boss Carmine DeSapio had sponsored Wagner’s accession to the 
mayoralty; in 1957, all four of the city’s county Democratic machines had united to earn 
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Wagner a plurality of 923,007 votes — the largest in New York’s history — over his 
Republican opponent. But splits had begun to emerge within the Democratic Party, and in 
1958 a reform wing led by Eleanor Roosevelt and Herbert Lehman broke with the 
regulars. The reformers hoped, in Lehman’s words, “to free this city with one blow from 
the shackles of the boss system”; most immediately, this meant democratizing the 
Manhattan Democratic organization, long dominated by Tammany.35 But the reformers 
also stood for a brand of municipal liberalism that in many ways lined up with Wagner’s 
beliefs. By 1961, with reform clubs sprouting up all over the city, it became clear that 
Wagner would have to join them or be seen as a tool of the bosses. DeSapio was a 
legendary figure who, with shaded glasses, impeccable hair, and tailored suits, seemed 
the very incarnation of backroom politics. But the Queens, Bronx, and Brooklyn 
machines were in many ways more formidable foes. Wagner took them all on in 1961 
and, in his proudest political moment, beat them all. In so doing he became the reform 
movement’s unlikely factotum and triggered a reconfiguration of the city’s political 
landscape. The Wagner of 1953 and 1957 had drawn on a classic New Dealer’s alliance; 
in 1961, he lost a portion of the white working class but pulled together a coalition made 
up of African Americans and Puerto Ricans, public-sector workers, left-leaning Jews, and 
intellectual elites. It was a fraught alliance: many young reformers had long seen Wagner 
as the enemy.36 
 By 1962, there were 44 reform clubs in the city. The most prominent represented 
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Manhattan neighborhoods, but there were eight clubs in Brooklyn, eight in Queens, and 
seven in the Bronx. Reformers planned to contest district leaderships in each one, and 
several candidates hoped to unseat machine-backed candidates for statewide office. 
Broadly speaking, the reform movement in Brooklyn had two wings. In the precincts of 
what would later be known as “Brownstone Brooklyn” — Brooklyn Heights, Cobble 
Hill, Park Slope — recent middle-class arrivals, many of them intellectuals harboring a 
countercultural streak, were taking on the patronage-dispensing clubhouses supported by 
working-class white ethnics. Meanwhile, in Central Brooklyn, African-American 
reformers were attempting to build an independent base of black political power that 
might mirror the spirit of civil-rights movement.37  
 The leader of this latter group was Thomas R. Jones, a diminutive yet imperious 
attorney. Jones gave voice, in his rousing speeches, to the reform movement’s most 
idealistic impulses. Born in 1913 to Barbadian immigrants, Jones had spent much of his 
childhood living in the area known today as Boerum Hill, where Jews, Poles, Italians, and 
West Indians lived side by side. In the 1920s Jones’s family moved to Hancock Street, in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant. His father, a podiatrist, was a Garveyite, and he also helped to 
organize the rising numbers of African-American homeowners in Bedford-Stuyvesant 
into block associations. The young Jones began practicing law out of a Fulton Street 
storefront during the Depression, working mostly with labor groups and block 
associations; later he would represent Communists and victims of police brutality. (The 
actor and singer Paul Robeson was a personal friend.) During the Popular Front years, he 
became active in the New York Youth Congress, a leftist organization. Upon returning 
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from his war service and attempting to join the Democratic club in his home district, he 
found himself referred to the “colored club.” (Its leader, Bertram Baker, was a political 
moderate from the Caribbean island of Nevis who had in 1948 been elected to the State 








James Farmer, national director of the Congress for Racial Equality, 
along with the comedian and activist Dick Gregory and the Rev. Milton 
Galamison of Brooklyn’s Siloam Presbyterian Church, conferring in 
February 1964 during the New York City school boycott. 
(AP Photo/Jacob Harris) 
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decades-long crusade against Brooklyn’s Democratic Party regulars. In 1948, he 
supported Henry Wallace and ran unsuccessfully for a judgeship on the American Labor 
Party ticket. Then, in the early 1950s, he teamed with Wesley Holder and Shirley 
Chisholm to found the pioneering Bedford-Stuyvesant Political League.38  
 In 1959, Jones again joined forces with Chisholm to launch the Unity Democratic 
Club, an integrated reform movement designed to challenge the regulars head-on. The 
Unity Democrats raised their profile in Bedford-Stuyvesant through dogged street-level 
organizing and by helping people address day-to-day concerns. They offered advice on 
how to buy homes without falling prey to unscrupulous lenders. They supported the 
efforts of Milton Galamison and the Brooklyn NAACP to desegregate public schools; 
they teamed with civil-rights groups to organize boycotts of companies that refused to 
hire black employees. Jones pledged to “run the carpet baggers out of the community” 
and posed as the defender of “people against power, men against money.” In 1962, with 
Eleanor Roosevelt campaigning on his behalf, Jones took on incumbent Sam Berman for 
the 17th Assembly seat and won; a black woman with close ties to CBCC, Ruth Goring, 
was elected co-district leader.39 
 “A political cloud lifted in our community” was the assessment of Amsterdam 
News columnist Ernesta Procope following Jones’s victory. Yet electoral politics could 
scarcely address the full range of injustices and deprivations facing Brooklyn’s African-
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American population. Even as the Unity Democrats were laying siege to segregated 
clubhouse politics in Kings County, civil-rights activists were massing their forces for the 
most concerted assault on racial discrimination in New York City’s history.40  
 The outpouring of activism in early-1960s New York was more than just a shadow 
movement appended to the Southern struggle. Of course New York activists were 
inspired by events unfolding on the national stage; and of course they went South to 
register voters, desegregate bus stations, and march on Washington. But the city’s civil-
rights mobilization was distinctive, for several reasons. First, it drew on a long tradition 
dating back to the civil-rights unionism of the 1930s, when New York was in many ways 
the epicenter of the national struggle for black rights. Don’t-buy-where-you-can’t-work 
campaigns in early 1960s Bedford-Stuyvesant — which included boycotts of the Sealtest 
Dairy, Ebinger Bakeries, and the A&P supermarket chain — harkened back to 
Depression-era campaigns conducted both in Harlem and, to a lesser extent, in 
Brooklyn.41 Second, civil-rights activists in 1960s Brooklyn had the law on their side: 
New York City and State had long led the nation in anti-discrimination legislation. And, 
unlike black activists almost everywhere else, they had allies at City Hall and in the 
Statehouse. (The liberal Republican Nelson Rockefeller, ostensibly a supporter of civil 
rights, became governor in 1959.) This meant, again, that civil-rights protests often ended 
in negotiations and compromise rather than attack dogs and fire houses, even when more 
radical voices among the protestors hoped to highlight entrenched systemic inequalities. 
Such was the case in the summer of 1963, when hundreds of demonstrators were arrested 
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while protesting Jim Crow construction crews at the Downstate Medical Center in 
Brooklyn, a state-funded hospital project. After a month-long direct-action campaign 
demanding a quota system to provide construction jobs for blacks and Puerto Ricans, a 
coalition of Bedford-Stuyvesant ministers negotiated a compromise with Governor 
Rockefeller. The campaign revealed emerging splits within Brooklyn’s fragile civil-rights 
coalition; the compromise disappointed many protestors, and radicals from the Congress 
for Racial Equality (CORE) accused the ministers of selling out their constituents in 
exchange for token concessions.42  
 Another aspect of New York’s distinctiveness, which could be said to some extent 
of the North in general, was that the grievances of African Americans most often 
concerned not unjust laws but unequal allocation of government resources. Since Jim 
New York’s elected officials from Wagner up through Rockefeller and Kennedy had 
almost to a man pledged allegiance to the cause of black equality, it made sense to hold 
them to their word by demanding a fair share of state largesse: hospitals, housing, public-
sector jobs, funds for urban renewal. The most ferocious battles erupted over public 
schools, which by the early 1960s ranked among the most segregated in the county. The 
stark disjuncture between New York’s official creed and its lived realities inspired a mass 
movement to integrate city schools. Led by Milton Galamison, head of the Brooklyn 
NAACP and the minister of Siloam Presbyterian Church in Bedford-Stuyvesant, the 
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movement peaked with a February 1964 boycott that saw 45% of the city’s 
schoolchildren stay home from school for a day. That same year, a group of Brooklyn 
teachers formed the African-American Teachers Union (AATA) to contest the meager 
resources being allocated to schools in majority-black areas, as well as the near-total 
exclusion of blacks from top administrative positions in city schools. The teachers group 
(discussed at length in Chapter 7) represented a new form of radical politics waged from 
within the state apparatus — teachers were, after all, public servants, though they would 
increasingly define themselves first and foremost as community servants.43  
 This raises a final point about New York’s civil-rights struggle: the men and 
women leading street protests were simultaneously working within the structures of city 
government to divert resources back to their own neighborhoods. Unlike in the South, 
Brooklyn-based activists had various access points to the state. Thomas R. Jones and the 
Unity Democrats picketed Jim Crow workplaces while also working their alliance with 
the Manhattan-based reform movement to penetrate the political system. The Rev. 
Gardner Taylor of Concord Baptist Church could simultaneously collaborate with CORE 
on direct-action campaigns, march alongside Martin Luther King, Jr., and serve as 
Wagner’s main surrogate in Bedford-Stuyvesant in the wake of the mayor’s split with the 
Democratic regulars. Later in the 1960s, the War on Poverty would open up a whole new 
set of access points to the state — so many, in fact, that community activists would wage 
fierce internecine battles over which ones merited their attention.   
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 In other words, New York’s civil-rights movement, and especially its Brooklyn 
iteration, featured forces often seen as irreconcilable — integrationists and separatists, 
radicals and moderates — joining forces in a multifaceted movement. This mirrored a 
broader inclination among civil-rights activists in the urban North who, according to 
Sugrue, were improvisational with their strategies and ideologically inconsistent.”44 It 
would be a stretch to speak of a grand civil-rights coalition in Brooklyn, given the strains, 
tensions, and fault lines that existed at all times. But there were spaces in which the 
various thrusts came together. The Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council was one such 
space, as were the poverty programs of the Great Society years. 
 An emblematic figure was Robert Palmer, who replaced Maude Richardson as 
president of CBCC in 1961. Palmer, a chiropractor, was perhaps best known for his 
campaign (as a Republican) for State Assembly in 1960, when he lost big to incumbent 
Sam Berman. He also ranked among the leaders of the Brooklyn chapter of CORE, which 
was gaining national attention for its bold protests. “Other CORE chapters looked to 
Brooklyn CORE as an example of how to maintain militant and aggressive actions that 
successfully attracted media attention and embarrassed intransigent powerbrokers into 
negotiations or concessions,” the historian Brian Purnell has argued.45 
 At the same time, Palmer sat on the executive board of the Bedford-Stuyvesant 
Neighborhood Council, an affiliate of CBCC. The Neighborhood Council was a 
consortium of 90-odd block associations that had been founded during the 1930s to 
promote interracial unity and quality-of-life improvements in the area. The organization 
spoke mostly for and to homeowners, organizing them to plant trees, run neighborhood-
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cleanup drives, and clear empty lots. The group emphasized individual responsibility for 
neighborhood conditions, encouraging each citizen to take pride in his or her home and 
block. But this didn’t stop the Neighborhood Council from lobbying city and borough 
officials for stepped up police protection, improved public transportation, and regular 
garbage collection. The latter issue — trash — was a point of contention in Brooklyn 
throughout much of the 1950s, ‘60s,’ and 70s. In fact, it was CORE that in 1962 led the 
most forthright campaign to improve city garbage-collection services in Bedford-
Stuyvesant — a campaign that featured activists dumping trash on the steps of Brooklyn 
Borough Hall. (“Taxation without sanitation is tyranny!” went the rallying cry.)46  
 Palmer’s activism offers an eloquent testimony to the ways in which distinctions 
between radicals and moderates could become scrambled. The Bedford-Stuyvesant 
Neighborhood Council reflected the aspirations of middle-class, integrationist 
homeowners; CORE was an incubator of black-power thought and in the early 1960s still 
included a good number of Communists. For Palmer, it made perfect sense to work 
within both groups. That eclecticism no doubt underpinned his election as CBCC 
president in 1961. But the balancing act could last only so long: by 1962, CORE’s left-
wing faction would write Palmer off as an “NAACP type” who preferred negotiations to 
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 The reform insurgency and the civil-rights struggle gave groups like CBCC a new 
vocabulary with which to define community grievances and petition governments for 
redress. A third uprising — the neighborhood revolt unleashed by Robert Moses’s Title I 
projects — also helped to redefine the city’s relationship with community groups. In 
1958, the mothers of Greenwich Village, with Jane Jacobs at the helm, succeeded in 
defeating Moses’s plans to ram a highway through Washington Square. A year later, the 
Cooper Square Committee, a grassroots group on the Lower East Side, rebuffed the city’s 
slum-clearance plans and hired planner Walter Thabit to produce a community-initiated 
redevelopment plan, the first of its kind. Grassroots groups all over the city began 
pushing back against the city’s urban-renewal regime. All this ferment imbued citizen 
groups with a sense of empowerment in the face of previously unresponsive power 
structures. In years to come, neighborhood-based organizations would take on enlarged 
roles not only in determining the shape of physical landscapes but also in dispensing 
social services.48  
 For CBCC, the challenge lay in convincing government officials that Bedford-
Stuyvesant was especially deserving of attention at a time when countless neighborhoods 
in New York (and across America) were facing what Mayor Wagner called “crises of an 
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unprecedented kind, and of an unprecedented severity.” Clearly, youth gangs could no 
longer be the sole, or even the primary, focus of the council’s activity. The Council began 
lobbying for new housing, education, employment, health, and welfare services in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant. “Juvenile delinquency does not exist in a vacuum and has a vital 
relationship to the total spectrum of social welfare problems in the community,” read a 
1962 position statement. “[T]he Council is now geared to address itself to any problem 
area where, it is felt, its efforts will help to bring about a better community.”49   
  CBCC also faced questions about its ability to speak for a Bedford-Stuyvesant 
“community” in the midst of a rapid transformation. In August 1962, the City Planning 
Commission announced, to the dismay of many Brooklynites, that despite previous 
promises it was postponing physical-renewal plans for Bedford-Stuyvesant at least until 
1963. A column written the following month by the respected Amsterdam News political 
reporter Simon Anekwe quoted unnamed sources from within the City Planning 
Commission slamming Bedford-Stuyvesant’s leadership class for pursuing individual 
agendas and pushing self-interested policy proposals. According to Anekwe’s sources, 
city agencies felt uncomfortable launching new programs in Bedford-Stuyvesant because 
CBCC seemed to lack the capacity and legitimacy to implement them. The Brooklynites 
retorted that the city government was unresponsive to the community’s needs. (“[I]t is a 
public disgrace that the City Planning Commission would cleverly discriminate against 
Brooklyn’s one-half million Negroes,” the Amsterdam News commented.) Either way, it 
had become clear that despite the expansion of the council’s reach — more than 40 
different social agencies, block associations, and church groups were affiliated by 1962 
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— CBCC would have to begin acting like more of an activist group and less like a 
government agency if it hoped to acquire greater political clout. “Basically what the [City 
Planning Commission] is saying is that Bedford-Stuyvesant has not brought enough 
pressure on them,” a CBCC official told Anekwe. “We are now re-organizing the 
Coordinating Council, and we will do that.”50  
 On September 26, 1962, some 100 local activists came together at the Bedford 
Avenue YMCA for a conference devoted to poverty in Bedford-Stuyvesant. In the 
keynote speech, the head of the Urban League of Greater New York, Edward S Lewis, 
urged those assembled to wield more “organized pressure” on elected officials. 
“Washington is not going to be interested in Bedford-Stuyvesant if you have a divided 
front. It will want to deal with a group totally representative and responsible,” he said. It 
was significant that Lewis should mention Washington as a target for CBCC’s activism. 
If the group to that point had mostly trained its sights on City Hall, the existence of the 
President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency now held out the promise of funds from 
the federal government or the Ford Foundation. The civil rights movement also fed the 
notion that CBCC was engaged in a national struggle.51  
 Lewis’s audience responded by reinventing CBCC as a broad-based and action-
oriented organization. In October, the group formally dissolved and reconstituted as the 
Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council, Inc. (as opposed to the Central Brooklyn 
Coordinating Council for Youth). The name change signified a shift in emphasis. No 
longer content merely to assist the city government’s anti-delinquency efforts, CBCC 
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would now target a range of community improvements while wielding the kind of 
political pressure Lewis and others were calling for. That fall the group put together a 
speakers bureau, through which volunteers pounded the pavement in an attempt to put 
CBCC in touch with PTA groups, professional guilds, tenant associations, and cultural 
groups. One organizer, Elsie Richardson, would later recollect, “We made an effort to 
involve everybody in the community. We went into barbershops, beauty parlors, bars. We 
made sure that everybody had a voice.”52  
 Such efforts paid off. CBCC’s membership began to expand dramatically: by 
1966, the council would claim some 140 local groups under its umbrella, of which dozens 
would send organizational representatives to the YMCA for the Council’s regular 
planning meetings. “The community meetings would run hour upon hour upon hour,” 
Ron Shiffman, a planning professor at the Pratt Institute who worked closely with CBCC 
for several years, would later recall. “There was a lot of emotion, there was a lot of 
capacity building. These were really democratic meetings.”53 
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 The reorganized council brought together a broad-based coalition with access both 
to the upper echelons of Bedford-Stuyvesant society and, to a lesser extent, its low-
income majority. CBCC’s new president, elected in November 1962, would be Cecil 
Gloster, an obstetrician notable less for his activism than for his ties to elite social groups 
like the Comus Club, the Chi Delta Mu fraternity of physicians, and the hugely influential 
black fraternity, Alpha Phi Alpha. Franklin W. Morton, a judge who had belonged to 
Bertram Baker’s Democratic political club (and who was also a Comus Club man), took a 
spot on the executive board too. CBCC also counted among its organizers a cohort of 
outspoken, politically radical women. The two most prominent were Elsie Richardson, 
the energetic school secretary who in 1966 would broker CBCC’s collaboration with 
Robert F. Kennedy, and the teacher turned reformer Shirley Chisholm.54  
 Chisholm would be elected to the State Assembly two years later before gaining 
national fame in 1968 as the first-ever black woman elected to Congress. In 1972, she 
mounted an inspirational if quixotic run for the Presidency, again becoming the first 
black woman to do so. “Unbought and Unbossed”: so went the motto of a woman who 
weighed less than 100 pounds but began throwing every ounce of her weight around the 
moment she reached Washington. Chisholm pushed uncompromisingly progressive 
causes: funding for low-income college students, subsidized daycare for working 
mothers, increases to the minimum wage, unemployment insurance for domestic workers, 
legalized abortions, the Equal Rights Amendment. As an African-American woman, she 
faced what she called “double discrimination” (and it was being a woman, she said, that  
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Shirley Chisholm and Thomas R. Jones, circa mid-1960s. The two reformers began as 
allies in the Unity Democratic Club, which helped Jones win election to the State 
Assembly in 1962. They later became rivals, and Chisholm would replace Jones in the 
Assembly before becoming the first black woman elected to the U.S. Congress. 
(SUNY-Albany, The Harlem Project online.) 
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posed far greater challenges). She instinctively sympathized with the underdog and didn’t 
hesitate to criticize Bed-Stuy’s elite, whom she once derided (echoing E. Franklin 
Frazier) as “the nose-in-the-air black bourgeoisie.” For this and for her flamboyant 
fashions and her plainspoken earthiness, she would become wildly popular in Bedford-
Stuyvesant, especially among working-class women.55  
 In 1962, though, Chisholm was best known as a loyal member of Thomas Jones’s 
Unity Democratic Club. (While pounding the pavement on Jones’s behalf, she also began 
turning heads with what one Brooklynite described as “Shirley’s colorful and dramatic 
manner of dress.”56) Like Jones, Chisholm was the daughter of Barbadian immigrants. 
Though born in Brooklyn, Shirley spent much of her childhood living with her 
grandmother in rural Barbados, where her parents thought she would have a more 
comfortable upbringing than in hardscrabble Brownsville. Returning to New York, she 
attended Bed-Stuy’s prestigious Girls High School before enrolling in Brooklyn College. 
There she joined the Harriet Tubman Society and fought to get courses in African-
American history added to the curriculum. She later earned a Master’s in early-childhood 
education from Columbia and began a career as a teacher’s aide at a Harlem daycare. By 
1960, she was working as an educational consultant for the city’s Department of Welfare 
and devoting most of her free time to the Unity Democrats and the reform movement.57 
 After CBCC’s reorganization, Chisholm was elected the Council’s Vice-President 
in charge of program development. It was an important position at a time when CBCC 
                                                
55 Susan Brownmiller, “This Is Fighting Shirley Chisholm,” NYT Magazine, Apr. 13, 1969; Shirley 
Chisholm, Unbought and Unbossed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970); “The Lady Is Also a First,” NYAN, 
Nov. 7, 1964.  
56 “Letter of the Week,” NYAN, Dec. 5, 1964; Gallagher, “Waging ‘The Good Fight’,” pp. 395-397. 
57 Brownmiller, “This Is Fighting Shirley Chisholm”; Julie Gallagher, “Waging ‘The Good Fight’: The 
Political Career of Shirley Chisholm, 1953-1982,” The Journal of African American History (June 22, 
2007), pp. 394-395; “King’s Diary,” NYAN, Dec. 5, 1959; “First Brooklyn Negro Woman Running for the 
Assembly,” NYAN, May 9, 1964. 
Chapter 3: Clubhouse Meets White House  190 
 
was proclaiming itself to be concerned not only with juvenile delinquency but with all 
“major problems and needs that affect the welfare of the people of this area.”58  
 Chisholm immediately drew up a list of pressing issues for 1963, which the full 
council subsequently endorsed. Item number one was housing; education and 
delinquency followed. On the first front, Chisholm recommended that CBCC leaders 
meet as soon as possible with the mayor and the City Planning Commission to press for 
urban-renewal funds and programs to address “the total housing and public services 
picture of the community.” In the realm of education, Chisholm proposed to tackle a 
broad range of areas where city schools were failing: overcrowded classrooms, lack of 
special-needs programs, and appallingly low graduation rates. Finally, Chisholm called 
for federal, state, and local funds for a broad-based youth program modeled on those in 
Harlem and the Lower East Side. Following on Chisholm’s recommendations, CBCC put 
together a number of issue-specific committees — labor, health and sanitation, youth 
services, urban planning and housing — under the chairmanship of prominent local 
citizens. Together, these committees would enable the Council to initiate an “all-out 
drive” to remedy the “social ills” plaguing Central Brooklyn.59  
 The reorganization of CBCC reflected the political savvy of its leaders, who 
realized that by broadening their base they might convey the energy of a social 
movement, as opposed to a government agency. At the same time, their actions can be 
read as an indicator of desperation. In 1963, Bedford-Stuyvesant’s leadership class felt 
increasingly besieged and bewildered. Even as the civil-rights campaign was gaining 
                                                
58 Constitution and By-Laws of the Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council, endorsed Dec. 5, 1962, 
Moshette papers. 
59 CBCC, Program Committee reports, Dec. 5, 1962, Jan. 24, 1963, Moshette papers; CBCC, “The 
Reporter: The Eyes and Ears of the Community,” Dec. 1962, Moshette papers; “Council To Act on Boro 
Problems,” NYAN, Feb. 2, 1963. 
Chapter 3: Clubhouse Meets White House  191 
 
steam, residential and educational segregation in Brooklyn was hardening. Mortgage 
capital was nonexistent except at usurious rates — a crushing burden for homeowners 
desperate to refinance so they could renovate their aging Victorian buildings. Political 
capital, too, had grown scarce in Bedford-Stuyvesant, and city services — fire and police 
protection, sanitation, schools — seemed to be declining as fast as whites were 
decamping. Brooklyn’s class landscape was shifting in ways that made Bedford-
Stuyvesant’s brownstone-owning, well-educated, professionals uncomfortable. Their 
sincere concern for poor neighbors was intimately related to a concern for their own 
welfare. Their own blocks might be neat, affluent, architecturally rich, and well-
organized — hardly “slums,” in other words. But there was nothing to prevent slum 
conditions from stalking them and their children.60  
 For all these reasons, urban renewal seemed an attractive prospect to Bedford-
Stuyvesant’s leadership class. Indeed, an oft-heard complaint among activists affiliated 
with CBCC all the way up to the late 1960s was that Bedford-Stuyvesant had been frozen 
out of urban-renewal funds. The area had not been targeted for large-scale slum clearance 
under the Title I program, nor were any projects planned for the years to come. Given the 
sordid history of “Negro removal,” this was generally seen as a positive thing, especially 
                                                
60 The emphasis on “slum conditions” was a major aspect of 1960s antipoverty and urban-rehabilitation 
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among the untold thousands of Bed-Stuy residents who had settled there after being 
uprooted from “slums” elsewhere in the city. But CBCC leaders worried that their 
community was being denied access to a plentiful pool of federal funds. In fact, it was the 
City Planning Commission’s decision in 1962 to table plans for urban-renewal in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant that provided the trigger for CBCC’s re-organization.  
This attitude jars with received narratives about urban renewal. Historians tend to 
assume that renewal was uniformly opposed in the African-American neighborhoods that 
were too often on the receiving end of schemes that destroyed their homes to profit 
developers and the white middle class. Yet a pragmatic ambivalence prevailed in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant.  
 Many of the homeowners who made up the core of Bedford-Stuyvesant’s activist 
black elite had originally moved to the area because they enjoyed its quiet streets, social 
peace, and refined airs. The number of such places where African Americans could aspire 
to buy homes was severely circumscribed, thanks to institutional racism and countless 
acts of cruelty and intimidation meted out by unwelcoming white neighbors. In Bedford-
Stuyvesant, beautiful homes were available, they were relatively cheap (despite 
blockbusting and predatory lending), and, increasingly, they were inhabited not by hostile 
whites but by welcoming blacks eager to build a nurturing, family-friendly community. 
Stuyford residents celebrated the fact that their neighborhood was not Harlem. By the 
1960s, however, many feared that social conditions and class hatreds in their backyards 
were coming to approximate Harlem’s. Not only did growing blight, juvenile 
delinquency, school overcrowding, and the rest offend their moral and political 
sensibilities and stimulate their impulse toward humanitarian reform — such conditions 
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also risked damaging the value of local real estate and making their beloved community 
unlivable.61At the same time, they feared the bulldozers associated with the city’s 
notorious Title I program. For good reason, they harbored a deep mistrust of city agencies 
when it came to physical-redevelopment schemes. When CBCC leaders invoked urban 
renewal, they emphasized things like scattered demolition of abandoned structures, 
rehabilitation of dilapidated but structurally sound brownstones, vest-pocket parks, and 
improvements to public transportation. 
 Nor was urban renewal something that appealed only to the black bourgeoisie. 
Many activists agreed with the Amsterdam News that “Bedford-Stuyvesant needs all the 
help it can get.” Elsie Richardson, for instance, who could speak from personal 
experience about the ravages of slum clearance, was perhaps the most forceful advocate 
of urban renewal in Bedford-Stuyvesant. To her mind, the “shortchanging” of Bedford-
Stuyvesant when it came to urban renewal was a civil-rights issue. “Minorities want first-
class neighborhoods with first-class citizenship,” she wrote to Mayor Wagner in a 1965 
letter requesting urban-renewal funds for Central Brooklyn. As Richardson saw it, the 
renewal program should focus on eliminating “the hundreds of burned-out and 
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Chapter 3: Clubhouse Meets White House  194 
 
abandoned buildings which spread blight and decay throughout the rest of the 
community.” In their stead, health centers, parks, and even a community college should 
dot the landscape.62  
 Some opposed urban renewal out of fear that once begun, it would lead to 
indiscriminate demolition no matter what community members might say. That was the 
opinion held by Martha Ross Leigh, a CBCC housing expert who also sat on the board of 
directors of the citywide Citizens Housing and Planning Council, and influential policy 
group. “I feel that this is a typical so-called ‘grey area’ in terms of city problems and as 
such may be in line for serious consideration by the planning commission and housing 
boards,” she said of Bed-Stuy in 1961. “But large numbers of the houses, while obsolete 
in terms of original uses, are well-designed, structurally sound and certainly capable of 
sustained use for a long time if the desirable social climate can be maintained. Urban 
renewal projects are not called for in the main here.”63  
 An Amsterdam News headline from August 1962 summed up the cautious attitude 
of many Brooklyn homeowners: “Urban Renewal — Yes! But Don’t Change Face of 
Area, Residents Plea.” The residents in this particular context were members of the 
Brower Park Civic Association, who lived in the area of Crown Heights bordering the 
Brooklyn Children’s Museum. In 1961, the City Planning Commission had proposed 
urban renewal in the area, only to reverse course the following year. The Brower Park 
Civic Association welcomed the prospect of renewal, but with three caveats. They asked 
that home-improvement loans be offered to homeowners at low interest rates, that small 
property owners be given access to the same kinds of tax abatements offered to large 
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developers who sponsored renewal projects, and that rent-control restrictions be eased. 
Finally, they insisted that the “basic character of our community” be preserved. “We 





Neighborhood Conservation  
 
 
 Such demands in fact dovetailed with a new thrust in the city’s urban-renewal 
program. In 1959 the city had unveiled its Neighborhood Conservation Program, under 
the supervision of the Housing and Rehabilitation Board. Wagner had originally floated 
the idea of such a program in 1954, the same year that saw passage of a federal Housing 
Act requiring that code enforcement and community participation play an important part 
in any future urban-renewal plans. The aim of neighborhood conservation was to pre-
empt wholesale urban renewal by “saving” targeted areas from becoming “all-out slums.” 
Instead of demolishing dilapidated buildings, the program would seek to provide the 
landlords who had neglected them with incentives to renovate. The effort was led by 
Hortense Gabel, a reform Democrat said to be “the only white person in the Wagner 
administration who really has a close relationship with the Negro community.”65 
 This approach was hardly unique to New York. The first such program had been 
launched in 1950 in Chicago’s Hyde Park neighborhood, capitalizing on the enthusiasm 
of block groups to maintain real-estate values in the face of demographic change and 
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infrastructural decline. The National Association of Real Estate Boards had picked up on 
the concept as well, launching a “Build America Better” campaign to lobby local 
governments for public improvements to streets, sewers, and schools; rehabilitation or 
demolition of dilapidated buildings; and rezoning of empty lots — all in the name of 
neighborhood conservation. After Congress passed enabling legislation in 1954, similar 
programs had emerged in Detroit, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and other cities. James Rouse, a 
mortgage banker known for his rehabilitation work in Baltimore, also promoted the idea 
of inner-city revitalization through an organization named American Council to Improve 
Our Neighborhoods, which received the backing of the Ford Foundation.66 
 In 1959, the first New York areas to launch neighborhood-conservation programs 
were small Manhattan enclaves, usually circumscribed within four or five street blocks 
and two avenue blocks. These were the places the Ford Foundation dubbed “gray areas”: 
neighborhoods in transition, where groups of newcomers — mostly Southern blacks and 
Puerto Ricans — mixed with white-ethnic residents who had been there for a generation 
or two. These were often neighborhoods where elegant townhouses pressed up against 
substantial industrial activity. A section of Chelsea on the West side of Manhattan hosted 
the city’s first project, thanks to the Hudson Guild settlement house. The city pledged to 
prevent such places from turning into “slums” by concentrating the services provided by 
city agencies and community groups. For each target area, the city delegated a 
community group, usually a settlement house, to coordinate the project and help local 
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property owners gain state or federal funds to rehabilitate rundown buildings.67  
 Late in 1959, Wagner declared “all-out war” on slumlords and vowed to wipe out 
single-room-occupancy buildings, which he dubbed “the hard core of our slum evil.” He 
threatened to reduce all SRO monthly rents to $1 and to file suit against slumlords for 
failing to make repairs on disintegrating properties.68 This was followed in April 1960 by 
the Housing Authority’s announcement that it would seize 125 neglected tenements filled 
with families in exorbitantly priced single-room apartments. The city promised to convert 
the 8,500 rooms contained within the buildings into some 2,000 spacious yet affordable 
apartments, to the tune of $25 million. If such actions against what the Times called “rat-
infested rookeries” were the stick, the city also offered a variety of carrots to induce 
property owners’ participation in the program: tax abatements, cheap loans for repairs, 
and stepped-up sanitation, street lights, and policing. On a number of “pilot blocks” in 
Harlem, city inspectors scanned every building, from cellar to roof, for fire, health, or 
sanitation violations. Meanwhile, in Chelsea, the city was paying for brownstone 
rehabilitation, which was meant to lure middle-class residents back to an area that had 
once known a quiet elegance.69 
 Declaring war on slumlords was the easy part. But Wagner unveiled the 
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neighborhood-conservation program as opposition to Robert Moses’s Title I projects was 
gathering heat. The “power broker” lost control of the notorious Committee on Slum 
Clearance in 1960, and that same year the city’s Housing and Rehabilitation Board 
announced that it would proceed with “a more orderly rebuilding of the city” than had 
prevailed at the apogee of Moses’s power, in the early 1950s. The neighborhood-
conservation approach seemed to consecrate the break with old ways, though the funds 
initially made available ($135,000) were minimal.70 Further, like Wagner’s 
neighborhood-board initiative of the early 1950s and the Youth Board’s efforts to sponsor 
community action, the neighborhood-conservation program marked yet another instance 
in which the city government was recognizing new forms of place-based politics, 
emphasizing citizen participation in planning at the ultra-local level.71  
 The city’s new emphasis on neighborhood rehabilitation, and the privileging of 
historic building stock, was also illustrative of ideas that had slowly been emerging 
among American urbanists in the late 1950s — ideas that would burst into the 
mainstream with the 1961 publication of Jane Jacobs’s Death and Life of Great American 
Cities. With the Neighborhood Conservation Program, the city government 
acknowledged that in an era of middle-class flight, Victorian townhouses could provide a 
counterweight. Brownstones, as the historian Suleiman Osman has argued, stood as 
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elegant markers of permanency and authenticity, and they attracted small groups of 
revivalists to enclaves like Brooklyn Heights and Cobble Hill and Greenwich Village 
during the postwar years. “In a kinetic modern city,” Osman writes, “brownstones were 
anchors, their heavy facades giving new white-collar workers a sense of rootedness and 
permanence in a transient urban environment.” The brownstoning ideal was also 
attractive in Bedford-Stuyvesant, though with an important difference. Where the white 
brownstoners often defined the state as an enemy, Brooklyn’s brownstone-owning black 
middle-class desperately sought government intervention to stem the decay they 
perceived around them.72 
 Such an intervention seemed plausible by the early 1960s, when New York policy 
elites, led by the chairman of the City Planning Commission, James Felt, and the head of 
the Housing and Rehabilitation Board, J. Clarence Davies (both of them real-estate men) 
had arrived at something of a post-Moses consensus. According to historian Christopher 
Klemek, “the urban renewal order in New York appeared politically well entrenched, 
relatively progressive, and responsive to both elites and average citizens — at least 
rhetorically.” Yet the conservation approach, in its hostility to “slums,” shared certain 
assumptions with the clearance approach it was ostensibly dislodging. Writing of the 
neighborhood-conservation program, the historian Joel Schwartz has argued that “close 
cooperation” among city agencies, settlement houses, and landlords was forged at the 
expense of tenant groups, whose interests were be represented in a high-handed manner 
by paternalistic liberals based in city government and settlement houses. According to 
Schwartz, the program’s emphasis on overcrowding and “slum conditions” translated into 
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mass displacement; a study carried out by the Metropolitan Council on Housing in 1963 
found that over 1,400 families, 95% of them blacks and Puerto Ricans had been turfed 
out of their homes to alleviate “congestion.”73  
 Tenant groups also expressed alarm at news of a Rockefeller-led effort to turn the 
Neighborhood Conservation Program into a for-profit scheme, through an outfit named 
the Conservation Renewal and Rehabilitation Fund. (Laurance Rockefeller, along with 
Columbia University, had earlier spearheaded a major neighborhood-rehabilitation effort 
in Morningside Heights on Manhattan’s Upper West Side.) “Neighborhood Conservation 
means the green light to real estate speculators who would like to turn Chelsea into 
another Yorkville or Greenwich Village,” was how the Chelsea Tenant Council put it.  
 Meanwhile, in the Children’s Museum area of Crown Heights, where the Brower 
Park Civic Association was asking the city to enforce building codes and provide tax 
abatements for home-improvement programs, tenants complained that this would 
inevitably mean higher rents. In an area where renters lived on the top floors of owner-
occupied townhouses, that seemed a realistic fear — especially since the homeowners 
group was lobbying the city and state to loosen rent-control laws so that tenants would 
“carry their share of the costs” of renovations. “We want the code enforced, and we want 
community renewal,” the Brooklyn Tenants Welfare Council said in 1963, “but we don’t 
want the tenant to pay for the landlord’s improvement.”74  
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 Despite murmurs of opposition, the idea of neighborhood conservation was popular 
within CBCC. The council had first petitioned Hortense Gabel for conservation funds 
shortly after the program was announced in 1959. “Bedford-Stuyvesant is especially in 
need of this program,” Maude B. Richardson had declared, explaining that the council 
“recognizes the intimate relationship between delinquency and poor housing in Bedford-
Stuyvesant.”75 Those early efforts had stalled, but in early 1963 Central Brooklyn 
activists renewed their attempts to bring neighborhood-conservation funds to the area. By 
that time, the Neighborhood Conservation Program had begun to draw federal funds and 
was focusing on “social renewal” in addition to physical renewal.  
 If conservation projects to that point had sought to save “sound” neighborhoods 
from deteriorating, the new effort, dubbed the Area Services Program, would seek to 
reverse the tide of “slummification” in enclaves where poverty and physical blight were 
the rule rather than exceptions. As an official from the Neighborhood Conservation 
Program put it in 1963, addressing a CBCC meeting, “area services” were designed to 
“hold the line [and] minimize contagion to adjoining areas.”76 In practice this meant not 
only conducting building inspections, slapping landlords with summons, and 
rehabilitating aging buildings, but also saturating small areas with social services and job 
counseling. In some neighborhoods, the Area Services office actively petitioned local 
businesses to open up more jobs for minorities; elsewhere, services included “study 
clubs” for children living in single-room occupancy buildings. If nothing else, this 
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represented a major bureaucratic undertaking. Among the city agencies whose work 
would be coordinated were the Departments of Buildings, Health, Fire, Police, Sanitation, 
Welfare, Education, and Water Supply, along with the Youth Board and the Commission 
on Intergroup Relations — in Wagner’s words, “an effective complement of social, 
educational, and health services.”77  
 This new thrust made the Neighborhood Conservation Program all the more 
appealing to the men and women of CBCC. For one, it dovetailed with their vision of 
how the rehabilitation of Bedford-Stuyvesant should proceed. For another, it promised to 
bring in a wide array of city services — just the kind of comprehensive approach that 
CBCC had in mind when it pledged to launch an “all-out drive” to remedy the “social 
ills” of Bedford-Stuyvesant. “Deterioration and blight plague several sections of our 
community,” read a March 1963 report authored by CBCC’s John L. Procope, a local 
real-estate broker and insurance salesmen who specialized in brownstone rehabilitation 
and home-insurance policies and who also chaired CBCC’s Committee on Housing and 
Urban Planning. Procope argued that the predominance of brownstones in relatively good 
condition made wholesale urban renewal undesirable. However, code enforcement, 
rehabilitation, selective clearance, and ramped-up social services — the hallmarks of the 
Neighborhood Conservation Program — seemed attractive.78 
                                                
77 “Housing Program To Get New Chief,” NYT, June 30, 1962; “City Plans Drive on Arverne Area,” NYT, 
Sept. 7, 1961; “2 More City Areas Due for Renewal,” NYT, Oct. 31, 1961; “Neighborhood Study Clubs in 
Operation,” NYAN, Nov. 23, 1963. 
78 “Council Wants Slum Housing Clearance,” NYAN, Mar. 16, 1963. Procope brought an interesting 
perspective to CBCC’s dealings. Having formerly sold advertising for the Baltimore Afro-American, he 
would later become the publisher of the Amsterdam News. In 1963, however, he was working for a 
storefront agency named E.G. Bowman, which had been founded by his wife, Ernesta in 1953 and which 
specialized in $25 fire- and home-insurance policies sold to African-American clients unable to gain 
credit from mainstream banks. After the urban uprisings of the mid-1960s caused major commercial banks 
to begin canceling home-insurance policies in majority-black neighborhoods, the Procopes successfully 
lobbied Governor Rockefeller to create the Fair Access to Insurance Requirements plan, which went into 
Chapter 3: Clubhouse Meets White House  203 
 
 The reorganization of CBCC the previous fall had apparently convinced city 
agencies that the time had come to begin collaborating with the council on more than just 
delinquency programs. In the meantime, the council hired a full-time professional 
consultant: Walter Pinkston, who as the Youth Board’s borough coordinator had helped 
found CBCC four years earlier. Pinkston had in fact spent the previous months devoting 
“75% of his time” to CBCC, and he remained on the Youth Board payroll. In his new job, 
Pinkston helped shape the group into a forceful and reliable advocate for stepped-up city 
programs in Bedford-Stuyvesant.79  
 On February 7, 1963, representatives of the Department of City Planning and the 
Department of Housing and Rehabilitation, which oversaw neighborhood-conservation 
projects, appeared at a CBCC board meeting to lay out possible programs for Bedford-
Stuyvesant. Members of CBCC’s Housing Committee were asked to choose among three 
areas that had been recommended for renewal by Raymond & May Associates, an urban-
planning firm.80 They opted for the neighborhood immediately surrounding Tompkins 
Park — the same area that had lent its name to the Brooklyn Council for Social 
Planning’s gang-outreach initiative 15 years earlier. This was one of the poorer areas of 
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Brooklyn in the early 1960s, though fewer of its buildings had been left to decay that in 
some other areas proposed for rehabilitation. Somewhere around 15% of residences were 
owner-occupied, and a similar number were single-occupancy dwellings.81 
 In March, Wagner unveiled plans for an Area Services project in a 22-block area 
bounded by Sumner and Nostrand Avenues, and Lafayette Ave and Monroe Street. To 
run it, he called on an African-American lawyer named Darwin W. Bolden, who 
previously had been among the leaders of the Harlem NAACP and Brooklyn CORE and 
would later become executive director of Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth in Action, a 
federally funded Community Action Agency, during the War on Poverty. The Brooklyn 
Eagle heralded the initiative as a “massive redevelopment program,” though its initial 
undertakings were small-scale.82  
 Bolden’s office aimed both to compel landlords to bring buildings up to code and to 
help local residents with welfare, health, and schooling issues. Bolden hired a full-time 
community organizer and six full-time city inspectors who scoured the area for violations 
of the city’s building code. The inspectors had no trouble finding what they were looking 
for, reporting 4,426 violations by August. Calls went out to 600 local landlords, who 
were invited to discuss their own grievances with Bolden and Harry C. Harris, Hortense 
Gabel’s replacement as head of the Neighborhood Conservation Program. Delinquent 
property owners would be offered inducements to comply with building codes; failing 
voluntary cooperation, however, the city would initiate legal action. At least in the early 
stages, this approach scored some successes, with reports that 1,000 violations were fixed 
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within six weeks of being flagged. Meanwhile, Bolden worked with the Bedford-
Stuyvesant Neighborhood Council to stoke the energies of block associations within the 
22-block area, who organized a cleanup drive and began fencing in empty lots. In 1963, 
cooperation between the block associations and city agencies resulted in some 3,000 tons 
of debris being removed from the area’s streets; campaigns to plant trees, install window-
boxes, and document price-gouging in local stores followed. This marked the beginning 
of a long-term redevelopment program in the Tompkins Park area. By the late 1960s, new 
facilities included the iconic Kosciuszko swimming pool (designed by Morris Lapidus), a 
band shell, an indoor performance space, Little League fields, and a community center.83 
 If the Neighborhood Conservation Program in its Manhattan iterations had largely 
represented a hedge against white flight (and, to some extent, a way of removing the poor 
blacks and Puerto Ricans around whose presence the discourse of white flight was 
euphemistically constructed), in Bedford-Stuyvesant it represented an intervention 
against black flight. The Wagner administration accepted CBCC’s claims to being both a 
responsible broker within black Brooklyn and a bulwark against black flight. By the early 
1960s, New York’s policy elites were beginning to worry that the black middle class 
might abandon the city as whites were. Wagner’s right-hand man, Paul Screvane, among 
others, expressed such fears in public and tied them to the city’s efforts to work alongside 
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middle-class outfits like the CBCC. Screvane lauded CBCC for giving voice to “the quiet 
side, the respectable side” of Bedford-Stuyvesant and helping to maintain “the character 
and dignity which attracted home-buyers” to Brooklyn in decades past. “We hear much 
about the white middle class moving to the suburbs. This phenomenon pertains to the 
Negro middle class as well. I know that it is the objective of the citizens of Bedford-
Stuyvesant to build a community to hold its home-owners and its businessmen,” 
Screvane told a CBCC meeting while campaigning to replace Wagner as mayor in 1965. 
“This is an objective which agencies of the City Government share in common with 





Jobs and Discrimination 
 
 
 Another area of prime concern for CBCC was unemployment. In February 1963, 
CBCC leaders began putting increased pressure on Wagner to address the problem of 
jobs, especially among youth, in Bedford-Stuyvesant. They stressed the urgency of the 
situation, demanding an end to surveys and studies and speeches. “[T]his a powder-keg 
that can blow up anytime,” the Amsterdam News opined of the unemployed population of 
Bedford-Stuyvesant. “And even more, we are wasting good youthful fiber, everyday, 
which could be turned into vital citizenry who could be a credit to their country instead of 
jailbirds.”85 On February 8, a collection of Brooklyn leaders converged on City Hall. 
There they met with the mayor and his top assistant, Julius Edelstein, along with 
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Commissioner of Labor James McFadden. The Brooklyn group featured Assemblymen 
Bertram Baker and Thomas R. Jones, Shirley Chisholm, Walter Pinkston, and a half-
dozen others including not only African Americans but also one Jewish delegate, Stanley 
Leyden, and a Hispanic activist, Raymond Rivera of the Urban League. That these 
notables came together under the CBCC banner was an indication of the council’s 
increasing clout. By defining themselves as a “united front” in negotiations with the city 
government, they were putting forth a new vision of the political power that could flow 
from their community.86   
 That said, their demands were hardly revolutionary. Jones, Chisholm, and company 
requested that the city’s Department of Labor open a service center in Bedford-
Stuyvesant to coordinate on-the-job training and run study programs for people preparing 
to take high-school equivalency tests. Wagner agreed, and by June he was set to place a 
Labor Office on Fulton Street in the heart of Bedford-Stuyvesant. Among its signature 
initiatives would be a “Job Talent Corps” to help college graduates find work; the 
department also promised to conduct investigations into allegations of workplace 
discrimination. A modest beginning, perhaps — but it represented an important premise: 
that there was a role for the city to play in helping black Brooklynites obtain “basic 
educational skills, basic worker’s skills, and good jobs.”87 
 Even so, controversy erupted when it emerged that Commissioner McFadden had 
tabbed a Westchester resident, Charles Fields, to run the office. McFadden had neglected 
to run the choice past any of Bedford-Stuyvesant’s leading politicos. Perhaps he assumed  
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A Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council poster, circa. 1963. “Your 
organization can help place this star by joining forces with other members of 
the CBCC,” reads the thought bubble pointing to the young man. Inscribed on 
the steps is a series of community aspirations: “an aroused and alert citizenry,” 
“adequate schools,” “sufficient housing,” recreational facilities,” “cultural 
institutions,” “elimination of juvenile delinquency,” “strengthening family 
ties,” “adequate social services,” “adequate public utilities,” and, at the top, 
“total community participation.” The ultimate goal hovers above the star: “A 
Better Bedford Stuyvesant.” (Sydney J. Moshette, Jr., papers.) 
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that Fields, who was black, would prove acceptable on the basis of his skin color; maybe 
there were patronage ties at work. Either way, CBCC leaders greeted the news with 
unveiled scorn.  
 “I am sick of this kind of attitude of the powers that be making decisions for us 
without consulting us,” Thomas Jones objected. Joseph E. Johnson, the chairman of 
CBCC’s Committee on Labor, declared it “a very definite slap in the face of the Bedford-
Stuyvesant community.” Added Johnson, “This is another example of planning for us and 
not with us. A very undemocratic process of democracy.” In other words, even the arrival 
of much-needed city services would not be enough to placate Bedford-Stuyvesant’s 
leaders. What they wanted, increasingly, was power over how those services would be 
dispensed because, in Chisholm’s words, “we know this community best.”88  
 Once the furor died down, Mayor Wagner visited Bedford-Stuyvesant on July 1, 
1963, to preside over the opening of the new Labor Office — a concrete acknowledgment 
by both city and community that the problem of jobs was central to Brooklyn’s woes. 
Though a small step, the new office showed that CBCC could extract concessions from 
the city government through negotiations and soft pressure. Wagner’s speech at the 
ribbon-cutting ceremony also gave a glimpse of how his government might respond to 
the civil-rights movement, at the very zenith of the national struggle: by marrying high-
minded rhetoric to plodding actions. 
 “[T]he alarm bells have been sounded, North and South, for the government — all 
levels of government — to act and act now to remedy the conditions of discrimination, 
segregation and deprivation which have so long been the lot of so many of our fellow-
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Americans,” the mayor said. “The recent protests of the Negroes of America have been 
loud and clear. Everywhere, both North and South, we have seen dramatic evidence of 
what might be called the Spirit of ‘63. It has been a militant spirit, a vigorous spirit, a 
fearless spirit.”89 
 For all that militancy and vigor, CBCC continued to pursue its old goal of 
controlling deviant youth behavior in Bedford-Stuyvesant. The examples of Mobilization 
for Youth and Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited inspired Brooklyn activists to push 
for a similar government-funded program on their own turf. The two Manhattan-based 
delinquency programs offered political lessons that the likes of Thomas Jones and Shirley 
Chisholm were quick to learn. MFY made clear that old-fashioned casework had fallen 
out of favor, and that community action was in. Kenneth Clark’s program in Harlem 
showed that the federal and municipal governments were eager to absorb the energy of 
the civil-rights movement. New action programs were to be framed as efforts not only to 
deal with contemporary “social problems” but to address their historical roots: 
segregation, ghettoization, discrimination, and the resultant “pathologies.” Further, the 
federal delinquency programs reaffirmed an assumption common to many initiatives 
undertaken in Wagner-era New York: that social-policy initiatives should target clearly 
delineated urban neighborhoods. In years to come, the unit of analysis for poverty 
workers would be a “community” rather than an aggregation of poor individuals. But in a 
place as fluid as 1960s Brooklyn — where new neighborhoods were constantly being 
named while old ones disappeared — that required acts of imagination. Grassroots 
groups would have to map new spaces for themselves, and to invent communities in the 
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heartlands of anomie.  
 Early in 1963, the chairman of CBCC’s delinquency committee, an attorney 
named William Chisholm (no relation to Shirley), began holding consultations with 
government officials and social scientists active in the juvenile-delinquency field. They 
met with, among others, the Deputy City Administrator, Henry Cohen; Leonard Stern of 
the PCJD; professors at Brooklyn College including the eminent sociologists Charles 
Lawrence and Clarence Senior; and Mobilization for Youth staffers. In July, a CBCC 
delegation huddled with Wagner at City Hall and extracted from the mayor a promise that 
he would fund a more muscular anti-delinquency program in Bedford-Stuyvesant. On 
August 14, 1963, Robert Kennedy alighted in New York for another impromptu tour, this 
one of the federally funded projects in Harlem and the Lower East Side. (“He was 
hatless, without so much as a briefcase,” a dazzled Times reporter wrote.) Having 
observed in action remedial-reading centers uptown and vocational-training programs 
downtown, Kennedy sat down to chat with representatives of CBCC, who proposed to 
import some of Mobilization for Youth’s pioneering programs across the East River. 
According to the Brooklynites, Kennedy pledged his “support and cooperation.” Though 
the PCJD would never get around to funding the Bedford-Stuyvesant effort, CBCC took 
heart and began planning the new project.90 
 A first step was “Operation Pipeline,” an outreach program to solicit feedback 
from Bedford-Stuyvesant residents about what kinds of programs the council should be 
pursuing. In particular, CBCC hoped to hear from young people, who were urged to 
speak their minds in person either at the Stuyvesant Community Center or to the Youth 
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Board. (In a similar vein, Kenneth Clark had actively tried to tap into the streetwise 
expertise of Harlem’s teen gangs while conceiving of HARYOU.) Thomas Jones, 
meanwhile, was convening public meetings and drawing up plans for a comprehensive 
anti-delinquency program. While CBCC was slowly moving toward a theory-based 
demonstration program in the PCJD mode, Jones had action — not research — in mind. 
“We have had enough studies of unemployment, bad housing, juvenile delinquency,” he 
said in August 1963. “Now we need a program. We are all well aware of the problems 
that exist in our community. It is our goal to get immediate help and extra money.” The 
root cause of those problems — “three centuries of prejudice and discrimination” — was 
clear as day to Jones. It didn’t take a scholar to make that diagnosis.91 
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War and Rumors of War 
 
 
“We are fighting a moral war, a war involving all America, and the 
possibilities of defeat must not exist. All agree it is a good thing if ghettos 
can be abolished, if people can be taken off welfare rolls and put to work, if 
wayward youths can be straightened out and made into useful productive 
citizens before they become number 7884403862.” 






                                                
1 Quoted in Communities in Action, newsletter of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) Apr. 1967. 
Lyndon B. Johnson delivering his first State of the Union address,  
January 8, 1964. (Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library.) 
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 “Outlook for ‘64: A War on Poverty” — so read the headline in the Washington 
Post on January 1, 1964. It had been less than six weeks since the assassination of 
President John F. Kennedy. Camelot was dead, the New Frontier a distant horizon. 
Lyndon B. Johnson, the garrulous Texan whom few saw as presidential, now slept in the 
White House. A somber tone had prevailed at New Year’s celebrations in the nation’s 
capital. But as bleary-eyed liberals stepped to their doorsteps that morning, they found 
heartening news.  
 “The fledgling Johnson Administration, true to Democratic Party instincts, again 
has stolen a march on the Republicans by uncorking an easily grasped mass appeal 
issue,” the Post reported. “The issue is the continued poverty of millions of Americans in 
a land of plenty.” Despite the much-trumpeted triumph of affluence since World War II, 
some 30 million Americans — a fifth of the population — still lived in households 
earning less than $3,000 a year, the government’s official poverty threshold. What 
liberals described as “the paradox of poverty amid plenty” offered a political opportunity, 
which Johnson intended to pursue. “Such a program is likely to enhance Mr. Johnson’s 
political standing among some groups, where his initial appeal might be less than Mr. 
Kennedy’s was — Negroes, liberal intellectuals and industrial workers fending for jobs,” 
the Post predicted. “And the antipoverty package is one that will carry a Johnson stamp 
— not a re-label from the Kennedy administration.”2 
 Seven days later Johnson stood before a joint session Congress to deliver his State 
of the Union address. Around the country, millions of living-room eyes gazed wistfully, 
nervously, hopefully, angrily at grainy black-and-white television screens. The president 
                                                
2 “Outlook for ‘64: A War on Poverty,” The Washington Post, Jan. 1, 1964.  
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— receding hair slicked back past floppy ears, too-small head perched atop hulking 6-
foot-4-inch frame, dark-rimmed glasses resting on prominent nose — lacked the breezy, 
youthful elegance of his predecessor. But as he took the podium to speak, Johnson looked 
dignified and vital.  
 He began on a somber note. “I will be brief,” he said, softly, “for our time is 
necessarily short and our agenda is already long.” He continued in measured, almost 
hushed tones, carefully eschewing flights of rhetoric that might ring dissonant in the 
subdued chamber. His proposals, too, came wrapped in moderate packaging: Johnson 
opened by announcing a $500 million rollback in federal spending, which would bring 
the budget down to $98 billion for the coming fiscal year.3  
 And yet Johnson that day put forth a fresh vision of American life. The speech 
stood out for its scope and ambition — though it was one of the shortest State of the 
Union addresses in American history, clocking in at only 16 minutes. The president 
offered more than a sober exhortation for a grieving country to unite. He promised the 
most ambitious domestic agenda since the New Deal. Ted Sorensen, John F. Kennedy’s 
former speechwriter, had drafted most of the text, but two-dozen others had offered edits 
and contributions. Fittingly, the final draft contained something for everyone. Budgets 
would shrink even as programs would proliferate; peace would be achieved, at home and 
abroad. Johnson would honor the slain President by passing measures JFK had proposed 
but which a recalcitrant Congress had refused to approve. (Johnson would later remark 
that he’d tried to “take the dead man’s program and turn it into a martyr’s cause.”)4 
                                                
3 Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, Jan. 8, 1964, Lyndon 
Baines Johnson Library and Museum (LBJL) online. The televised address is available via youtube.com. 
4 “That State of the Union message was probably rewritten more times, by more people, than any 
Kennedy speech, with the exception of the October 22, 1962, speech during the Cuban missile crisis,” 
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 More boldly, the onetime Senate Majority Leader exhorted lawmakers to pass a 
series of measures which taken together would extend the protections of the American 
welfare state to those groups the New Deal had left behind. It would be another four 
months before Johnson began affixing the “Great Society” label to his domestic 
programs. But he was already making his intentions clear:  
 
Let this session of Congress be known as the session which did more for civil 
rights than the last hundred sessions combined; as the session which enacted 
the most far-reaching tax cut of our time; as the session which declared all-
out war on human poverty and unemployment in these United States; as the 
session which finally recognized the health needs of all our older citizens; as 
the session which reformed our tangled transportation and transit policies; as 
the session which achieved the most effective, efficient foreign aid program 
ever; and as the session which helped to build more homes, more schools, 
more libraries, and more hospitals than any single session of Congress in the 
history of our Republic.5 
 
 It was an imposing list of priorities. If the civil-rights bill and the tax cut were the 
major pieces of unfinished business left over from the Kennedy administration, it was the 
poverty program that was to be Johnson’s signature domestic initiative. Johnson believed 
he could rally Americans to a national offensive against want by using the bully pulpit 
afforded him by his sudden accession to the Presidency. As a society, the U.S. had 
achieved prosperity unequaled in human history — but few Americans were in a self-
congratulatory mood. LBJ, who fancied himself a friend of the underdog, sensed that if 
                                                                                                                                            
Sorensen wrote in his memoir. Ted Sorensen, Counselor: A Life at the Edge of History (New York: 
Harper-Collins, 2008), p. 386. Johnson is quoted in Bruce J. Schulman, Lyndon B. Johnson and American 
Liberalism: A Brief History With Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1995), p. 70. 
5 Johnson, State of the Union address, Jan. 8, 1964, LBJL online.  
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ever the country’s middle classes might be asked to sacrifice for those left behind, that 
time was now, in the wake of tragedy. A war against poverty was the moral thing to do; 
as he later put it, the Great Society was a place “where men are more concerned with the 
quality of their goals than the quantity of their goods.”6  
 Johnson, of course, was a politician through and through. He hoped the War on 
Poverty would prove a political winner in an election year. It would be hard for 
Republicans to oppose without seeming callous; it also promised to win over minority 
groups and Northern elites otherwise predisposed to distrust a Southern Democrat in the 
White House. But Johnson knew that he ran the risk of alienating not only the affluent 
but also hard-working Americans who struggled to make ends meet and suspected that 
social programs targeting poor people were wasting their tax dollars. So it made some 
sense to speak of the campaign against poverty as a war. To declare war on poverty was 
to bind social programs to patriotic sentiment. To declare war on poverty was to conjure 
up images of national unity, wholesale mobilization, and collective action. To declare 
war on poverty was to assert that the campaign could be won.7  
 “This administration today, here and now, declares unconditional war on poverty in 
America,” Johnson said in the State of the Union. The language — martial, 
                                                
6 Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the University of Michigan, May 22, 1964, LBJ online. On the 
meanings of Johnson’s emphasis on “quality” over “quantity,” see Sidney M. Milkis, “Lyndon Johnson, 
the Great Society, and the Modern Presidency,” in Sidney Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur, eds., Great 
Society and the High Tide of Liberalism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005). 
7 For an insightful look on how rhetorical choices in the realm of national policy served both to enlarge 
and constrain the range of effective policies, see William Leuchtenberg, “The New Deal and the Analogue 
of War,” in John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and Everett Walters, editors, Change and Continuity in 
Twentieth-Century America (Ohio State University Press, 1964). Leuchtenberg argues that much of the 
New Deal’s rhetoric borrowed from the experience of World War I, and that several key programs were 
enacted on the basis of the wartime mobilization of government resources. The analogue of war, 
Leuchtenberg writes, was valuable because it allowed the New Dealers to justify an unprecedented 
expansion of governmental programs; at the same time, it precluded a serious reckoning with “the real 
problems of the relation of order to liberty which the power of the twentieth-century state creates.” 
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uncompromising, urgent — would haunt LBJ in later years, as critics accused him of 
artificially boosting expectations with grand promises he could never hope to fulfill.8 On 
January 8, 1964, though, it fit the country’s mood. Or so Johnson hoped. To be safe, he 
hedged his bets. The War on Poverty would include a welter of programs “obviously not 
for the poor or the underprivileged alone”: universal health care for the aged, funds for 
mass transit, enforcement of minimum-wage laws, federal aid to public schools, and a 
beefed-up program of unemployment insurance.9  
 In other words, the campaign against poverty would benefit society at large. To 
woo business groups, Johnson tied the poverty program to tax cuts and repurposed the 
old New Deal argument that social-welfare programs could boost workers’ purchasing 
power and thus spur economic growth. To those worried about government waste, LBJ 
promised to turn the unemployed into productive taxpayers and to coax the poor off 
welfare. This latter point was key to the Texan’s political calculus. Self-help would 
become a byword of the War on Poverty programs; the poor would be offered not cash 
but opportunity. “A Hand Up, Not a Handout,” went the official slogan. (As LBJ’s 
appointee to run the War on Poverty, Sargent Shriver, began work that February, Johnson 
offered a simple bit of advice: “No doles!”)10 
                                                
8 Among the many who have commented on the rhetoric of the War on Poverty, the most insightful is 
David Zarefsky, President Johnson’s War on Poverty: Rhetoric and History (University of Alabama 
Press, 1986).  
9 President’s Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 8, 1964, Lyndon Baines 
Johnson Library online; Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.  
10 Johnson, State of the Union, Jan. 8, 1964; Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, America Divided: The 
Civil War of the 1960s (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 109; Schulman, Lyndon Johnson, 
pp. 71-73. The literature on Johnson is vast, and most biographers consider the question of what 
motivated him to declare poverty. See, among others, Joseph A. Califano, Jr., The Triumph & Tragedy of 
Lyndon Johnson: The White House Years (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); Randall B. Woods, LBJ: 
Architect of American Ambition (New York: Free Press, 2006); and Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of 
America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harper & Row, 1984). For an account told in 
the voices of those who crafted the War on Poverty, see Michael L. Gillette, Launching the War on 
Poverty: An Oral History (New York: Twayne Books, 1996). 
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 All this undeniably carried “a Johnson stamp.” Still, there was no shortage of “re-
labeling” that went on in designing the new poverty program. The president’s aversion to 
“handouts” was as American as apple pie. Popular New Deal initiatives such as the 
Civilian Conservation Corps would be repackaged. (Johnson’s idol, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, was another inveterate foe of doles.) The idea of launching a national assault 
on poverty had emerged during the Kennedy administration, and the most innovative idea 
embedded in the program — the community-action principle — was handed down from 
the President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency (PCJD), which itself had drawn on a 
large body of social-work practice and social-scientific theory.11  
 Historians chronicling the origins of the War on Poverty have tended to focus on 
the discourse among social scientists, policymakers, and bureaucrats, most of them 
operating in academia or within the orbit of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. 
Yet LBJ’s poverty agenda, as it took shape in 1964, also reflected the ideas, institutions, 
and programs that had emerged among municipal policymakers and grassroots activists 
in postwar New York. In Brooklyn, the first Community Action Agency designated to 
receive federal funds was a direct offshoot of the Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council, 
which had emerged in the late 1950s to run city-funded delinquency programs. It was on 
the CBCC’s home turf — Bedford-Stuyvesant — that Brooklyn’s first War on Poverty 
initiatives sprang up, and it was there that the bulk of the action would unfold in the years 
to follow. The poverty warriors who set to work in Bedford-Stuyvesant in 1964 included 
                                                
11 Johnson often appropriated the language of the New Deal in selling the poverty program, such as when 
he referred to “our fellow citizens who are ill-clad, ill-fed, ill-housed” in his open letter confirming 
Sargent Shriver’s appointment to run OEO. Johnson to Shriver, Feb. 12, 1964, “FG 11-15, 11/22/63-
11/24/64,” Box 124, White House Central Files (WHCF), LBJL. On Johnson and FDR, see William E. 
Leuchtenberg, “Lyndon Johnson in the Shadow of Franklin Roosevelt,” in Milkis and Mileur, eds., The 
Great Society.  
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many of the preachers, lawyers, social workers, civil-rights activists, and grassroots 
organizers who had led community activism in previous years. While they adopted an 
analysis of poverty in line with that emanating from academics and federal policymakers, 
they made sure to weave in the specific concerns of their neighborhood. The shape and 
direction of the poverty program also reflected the fears of New York’s Mayor, Robert F. 
Wagner, Jr. Once a champion of community planning in poor neighborhoods, Wagner 








 The U.S. in the late 1950s had become what the economist John Kenneth 
Galbraith memorably called “the affluent society.” By the time Kennedy took office in 
1961, however, the triumph of affluence was beginning to seem less decisive than it had a 
few years earlier. The economy continued to expand, to be sure, and the steady migration 
of middle-class urbanites into suburban dreamlands continued apace. Yet if the 
Eisenhower years enshrined the mythology of abundance in the American psyche, they 
were also years of relative economic stagnation. From 1933 to 1952, two decades of 
unprecedented Democratic Party dominance, the American economy had grown at an 
astounding average annual rate of 6%; during the Eisenhower years, GDP growth 
averaged only 3%. The unemployment rate, which neared 25% during the 1933 nadir of 
the Great Depression, reached a postwar low of 2.5% in early 1953, as Harry Truman was 
vacating the White House. But unemployment had crept back up to 7% by the time 
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Kennedy took office in 1961.12 Meanwhile, a dramatic transformation was unfolding in 
the sectorial makeup of the economy. Between the end of World War II and 1970, the 
fraction of Americans working on farms declined from 17% to 3%; white-collar jobs, 
meanwhile, increased from 31% of total employment to 47%. American workers were 
becoming increasingly tied to the provision of services rather than the production of 
goods.13 
 In New York, the economy was becoming, in the words of Assistant Secretary of 
Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “more and more biased against the preservation of a 
stable and honorable family life for wage earners.” Between 1947 and 1962, New York 
State lost 7.3% of its manufacturing jobs, and the jobs that remained also paid less. 
Whereas in 1950 hourly earnings in New York City’s manufacturing sector ranked 10th 
among U.S. cities, by 1960 New York had dropped to 30th. A 1959 study found that the 
average weekly wage among New York’s factory workers was close to $83, as compared 
with $117 in Detroit, $110 in Pittsburgh, and $107 in Cleveland. That same year, Mayor 
Wagner called attention to “sweatshop conditions” in New York’s garment industry and 
proposed a 25-cent hike in the state and federal minimum wage, to $1.25. In the early 
1960s, it was estimated that 15% of New York families and 44% of single individuals 
were making do on incomes below the poverty line. And things were getting worse.14 
                                                
12 Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Gross Domestic Product: Percent change from preceding period, based 
on chained 2005 dollars,” www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp; “The U.S. Unemployment Rate, Jan. 
1948 to Aug. 2011,” www.miseryindex.us. GDP growth would pick up again during the Kennedy-
Johnson administrations, averaging almost 5%. The unemployment rate would soon dip back down below 
4% and stay there through the late1960s; the next and last time official unemployment fell below the 4% 
barrier was in 2000.  
13 Benjamin M. Friedman, The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2005), pp. 183-184. 
14 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Speech before the New Democratic Club, June 10, 1964, Folder 7, Box 
060249, RFW Papers, LGW Online; “Wagner To Press for Minimum Pay of $1.25 an Hour,” New York 
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 Beyond statistics, the early 1960s witnessed a new sensitivity to urban poverty 
among policy elites. During the 1950s, even as Third World poverty took on geopolitical 
importance, poverty at home increasingly went unmentioned; when it did come up it was 
usually as a rural issue.15 Social scientists, however, had continued to study class and 
racial inequality in the cities. A number of works on poverty appeared in the late 1950s 
and early ‘60s, transforming public discourse and ushering in a new era in social policy.16  
 The most notable such work was Michael Harrington’s The Other America, a 
breezily written yet emotional study of the “invisible poor,” published in 1962. 
Harrington, a socialist and freelance journalist, had spent the early 1950s working among 
homeless alcoholics on the Bowery in Lower Manhattan. In The Other America, he 
visited Americans living in various other “pockets of poverty” (Appalachian farms, 
California migrant camps, urban ghettos), as well as those individuals whom prosperity 
had forgotten, including most notably the aged. The book became a surprise bestseller. 
Harrington offered vivid descriptions of life on the margins, tugging at heartstrings and 
stirring consciences in a manner reminiscent of Jacob Riis, whose How the Other Half 
Lives had similarly dramatized poverty in the 1890s. Beyond reportage, Harrington also 
introduced popular audiences to a new body of social-scientific knowledge about poverty. 
Harrington argued that the poor were not merely middle-class Americans who lacked 
money; rather, they lived in what was, for all intents and purposes, a different 
                                                                                                                                            
Times [NYT], Dec. 17, 1959; Community Council of Greater New York. “Poverty in New York City: 
Facts for Planning Community Action” (New York: second printing, Jan. 1965), p. iv. 
15 The rhetoric used by Richard Nixon during the 1960 campaign is illustrative. Nixon proposed that 
“rather than having as our objective only the negative one of fighting communism — and we will do that 
— it must be the positive one of waging the war on poverty and misery and disease all over the world.” 
Remarks of Richard Nixon at Fordham University, Oct. 5, 1960. Accessed via the American Presidency 
Project online. 
16 Among the books that came to the attention of federal policymakers were Galbraith’s The Affluent 
Society and Gabriel Kolko’s Wealth and Power in America. See Administrative History of the Office of 
Economic Opportunity, Volume I, Box I, p. 4, LBJL. 
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civilization. This interpretation reflected Harrington’s reading of the “culture of poverty” 
thesis, whose most famous proponent was the anthropologist Oscar Lewis. For Lewis, 
whose had carried out much of his research among slum-dwellers in Mexico, the poor 
were ensnared in a multigenerational pattern of unemployment, ignorance, and 
hopelessness. Though structural factors (discrimination, automation, capitalist 
exploitation) had helped to create the conditions in which poverty emerged, once the poor 
were poor they became caught in a “vicious circle.” Because they were poor, their 
children would likely go to poor schools where they would lack motivation to succeed; 
even if they did thrive, they would face poor job prospects upon graduation. In turn, their 
children would grow up poor, too.17 As Harrington put it:  
Poverty is a culture in the sense that the mechanism of impoverishment is 
fundamentally the same in every part of the system. ... There are people in 
the affluent society who are poor because they are poor; and who stay poor 
because they are poor. To realize this is to see that there are some tens of 
millions of Americans who are beyond the welfare state.18 
 
 The culture of poverty thesis would later come in for intense criticism, especially 
after Daniel Patrick Moynihan incorporated it into a controversial 1965 report about 
African-American unemployment, titled “The Negro Family: A Case for National 
                                                
17 See Oscar Lewis, “The Culture of Poverty,” in Daniel P. Moynihan, ed., On Understanding Poverty: 
Perspectives From the Social Sciences (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 87-200. On Harrington, see 
Maurice Isserman, “50 Years Later: Poverty and The Other America,” Dissent (Winter 2012).  
18 Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 
160. For a discussion of how the “culture of poverty” thesis influenced the War on Poverty, see 
O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge, Chap. 4. For more on the consequences of social science in the War on 
Poverty, see Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding; Marris and Rein, Dilemmas of Social 
Reform; and Noel Cazenave, Impossible Democracy: The Unlikely Success of the War on Poverty 
Community Action Programs (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007). For a revisionist take 
on the “culture of poverty” debate, see Mario Luis Small, David J. Harding, and Michèle Lamont, 
“Reconsidering Culture and Poverty,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 629:1 (2010), pp. 6-27. 
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Action.” With its emphasis on the psychological deficiencies of the poor themselves and 
on the self-perpetuating aspects of lower-class lifestyles, Lewis’s thesis was easily co-
opted into an intellectualized exercise critics labeled “blaming the victim.” That had 
hardly been the initial thrust. The historian Alice O’Connor writes that for Harrington, 
Lewis, and their ilk, “the culture of poverty was more than an explanation for persistent 
disadvantage; it offered a dissent from postwar optimism about the solvent of economic 
growth, and a dire warning about the consequences of failing to act.” And yet, as 
O’Connor points out, Harrington also focused on the individual deficiencies of the poor, 
rather than the political economy of inequality, and in so doing laid the basis for an 
assault on poverty that targeted individual remediation rather than structural change.19  
 Harrington’s work, which Dwight MacDonald summarized in a widely read New 
Yorker essay, struck a chord in Camelot. President Kennedy had famously encountered 
impoverished West Virginians on the campaign trail in 1960, and his brother had 
frequently alighted in some of the country’s most benighted neighborhoods as part of his 
work with the President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency. These raw, emotional 
encounters with real human misery, combined with mounting pressure from the civil-
rights movement to address the economic demands of African Americans (half of whom 
lived below the poverty line in 1960), primed the Kennedys to accept arguments that 
helping the most disadvantaged Americans was both a moral and political imperative. 
But it was The Other America that gave Kennedy and his aides a master concept with 
which to frame their response to urban poverty.20 
                                                
19 O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge, pp. 122, 151 
20 Dwight MacDonald, “Our Invisible Poor,” The New Yorker, Jan. 19, 1963; Gillette, Launching the War 
on Poverty, Chap. 1. Edward R. Schmitt, President of the Other America: Robert Kennedy and the 
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 James L. Sundquist, an official in the Department of Agriculture under Kennedy, 
later wrote that prior to 1962: 
 
The measures enacted, and those proposed, were dealing separately with such 
problems as slum housing, juvenile delinquency, dependency, unemployment, 
illiteracy, but they were separately inadequate because they were striking only at 
surface aspects of what seemed to be some kind of bedrock problem, and it was the 
bedrock problem that had to be identified so that it could be attacked in a concerted, 
unified, and innovative way. Perhaps it was Harrington’s book that defined the 
target for Kennedy and supplied the coordinating concept — the bedrock problem, 
in a word, was ‘poverty.’”21 
 
 Historians have probably made too much of this “rediscovery of poverty.” 
Government officials were hardly ignorant of poverty’s persistence. As early as 1955, 
New York’s governor, Averill Harriman, made poverty a major theme of his inaugural 
address: “There are many reasons for poverty in our rich state — and we must attack 
them all. Unemployment, irregular employment, low wage rates, lack of education and 
skill, premature retirement, lack of provision for old age, physical handicaps and illness... 
all of these causes of poverty are subject to alleviation by action by our federal, state and 
local governments in cooperation with private efforts.” Kennedy himself promised in 
September 1960 that if elected President he would task himself with “wiping out poverty 
here in the United States.” 22 
                                                                                                                                            
Politics of Poverty (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010). See also, Matusow, The 
Unraveling of America; O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge, Chap. 6. 
21 James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Years (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 113-114. 
22 “Text of Gov. Harriman’s Inaugural Address,” NYT, Jan. 2, 1955; Speech of John F. Kennedy, Sheraton 
Park Hotel, Washington, D.C., Sept. 20, 1960. Accessed via the American Presidency Project online.  
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 In New York, reformers had been discussing poverty long before Kennedy read 
The Other America (or at least MacDonald’s summary of it). Indeed, as chronicled in the 
first three chapters of this dissertation, the people Harrington called the “other America” 
and whom MacDonald labeled “our invisible poor” inspired significant policy 
innovations throughout the 1950s and early ‘60s. The word “poverty” itself may have 
come up less frequently in the 1950s than it did a decade later. But there were many ways 
of talking about economic want and social inequality that didn’t involve using the actual 
word poverty. Housing officials were more likely to speak of blight, overcrowding, and 
unsanitary living conditions; architects of gang-outreach programs spoke of delinquency, 
family breakdown, unemployment, and discrimination. Among Wagner-era reformers, 
terms like “slums” and “multi-problem families” denoted something similar to what the 
word “poverty” evoked in the 1960s. The conditions the New York City Youth Board 
had tackled in the early 1950s, which the Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council had 
taken up in the late 1950s, and which the city’s Neighborhood Conservation Program 
attacked in the early 1960s, were conditions that together constituted something called 
poverty. The Northern civil-rights movement, too, addressed inequality and deprivation 
by focusing on the socio-economic consequences of racial discrimination: mass 
unemployment, slumlords, failing schools. Most important, residents of places like 
Bedford-Stuyvesant hardly needed to rediscover poverty in 1962. Among social workers 
and activists like Kenneth Marshall, Walter Pinkston, Archie Hargraves, and Elsie 
Richardson — all of them active in the struggles of the 1950s, all of them antipoverty 
crusaders during the 1960s — poverty often was left unnamed not because it had been 
forgotten but because it was so widespread that it was taken for granted. 
Chapter 4: War and Rumors of War  227 
 
 Taken literally, the word “poverty” denotes an economic condition: a lack of 
wealth, a lack of money. In truth, what was rediscovered in the 1960s was not poverty 
itself but a set of ideas about how culture intersected with poverty. Poverty was 
rediscovered not as a matter of economics but as a social, psychological, and ethnic 
condition. In some ways, poverty assumed roughly the same policy function in 1960s 
Washington as did the idea of juvenile delinquency in postwar New York. It acted as the 
entry wedge for a reform agenda aimed at altering social and political structures.  
 This is not to say that the liberals’ rediscovery of poverty was a non-event. On the 
contrary, it marked a clear turning point in the history of federal efforts to assist the 
downtrodden. It gave impetus to a new way of thinking and crystallized within the 
president’s mind a set of problems. Above all, the naming of the problem raised the 
possibility that something might be done to solve it. Harrington gave Kennedy a 
conceptual apparatus with which to make sense of the suffering that had so moved him 
during his trips to Appalachia. By highlighting poverty, Harrington paved the way not 
only for the programs lumped under the War on Poverty rubric but also a slew of federal 
programs (Medicaid, Medicare, food stamps, health clinics, and educational reforms, 
among others) that benefited the poor and the middle-class alike and which, taken 
together, contributed to the halving of poverty rates during the 1960s.  
 In December 1962, Kennedy asked the chairman of his Council of Economic 
Advisors, Walter Heller, to begin gathering facts on poverty and to lay out blueprints for 
a possible antipoverty program. Heller was a forceful advocate for a tax cut aimed at 
stimulating economic growth, but he recognized that growth alone would not be enough 
to lift the “other Americans” out of their misery. Throughout the late summer and autumn 
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of 1963 small groups of administration officials met repeatedly to brainstorm ideas for 
the coming poverty program. Only days before his death, Kennedy met with Heller and 
made it clear that he would throw his weight behind a poverty program of some sort 
within the coming year. The outlines of the initiative remained blurry, but most insiders 
agreed that youth programs and community action would make up the central 
components of the coming  “attack on poverty and ignorance,” to use Heller’s words.23  
 A key point of emphasis of the program would be on preventing people’s “entry 
into poverty.” This implied extra efforts at reaching young people, as well as those 
working people struggling to make ends meat. The government would also strive to 
accelerate the exit of older individuals from poverty and to alleviate hardships endured by 
those unable to escape poverty — but the primary focus would be on youth.  
 Thus did federal planners infuse the new poverty program with the key 
assumptions that had been driving policy in New York City’s low-income areas since the 
1950s. Was this a conscious decision? Perhaps not. But the influence of the PCJD, and 
especially of Mobilization for Youth, was widely acknowledged, and Mobilization itself 
had grown out of the Youth Board programs of the 1950s. The new poverty programs, 
like their New York City precursors (and like Ford’s Gray Areas program, another 
important influence), would target areas where it was assumed community participation 
in planning would help to direct policy. Further, the federal poverty initiatives would 
proceed as demonstration programs underpinned by social-scientific theory. Heller, in a 
Dec. 20, 1963, memo to Johnson, laid out the rationale:  
 
                                                
23 See Gillette, Launching the War on Poverty. 
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We believe that the key new element in any realistic attack on poverty 
should be a proposal which 1) is aimed at specific local areas of poverty; 2) 
relies on well-organized local initiative, action, and self-help under 
Federally-approved plans and with Federal support; 3) establishes action 
programs to evaluate and coordinate existing Federal State, local and 
private programs and test and demonstrate new ones.24 
 
 On November 23, less than 48 hours into his presidency, Johnson met with Heller 
and told him to press on with the effort. “That’s my kind of program,” Johnson said, to 





“It must be won in the field” 
 
 
 The War on Poverty, though conceived and funded at the federal level, was a local 
story. Lyndon Johnson, who had come of age during the New Deal as the Texas 
coordinator of National Youth Administration, understood as much as anyone the 
benefits of creative federalism, and also the potential for local obstructionism. “Poverty is 
a national problem, requiring improved national organization and support,” Johnson said 
in his first State of the Union address. “But this attack, to be effective, must also be 
organized at the State and the local level and must be supported and directed by State and 
local efforts. For the war against poverty will not be won here in Washington. It must be 
                                                
24 Walter Heller to Lyndon B. Johnson, Dec. 20, 1963, LBJL. 
25 Schulman, p. 71. For more on the planning phases of the War on Poverty, see, among others, Lemann, 
The Promised Land; Gillette, Launching the War on Poverty; and Moynihan, Maximum Feasible 
Misunderstanding. 
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won in the field, in every private home, in every public office, from the courthouse to the 
White House …”26 
 No place in the country was quicker to mobilize than New York City. In a sense, 
New York’s governing elites and its neighborhood activists been readying themselves for 
the War on Poverty for two decades, since the launch of the early postwar delinquency 
programs. Mayor Wagner himself had been declaring war on various manifestations of 
poverty for years. In 1957, Wagner had promised an “intensive fight” on juvenile 
delinquency in poor neighborhoods; in 1958, he had unveiled a “massive new attack on 
slums”; in 1961, he’d declared “all-out war on the forces of crime, slum blight, and 
poverty” on Manhattan’s West Side. A 1963 study of child services commissioned by the 
mayor called for a “war against poverty and discrimination.” Amidst this flurry of martial 
rhetoric, the leader of the city’s Liberal Party, Alex Rose, facetiously nicknamed the 
mayor “Fighting Bob.”27  
 Further, New York’s juvenile-delinquency programs had been an important testing 
ground for the community-action approach. Throughout the 1950s and early ‘60s, 
Wagner had continually argued that juvenile delinquency ought to be addressed with 
targeted social-policy innovations and not merely stepped-up law enforcement. Wagner 
wasn’t alone: the National Institute of Mental Health, Ford Foundation officials, and a 
small number of other mayors (most notably New Haven’s Richard Lee) were pursuing 
similar initiatives. But it was in Manhattan that the most influential of the federal 
                                                
26 As far back as 1973, David Greenstone and Paul Peterson found that community action unfolded 
differently in each of the five cities they studied. J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, Race and 
Authority in Urban Politics: Community Participation and the War on Poverty (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1973).  
27 “Mayor Mobilizes Full City Attack on Teen Violence,” NYT, Sept. 7, 1957; “Attack on Slums,” NYT, 
Dec. 10, 1958; “Text of Mayor’s State-of-City Message,” NYT, Apr. 15, 1959; “Clean-Up of Slums in 
West Side Area Begun by Wagner,” NYT, July 11, 1961; Institute of Public Administration, “The 
Administration of Services to Children and Youth in New York City” (1963). 
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delinquency projects — Mobilization for Youth on the Lower East Side and the Harlem 
Youth Opportunities Unlimited agency — had launched.28  
 In the summer of 1963, before any firm plans for the federal antipoverty program 
had hatched, Wagner was already busying himself building an antipoverty bureaucracy. 
In July, he formed a seven-member Council on Expanded Economic Opportunity and 
Training, which oversaw a $3 million job-training program for youth financed jointly 
with the federal Department of Labor.29 A mayoral executive order also established a 
Council Against Poverty under the supervision of City Council president Paul Screvane. 
Though the Council’s specific jurisdiction remained murky, Wagner formally tasked it 
with overseeing a concerted, citywide attack on poverty in January 1964; its 
administrative arm would be called the Economic Opportunity Committee. The mayor’s 
appointees to the Council included elected officials, representatives of religious 
communities, and leaders of philanthropic and social-service organizations; groups 
represented on the board included the United Neighborhood Houses, Catholic Charities, 
the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, the Federation of Protestant Welfare Agencies, 
and the Citizens Committee for Children. In this, the Council Against Poverty resembled 
the Youth Board set up a decade and a half earlier.30 
                                                
28 New York City Youth Board, “Report of the Mayor’s Conference on Labor, Industry, and Employment 
Opportunities for Youth,” Dec. 13, 1960, Watkins papers.  
29 The program, Job Orientation in Neighborhoods, foreshadowed the War on Poverty if for no other 
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the Great Society. According to official estimates, the program, which offered guidance, basic-skills 
training, job preparation, and on-the-job training, helped to place 6,000 people in jobs by the end of 1965. 
Robert F. Wagner, Speech at Youth Week Conference sponsored by the New York City Youth Board, 
Nov. 22, 1965, Folder 18, Box 060029W, RFW, LGW online. 
30 Bertram M. Beck, “Organizing Community Action,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 
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 In the weeks following the Kennedy assassination, as rumors of the federal 
initiative began to leak, Wagner prepared to launch his own antipoverty program. Within 
the halls of city government, unemployment (and specifically youth unemployment) 
became a hot conversation topic. In December, the mayoral cabinet discussed ways to 
increase opportunities for on-the-job training and to divert vocational learning toward 
more productive industries. Automation, in particular, worried city officials — though 
none had a clue what to do about it. One idea floating around was to stage a massive 
public-works program with a focus on training young people for jobs in the new service-
oriented economy. Again, though, it was unclear how any city government, even one as 
large as New York’s, might find the resources for such an initiative. Wagner also began 
to express concern about the “startling” rate of increase in the city’s welfare expenditures. 
It was no secret that manufacturing jobs were trickling out the city; further exacerbating 
the problem was a rising high school-dropout rate and a massive influx of unskilled 
workers. Under Wagner, the city government itself would fill a good part of the 
employment gap. The expense budget rose 70% (to $3.4 billion) during Wagner’s second 
and third terms; by 1965, some 382,000 people — more than lived in the entire state of 
Wyoming — were working in civilian government jobs in New York City, of whom 
250,000 received their paychecks from the municipal government. Such government 
growth exposed Wagner to intensifying pressure from business and real-estate interests to 
lower taxes and cut back on social-welfare programs. The 1963-64 budget was the first to 
feature the kinds of accounting tricks that would come home to roost during the fiscal 
crisis of the 1970s. To avoid having to provide “perpetual dole,” the mayor urged his 
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charges to come up with creative solutions to the new configurations of poverty and 
unemployment in the city.31  
 With so many New Yorkers in need of vocational training, the city’s programs in 
that area were woefully inadequate — and expensive to boot. The Youth Board, for 
instance, found jobs for between 300 and 400 young people each month, at a cost of some 
$400,000. Every drop in the bucket seemed to cost a fortune. Even Mobilization for 
Youth, which was intended to demonstrate innovative solutions to youth unemployment 
through community action, had thus far produced results that were negligible relative to 
the overwhelming need. The focus on youth was in itself a problem. Some 225,000 adult 
New Yorkers were unemployed, yet the preponderance of job-training and placement 
programs were run through the Youth Employment Service, the Youth Board, and the 
Job Orientation in Neighborhoods program designed to aid jobseekers aged 17 to 21.  
 At a December 15, 1963, meeting of his Council on Expanded Economic 
Opportunity and Training, Wagner repeatedly warned of the need to reach out to 
unemployed New Yorkers, many of them black and Puerto Rican and many of them 
young. Wagner argued strongly for new programs to help workers develop the skills they 
needed to flourish in the new economy. Private industry was not doing its part, Wagner 
complained — but he also thought government could do better by gearing its skills-
                                                
31 Notes on caucus meeting, City Hall, Dec. 15, 1963, Folder 11, Box 060239, RFW Papers, LGW online; 
Meeting of Council on Expanded Employment Opportunity with Mayor Wagner, Dec. 15, 1963, Folder 
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Gottehrer, ed., New York City in Crisis: A Study in Depth of Urban Sickness (New York: D. McKay, 
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training programs toward those who had been unemployed for six months or less, who, 
he thought, would retain stronger motivation to work than the “hard-core” unemployed.32 
 As these conversations unfolded behind closed doors, Wagner supporters were 
floating trial balloons regarding the mayor’s future. Almost immediately after Kennedy’s 
death, speculation arose that Wagner might be among the frontrunners to run as LBJ’s 
Vice-Presidential nominee in 1964. No matter that “Fighting Bob,” once game to defend 
the common man and overhaul city government, seemed increasingly listless and 
detached as crisis after crisis buffeted his city. Political wisdom at the time held that the 
next Vice-President should be a northern liberal, preferably a big-city Catholic. Wagner, 
who had been mulling a run for Senate in 1964, fit the bill. The rumors intensified when 
Johnson invited Wagner to sit in the presidential gallery for his November 27, 1963, 
address — known as the “Let Us Continue” speech — before a joint session of the 
Congress. By December 20, when Wagner traveled to Washington for a one-on-one 
meeting with LBJ, the Wagner-as-Vice-President story had become front-page news.33  
 The mayor’s accomplishments translated easily onto the national stage at a moment 
of liberal ascendancy. He had served three terms at the helm of the nation’s largest city 
and second-largest government. He had brought about the city’s first rezoning in almost a 
half-century and passed a new city charter. Under his watch, City Hall had dramatically 
improved its relations with municipal employees and begun collective bargaining with 
unions. New York had added historic numbers of public-housing units and schools; the 
                                                
32 Meeting of Council on Expanded Employment Opportunity with Mayor Wagner, Dec. 15, 1963, Folder 
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City University system had been consolidated. Wagner had also proven himself a 
steadfast supporter of civil rights; until the early 1960s, as historian Clarence Taylor has 
written, “New York City’s liberal efforts at challenging racial discrimination had the 
potential of making the city a model for other large urban centers.” Yes, the budget had 
exploded under Wagner’s watch, doubling from $194 per head annually to $396; yes, 
Wagner had often procrastinated when faced with difficult decisions; and yes, increasing 
numbers of New Yorkers worried that the city was on the verge of a period of devastating 
decline. But as the Times put it soon after the assassination, “Mayor Wagner has an 
impossible job — one that would strain the capacities of a superman. The Mayor is no 
superman, but in his slow, tenacious way he has done much to improve New York City’s 
government.” To top it off, the Wagner name occupied a position of almost unrivaled 
prominence in the liberal pantheon.34 
 Wagner disclaimed such talk, publicly scolding surrogates who campaigned on his 
behalf during what was meant to be a national period of mourning.35 What, then, was 
Wagner talking to Johnson about? “We need to tackle this whole question of poverty,” 
                                                
34 Clarence Taylor, “Robert Wagner, Milton Galamison and the Challenge to New York City Liberalism,” 
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was how Wagner summed up his meeting with LBJ at the White House on December 20, 
1963. During the same visit, Wagner and his aides met with Labor Secretary Willard 
Wirtz and his assistant, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, to talk about the incipient poverty 
program and job-retraining initiatives. On January 7, 1964, a day before Johnson made 
his official declaration of war on poverty, Wagner garnered front-page headlines by 
announcing that the city was preparing to tackle poverty “in its many local 
manifestations” and that he hoped the New York programs might “be helpful in 
providing a pattern for the federal government.” The same day, the city’s Labor 
Department announced that it would be holding a major conference under the banner of 
“Hope vs. Poverty.”36  
 Around this time, Wagner began to trumpet the amount of money his 
administration was spending to address “conditions approximating poverty.” Annual 
outlays lumped into this category totaled more than $725 million — a gargantuan tab for 
any municipal government — of which some $305 million was dispensed in welfare 
checks and $260 million came from defraying the hospital care of citizens lacking health 
insurance. Another $102 million went to anti-delinquency initiatives, including 
Mobilization for Youth, which by 1964 was receiving almost $5 million annually from 
the City Administrator’s Office.37 The mayor laid out his vision of the emerging 
antipoverty drive in an uncommonly long and moving address to the City Council on 
January 16, 1964. The speech was notable for its explicit endorsement of the “culture of 
poverty” thesis:  
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 The fact is that a portion of our population which lives within sight and 
sound of the rest of us, actually inhabits almost a different world — a 
submerged world of utter, abject, grinding, hopeless poverty. The New 
Yorkers to whom I refer are not only poor; they are impoverished. They 
are stricken, paralyzed and disorganized by poverty. Many of them are at 
the same time disfigured by the permanent scars of racial discrimination, 
oppression, and degradation.38 
 
People born into such deprivation, Wagner warned, were “social dynamite” 
waiting to erupt. Here he was referring explicitly to minority groups, particularly African 
Americans. “This urban association of poverty next door to luxury is both corrosive and 
explosive, especially when mixed with the experience of racial discrimination and the 
current eruption of revolution against it,” he said. So what did the mayor propose to do 
about it? Most of his suggestions echoed closely the kinds of things his father supported 
during the New Deal: massive public-works programs to employ the jobless, increased 
and improved public-housing construction, youth camps for dropouts. Job training, too, 
figured prominently. Increasing the minimum wage (a longtime Wagner cause) also made 
the cut. Wagner barely mentioned delinquency, although he did offer up the Job 
Orientation in Neighborhoods program, then being started up in Bedford-Stuyvesant, as 
an example of the type of youth-oriented organizing that might help in the poverty 
program. Conspicuously missing from Wagner’s address was a plug for community 
action, which would soon emerge as the centerpiece of the federal poverty program. But 
the idea that community participation in planning might form an important part of the 
coming campaign against poverty dovetailed with the efforts by various branches of the 
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city government (the Youth Board, the Neighborhood Conservation program, the 
Community Planning Boards) to open a policy dialogue with grassroots groups.39 
 Wagner’s early endorsement of the president’s agenda would earn him widespread 
goodwill among the activists who’d been pressing for such initiatives in the preceding 
years. He became intimately associated with the poverty program in its formative months 
— the Amsterdam News labeled it the “Johnson-Wagner War on Poverty” — and he 
promised to put New York in the vanguard of the Great Society. “He was the mayor who 
was most willing to try the Great Society programs,” the chief advisor to Lyndon Johnson 
on domestic affairs, Joseph Califano, would recall decades later. “Part of what he did was 
empower minorities.” According to Elsie Richardson, one of the leading African-
American activists in 1960s Brooklyn, “Wagner was good. He really tried to help us.” 
Yet the mayor’s characterization of poor New Yorkers as “stricken,” “paralyzed,” 








 It soon became clear that the bulk of Wagner’s antipoverty initiatives would target 
New York’s predominantly African-American and Hispanic neighborhoods. At the time 
the War on Poverty was declared, minorities made up 19.5% of all New York City 
families but accounted for 37% of all families living in poverty. Unemployment rates for 
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black workers were half-again as high as for whites; for Puerto Ricans, they were twice 
the rate for whites. The portrait of minority poverty was even grimmer when one took 
into account that black and especially Puerto Rican households were larger and younger, 
on average, than were white ones. It meant one thing to live on $3,000 a year as a retired 
couple, and quite another when there were four children to feed and clothe. The Wagner 
administration considered $4,000 to be a more realistic poverty threshold for households 
living in New York City; using that measure, the poverty rate among New York families 
reached a whopping 25%. With thousands of low-skill manufacturing jobs, especially in 
the garment and food-processing industries, fleeing the city every year, the situation 
threatened to worsen. For African Americans, whose mobility was seriously hampered by 
the geography of racism, it was much harder to follow the jobs out of town, as their white 
working-class neighbors were increasingly choosing to do. Nor was education a foolproof 
solution: while 29% of white college graduates earned $10,000 or more per year, this was 
true for only 7% of nonwhite college grads.41 
 On the other hand, optimists pointed out the growing evidence that many African 
Americans in New York were moving out of poverty and into middle-class lifestyles. For 
instance, more than 60% of employed African-American women had been domestic 
laborers in 1940, but that was true of just 20% in 1960. In the intervening years, as New 
York City began its transformation from a predominantly industrial economy to one 
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anchored by finance, insurance, and real estate, the share of female black professionals 
doubled, and the percentage of clerical workers had risen from 2.4% to 18.9%. Similar 
increases were observed among black men, among whom the share of low-wage factory 
workers was decreasing. Further, poverty rates among African Americans in New York 
were significantly lower than elsewhere in the country. Census figures from 1960 pointed 
to a poverty rate among African Americans nationwide of almost 50%; by comparison, 
only 27% of black families in New York were counted as impoverished.42  
 Few places in the city were better acquainted with that dichotomy — of grinding 
poverty coexisting side by side with rising expectations — than Bedford-Stuyvesant. By 
the mid-1960s, the sprawling Brooklyn neighborhood housed between 250,000 and 
400,000 people, depending where one drew its boundaries; around 80% of its residents 
were black and perhaps 15% of Puerto Rican descent. The neighborhood, with its elegant 
Victorian brownstones, tree-lined blocks, and thriving club life, had long been a magnet 
for New York’s black middle class. In the postwar era, thousands of migrants from the 
rural South and Puerto Rico, most of them unskilled laborers with little education, moved 
in as well. The widespread poverty that had spurred the community to act in the 1950s 
intensified. But people of all classes felt afflicted by the indices of community breakdown 
besieging Bedford-Stuyvesant.43   
 A failed school system that was quickly becoming hyper-segregated left the average 
Bedford-Stuyvesant eighth grader more than two years behind the city average in 
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reading; in 1963-64, only 1% of local high school seniors would graduate with averages 
high enough to qualify them for city colleges. Three out of four third-graders in Bed-Stuy 
read below their grade level. Meanwhile, studies found that 30% of all houses in the area 
could be described either as “dilapidated” or “deteriorating.” Despite catastrophic infant-
mortality rates of 38.9 per 1,000, local mothers received less prenatal instruction and care 
than in any other area of the city. Rates of venereal disease were four times higher than 
for the city as a whole. According to the 1960 census, Bedford-Stuyvesant families 
earned a median income of $4,487 — 26% lower than the citywide figure and barely 
above the threshold at which the government categorized families as “poverty-stricken.”44 
 Automation and the flight of industry from New York City made unemployment a 
worsening problem. In 1965, it was estimated that unemployment in Bedford-Stuyvesant 
had reached 8.3%, including 11.6% for men — this at a time when the national figure 
was fluctuating between 4% and 5%. Further, according to a study carried out by a local 
agency, “most jobs Bedford-Stuyvesant residents hold lack stability or job security.” The 
high price of consumer goods in Bedford-Stuyvesant further exacerbated its residents’ 
economic troubles. Better quality clothing cost less in downtown Brooklyn than in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant, and food retailers in Bed-Stuy charged significantly more for staple 
products. Black Brooklynites blamed racism for these discrepancies: a study found that 
whites owned 70% of the businesses on Fulton Street (Bedford-Stuyvesant’s main 
shopping thoroughfare), along with 78% of all large businesses in the area. Meanwhile, 
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youth crime in Bedford-Stuyvesant had increased 150% in the decade to 1962, leaving 
the neighborhood with a delinquency rate twice as high as that for the city as a whole.45  
 The grim statistics told only a partial tale, and in some ways their accumulation made 
it more difficult to grasp the true character of life in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Despite all the 
depressing social indicators, the city, state, and federal governments had been slow to 
help. In the eyes of Bedford-Stuyvesant’s vocal middle-class leaders, this amounted to 
near-criminal neglect. “The informed city official must be aware that Bedford-Stuyvesant 
has become a concentration of low-rent projects and that middle-income families are 
fleeing Kings County for greener counties in Queens, Nassau, Suffolk, etc.,” an 
Amsterdam News editorial pleaded. “Certainly, he must know that the middle-income 
group is the backbone of any society, minority, or community and that Bedford-
Stuyvesant is fast becoming a one-income area.”46 
 Thus it was appropriate that the first shot fired in New York’s War on Poverty was 
in Bedford-Stuyvesant. On January 16, 1964, the day Mayor Wagner delivered his 
poverty speech to the City Council, he also announced that his administration would 
award a $39,500 planning grant to the Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council. By 1964, 
CBCC inhabited a unique political space. The consortium had expanded to include more 
than 50 civil-rights organizations, churches, social clubs, block associations, and fraternal 
orders, who together strove to organize grassroots energies. At the same time, CBCC 
continued to serve as the quasi-official conduit for government programs in Bedford-
Stuyvesant. The group brought together vocal, forward-thinking activists such as Elsie 
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papers; B-S YIA, “Fulton Street Business Survey” (1965), Watkins papers, pp. 4-5. 
46 “Looking Ahead,” NYAN, Sept. 9, 1961.  
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Richardson and Robert Palmer; budding politicians like Shirley Chisholm; and respected 
professionals, including Dr. Cecil Gloster. The group’s leaders had developed an analysis 
of the community’s socio-economic landscape that linked delinquency to poverty, 
unemployment, failing schools, poor housing, and racial discrimination. Many CBCC 
leaders also had ties to the insurgent reformers within the Democratic Party whose 
campaign against the Kings County machine carried Chisholm, among others, into 
elected office. But the Wagner administration was most interested at this stage in 
delinquency, and it was also becoming clear that the new federal program would focus 
heavily on youth issues.  
 CBCC leaders had tried in 1963 to persuade Attorney General Kennedy and the 
President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency to release federal funds for a 
demonstration program in Brooklyn. The effort had fizzled out, leaving CBCC 
completely dependent for its monies on the city. Nonetheless, the youth-focused 
demonstration programs sponsored by the Kennedy administration on the Lower East 
Side and in Harlem (both of which also received city funds) provided a template for the 
nascent Brooklyn experiment.47  
 Wagner asked CBCC to carry out a comprehensive study of youth problems in 
Brooklyn, with an eye toward eventually launching an anti-delinquency program. Armed 
with the $40,000 grant, CBCC’s Youth Services Committee promptly reconstituted as a 
new community-based organization called Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth in Action (YIA). 
Youth in Action quickly hired a small professional staff under the direction of the former 
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CBCC committee chairman, attorney William Chisholm. Early on YIA drew heavily on 
the network of supporters CBCC had organized in the preceding half-dozen years. These 
men and women were generally well-educated, politically connected, professionally 
successful, and most often owners of their own homes. Few were wealthy — but by the 
standards of 1960s Bedford-Stuyvesant, they qualified as an elite.  
 In 1964, all 20 seats on the Youth in Action board of directors were filled by 
college graduates, and half held advanced degrees. (By contrast, only 5.4% of the 
Bedford-Stuyvesant adult population had attended college, and 0.3% had done graduate 
work.) Joining Chisholm on the board was another lawyer, Garvey Clarke, and a judge, 
Franklin Morton; yet another lawyer, Darwin W. Bolden, who had previously worked 
with CORE and helmed the Bedford-Stuyvesant Area Services Program under the city’s 
Housing and Redevelopment Board, became YIA’s executive director. Ministers H. Carl 
McCall and William Jones also assumed leadership positions in the new organization, 
and several other preachers, including famed NAACP leader Milton Galamison, would 
soon join the board. Two physicians, Cecil Gloster and Robert Palmer, both past 
chairmen of CBCC, also joined. Other Youth in Action directors included John Procope, 
the real-estate and insurance broker who chaired CBCC’s influential Housing and Urban 
Renewal Committee; Russell Service, the head of the Bedford branch of the YMCA; 
Sydney Moshette, Jr., a probation officer; and Johnny Parham, Jr., a 27-year-old who had 
led lunch-counter sit-ins in his native Atlanta before moving north to head up Brooklyn’s 
chapter of the Urban League. Women, many of them longtime CBCC activists, also got 
involved; the most prominent were the indefatigable activist and school secretary Elsie 
Richardson, social worker Anne W. Pinkston, and an IBM employee named Louise  







Glover. (Each of the original directors was black, though a white sociologist, Don 
Watkins, joined later in 1964 and Puerto Ricans would figure prominently in later years.) 
In short order, a slew of big-name politicians would also join the board, including State 
Assemblywoman and former CBCC spokesperson Shirley Chisholm; William 
Thompson, a judge who later gained election to the State Senate; Albert Vann, a teacher 
and future New York State Assemblyman; and Thomas Fortune, a future district leader 
and State Assemblyman.48 
                                                
48 B-S YIA, “The Bedford-Stuyvesant Proposal,” Aug. 20 1964. City of New York, Office of the Mayor, 
press release, July 25 1964, “War on Poverty” binder, New York City Municipal Archives (NYCMA); B-
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Darwin W. Bolden, future executive director of Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth in Action, 
walks a picket line organized by Harlem CORE to show solidarity with the Southern 
lunch-counter sit-ins that kicked off in 1960. Bolden would go on to head the 
Interracial Council on Business Opportunity in the late 1960s and early ’70s.  
(Bettmann/Corbis Images, via Harlem Core online archive, Item #190.)   
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 This accumulation of social and political prestige on the new agency’s board was 
significant for several reasons. Youth in Action, like CBCC, would spend much of its 
early years attempting to rally political support as it waged repeated battles for funds that 
always seemed too meager and too slow to arrive. One of its primary purposes was to 
organize Bedford-Stuyvesant and to build political power among a largely disempowered 
constituency. In this sense, its mission dovetailed with the ongoing efforts of reformers 
like Chisholm and Thomas Jones to build a durable, black-led reform coalition within the 
Democratic Party. Further, the presence on YIA’s board of civil-rights leaders like 
Galamison and William Jones lent star power and organizing clout to the group’s efforts. 
These men yoked the energy and hope associated with the civil-rights movement to the 
new fight against poverty. This role was all the more relevant at a time when mainstream 
civil-rights leaders were becoming increasingly vocal about the interrelationship of 
poverty, racial discrimination, and the political disempowerment of African Americans.49 
The preachers of Bedford-Stuyvesant had often stood on the front lines during the 
anti-discrimination protests of the early 1960s. Though mostly moderate in their political 
leanings, they took up the challenge of the civil-rights era with gusto. “For a brief period 
black ministers of Brooklyn set aside their moderate approaches and became 
revolutionaries,” historian Clarence Taylor writes. “They sacrificed their comfortable 
                                                
49 Perhaps the most eloquent statement of this shift was a piece by Bayard Rustin in Commentary in early 1965. 
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positions as power brokers closely tied to the dominant political order and joined with 
ordinary people in the streets to eliminate racist union policies that denied people of color 
employment and to end government inaction on those policies.”50 McCall, Jones, 
Galamison, and another minister who later became the chairman of YIA’s board, Walter 
Offutt, took leadership roles in school protests, picket actions, and the dramatic 
Downstate Medical Center protests. But if many temporarily “sacrificed their 
comfortable positions as power brokers,” they quickly recaptured those positions by 
trying themselves to the expanding welfare state after 1964.  
 There was something dissonant about putting a self-selected group of doctors and 
lawyers and preachers and teachers in charge of poverty policy. These men and women 
had organized tirelessly on behalf of black Brooklynites of all classes. But none belonged 
to the area’s low-income majority. Where were the custodians and the cashiers and the 
shelf-stockers and the laid-off seamstresses? Where were the single mothers on welfare? 
As Youth in Action became the best-known and best-funded War on Poverty agency in 
Brooklyn (years later it would end up with a higher annual budget than any other 
community agency in the city), more and more voices in Bedford-Stuyvesant began to 





Dark Ghetto or Competent Community? 
 
 
 Youth in Action’s first step was not action but study. Having hired a group of 
social scientists as research consultants, it embarked on an exhaustive survey and 
                                                
50 Clarence Taylor, The Black Churches of Brooklyn (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 
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demographic study of Bedford-Stuyvesant. Youth in Action’s program was to be rooted 
in theory. Led by executive director Darwin Bolden, YIA planners consulted extensively 
with staffers from Mobilization for Youth and Harlem Youth Opportunities. Just as 
important, they read what the intellectual architects of those programs, Richard Cloward 
and Kenneth Clark, had written and attempted to apply their insights to Brooklyn. The 
new agency would attempt, in painstaking fashion, to chart the relationship between 
youth crime and poverty. But events suddenly changed the equation.51 
 On July 16, 1964, a white police lieutenant in Harlem shot and killed a 15-year-old 
African-American boy, James Powell. The officer, Thomas Gilligan, claimed to have 
acted in self-defense after Powell had attacked him with a knife. Harlemites didn’t buy it. 
That night the Congress for Racial Equality led a march on the 26th precinct house in 
Harlem, where demonstrators met a wall of policemen in riot gear. Some marchers hurled 
bricks and bottles at the police, who responded by firing shots in the air and beating 
whomever came too close. What ensued was a weeklong outpouring of rage that spilled 
over the East River into Brooklyn and then migrated upstate all the way to Rochester. 
Marauding gangs of teenagers smashed store windows, took whatever they could grab 
inside, and torched the rest. By the time tempers cooled, the police had made more than 
450 arrests. Hundreds of stores sat smoldering. This was not simply a nihilistic 
outpouring; protestors articulated specific political demands. Amidst the violence, CORE, 
under the leadership of James Farmer, had organized large demonstrations demanding 
that the city act against police brutality, hire more black police officers to work in Harlem 
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and Bedford-Stuyvesant, and form a civilian complaint review board to oversee the 
NYPD. City Council President Paul Screvane, the acting mayor in Wagner’s absence, 
blamed the violence on “fringe groups, including the Communist Party.” The mayor was 
sufficiently alarmed that he cut short a vacation on the Spanish island of Majorca and 
flew home to Kennedy airport, tanned and worried.52 
 New York’s governing class had long feared the prospect of violent uprisings, 
especially as the weather warmed and schools let out each spring. In the spring of 1960, 
for instance, the Times alluded to “what have become characteristic hot-weather 
outbreaks of juvenile violence here in the city”; that same year, the city undertook a 
variety of youth-focused summer programs to preclude the “horrifying violence that the 
city has come to dread in the summer.” In 1962, Wagner fretted that among New York 
City youth “serious group tensions and hostilities” were increasingly being manifested in 
“highly violent and extreme form ... in a savage revolt against all law, order and society.”  
In decades past, American cities had intermittently exploded in racially motivated 
summer violence, most of it meted out against African Americans by vigilante mobs and 
the forces of order. The summer violence of the mid-1960s, however, captivated the 
American public and policymaking community as never before. The conflagrations 
played out on television screens and thrust black rage into the spotlight as never before. 
In a sense, the events of July 1964 in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant pioneered a new 
mode of urban politics. During ensuing summers — “long, hot summers,” as they became 
known — throngs of mostly young, mostly black city-dwellers expressed discontent with 
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the system through glass-shattering, store-burning, epoch-defining, hot-weather rage. 
Across the barricades, police forces responded with gunfire while populist politicians 
armed themselves with law-and-order rhetoric. Some spoke of riots, others of rebellions. 
Either way, the summer outbursts were easily understood as political events. Following 
hot on the heels of the civil-rights crusade, they begged a political response.53 
 The uprising of July 1964 kicked New York City’s War on Poverty into high gear. 
On July 29, 1964, two weeks after the killing of James Powell, Wagner announced the 
creation of between 18,000 and 20,000 new jobs within government agencies, most of 
them for low-skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers. The target group would be 
unemployed 16- to 21-year-olds, who, the thinking went, would not otherwise have found 
work. Each was to receive training, either through the soon-to-be launched federal Job 
Corps program or through some more traditional form of workplace apprenticeship. But 
while Wagner’s personnel director, Theodore Lang, instructed the 100-odd department 
heads and deputies assembled at City Hall to “roll up your sleeves and get to work,” the 
job-creation plan was, for the moment, little more than a lofty aspiration. At best, it gave 
skittish city officials something to point to when asked what they were doing to avert 
further riots. “This program must succeed,” Welfare Commissioner James R. Dumpson 
said of the new job-creation initiative, “or we can look forward to something more awful 
and more terrible than anything we have seen so far.”54  
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 Critics of the War on Poverty in years to come would tar it as a “riot-insurance 
program.” Whatever the exact relationship of unrest to the decisions made in 
Washington, D.C., the uprising of July 1964 was very much on the minds of the people 
crafting Brooklyn’s new poverty program. Youth in Action’s leaders were convinced that 
what they’d witnessed on the streets of Bedford-Stuyvesant was a direct response by 
underprivileged youth to poverty and discrimination. Thus they urged government 
officials to act on their promises to end poverty and discrimination. Wagner needed little 
prodding. On July 26, the mayor approved a second grant to Youth in Action, this one for 
$223,000. Wagner explicitly tasked YIA both with fighting poverty and pre-empting 
unrest. “Not only must we insure law and order in all sections of our city,” he said in 
announcing the grant, “but we must take effective and comprehensive action to relieve 
the basic causes of poverty, unemployment, and other ills which trigger violence and 
lawlessness.” Screvane added, ominously, that the city would be “heading for very, very, 
serious trouble,” unless it addressed the root causes of poverty. The need for social 
control, in other words, justified new social policy.55 
 Thus was Brooklyn’s first War on Poverty program triggered entirely with 
municipal monies — not surprisingly, given that federal enabling legislation for the War 
on Poverty had yet to clear Congress. Youth in Action immediately switched gears. For 
the first six months of the agency’s existence, a skeletal staff had been compiling data on 
delinquency in Bedford-Stuyvesant, hoping to get a targeted program up and running 
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later in the year. Now, all of a sudden, Youth in Action would be on the front lines of the 
nationwide campaign to address the “root causes” of poverty, unemployment, and urban 
violence. The quarter-million dollars in the group’s coffers testified to the success of the 
Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council (of which Youth in Action was still seen an 
appendage) in convincing the city government to act in Bedford-Stuyvesant. It also 
reflected the sense of urgency in the air that summer.  
 Youth in Action’s program proposal, submitted to the city in August, grappled at 
length with the issue of violence. The document drew attention to the usual “problem 
symptoms” of juvenile delinquency: alcoholism and drug addiction, unemployment, and 
a high dropout rate. But it also underlined several recent incidents that had raised the 
stakes considerably in Bedford-Stuyvesant. On April 21, 1964, several black teenagers, 
while returning from the funeral of a slain classmate, had tussled with Jewish school 
children at the United Lubavitcher Yeshiva. On Memorial Day weekend, several violent 
clashes had exploded on Brooklyn subways, resulting in a tense confrontation between 
the police and a group of black youths. Previously, African-American boys attending 
Park Slope’s John Jay High School, one of a shrinking number of integrated schools in 
Brooklyn, had endured a series of beatings at the hands of Italian-American teen gangs.56 
 The July riots followed hard on the heels of these incidents. The Youth in Action 
proposal argued that the riots testified both to the effects of poverty and to a “cult of 
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color.” According to YIA, racism had caused young African Americans to develop “a 
sense of impotence and inferiority which tends to destroy aspirations and develops a 
feeling of being locked in a prison from which escape is rare.” The children of Bedford-
Stuyvesant grew up in a “televised arena of open violence and conflict between black and 
white Americans”; their parents, meanwhile, faced racial discrimination by unions and 
employers, and struggled to make ends meet. According to YIA’s board chairman, 
William Chisholm, the only way to preclude further uprisings was for local communities 
and governments alike to work toward “alleviating the smoldering feeling of 
powerlessness.” Youth in Action would seek to provide a “suitable ego model” for the 
youth of Bedford-Stuyvesant and work on boosting their self-esteem. Community action 
would help; so, too, would teaching history. “Negroes and Puerto Ricans do have a past, 
which not only includes slavery but, also, a rich reservoir of heroes, culture, and artistic 
achievement,” the YIA proposal stated.57 
 YIA’s planners made it clear that Bed-Stuy had reached a turning point:  
 
Bedford-Stuyvesant has serious problems, but they are not necessarily insoluble. 
While the atmosphere that pervades is not totally that of a slum, it is a community 
at the crossroads between physical rehabilitation, social renewal, and resurgence 
of a vital, positive community life — or an acceleration of the process of 
deterioration, stagnation, waste, helplessness and hopelessness. It is, in short, a 
community in crisis.58  
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 To carry out the research program mandated by the new grant, Youth in Action 
hired a sociologist named Joseph Bensman. A Wisconsin-born professor at City College, 
Bensman applied a heavily theoretical perspective to his reading of Bedford-Stuyvesant; 
most notably, he drew on the work of his City College colleague Kenneth Clark, the 
psychologist best known for his work on the Brown v. Board of Education case.59 Clark 
was the brain behind Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited (HARYOU), which in 1964 
published a landmark document titled “Youth in the Ghetto: A Study of the 
Consequences of Powerlessness and a Blueprint for Change.” (Clark would later revise 
the study’s findings in a scholarly book titled Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power, 
and the agency even released a comic-book version aimed at teenagers.) Clark’s ideas 
reflected what Alice O’Connor has termed the “self-consciously behavioral, 
psychological drift” that informed early theories of community action. Harlem was a 
“sick” community, Clark argued, and its young people in particular suffered from 
psychological deficiencies born of racial discrimination, poverty, and family breakup. 
But outside forces weren’t hegemonic. Clark believed that Harlemites, though in need of 
government-financed remediation, could also empower themselves through concerted 
community action, especially by targeting education and jobs for youth.60 
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 In a Youth in Action planning document dated January 20, 1965, Bensman argued 
that the root of almost every problem facing Bedford-Stuyvesant youth could be found in 
“the heritage of slavery, and subsequent segregation, discrimination, and exploitation in a 
ghetto community.” Slavery, Bensman claimed, had destroyed black families, and the 
subsequent onslaught of segregation and workplace discrimination had conspired to 
disempower and emasculated black males. Black women, compelled to become 
breadwinners as well as caregivers, had struggled to devote enough time to their children; 
it was no surprise, then, that these children had failed to develop what Youth in Action 
dubbed the “creative capacity, habits, personality, and motivation” needed to succeed. 
Not only that: the youth of Bedford-Stuyvesant, especially males, also lacked self-esteem, 
role models, and career aspirations. As a result, they dabbled in “forbidden, malicious, 
negativistic, hedonistic activities” and, following on the example of their parents, gave up 
on pursuing opportunities outside “the framework of the ghetto.” All told, the youth of 
Bedford-Stuyvesant were caught in a “self-defeating vicious cycle.” Though racism 
initially closed off opportunities, they responded in ways that closed off even more.61 
 This was the “culture of poverty” analysis taken to its logical conclusion. In its facile 
historical diagnosis of black poverty and condescending tone toward black working-class 
culture, Youth in Action’s early analysis foreshadowed the Moynihan Report, which 
would appear later in 1965. Such lines of analysis, in the words of historian Michael 
Katz, “patronized the poor by reinforcing stereotypes of empty, childlike incompetence.” 
They also laid a shaky theoretical foundation for an agency meant to empower a 
disempowered community. Youth in Action proposed to lift up “large groups of disabled  
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The psychologists Kenneth Clark and Mamie Phipps Clark, whose research 
influenced the arguments made in the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education 
Supreme Court case. Kenneth Clark founded Harlem Youth Opportunities 
Unlimited in 1962. Next page: The cover of a comic-book version of “Youth 
in the Ghetto,” HARYOU’s 1964 research document and program.  
(Don Watkins papers.) 
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persons, poverty-stricken, ghettoized, and segregated from the opportunities of the 
general society.” But how could one expect to rally people to community action while at 
the same time telling them they were incompetent, damaged, and pathological? 
 One answer lay in the “opportunity theory” of Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, 
which had provided the theoretical framework for Mobilization for Youth and several 
other projects funded by the President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency. The 
programs Youth in Action proposed early on reflected the Cloward-Ohlin influence. 
Remedial education, job training and placement, mental and physical health facilities, 
leadership training, a neighborhood “Youth Council,” even coffee houses — all these 
were seen as potential “barrier eradicators.” By giving young people a stake in running 
these programs, YIA would help them build self-esteem and broaden their horizons. Only 
then would it become possible, as YIA’s chairman, William Chisholm, wrote in 1964, “to 
arrest the tide of human waste and youth deterioration rampant in this community.”62 
 Scholars of the War on Poverty have often presented its theoretical underpinnings as 
a fatal flaw in the overall design. Katz, for instance, has argued that the emphasis on 
remedying deprivation through new opportunities was incompatible with a supposedly 
“unconditional” struggle against poverty, since it foreclosed any discussion of wealth 
redistribution. The poverty planners, according to Katz, “wanted to give everyone a 
chance to compete, unhindered by the accident of birth, for the sweet rewards of success. 
No approach to poverty could be more conventional, or more American.” A further 
criticism of the War on Poverty is that it ignored the political economy of inequality. 
According to Alice O’Connor, the Community Action Program treated poverty as “a 
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problem that could be addressed without recourse to structural measures such as targeted 
job creation, without seriously upsetting the political status quo, and without explicitly 
mentioning race.”63 
 Youth in Action, however, demonstrated that it was possible for Community 
Action Agencies to straddle the fence, to pay lip service to the theoretical language of 
cultural deficiency while at the same time calling for practical measures to create jobs 
and combat segregation.64 The Brooklyn agency’s final set of program proposals, titled 
“Planned Intervention to Halt and Reverse the Vicious Cycle,” appeared in March 1965. 
It theorized a program that would simultaneously attack the “root causes” and the 
“symptoms” of delinquency by folding anti-delinquency efforts into a comprehensive 
anti-poverty program. What did this mean in practice? The specific programs YIA 
proposed to launch in 1965 catered mostly to youth: a remedial education program for 
young mothers; a youth leadership training institute; a local chapter of the Neighborhood 
Youth Corps, an OEO-funded program meant to provide teenagers (mostly male) with 
useful, remunerative work experience while encouraging them to stay in school; a 
homework-study program; cultural arts education; and Head Start, an innovative daycare 
program for low-income children. All this was presented under the overall rubric of 
fighting delinquency and, by extension, poverty.  
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 At the same time, Youth in Action also proposed to open up employment 
opportunities for African Americans, young and old, by fighting workplace 
discrimination (especially in the construction unions), as well as offering remedial 
education and job-training programs. The newly employed, it was assumed, would enjoy 
newfound self-esteem and pride and offer examples for others. Similarly, the Brooklyn 
agency hoped to foster an “effective Negro leadership corps” by training talented youths 
in leadership techniques, African-American history, and community organizing; this new 
generation of leaders, the agency hoped, would in turn dedicate itself to the removal of 
“discriminatory bars to employment opportunities.” Unemployment, automation, capital 
flight, and the loss of blue-collar jobs were also on the minds of the agency’s planners. In 
other words, for all the talk about ghetto pathologies, Youth in Action planners clearly 
targeted the political economy of segregated urban space as a crucial factor in 
perpetrating poverty.65  
 Further, despite the influence of Clark, Cloward, and Bensman, there were dangers 
in appropriation. Bedford-Stuyvesant was neither Harlem nor the Lower East Side. Far 
from a disorganized, apathetic place, Bedford-Stuyvesant was a highly organized 
community. Its class structure and ethnic diversity put a lie to blanket statements about 
life in “the ghetto.” Many Bedford-Stuyvesant residents were vocal, plugged-in, activists 
who had been practicing community action for years. Through CBCC, they had struggled 
to preserve the character of a neighborhood they saw not as a pathological mess but as a 
threatened space needing protection.  
                                                
65 B-S YIA, “History & Development of Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth in Action, Inc.” [1967], Watkins 
papers; B-S YIA, “Supplementary Data Sheet Based on 1960 Census,” undated, Watkins papers. 
Chapter 4: War and Rumors of War  261 
 
 Youth in Action’s initial program proposal took exception to the portrayals of 
Bedford-Stuyvesant as a damaged community: 
  
 In the words of the daily press, Bedford-Stuyvesant is “just another 
Harlem, but a little bit worse”; “a slum”; “a ghetto”; “ a step down from 
Harlem” because it has “all of Harlem’s poverty, plus a defeatism and 
despair that comes from a diffusion of geography.” Many long time 
community residents reject these definitions and characterizations of 
Bedford-Stuyvesant. It, they claim, is a highly-mixed community of both 
low, middle, and high income families. It has many fine tree-lined streets 
with solid, substantial middle-income brownstone buildings, a large 
residential leadership group, many institutions with great strength and 
wealth, some private schools catering to the children of middle income 
Negro families. It has, they claim, great strengths which if constructively 
utilized can eradicate the community’s weaknesses.66 
 
 To capitalize on these “great strengths,” Youth in Action proposed to mobilize the 
middle class of Bedford-Stuyvesant in cooperation with the “upper lower class who are 
striving to overcome the shackles of poverty and prejudice” as a means of providing 
positive “ego models” to the poor.67 Ideally, this “reservoir of middle-upper class 
Negroes” would help build an “interdependent relationship” between Bedford-Stuyvesant 
and the rest of American society. Such “constructive” community action, if it led to the 
emergence of new, dynamic leaders, would provide young people with an example of 
problem-resolution and, it was hoped, shatter their apathy. This, as YIA planners saw it, 
would eventually help restore to the community “a sense of its own strength … that may 
                                                
66 “The Bedford-Stuyvesant Proposal,” pp. 1-2. 
67 B-S YIA, “Planned Intervention,” Jan. 20, 1965, pp. 13 & 15, Watkins papers; B-S YIA, “Programming 
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lead to continuous and persistent attacks on segregation, exploitation and poverty 
wherever it occurs.” In this sense, YIA was pursuing political objectives similar to what 
Thomas Jones, Shirley Chisholm, and the Unity Democratic Club had been up to. As one 
YIA planning document put it, the Bedford-Stuyvesant community needed “a decision 
making role in … policies that directly affect this community.”68 
 The fledgling antipoverty program, in other words, did not merely reflect theories 
being dreamt up and handed down by social scientists and bureaucrats. “We are not 
happy with our lot, nor are we contented with the ‘culture of the poor’ theory held by 
some sociologists,” was how Elsie Richardson put it. In Bed-Stuy, Richardson and others 
drew from a long tradition of community organizing to conceive of community action as 
a tool for attacking segregation, coping with changes in the political economy, and 
mobilizing the political power of African Americans. For assistance, they turned not only 
to theoreticians like Bensman but to activists like Youth in Action’s first executive 
director, Darwin Bolden, who had previously worked as a field secretary for CORE. By 
early 1965, Bolden had hired a staff that included eight professional researchers, six 
secretaries, and five neighborhood workers. The agency began holding town-hall 
meetings, soliciting the participation of local leaders, and setting up a youth advisory 
council. Meanwhile researchers combed the sprawling district street by street, sounding 
the opinions of block associations, church groups, school administrators, and civic groups 
ranging from the Wynn Center Drum & Bugle Corps to the YMCA Luncheon Club.69 
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 On August 20, 1964, the same day Youth in Action submitted its initial program 
proposal to the Wagner administration, the War on Poverty became law. The Economic 
Opportunity Act, which passed the House on April 8, cleared the Senate on August 11 
and met the president’s pen nine days later. Some $785 million was appropriated for 
fiscal year 1965, which began on July 1, 1964. At the time, some 10.1 million poor 
people lived in central cities, 6.3 million lived in suburbs, and 17.9 million lived in rural 
areas, including 4.4 million on farms. On the whole, 34.3 million people among a total 
U.S. population of 190 million were forced to make do with incomes below the official 
definition of poverty.70  
 Though Johnson had once spoken expansively of an assault on poverty that 
included educational funding, medical insurance, and urban revitalization, it soon became 
clear that when one spoke of the “poverty program,” one was referring to the various 
initiatives authorized by the Economic Opportunity Act and administered by the Office of 
Economic Opportunity (OEO), the new agency headed by Sargent Shriver. This 
rhetorical shift robbed the War on Poverty of valuable political capital. Medicare and 
Medicaid, for instance, would be widely hailed as the most effective of all Great Society 
programs, in part because they helped bring about dramatic reductions in poverty rates. 
                                                
70 Of that total, approximately 10.6 million people (30% of the total) were classified as “non-white” — 
this category being problematic because, among other things, contemporary census figures classified most 
Puerto Ricans as “white.” Women headed close to 50% of all poor households — but only 37% of these 
“heads” held a job of any kind in 1964. The OEO also found that some 38% of households headed by the 
aged were living in poverty in 1964. OEO, “Dimensions of Poverty in 1964,” “Office of Economic 
Opportunity, 6/1965-11/1965,” Box 31, Adam Walinsky papers, JFKL.  
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Yet they were rarely mentioned as important components of the War on Poverty — this 
despite repeated claims by LBJ that expanding medical coverage was a vital aspect of his 
poverty program. The same was true of cash-transfer and income-support programs that 
clearly benefited low-income groups, such as Food Stamps. The Johnson administration 
insisted that poverty program was about promoting economic opportunity. Wealth 
redistribution was not in the cards.  
 Given the focus on opportunity, it made sense for most War on Poverty programs 
to target youth: the young could avoid living lives of poverty as long as government 
programs provided them with opportunities early enough in life. OEO programs included 
the Job Corps, which was vaguely modeled on the Civilian Conservation Corps of the 
New Deal and offered a 2-year program of vocational training and on-the-job experience 
for young women and (mostly) men, aged 16 to 21. A related experiment dubbed the 
Neighborhood Youth Corps provided summer jobs for high-schoolers and work training 
for potential college students. A work-study program, Upward Bound, sent money to 
institutions of higher learning (some 663 were funded in the first year) to underwrite part-
time jobs for students. The Head Start program launched in 1965 offered free education 
to poor preschoolers. Some OEO initiatives targeted adults. The Work Experience 
Program, for instance, employed “heads of families” on welfare, and the Adult Basic 
Education program provided literacy training. Finally Volunteers in Service to America 
(VISTA) operated as a domestic Peace Corps — a mechanism to harness the idealism of 
young volunteers.71  
                                                
71 White House press release, Mar. 16, 1964. “Federal Government 11-15, 11/22/63-11/24/64,” Box 124, 
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 The most innovative aspect of the War on Poverty was its design for funneling 
federal funds directly to ad-hoc coalitions of social-service agencies, settlement houses, 
community activists, and poor people. These would be known as Community Action 
Agencies, and Youth in Action was among the early prototypes. Each agency, according 
to a 1964 planning document, would provide “a means whereby a community can look 
anew and comprehensively at the problem of poverty. It enables the various local 
agencies and citizens to plan together, and from their pooled experiences and diverse 
perspectives, to find new and more effective ways to reduce poverty.” This was a tall 
order, and the process of solving problems through community action was by design 
unpredictable and difficult to control. At the very least, federal planners hoped the new 
agencies would coordinate fragmented social services and guard against “the assumption 
that Uncle Sam will now solve their problems.”72  
 The Community Action Program immediately courted controversy thanks to a 
clause inserted in the Economic Opportunity Act mandating that community action 
unfold with the “maximum feasible participation” of the poor. This directive heralded a 
radical experiment in what has been dubbed “creative federalism.” At the same time, it 
set the White House on a collision course with local governments. Indeed, in many big 
cities, the early years of the War on Poverty brought about the odd spectacle of 
                                                                                                                                            
Poverty. On Head Start, considered by many to be the War on Poverty’s most popular initiative, see Maris 
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72 Task Force on Urban Areas, Preliminary Report, Apr. 8, 1964, “President Committee File, 4/64,” 
Richardson White Papers, Box 4, JFKL; David L. Hackett to Sargent Shriver, Feb. 11, 1964, “Poverty, 
Hackett, David: Memoranda, 1963-1964,” Adam Walinsky papers, Box 33, JFKL. For more on the 
reasoning behind the Johnson administration’s decision to make community action a central component of 
the poverty war, see Gillette, Launching the War on Poverty; Marris and Rein, Dilemmas of Social 
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Democratic mayors openly fighting against a Democratic White House they accused of 
fostering rebellion among their (mostly Democratic) constituents. 
 In New York, Mayor Wagner greeted the federal antipoverty apparatus with 
skepticism. Having pre-empted the federal poverty program by setting up the shell of a 
New York-based initiative, Wagner expected leeway in determining how to spend OEO 
monies. As the Economic Opportunity Act wound its way through Congress during the 
summer of 1964, Wagner’s top advisor on policy matters, Julius Edelstein, repeatedly 
insisted to federal officials that he saw no need to modify New York’s existing programs. 
“New York has its own poverty program,” Edelstein would say. “We spend $800 million 
a year on it.” A frustrated official working in the embryonic OEO wrote in August 1964 
that “New York has not begun to plan, has not begun the preliminaries to planning; and 
there is no sign of a beginning. … New York’s ‘planning’ thus far is totally unacceptable 
to us; and [the] city is far behind others.”73 
 In fact, New York had been developing its poverty program for years. If anything, 
the Wagner administration was guilty of excessive planning and excessive preliminaries 
to planning — and insufficient implementation. It soon became clear that Edelstein and 
Paul Screvane, the City Council president whom Wagner tabbed to oversee the city’s 
attack on poverty, had no intention of following the directives emanating from 
Washington. New York City officials were suspicious of Sargent Shriver’s new super-
agency, especially as OEO rolled out the Community Action Program. The community-
action model may have been a fresh concept on the national stage, but it had been playing 
                                                
73 Mark H. Furstenberg to Jack Conway and Richard Boone, Aug. 7, 1964, “Poverty, Hackett, David: 
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out in a variety of New York City experiments, most notably Mobilization for Youth, for 
a decade. And Wagner was running out of patience.  
 Wagner’s wariness was understandable. The mayor presided over an unsteady 
electoral coalition and a Democratic Party on the verge of implosion. When he’d 
repudiated Tammany Hall in 1961 Wagner had sided with the reformers against the 
clubhouses. That had gained him some goodwill among African Americans, Hispanics, 
and liberal Jews but had also lost him many working-class whites. Since then the tone of 
the civil-rights movement had grown more urgent and the scale of protests had 
intensified, with Milton Galamison leading a massive school strike in February 1964 and 
CORE threatening to shut down the World’s Fair that summer. Wagner’s racial 
liberalism, though sincere, was unable to accommodate demands that he take on 
entrenched interests (notably the Board of Education) to ensure that African Americans 
and Puerto Ricans gain equal access to schools, jobs, housing, and city services. 
Increasingly the mayor gave his minority constituents the appearance of acting against 
poverty and discrimination while in fact doing the minimum possible to avert unrest. As 
the historian Clarence Taylor has written, “The mayor worked well with an established 
black leadership much more willing to sit and bargain. However, politically he could not 
acquiesce to grassroots demands and protests without alienating others who were 
opposed to those demands.”74 
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 Embedded in the so-called  “Johnson-Wagner War on Poverty” was a new politics 
fundamentally at odds with Wagner’s vision of social change. As Wagner staffed the 
various government agencies related to the poverty war, he turned repeatedly to tried-
and-true institutions of urban progressivism: labor unions, social workers, the NAACP. 
The settlement houses, in particular, were staunch Wagner allies, or so he thought. But 
many were changing their outlook in the new era of federally funded urban social work. 
Facing the prospect of obsolescence, settlement houses grew more assertive in their 
pursuit of radical social change.75  
 Mobilization for Youth, in particular, tested the mayor’s commitment to the new 
politics. At Mobilization’s official launch in February 1959, it was Wagner who had 
acted as the experiment’s patron, providing most of the funds and offering the full 
cooperation of the Youth Board and other city agencies. Since then, Mobilization had 
quickly outgrown its mandate to turn the Lower East Side into a “great natural 
laboratory” for the study of juvenile delinquency. Especially after 1962, as funds poured 
in from the Ford Foundation and the federal government, Mobilization had taken on a 
more explicitly political function. In addition to providing social services, small-business 
grants, and legal aid to the poor, the group had begun organizing Lower East Side 
residents to launch rent strikes, picket the welfare bureaucracy, and confront City Hall. 
Just as important, the agency had begun to reflect the political priorities of its largely 
Puerto Rican constituency. Led by a Puerto Rican social worker (and former student of 
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Kenneth Clark’s) named Manny Diaz, the agency sponsored a delegation to Washington, 
D.C., for the 1963 March for Jobs and Freedom and helped to organize direct-action 
campaigns linking the Puerto Rican and African-American civil-rights struggles.76  
 In effect, Mobilization for Youth had made the transition from one model of 
community organizing to another. In the 1950s, it had ostensibly embraced the Clifford 
Shaw model pioneered in Depression-era Chicago, by which communities organized for 
the sake of increasing internal cohesion, competence, and social control. By the early 
1960s, MFY was closer to the style of community organizing practiced by Saul Alinsky, 
who sought to empower communities to take on outside power structures in pursuit of 
greater resources. The Shaw model, Wagner could abide; Alinsky, not so much. 
 Mobilization continued to draw substantial funds — $12 million in 1963 — from a 
variety of sources including Ford, the National Institute for Mental Health, the 
President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, and the Wagner administration. But 
controversy engulfed the agency during the summer of 1964. A campaign initiated by the 
Daily News lobbed accusations of Communist infiltration against the agency, leading the 
city to suspend funds and launch an investigation. The red-baiting was based on bogus 
evidence, but that didn’t stop city officials, Screvane in particular, from attacking the 
agency. At the same time, Mobilization’s founding director, James McCarthy (a former 
Youth Board official) found himself accused of shoddy bookkeeping and possibly 
fraudulent expense accounts. Further accusations followed: that Mobilization had helped 
to organize the February 1964 school boycott, that it had distributed leaflets supporting 
Robert F. Kennedy’s campaign for the U.S. Senate (a no-no given the ban on partisan 
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activity among government agencies; that Richard Cloward had been improperly paid a 
full-time salary while remaining on the payroll of Columbia University; that MFY 
staffers were organizing further riots. No evidence of wrongdoing was turned up. But 
McCarthy and Cloward both quit the project in vain attempts to take the heat off.77 
 In Harlem, meanwhile, Kenneth Clark’s agency had become embroiled in an 
unwinnable political fight. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., Harlem’s indomitable 
Congressman, had insisted that if federal funds were to arrive in his district — as they 
had been for two years, via the PCJD — he would have control over them. He’d thrown 
together an agency named Associated Community Teams (ACT) and had pushed for a 
merger with Clark’s Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited. Even more distasteful than 
the ensuing acronym (HARYOU-ACT) was the way in which Powell shunted Clark aside 
and brazenly set about converting the demonstration program into a patronage mill. 
Wagner, who’d long clashed with Powell, tried in vain to beat back the Congressman’s 
power play. The mayor was in a bind. Not only did Powell reign supreme in Harlem: In 
1964 he was at the height of his influence in Washington, and the antipoverty bill then 
before Congress became law thanks to Powell’s labors as chairman of the House 
Committee on Health, Education, and Welfare.78  
 This confluence of events — intensifying civil-rights protests, the radicalization of 
Mobilization for Youth, and the power struggle in Harlem — convinced Wagner that he 
was witnessing the first eruptions of the “social dynamite” he’d warned against in 
                                                
77 “The Right to Fight City Hall,” NYT, Nov. 11, 1964; Cazenave, Impossible Democracy, Chap. 6; Marris 
and Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform. See Mobilization for Youth correspondence from 1964 in Folder 7, 
Box 060236, RFW, LGW online. 
78 Cazenave, Impossible Democracy, Chap. 6; Kenneth B. Clark, oral history interviews with Ed Edwin, 
Apr. 7, 1976, and May 10, 1976, Columbia University Libraries Oral History Research Office (online 
collection). For more on Clark’s unhappy departure from HARYOU, see Markowitz and Rosner, 
Children, Race, and Power. 
Chapter 4: War and Rumors of War  271 
 
January. The city began taking steps to rein in the community-action agencies, including 
Youth in Action. On July 1, 1964, Screvane announced that he would be funding 
Mobilization, HARYOU, and Youth in Action on a “week to week” basis. The programs, 
Screvane said, required “further study.” The July riots only upped the stakes further.79 
 After Johnson signed the War on Poverty legislation into law in August and OEO 
began disbursing money around the country, it became clear that Wagner, like Powell in 
Harlem, had no intention of letting the federal government fund experiments on his turf 
unless he could also exercise a measure of control. Wagner’s solution was to have all 
OEO funds flow through municipal coffers. Where most Community Action Agencies 
around the country incorporated as private non-profits and received funds directly from 
OEO, in New York City, the municipal government itself was the delegated Community 
Action Agency. Thus all federal monies destined for agencies like Youth in Action first 
passed through the hands of the city’s antipoverty bureaucracy, to be doled out by 
Screvane. This gave Wagner veto power over how — and when — federal Community 
Action Agencies would be launched throughout the five boroughs.80  
 The main policymaking body in the city, the Council Against Poverty, initially 
targeted 16 neighborhoods designated as “poverty areas.” In 13 of these areas, so-called 
Community Progress Centers would set up shop with the help of settlement houses, 
religious charities, civil-rights groups, and other community groups. Once armed with 
government monies, these groups would organize elections in which local residents could 
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elect board members. In the remaining three areas, the pre-existing agencies — 
Mobilization for Youth, Harlem Youth, and Youth in Action — were to become the 
official community-action agencies. As the local agencies got off the ground, 
representatives from each were to join the Council Against Poverty, thus vaguely 
satisfying the “maximum feasible participation” mandate. The Council soon ballooned to 
70 members, most of them representatives of the same religious groups, settlement 
houses, government agencies, and local reform coalitions that had directed juvenile-
delinquency policy in earlier years. (In 1965, the representatives of Youth in Action on 
the citywide policymaking body were Cecil Gloster, William Chisholm, and Almira 
Coursey — all three major players within CBCC — as well as Dorothy Orr, a social 
worker who was hired that year to serve as YIA’s executive director.)81 The Wagner 
administration was slow to give the poor a seat at the table. Further, Wagner set up an 
agency, the Antipoverty Operations Board (APOB), which controlled city funds and 
dispensed community-action monies by a different mechanism that circumvented the 
Council Against Poverty. The APOB, which controlled perhaps $30 million a year, was 
made up exclusively of Wagner appointees and tapped into traditional patronage 
networks. With federal funds being routed through the Council Against Poverty, the 
existence of the APOB allowed the city to continue to finance its own poverty war 
alongside the federal one.82 
 The dual structure had two major effects. First, simply by forcing Community 
Action Agencies to report to two different sets of bureaucracies, it made it all the more 
difficult for those agencies to set organizational goals and to plan ahead, especially since 
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the OEO and the APOB often had different ideas about what community-action should 
mean. Second, having two separate funding streams for the poverty agencies gave 
Wagner a measure of control that mayors elsewhere in the country — with the exception 
of Chicago’s Richard Daley — were initially unable to exert.83 
 New York’s funding structure was deliberately engineered to put City Hall in 
control of community action. As it evolved in late 1964 and early 1965, the city’s poverty 
program clearly reflected that impulse. If anything, Wagner’s attempts to suppress the 
radical tendencies of CAAs proved too successful by half: OEO in early 1965 withheld 
$10 million destined for New York because of Wagner’s refusal to abide by the federal 
“maximum feasible participation” directive. In Bedford-Stuyvesant, Wagner’s 
centralized, plodding poverty bureaucracy would grind Youth in Action to a halt. Having 
fostered the agency’s creation amid high hopes and apocalyptic fears, the city thrust a 
series of bureaucratic hurdles in the way of its development. Those included overlapping 
jurisdictions, confusing regulations, and an agonizingly slow and opaque process of 
releasing funds. By mid-1965, in the words of one YIA employee, getting funds from the 
city (and thus from OEO) was “like pulling teeth.” The War on Poverty was devolving 
into a skirmish pitting activists against bureaucracies.84 
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Previous page: the organizational chart for New York City’s Council Against Poverty, 
set up by Mayor Wagner to administer federal antipoverty funds released by the 
federal Office of Economic Opportunity. Above: lists of board members for the 
various city antipoverty bodies in 1965. Both charts are taken from “New York City 
War on Poverty 1965: A Report to the Citizens of New York from the New York City 




Maximum Feasible Bureaucratization 
 
 
“What is happening here is that everybody seems to be playing a little 
football with the money. We are saying if anybody is going to be playing 
football with the money, let the poor people spend the money. ... We are 
probably the greatest experts on poverty. I don’t think they taught poverty 
in the educational system, but all of a sudden everybody is a professional 
on poverty.”  
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1966, “Poverty, 4/1966-6/1966,” Box 32, Adam Walinsky papers, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library 




A poster produced by the 
Bedford-Stuyvesant 
Youth in Action 
community corporation in 
1966 to protest a decision 
by the federal Office 
Economic Opportunity to 
withhold previously 
allocated funds due to a 
series of bureaucratic 
slip-ups on the part of 
New York City’s 
antipoverty bureaucracy. 
The funds were 
eventually released, 
thanks in part to protests 
like this one, organized 
by the chairman of Youth 
in Action’s board of 
directors, William Jones. 
(Don Watkins papers.) 
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 On March 26 1965, two weeks after Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth in Action submitted 
its comprehensive program proposal to city and federal authorities, the Brooklyn 
antipoverty agency hired a new executive director, Dorothy Orr. She made for an 
interesting choice. A longtime resident of Westchester County and a professor of social 
work at Fordham University, she had no clear ties to Brooklyn. Prior to being named the 
executive director of Youth in Action in March 1965, Orr was probably best known to 
most Bedford-Stuyvesant residents, if they had heard of her at all, for her appearances in 
the society columns of the Amsterdam News. (She’d earned several honorable mentions 
in the paper’s annual “Best Dressed Women in New York” roundup.) Described in the 
press as “pretty and petite,” Orr would prove herself anything but a lightweight in her 
new job. Behind the sweet smile and neatly coiffed hair was a confident, forthright 
woman. Some in Bedford-Stuyvesant saw her as arrogant; many underestimated her 
strength. Others welcomed her as an asset. A 1965 Amsterdam News profile opined that 
Orr “epitomizes simultaneously the essence of feminine gentility and the no-nonsense 
approach of the efficiency expert.”2  
 Orr came on at a healthy annual salary of $17,500. She’d begun her career as a 
caseworker among emotionally disturbed boys in the Westchester County town of Dobbs 
Ferry, and she brought with her a social-work professional’s view of how community 
action should unfold. “It’s a team effort of the professional and non-professional,” Orr 
explained of Youth in Action in 1965. “The poor are being trained so they have an 
important role in implementing the program instead of it being just a handout.” She also 
promised to infuse the new agency with managerial competence. Later in life Orr would 
                                                
2 “Former Lady Professor Taking Youth Program Over the Top,” New York Amsterdam News, (NYAN), 
Dec. 18, 1965; “Antipoverty Director Is Named in Brooklyn,” New York Times (NYT), Mar. 27, 1965; 
Elsie Richardson, interview with author, June 5, 2011. 
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co-chair the Interracial Council for Business Opportunity3 and go on to become a vice 
president in charge of corporate social responsibility at Equitable Life Assurance.4  
 Orr’s fondness for professionalism and order would be put to the test in Bedford-
Stuyvesant. Youth in Action was fast developing a reputation for chaotic meetings, 
confused objectives, fiscal uncertainty, and rampant infighting. Some of that chaos was 
inherent to the Community Action Program itself — it was, after all, an effort to organize 
the unorganized and empower the disempowered. The bureaucratic obstacles erected by 
the Wagner administration didn’t help. Under Orr, however, Youth in Action would take 
a further turn toward turmoil because of disagreements over what it meant to encourage 
the “maximum feasible participation” of the poor in the War on Poverty.  
 Despite appearances, Orr harbored a radical streak. She believed the War on 
Poverty apparatus could and should be used to build a social movement of the poor, 
especially if funds for launching social-service programs were to remain scarce. She 
decried the overweening influence of the Wagner administration in directing the poverty 
program. “The whole problem with the program has been that the structure has been 
imposed from above,” Orr said in 1966. She also suspected that the middle-class leaders 
represented on Youth in Action’s board were not fully committed to the empowerment of 
the area’s low-income majority. An outsider, she would soon find herself clashing with 
some of Bedford-Stuyvesant’s most prominent citizens.5   
 One of the premises of the antipoverty program in Bedford-Stuyvesant was that 
                                                
3 In an interesting twist, the executive director of the Interracial Council for Business Opportunity during 
the early 1970s was Darwin W. Bolden, the man Orr replace as executive director of Bed-Stuy Youth in 
Action. “Drive on for More Negro Businesses,” NYT, July 28, 1968.  
4 Seymour Gray, “A View From the Top: Dorothy Orr,” Black Enterprise, Feb. 1977, pp. 60-63; “Ten 
Best Places to Work,” Black Enterprise, Feb. 1982, pp. 37-44. Thanks to Orr’s efforts, Equitable gained a 
reputation in the early 1980s as having the country’s best corporate affirmative-action program. 
5 “Poor to Control a Poverty Plan,” NYT, May 20, 1966. 
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effective community action should unify people across class lines. Youth in Action’s 
chairman, William Chisholm, presented such a vision in announcing Orr’s appointment 
as executive director. “Bedford-Stuyvesant is an unusual and unique community,” he 
said. “It has a high rate of delinquency and poverty, as well as a large number of Negroes 
with middle-class values, ambition, and achievement. Consequently, much of the probing 
and research Youth in Action has undertaken will help to determine how all forces of the 
community can actively engage in the City’s war on poverty.” But on what terms should 
those forces come together? In Dorothy Orr’s mind, it was clear that poor people, and 
especially poor youth, should lead the War on Poverty. She believed they were tired of 
waiting for promises to come true. And she believed that if the governments that had 
declared war on poverty were unwilling to follow through on their rhetoric, they should 





“Like Pulling Teeth!” 
 
 
By the spring of 1965, the national War on Poverty seemed to be steaming ahead. 
On February 17, President Johnson had requested $1.5 billion to fund programs 
authorized by the Economic Opportunity Act in fiscal year 1966; the overwhelmingly 
Democratic Congress had responded by upping the ante to almost $2 billion. This figure 
doubled the amount appropriated during the War on Poverty’s first year. Of these funds, 
$825 million were earmarked for youth programs, $680 million for the Community 
Action Program, $300 million for work-experience programs, and $70 million for rural-
                                                
6 “Directs Brooklyn Youth Project,” NYAN, Apr. 3, 1965. 
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poverty programs. The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), tasked with 
implementing the War on Poverty, also planned to fund a Neighborhood Youth Corps 
300,000 strong, a Job Corps with 80,000 enrollees, a college work-study program 
involving 145,000 students, literacy programs for 70,000 adults, and on-the-job training 
initiatives benefiting a quarter-million workers. Perhaps most significant, Community 
Action Agencies were expected to spring up in 700 locations across the country. 
Optimism ran high in the nation’s capital: OEO’s director, Sargent Shriver, reckoned that 
poverty could be eradicated within a decade.7 
Back in Brooklyn, though, frustrations were mounting. The community-action 
experiment in Bedford-Stuyvesant came dangerously close to imploding before it even 
got started. The better part of a year was gobbled up dealing with funding delays, 
paperwork, and procedural obstacles. It was a time that “taxed the patience of the 
community [and] the skill of the YIA staff,” according to Orr, and resulted in “the 
mounting of community tension, particularly among the youth who became discouraged 
and hostile with the continued delay of funds.” The federal poverty law had mandated the 
“maximum feasible participation” of the poor. What unfolded in Bedford-Stuyvesant was 
maximum feasible bureaucratization.8  
By the time Dorothy Orr took charge of Youth in Action, in March 1965, the agency 
had spent more than a year diagnosis and cataloguing the problems of Brooklyn. 
Solutions lagged. “The war on poverty in Brooklyn has been anything but a war,” 
Brooklyn Borough President Abe Stark declared on March 10. “It has consisted of 
                                                
7 Fact Sheet: Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1965, “Office of Economic Opportunity, 6/1965-
11/1965,” Box 31, Adam Walinsky papers, JFKL. 
8 B-S YIA, “Executive Director’s Progress Report,” Feb. 17, 1966, Mar. 17, 1966, Don Watkins private 
papers, in author’s possession. 
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sporadic skirmishes, which have made very little progress toward alleviating the effects 
of deprivation.” The city’s Council Against Poverty had so far allocated six times more 
antipoverty money to Manhattan than to Brooklyn, despite the fact that Kings County had 
twice as many people and a higher incidence of poverty than did New York County. 
(During this time, Stark and several Brooklyn Congressmen mounted an unsuccessful 
effort to bypass the municipal government and solicit Brooklyn’s antipoverty funds 
directly from federal agencies.) Worse, it was beginning to look as if New York City 
would be frozen out of the poverty program altogether. Such was the obstructionism of 
Mayor Robert F. Wagner, Jr., by then a lame duck in Gracie Mansion, that OEO 
temporarily cut off all New York City community-action funds and ordered the city to 
heed the “maximum feasible participation” directive if it wanted funds released. In June 
1965, Wagner announced he was reorganizing the Council Against Poverty to include 
representatives of the poor, and OEO agreed to unfreeze $9.2 million in delayed funds. 
But it wouldn’t be the last time that Wagner’s bureaucratic maneuvering would deprive 
the city of much-needed antipoverty monies.9 
 No group faced a more agonizing budgetary process than did Youth in Action. The 
agency, after carrying out a painstaking study of Bedford-Stuyvesant that took 14 months 
to complete, submitted the final draft of its comprehensive program proposal to the 
citywide Council Against Poverty on May 7, 1965. The proposal included a request for 
$5.2 million, but after a month-long review process, the Council asked for a revised plan 
based on a budget half that size. On June 14, YIA submitted the new program proposals, 
                                                
9 Ford Foundation (R.B. Goldmann author), “Performance in Black and White: An Appraisal of the 
Development and Record of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration and Development and Services 
Corporations” (February 1969), p. 8. Papers of the Ford Foundation, Box 1, JFKL. “We Have Not Yet 
Begun To Fight,” New York World-Telegram, Mar. 11, 1965; “Screvane Scores Antipoverty Unit,” NYT, 
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which the Council approved. Further foot-dragging ensued; for reasons that remained 
mysterious, the city delayed before forwarding the relevant materials to OEO. As a result, 
OEO, already wary of anything stamped with the Wagner seal, refused to fund a 
comprehensive program in Bed-Stuy. Instead the feds released a summer grant of only 
$440,351, effective July 1 — though it took another three weeks for the City 
Comptroller’s Office to transfer funds from OEO to the local agency. Once the OEO 
summer funds expired, YIA once again came to rely exclusively on city monies. On 
September 23, Wagner’s Antipoverty Appropriations Board (which the mayor had set up 
the year before to maintain a separate War on Poverty apparatus funded exclusively by 
the city) awarded YIA a $2.5 million grant, or approximately the amount first discussed 
in May. But for reasons that remained obscure, only $600,000 of that amount was 
released, and that wasn’t until late October. During the interim period, YIA depended on 
emergency bank loans to cover payroll. Meanwhile, YIA submitted a revamped (and 
wildly optimistic) budget proposal calling for $25 million in expanded programs; at 
Christmas, the Brooklynites were still waiting for a response and growing increasingly 
irritated. On December 29 OEO asked YIA staffers to re-compute budgets by January 3, 
causing a mad scramble and forcing employees to cancel New Year’s plans. On January 
7, 1966, YIA re-signed a contract with the city that approved the release of $1.9 million 
originally granted the previous September. The cat-and-mouse game continued, however. 
As of January 31, YIA’s budget was again put on hold, and municipal funds didn’t arrive 
until March 10. A federal grant of $838,759 was finally approved in April.10  
 “The year was eaten up in review,” was how YIA’s fiscal director, Owen Hague, 
                                                
10 B-S YIA, “Executive Director’s Progress Report,” Feb. 17, 1966; B-S YIA, “Recap on Youth in Action, 
Inc. Funding” (May 1966), Watkins papers; “Few Programs Use Quotas,” NYT, Aug. 4, 1966. 
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put it in August 1966. “We couldn’t spend more than half the money we eventually got. It 
was impossible to hire, let alone run a program.” A Youth in Action poster from early 
1966 was more blunt: “Getting Money for YIA Was Like Pulling Teeth!”11 The funds 
would flow more freely — too freely, perhaps — in the years that followed; by then, 
however, the political capital bankrolling the poverty war had all but dried up. In 
Bedford-Stuyvesant, alienation grew among even the most idealistic of reformers. That it 
had taken so long to act on the grand promises of 1964 struck them as a cruel joke — 
especially considering that the Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council had been among 
the first grassroots organizations in the country to propose ways of implementing the 
antipoverty campaign.12  
 It wasn’t until June 1966, almost two and a half years after Lyndon Johnson and 
Robert Wagner had jointly declared unconditional war on poverty, that both the federal 
and city governments were simultaneously supporting the Bedford-Stuyvesant agency 
with substantial funds. Shortly thereafter, it came to light that some $10 million of the 
federal antipoverty allotment to New York City had gone unspent simply because 
administrative chaos and bureaucratic delays had rendered action impossible. The Head 
Start program, most notably, had been crippled by miscommunication; apparently the city 
had failed to brief local agencies on health and safety standards required of buildings that 
housed preschools. By the time OEO released $6.5 million in Head Start funds destined 
for New York, less than $4 million could actually be spent. In Bedford-Stuyvesant, only 
three of  
                                                
11 Quoted in “Few Programs Use Quotas,” NYT, Aug. 4, 1966; B-S YIA, “Recap on Youth in Action, Inc. 
Funding” (May 1966), Watkins papers.  
12 B-S YIA, “Recap on Youth in Action, Inc. Funding” (May 1966); B-S YIA, “Executive Director’s 
Progress Report,” Feb. 17, 1966; B-S YIA, Minutes of the Board of Directors, Sept. 16, 1965; Dec. 16, 
1965; Feb. 23, 1966, all Watkins papers.  






Boys reporting to a Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth in Action summer recruitment  
session, 1965. Next page: a poster produced by Youth in Action in 1966. (“New York 
City War on Poverty 1965: A Report to the Citizens of New York; Watkins papers.) 
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the 15 Head Start centers that had been in the works passed inspection by June 1966.13  
 By this point, a gust of change had blown into the mayor’s office. John Vliet Lindsay 
presented himself as a compassionate, earnest, sleeves-rolled-up kind of reformer. 
Promising to infuse a declining city with wit, vigor, youth, and creativity, he brought with 
him a band of young idealists eager to storm City Hall. “He is fresh and everyone else is 
tired” — that had been his campaign’s motto in 1965. For seven years Lindsay had 
represented Manhattan’s Upper East Side, the so-called Silk Stocking District, in Congress. 
While he was not himself wealthy, he seemed the epitome of moneyed ease. Tall, blue-
eyed, stylish, and impossibly handsome, his very walk exuded noblesse oblige. Though a 
Republican, Lindsay gravitated toward Great Society liberalism even as his party was 
embracing Goldwater conservatism. As a Congressman he supported Medicare, civil rights, 
federal aid to education, and the War on Poverty; haunted by the Watts riot of 1965, he 
became one of the country’s foremost spokesmen of an analysis that linked the urban 
conflagrations directly to black poverty and the legacies of racism. In 1968, as Vice 
Chairman of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, he penned the famous 
statement that “Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white — 
separate and unequal.”14   
 Lindsay arrived in office on January 1, 1966, and was greeted with a 12-day transit 
strike that inflicted lasting damage on his mayoralty. He soon found himself snowed 
under by the pressures of what he called “the second toughest job in America.” Yet 
                                                
13 “Few Programs Use Quotas,” NYT, Aug. 4, 1966. 
14 Jerald E. Podair, The Strike That Changed New York: Blacks, Whites, and the Ocean Hill-Brownsville 
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regardless of future failures, Lindsay began his mayoralty with the earnest belief that he 
might, in the words of historian Vincent Cannato, “reformulate city government and 
make the city into a laboratory for Great Society social policy.” A centerpiece of this 
vision was Lindsay’s plan to revamp the antipoverty program and to get OEO monies 
flowing into the city’s poorest neighborhoods. This was not a selfless wish; Lindsay also 
needed to solidify a tenuous political coalition that united the left-wing intelligentsia, 
philanthropic foundations, business elites, civil-rights activists, and low-income 
minorities. The groups’ motives diverged vastly. New York’s corporate leaders, along 
with the foundations they oversaw, supported antipoverty programs (as well as later 
efforts to promote community control of resources in poor minority neighborhoods) as 
the best bet for avoiding urban chaos, while many African-American leaders used such 
initiatives to consolidate new power bases. Lindsay held together his reform coalition, in 
part, with a series of bureaucratic shakeups aimed at linking community-action agencies 
to City Hall. As the political scientist Arnold Bornfriend pointed out in 1969, New 
York’s bureaucracy in the post-Tammany era had become “the new-style machine 
because of the discretion it exercises in awarding urban renewal and other privileges.”15 
 Lindsay’s stated goal was to promote the involvement of the poor at all levels of 
decision-making. He also aimed to show that New York could “lead the nation in the war 
against poverty.” The rhetoric was familiar. But whereas Robert Wagner had allowed a 
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gaping chasm to yawn between his words and his actions, Lindsay sincerely intended to 
follow through. His first step, taken before he had even taken office, was to solicit the 
opinions of nationally known experts including Michael Harrington, John Kenneth 
Galbraith, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Richard Boone. On December 5, 1965, a month 
after defeating Democrat Abraham Beame and Conservative William F. Buckley in the 
mayoral election, Lindsay announced the formation of a 14-person task force to review 
the city’s poverty program. He named the former Inspector General of OEO, William 
Haddad, to chair the group, and while many of the bigger names offered only minimal 
input, the task force did hold a series of public meetings around the city, at which 
Lindsay often presided.16  
 Once in office, Lindsay hired the well-known urbanist Mitchell Sviridoff to study 
the city’s antipoverty program and propose ways of getting it moving again. Sviridoff had 
begun his career on the assembly line in a New Haven aircraft-parts factory and 
eventually rose to become president of the Connecticut AFL-CIO. In 1962, he’d helped 
New Haven mayor Richard Lee to launch Community Progress, Inc., an antipoverty 
program that received funding from both the federal government and the Ford 
Foundation’s Gray Areas program. Two years into the War on Poverty, Community 
Progress employed some 1,500 people and drew such generous funding that Sviridoff had 
become nationally known for his “magic at getting money.” According to the historian 
Alice O’Connor, Sviridoff “was consistently a voice of moderation and practicality … 
and of judging local organizations by their ‘managerial abilities and technical proficiency 
rather than by their proneness to shake a fist or lead a picket line.’” In New York, he took 
                                                
16 Office of John Lindsay, Press release, Dec. 5, 1965, Papers of the Lindsay Administration, Microfilm 
Roll 5, Folder 115, New York City Municipal Archives; “Voice of Poverty Demands Action,” NYT, Feb. 
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aim at the hostility that had developed among different constituencies under Wagner, 
hoping to rationalize bureaucratic procedures and harmonize relations between city 
agencies and neighborhood groups. He also decried the meager funds being dispensed. 
“We speak of the War Against Poverty, but we’re not fighting it like a war,” he said in 
mid-1966, “for we would never ration our ammunition in the battlefield as tightly as we 
are allocating resources to the fighters against poverty. It would be a national scandal.”17  
 Sviridoff’s report, submitted in June, called for a total reorganization of the city’s 
social-service bureaucracy. Dorothy Orr called it “very bold and courageous.” Sviridoff 
wrote, somewhat fantastically, that the city should provide every poor citizen with a job, 
an education, and sufficient opportunities to take advantage of city services. The means 
would be a new umbrella agency, the Human Resources Administration, which would 
coordinate the city’s Department of Welfare and the Youth Board, as well as the new 
agencies spawned by the antipoverty program. The disbursement of funds for the 
community-action agencies would stay in the hands of the Council Against Poverty, but a 
new Community Development Administration would coordinate the relevant 
bureaucracy. The old Antipoverty Operations Board, by which Wagner had maintained a 
source of War on Poverty funding entirely within the hands of his administration, would 
be abolished, thus pooling city and federal funds.18  
 Sviridoff’s reorganization called upon agencies like Youth in Action to reconstitute 
as non-profit “community corporations.” In practice, this would mean giving up 
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responsibility for direct services to the poor, such as the job-training, remedial education, 
and family-planning programs ostensibly being funded by the War on Poverty. Instead, 
community corporations were to focus on issuing program guidelines, coordinating area-
wide services, and spinning off delegate agencies to carry out on-the-ground initiatives. 
Sviridoff was careful not to issue specific directives; he stressed that each community 
must tailor its corporation to local needs. Above all, each effort should be directed by an 
elected board that was “broadly representative of the community” and which would guard 
against control by “a closed clique which excludes many elements of the community.”19  
 Sviridoff’s recommendations were meant to create more efficient management 
structures that would allow for the participation of the poor in the poverty program 
without hindering planning. In later directives for the formation of community 
corporations, the Council Against Poverty emphasized the importance of organizational 
flexibility and democratic responsiveness — to a fault. “Community action is an evolving 
and dynamic concept,” the council’s guidelines insisted. “The instruments which will 
operate community action programs should be similarly evolving and dynamic. There 
should be provision for regular renewal — generally through re-election of Corporation 
governing boards. This renewal should occur annually for at least part of the boards.” 
Such turnover, though theoretically healthy, also proved destabilizing to community 
corporations like Youth in Action. 20 
 Indeed, despite Lindsay’s desire to involve poor people in planning the poverty 
program, his reforms hindered community action, at least in the short term. The Sviridoff 
Report exacerbated the contradictions that were already undermining the war on poverty 
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in New York City. As Bertram Beck, the onetime director of Mobilization for Youth, put 
it, “On one hand, the complex nonfunctioning, citywide bureaucracy was made even 
more complex and, on the other hand, there was a direct transfer of power to the 
neighborhoods which found themselves frustrated by the malfunctioning, citywide 
structure.” Added to these tensions were the continuing federal efforts to enforce 
maximum feasible participation in local community-action efforts. There was something 
inherently contradictory in dictating participatory democracy from above.21 
 The upshot for YIA was twofold. On one hand, Lindsay was injecting his personal 
political capital into the poverty program. He would push the federal Office of Economic 
Opportunity to increase funding for community action; if rebuffed, the mayor would do 
so himself. On the other hand, in order for Community Action Agencies to participate in 
Lindsay’s brave new poverty program, they would have to reinvent themselves. YIA 
would be given more autonomy in dispensing funds, but first it would have to prove that 
it was a representative body, and it would have to do it at the ballot box. At the same 
time, the agency would also have to initiate a decentralization process by which it would 
“spin off” various programs to sub-agencies operating within small subsections of 
Bedford-Stuyvesant.  
 This conversion process took more than a year. Ostensibly an exercise in 
participatory democracy, Lindsay’s reforms had the effect of devolving decision-making 
structures to the point where concerted programmatic innovation became impossible. The 
more attention YIA devoted to bureaucratic reorganization, the less capable it seemed of 
generating a comprehensive approach to poverty — and the more it generated community 
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tensions. As Lindsay himself was finding out, decentralization tended to strip governing 





Of Young Mothers and Talented Women 
 
 
 Despite the uncertainty that clouded the first three years of Youth in Action’s 
existence, the agency did manage to launch a number of programs. By early 1966, these 
included a Medicare alert service to help senior citizens register for the brand-new federal 
healthcare program, an eight-week job training course with the New York Port Authority, 
and consumer-action drives to protect Bedford-Stuyvesant residents against unfair 
business practices. The previous summer, some 17,000 teenagers, according to official 
estimates, had taken jobs at $1.25 an hour in Neighborhood Youth Corps programs across 
the city. The city claimed to have 86 Head Start centers up and running in Brooklyn, 
including 35 in Bedford-Stuyvesant and Crown Heights, although funds for the popular 
preschool program were slow to land in the Youth in Action coffers. By October 1966, 
the agency had received a total of $2.55 million in funding, of which $1.57 million came 
from the city and the rest from OEO.22 
 One of Youth in Action’s most celebrated initiatives was the Young Mothers 
Program, which began operating out of a Salvation Army basement in 1965. The program 
grew out of the efforts of Olga DeFreitas, a one-woman whirlwind of activity who had 
previously taught at Brooklyn College. A social worker who valued casework at a time 
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when many in her profession were pursuing systemic change, DeFreitas believed she 
could help transform Bedford-Stuyvesant by touching individual lives, one at a time. One 
of her admirers wrote of DeFreitas that “she can be arrogant, stubborn, and authoritarian, 
but most often, she is caring, warm, and sympathetic.” Armed with a small Youth in 
Action grant, as well as precious monies garnered through door-to-door fundraising, 
DeFreitas in late 1965 set about providing training, counseling, remedial education, and 
prenatal care for pregnant teenagers. Many of these women came to DeFreitas from 
families unable or unwilling to support them through their pregnancies. All had dropped 
out of high school once they’d discovered they were pregnant.23 
 Undergirding DeFreitas’s work lay a well-developed analysis of the structural 
factors related to the young mothers’ predicament. “For the Negro girl, the impact of 
segregation, the social and economic status of the Negro, the plantation view of the 
Negro woman as a sexual target, the discomfort of living in a ghetto and the lack of 
parental role models all contribute to promiscuous and superficial relationships with 
men,” a 1965 YIA study stated, noting that a quarter of all babies in Bedford-Stuyvesant 
were being born out of wedlock. That statistic, which would continue to rise precipitously 
throughout the late 1960s, ’70s, and into the ’80s, represented for people like DeFreitas 
what the delinquency figures had signified to Maude Richardson and Archie Hargraves a 
decade earlier — a harbinger of social breakdown, especially among young African 
Americans. As Youth in Action planners understood the issue, the spike in out-of-
wedlock births among teenagers owed in large part to the mores of the rural South and 
the Puerto Rican countryside, which postwar migrants had brought with them when they 
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arrived in Brooklyn: 
 
The socialization process for both Negro and Puerto Rican groups 
prevents a large number of these groups from being absorbed into the 
mainstream of the metropolitan community; the unwed mother faces 
additional social stigma which further inhibits her participation in the 
society. Without help she and her children can be caught in the web of 
economic dependency and a life of poverty. These circumstances are 
likely to reinforce the pattern of bearing children out of wedlock.24 
 
 According to Youth in Action documents, these young mothers had themselves 
been raised in environments of “psychological deprivation” and often in single-parent 
homes. Now their infant children were almost certain to become ensnared in the cycle. 
“In Negro homes the absence of a stable paternal and masculine figure heightens the 
sexual insecurity of adolescence for the young Negro woman,” a YIA document 
explained.25 This made them more likely to become pregnant as a way of proving their 
womanhood or otherwise establishing a role in society. Thus the increasingly prevalent 
pattern of out-of-wedlock births testified to the “social and emotional pathology” 
prevalent in Bedford-Stuyvesant. (Youth in Action also planned to coordinate a Young 
Fathers Project, but it never got off the ground.)  
 DeFreitas endeavored to inculcate “self-discipline” and to make the women 
“economically independent” — goals that resonated with long-cherished American ideas 
about the wellsprings of individual freedom and autonomy. All told, the Young Mothers 
Program sounded a number of distinctly conservative notes, despite its pioneering 
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program. For one, it subscribed to a philosophy of self-help and bootstrap individualism 
that was typical of the War on Poverty. A 1965 Youth in Action planning document 
explained that the community-action effort embraced “the philosophy that the individual 
must be taught, trained and given the knowledge to act independently in a free society.” 
The Young Mothers program fit squarely into this ethic. Its expressed goal was “to help 
teen-age girls who have made a mistake to move out into the mainstream, confident of 
their ability to provide emotional and economic security for their children.” As DeFreitas 
put it in 1967, “We have done what the Office of Economic Opportunity expects of the 
antipoverty effort, by proving what can be done for a community through self-help.” 
Such language would’ve been music to Lyndon Johnson’s ears. “No doles” indeed. 26 
 The notion of welfare dependency would permeate mainstream political discourse 
later on, but the Young Mothers Program was both implicitly and explicitly an attempt to 
rescue teenage mothers and their children from “a web of economic dependency” and to 
wean them from their welfare checks. At a time when African Americans across the 
country were repudiating the “culture of poverty” analysis, largely in response to Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan’s controversial report on the black family, the Young Mothers Program 
endorsed a similar analysis. What was notable about DeFreitas’s riff on the theme was 
that she was working at street level throughout, not studying statistics in a Washington, 
D.C., office building.  
 Given the deep-rooted pathologies Youth in Action planners detected among the 
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young mothers of Bedford-Stuyvesant, what could be done to help them? DeFreitas’s 
program began by enrolling pregnant girls between the ages of 14 and 18 in a daily 
program of study and training. The first group of 45 (all of whom had chosen to keep 
their babies) officially began classes in the spring of 1966, in a space provided by Milton 
Galamison’s Siloam Presbyterian Church on Jefferson Avenue. Six hours a day for 15 
weeks, the expectant mothers got down to the studies they’d been forced to abandon 
when they got pregnant. Not only that — they also received sexual-education classes and 
counseling sessions and also were offered prenatal training and in-house nursing services. 
(Some of the young mothers had already given birth once, and they were invited to bring 
their first child to classes with them.) In addition to an academic curriculum designed to 
help students re-enter high school at a higher grade level, the program also featured a 
number of elective choices, from “History of La Négritude” and “Minority Group 
Heritage” to “Electives in Sewing” and “Fashion and Grooming.” Otherwise students 
could receive remedial tutoring and training for a future trade. Secretarial skills featured 
prominently in the Young Mothers Program.27  
 The program was innovative on two fronts. First, the mere fact of reaching out to 
pregnant teenagers and encouraging them to envision future careers flew in the face of 
contemporary norms. Second, DeFreitas petitioned OEO to approve biweekly stipends 
for any girl with a strong attendance record and “a desire for self-help.” Given the 
societal disdain in the mid-1960s for teenage mothers and the expectation that they 
should drop out of school to care for their children, the program ran a considerable 
political risk by asking taxpayers to pay the girls a salary to attend school. DeFreitas took 
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pains to emphasize that stipends were not paychecks. Rather, they were conditional 
grants — paid out at a rate of $1.50 per hour of class attended — to be used in support of 
babies. DeFreitas also made it clear that stipends could easily disappear. According to 
house rules, the penalties for showing up late to classes, which started promptly at 8:50 
a.m., were, for a first offense, the loss of two hours’ stipends, for a second offense, the 
loss of a full day’s stipend, and for a third offense, a “conference with Ms. DeFreitas.” 
(Students were also fined 25 cents for swearing and 50 cents for “disrespect,” enforced 
by a peer group named the Big Sisters Club.) Soon after the program’s launch, DeFreitas 
also began raising money for a daycare, where enrollees who had already given birth 
could leave their babies while they studied or attended on-the-job training.28  
 In contrast to most other initiatives launched by Youth in Action during the early 
phase of the War on Poverty, the Young Mothers Program flourished. Working on 
promises of an annual $224,000 grant, DeFreitas had hired 10 staffers by the end of 1966; 
that number would climb to 35 the following year. She could soon boast of hundreds of 
graduates who had successfully reintegrated the educational system. The program’s 
success inspired a group of community leaders, led by the educator and activist Almira 
Coursey, to begin raising funds for a daycare center that the young mothers and their kids 
could use. The program also drew the attention of the Times, which published a florid 
account of the December 18, 1966, graduation ceremony for 110 young mothers. “A 
sustained chord sounded the piano in the packed and hushed auditorium of Public School 
21 in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn, a signal for 110 girls to rise to their 
feet at a special graduation ceremony,” the Times reported. “The girls, between the ages 
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of 14 and 18, did so heavily, and as they rose they smoothed their maternity dresses.”29  
 Another far-sighted initiative launched with OEO funds was the “Women’s Talent 
Corps,” a program to train low-income women for jobs in the social-service bureaucracy. 
The Talent Corps was not a direct outgrowth of Youth in Action or, for that matter, the 
federal poverty program. It sprung from the creative mind of Audrey Cohen, a well-off 
white woman who was also a civil-rights activist and educational reformer. In the late 
1950s, while still in her 20s, Cohen had founded the Part-Time Research Associates, a 
group that employed well-educated housewives to carry out social-science research; 
clients had included the McKinsey consultancy, AT&T, the State Department, and 
Governor Nelson Rockefeller. In the early 1960s, Cohen turned her attention to finding 
work for low-income women. Her central insight was that as the country’s core economic 
activity shifted away from manufacturing, the social-service professions could become an 
important source of jobs for women living in deindustrializing cities. Cohen observed 
that New York City lacked trained workers to staff the growing health, education, and 
social-welfare sectors. “In the field of community service there exists a shortage of jobs, 
as well as a short supply of professional and non-professional workers to fill them,” she 
wrote in her 1965 request for antipoverty funds. “If our efforts are to be directed 
forcefully against the conditions of poverty, new jobs in community and social agencies 
must be developed and persons presently unemployed or underemployed must be 
recruited and trained for them.”30  
 The key, Cohen decided in 1964, would be to recruit low-income women, with or 
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without high-school diplomas, to train for paraprofessional positions in understaffed 
social-service professions — what a Talent Corps report dubbed “meaningful, socially 
useful jobs.” This approach would fight poverty on two fronts. On one hand, it would 
provide poor women with an alternative to welfare by offering both job training and 
placement; on the other, it would staff hospitals, schools, social-work agencies, health 
clinics, legal-services centers, and daycares with support staff able to serve as “bridges” 
between the poor and the government agencies and professional service providers with 
whom they interacted on a day-to-day basis. The lion’s share of Brooklyn women who 
graduated from the Talent Corps in the 1960s took up paraprofessional jobs as teacher’s 
aides in city schools. 
 Cohen’s vision implied a strategy of “institutional change”; indeed many of the 
jobs she envisioned did not yet exist, and it would be necessary to convince social-service 
and governmental agencies that creating such jobs would redound to their benefit and to 
society’s. Another strength of the program lay in who was doing the training: Cohen, 
departing from her experience with Part-Time Research Associates, planned to call on 
underemployed yet highly educated women with expertise in the social services to carry 
out the training. Wrote Wilbur J. Cohen, Under-Secretary of Health Education and 
Welfare, “This project, by making use of professionally trained women, not now 
employed, to train disadvantaged women for jobs ... provides one method of obtaining 
manpower to staff anti-poverty programs.”31  
   Cohen, who in 1965 had only recently moved to New York, pitched her idea to 
the federal Office of Economic Opportunity and held a series of meetings in the Bronx, 
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Harlem, Brownsville, and Bedford-Stuyvesant to rally support among the local CAAs. 
Her plan met with an enthusiastic reception. OEO pledged to put up 100% of the funds 
necessary to launch the Women’s Talent Corps in 1966. Meanwhile, New York City’s 
Board of Education agreed to create a number of new paraprofessional positions, 
including teaching assistants and guidance assistants in public schools, designed 
expressly for Talent Corps graduates to fill. This followed months of lobbying efforts 
carried out by Cohen, school principals, the United Federation of Teachers, and others.  
Cohen was also successful in persuading local agencies to refer applicants for the 
program and pledge to create positions for them to take up as internships and eventually 
jobs. (Such positions included research assistants, social-work aides, and legal 
secretaries.) Youth in Action hoped the program would help to find jobs for currently 
unemployed Bedford-Stuyvesant women in welfare agencies, neighborhood houses, 
health clinics, daycare centers, legal-service centers, churches, schools, and recreational 
centers. “The non-professional woman will be trained in the field in her own 
neighborhood,” a Youth in Action memo explained.32  
 Of the first group of 40 trainees to take classes at the Talent Corps’ institute in 
Lower Manhattan, almost all were unemployed at the time they were chosen to 
participate. Many had never finished high school. More than half were single mothers 
and 90% were black or Puerto Rican. All were living on incomes below the poverty level. 
The $2-an-hour stipend they received for attending lectures and participating in 
internships was a valuable resource in and of itself. (Program coordinators earned $4 an 
hour.) Even more valuable were the jobs waiting for them upon completion of the 
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educational program. If many War on Poverty job-training initiatives faltered because 
they gave vast numbers of young people skills to take up jobs that didn’t exist, the 
Women’s Talent Corps insisted that the institutions it cooperated with create new 
positions for trainees to fill. Thus of the first 75 students to complete the program in 
1966-1967, most immediately graduated into jobs created specifically for them to fill.33 
 As Michael Katz has observed, one of the most lasting legacies of Great Society 
programs was that they marked the entry, en masse, of black women into government 
jobs. In light of this result, the Women’s Talent Corps comes off as particularly far-
sighted. Planned for women, by women, it also represented a creative use of state 
resources to quietly advance the goals of the feminist movement. Equally significant was 
the fact that the Talent Corps explicitly repudiated the culture of poverty thesis:  
 
The training program reflects a basic philosophy about the “teachability” of 
uneducated people. It assumes that the “culture of poverty” does not affect the 
attitudes of most of the low-income groups in New York City, and specifically not 
of the women enrolled in the Women’s Talent Corps program. Rather, the 
Women’s Talent Corps trainees subscribe to the basic cultural values of the U.S. 
and strive for the same goals as other Americans. It assumes that these women are 
ready and able to become the “new careerists” of the future. What they need is 
help in developing and focusing their latent talents, rather than major restructuring 
of their attitudes toward society. Because certain behavior is expected, it is 
received.34 
 
 By 1968, the program had a backlog of close to 2,500 applications. Cohen’s efforts 
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had also launched the new College for Human Services (later to be known as the 
Metropolitan College of New York), which gave the Women’s Talent Corps an 
institutional structure. The Talent Corps proved so successful that in 1970 Cohen turned 
it into a two-year professional-training program within the College for Human Services. 
The college, which admitted men as well as women, eventually began offering bachelor’s 





A Social Movement of the Poor? 
 
 
 Olga DeFreitas and Audrey Cohen showed that select programs, if shepherded 
along by strong leaders with a clear vision of what they were seeking to accomplish, 
could succeed in the War on Poverty. Both programs targeted women; another point in 
common was that they offered cash incentives and valuable training to their enrollees. 
Each received favorable press coverage and institutional support both from Youth in 
Action and from other War on Poverty funding streams. Not coincidentally, neither 
initiative made much use of community action, except insofar as sporadic organizing 
might put pressure on governments to release funds.  
 Elsewhere, however, community action was very much at the forefront of 
Brooklyn’s War on Poverty. It was a time of turmoil. The poverty program had turned 
into in political football. In the fall of 1965 and for most of 1966, Youth in Action’s 
leaders argued among themselves and with the city and federal funding agencies over 
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what “maximum feasible participation” was supposed to mean. In view of Bedford-
Stuyvesant’s large population and glaring needs, and in light of the supposedly 
unconditional nature of the “war,” the funds being released seemed pitiful. It was 
difficult, if not impossible, to launch significant service programs. So YIA staffers and 
some board members decided to capitalize on the discontent caused by the funding 
deficits to raise political awareness in the community. YIA thus spent much of early 1966 
organizing community action, though not necessarily of the sort the OEO had in mind.  
 Protests proliferated. In February, Almira Coursey, a YIA board member who 
worked closely with the Young Mothers Program, instigated a drive to recruit local 
parents for a march on City Hall demanding Head Start funds. The Rev. Walter Offutt, 
another board member, called for direct action to combat discrimination in unions and 
industry, without which, he pointed out, job training was useless.36  
 The increasingly restive mood in the community surfaced at a February 3, 1966, 
meeting of the antipoverty task force set up by Mayor Lindsay. With Lindsay himself in 
attendance, Youth in Action supporters packed the auditorium of P.S.3 on Jefferson 
Avenue. Among other demands, they asked the city to provide better police protection, 
traffic lights, health clinics, and daycare centers in Central Brooklyn. Isaiah Lewis, a 21-
year-old high school dropout employed by YIA as a community-outreach worker, then 
riled up the crowd with a screed against the poverty program’s architects.  
 “I can’t speak the big words you all sling around, but I know about poverty 
because I live in it,” said Lewis, who described himself as an “intellectual mau-mau.” 
Johnson and Lindsay, he said, were “pseudo-liberals” who had delivered promises in 
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bundles but copped out whenever it came time for real action. The assembled crowd 
responded with calls of “That’s right!” and “Tell it like it is!” Lewis continued: “They 
think they can just throw a little money in here and hope the natives …” He trailed off, 
but some in the crowd finished his sentence for him: “Don’t get restless!”37  
 Lindsay seemed to have an appetite for such meetings. Two weeks after his 
confrontation with Isaiah Lewis in Brooklyn, he faced jeers and calls of “Watts! Watts!” 
(in reference to the recent uprising in Los Angeles) at a meeting of his antipoverty task 
force in Harlem. As he walked to his car, a group of local youth leaders accosted him 
chanting “Where’s the bucks, John?” Ten days later, a group of community 
representatives traveled to Washington, D.C., to solicit funds from OEO officials and 
politicians including Representative Emmanuel Cellar of Brooklyn’s 10th District and the 
senior Senator from New York, Jacob Javits. At one point during a meeting with a 
Community Action Program official, the irascible Isaiah Lewis rose, with tears in his 
eyes, and warned, “I’m getting madder and madder. I can’t return to Brooklyn and tell the 
poor people to wait for hope. Can you tell a starving man to wait?” Faced with such mau-
mauing, Javits promptly took up the issue with OEO’s director, Sargent Shriver. In view 
of the “long and disturbing delay” caused by the now-departed Wagner administration, 
Javits explained, he felt YIA’s application for OEO funds should be expedited.38 
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 Dorothy Orr looked on proudly, if somewhat worriedly. YIA’s executive director 
approved of the militant political consciousness YIA was nourishing among its 
“articulate and well-informed” community-leadership trainees, including Isaiah Lewis. 
“The Task Force Meeting was an excellent demonstration of the potential and capacity of 
the ‘poverty stricken’ to respond,” Orr reported to her board. “There was a new sense of 
self, an awareness of their political power ... The total atmosphere within YIA presently 
is one which reflects a resurgence of drive, ambition, and restlessness to have knowledge; 
to get training and to ‘join the great society’.”39 Orr believed that the only way for 
Bedford-Stuyvesant residents to extract concessions from the federal and city 
bureaucracies was to get mad and to get organized. “Bedford-Stuyvesant residents know 
and feel strongly that it is not a community of decadence, apathy, or lack of drive,” she 
wrote in 1966. “Rather it is a community that has a history of fierce pride, concern, and a 
will to ‘overcome.’ The problem is not one of indifference; it is one of lack of 
opportunity, lack of funds, and lack of cooperation from the world outside.” 
 Yet Orr also believed that only an alliance between Bedford-Stuyvesant’s middle 
class and its low-income majority could bring about meaningful social change. By the 
spring of 1966, she perceived a widening rift. A new generation of leaders was gaining 
followers by fusing the language of black power with grassroots organizing and pressure 
tactics borrowed from street gangs. The most prominent of these men was Sonny Carson 
of Brooklyn CORE, who had once belonged to the notorious Bishops gang; in the late 
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1960s, he often attended community meetings flanked by several armed men. Several 
younger activists, including Isaiah Lewis, gravitated toward Carson and CORE while also 
taking paid positions with YIA’s community-organizing arm. Though employed by the 
state, they challenged the very legitimacy of the government and denigrated the 
bureaucratic apparatus that structured the poverty fight. They even disclaimed a role as 
“representatives” of the poor. “We are the poor,” one “mau-mau” was quoted as saying 
in 1967. “Maximum feasible participation means me, baby.”40 
 In the eyes of such young men, both the civil-rights movement and the War on 
Poverty had failed. Segregation or economic inequality persisted, and life in “the ghetto” 
seemed to be getting worse, not better. The generation of moderate, middle-class leaders 
who had erected the antipoverty apparatus in places like Bedford-Stuyvesant seemed 
toothless, at best. For years, black liberals had waited on Mayor Wagner to toss a few 
crumbs into the community; now they vested their hopes in another white liberal, John 
Lindsay. What good was their leadership if they couldn’t convince their allies in 
government to throw some change their way?41  
 Orr warned the Youth in Action board that hostility toward “community systems” 
was growing among Bedford-Stuyvesant’s young, poor majority. She urged a 
rapprochement between traditional leaders and the “indigenous population” of the area. 
Later in the decade, the director of the Restoration Corporation, Franklin Thomas, would 
similarly attempt to bond between local elites and the poor. Well aware of the YIA 
experience, Thomas and others within Restoration would work hard to deliver benefits, 
however small, to Bedford-Stuyvesant residents as quickly as possible, knowing that in 
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the absence of concrete action local elites would lose face. In 1966, Orr and many among 
Youth in Action’s leading board members clearly recognized this problem as well, but 
could do little without adequate funding — and funding depended entirely on the whims 
of decision-makers within the federal and municipal power structures.42  
 Absent such funding, there was nothing to do but organize. Led by a new board 
chairman, the Rev. William A. Jones, Youth in Action began increasingly to capitalize on 
local discontent and raise political awareness in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Jones, who replaced 
William Chisholm as chairman in early 1966, was a charismatic figure beloved in Bed-
Stuy for his civil-rights activism and easy demeanor. Born in Kentucky, Jones was the 
son and grandson of ministers. During the early 1960s, he became a close ally of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., and made his name by coordinating the New York chapter of 
King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference. (Later, he would head up the New 
York branch of the Operation Breadbasket campaign, another King initiative.) Since 
1962, as pastor of Bethany Baptist Church, Jones had preached to a congregation of 
5,000 and led a series of high-profile boycotts, marches, and protests. As an orator, Jones 
had few rivals. He stood 6 feet, 5 inches tall, weighed 265 pounds, and had a booming 
baritone to match. He was also known for his warmth, charm, and sense of humor. When 
asked how he was doing, he’d often answer, with a smile: “Jumping up and down and 
calling it progress.” At the close of board meetings, which usually stretched long into the 
night, he’d go around the room and make sure everyone had a ride or a safe route home. 
“The hawks are out tonight,” he’d quip. It was easy to forget he was only 31 years old.43 
 Jones made clear that the War on Poverty was a direct extension of the civil-rights 
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struggle. As Youth in Action’s funding crisis dragged on, Jones sponsored the formation 
of a new group dubbed the Citizens Committee for the Preservation of Youth in Action, 
which, unlike the agency itself, could devote itself exclusively to protesting hold-ups in 
city and federal funds. Jones also convened a series of town-hall meetings at which Bed-
Stuy residents were invited to air their complaints face to face with representatives from 
city agencies. At one of these meetings, on April 1, with upwards of 600 people 
attending, YIA officials encouraged representatives of the “indigenous population” not 
only to pose questions but to run the meeting. The following month, YIA began issuing 
official “memberships” to local residents, with an eye toward forming neighborhood 
poverty planning boards. Jones claimed that 21,000 locals signed up within a fortnight.44  
 Whether or not Jones was in fact recruiting YIA supporters by the tens of 
thousands, he had clearly decided to use the new agency to build a social movement of 
the poor. If the city chose to stand in his way, he would use this expanding grassroots 
network as a political weapon in the fight with City Hall. On June 17, 1966, Jones led a 
rally that called attention to a $1.5M discrepancy between the money YIA had been 
promised and what it had received. Posters read: “Red Tape is keeping our children from 
having a full Head Start program in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Let’s cut it!” Addressing the 
crowd at Fulton Park, Jones thundered that the city’s treatment of YIA amounted to “an 
insidious attempt to bring about the ultimate demise of Youth in Action.”45  
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 If Jones underestimated Lindsay’s desire to devolve power to the poor, he rightly 
sensed the way the political winds were blowing in Washington. Support for the War on 
Poverty had waned dramatically in Congress, and Lyndon Johnson himself was turning 
against a program that seemed to be causing more than its share of controversy. In a letter 
to Lindsay, Jones pinpointed a central problem of much of the War on Poverty: the curse 
of high expectations: “It will be difficult to interpret to a community, just becoming 
mobilized to seek solutions to their problems, such a solution,” he wrote of the 
administration’s design for yet another reorganization of the community-action agencies. 
The funding delays, Jones told the mayor, had increased citizens’ hostility toward 
government, which imperiled YIA’s basic goal of “redirecting the angry and destructive 
feelings of residents into constructive channels.”46 
 Orr, meanwhile, was taking the community grievances of Bedford-Stuyvesant all 
the way to Washington, D.C. And YIA’s executive director kept thrusting radical youth 
leaders to the forefront of what she continued to see as a grassroots crusade for 
community empowerment. When Orr was invited to testify before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Labor and Public Welfare on June 24, 1966, Orr demurred, presenting 
Timothy Vincent as the agency’s spokesman. Vincent spoke for a small sub-agency 
called the Youth Leadership Institute, which mobilized and provided job training for 
young men aged 17 to 23, especially those who were referred to as “hard-core dropouts.” 
Speaking to the most powerful legislative body in the land, however, Vincent had not 
time to discuss the logistics of youth leadership training. What concerned him was 
politics. Vincent laid out what was becoming a familiar litany of complaints. YIA had not 
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Chapter 5: Maximum Feasible Bureaucratization  310 
 
received federal funds in almost nine months. Only a small portion of requested funds 
were being provided by the city government; when such funds were released, it was on a 
sudden and ad-hoc basis and accompanied by threats that the monies would be withdrawn 
if unspent by artificially imposed deadlines. Of the funds appropriated in 1965, the better 
part had been earmarked “to keep the young fellows cool” through the summer. Other 
monies repeatedly got bogged down in confusing bureaucratic channels. As for the poor, 
they stood by powerlessly, organizing to no avail, pursuing maximum feasible 
participation in a hoax. The cruel harvest had been anger and cynicism.47  
 “It has been our observation that there is a general air of discontent among the 
grassroots segment of the community,” Vincent said, “because only token efforts have 
been made toward elimination of adverse conditions affecting them: unemployment, poor 
housing, substandard city service, health welfare, and police.” According to Vincent, it 
was getting harder and harder for YIA’s supporters to justify their program of reforming 
the system from within. In talking to young people on the streets of Brooklyn, he’d heard 
the questions a hundred times: “What is happening, baby? Do they really mean business?” 
Now was the time for the feds to show that they did, indeed mean business. “When we get 





Indigent or Indigenous? 
 
 
 The efforts of Dorothy Orr and William Jones to broaden YIA’s base of community 
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support in many ways dovetailed with Lindsay’s push for greater grassroots participation 
in the poverty program. They also suffered from some of the self-defeating aspects of 
Lindsay’s vision. It seemed as if the more they devolved power, the more chaos reigned.   
 The debate about maximum feasible participation took on a new dimension once 
funds finally landed in Youth in Action’s coffers in the summer of 1966 and the agency 
started hiring. YIA recruited new staff from among what it called the “indigenous 
population” — poor, uneducated youth — as a way of simultaneously providing on-the-
job training while dispensing services. If its board represented the middle-class leadership 
of Bedford-Stuyvesant, the Youth in Action staff in effect came to represent the 
“maximum feasible participation” arm of the agency. This produced a bitter, if not 
unpredictable, succession of power struggles between the board and its staff.  
 Dorothy Orr fought in vain to hold the different factions together. YIA’s executive 
director through October 1966, she thought the agency’s survival hinged on winning over 
the poor. Though she had initially applauded Mitchell Sviridoff’s plan for reorganizing 
the city’s poverty apparatus, she recoiled at the suggestion that YIA itself might become 
a “bureaucracy” within that apparatus. Throughout her tenure, Orr worked to incorporate 
the poor in decision-making processes and protest activities. As a result, she butted hears 
with influential members of YIA’s board. In April 1966, the chairman, William 
Chisholm, accused Orr of mismanagement while Orr shot back with allegations that the 
board was trampling on administrative privileges. The dispute soon took on gendered 
tones before blowing up into a fiery shouting match at an April board meeting, which led 
Chisholm to resign. Two weeks later, so too did the Rev. Milton Galamison, who had 
been serving as interim chairman. Galamison, cryptically, explained that “there was 
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nothing more I could do for an agency that resists constructive help.”49  
 Thereafter, Orr organized community meetings, laid the groundwork for 
neighborhood-board elections, and recruited local gang members into youth-leadership 
programs. To these organizational efforts, she appended a redistributive philosophy: “The 
war on poverty is a war which calls for a redistribution of power, responsibility, and 
participation by all people in the economic, political, and social structure of our country. 
… The vested interest of the middle class, the professional, the politician, the 
businessman must be touched in this process. The shift of power does not come easily or 
without active and angry resistance.”50 
 In short, Orr hoped to stir up ferment and focus YIA’s energies on directing what 
she called “the total process that is inherent in any basic change [and] which is the goal of 
the War on Poverty,” namely the political empowerment of young, poor, African 
Americans. Yet hers was no revolutionary vision. Orr saw controversy, conflict, and 
potentially explosive tensions as beneficial if and only if they could be “redirected into 
appropriate and productive channels” within mainstream American political life. Thus 
she differed with YIA’s middle-class board not so much on ends but on means. Orr hoped 
ultimately that “the poor, the professional, the wealthy, the politician, etc. can merge on a 
policy-making, program-planning, and implementation level so as together to alleviate 
some of the basic core problems of poverty in the community.”51 
 Orr and several YIA staffers, most notably the agency’s treasurer, Owen Hague, 
did not feel the board endorsed their vision of maximum feasible participation. The long-
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simmering dispute over the proper role of poor people in managing the agency’s affairs 
blew up in the summer of 1966, when Orr quit and took a job as executive director of the 
Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited agency. Orr was not alone in accusing the YIA 
board of reflecting a middle-class outlook divorced from the concerns of the Bedford-
Stuyvesant poor. It was Hague who, in resigning alongside Orr, complained loudest that 
the poor had been frozen out of YIA’s decision-making process. In an interview with the 
Times, Hague charged that the board was preventing YIA from reaching out to the most 
“hard-core” delinquents, which amounted to “committing a fraud on the public.” (What 
Hague didn’t tell the Times was that he had been encountering increasing difficulty 
meeting payroll, at one point taking out an emergency three-day loan in order to pay 
employees.) A dozen employees from YIA’s fiscal department joined Hague in resigning 
because, they said, board intransigence meant they were unable to interpret the meaning 
of the agency’s basic operational principle: maximum feasible participation.52 
 On October 3, YIA’s chairman, William Jones, defended himself to the 
commissioner of the city’s Community Development Agency, George Nicolau. “The 
Board has not shown a lack of concern for the poor,” Jones wrote in a letter. “The Board 
is not middle-class oriented. In fact, the ‘indigenous’ are well represented and their 
voices are distinctly heard in all matters pertaining to policy in this agency.” Jones’s use 
of the term “indigenous” is telling. A slippery word used in this context as a euphemism 
for “poor,” it was meant to lend an air of authenticity to those members of the community 
being held up as proof of maximum feasible participation in action. However, its very 
usage indicated the difficulty of gauging who, exactly, was being served by the War on 
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Poverty and whose empowerment was being pursued. In his letter to Commissioner 
Nicolau, Jones listed six “indigenous” board members, all women. He also took pains to 
point out that the YIA representative on the Council Against Poverty, Oliver Ramsay, 
was a sanitation worker who lived in public housing — which supposedly made him a 
fitting representative of Bed-Stuy’s “indigenous” population.53  
But there were difficulties inherent in Jones’s efforts to prove that the poor were 
equal and willing participants in the poverty effort. If the indigenous were indeed leading 
the antipoverty effort, then why should Jones need to highlight their participation? If poor 
people were the “indigenous” population, did that mean middle-class folk were 
interlopers? Was the point of maximum feasible participation to put poor people in 
decision-making positions within the antipoverty bureaucracy, or was it to give them 
jobs? The answers remained unclear. 
                                                
53 William Jones to George Nicolau, Oct. 3, 1966, Watkins papers. 
Left, the chairman of the board of Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth in Action in 1966-67, 
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 Regardless, Youth in Action embarked in the fall of 1966 on a complex process 
intended to bring the agency closer to the “indigenous” population it was meant to be 
serving. The centerpiece of this effort was a network of five neighborhood boards, each 
serving a subsection of Bedford-Stuyvesant. The boards would fulfill three purposes. 
First, each was to oversee a neighborhood center dispensing services tailored specifically 
to the local population. (For instance, the area of northern Bedford-Stuyvesant abutting 
Bushwick, heavily populated by Puerto Ricans, would offer services in Spanish as well as 
English language remediation classes.) Second, each board would help to ensure 
representation of block-level concerns during meetings of the central YIA board. Third, 
the neighborhood boards would help to develop new sources of leadership at street level.  
 The architects of YIA’s decentralization process believed that neighborhood boards 
would foster local control and self-help. Further, they hoped strong and active 
neighborhood boards could act as bulwarks against corruption by keeping the antipoverty 
program “free from an umbrella type of operation which could easily become politically 
controlled.” The agency showed it meant business by sending out an armada of staff 
trainees to canvas each area and to recruit candidates for the boards “on a block-to-clock 
basis.” This amounted to an ambitious plan to breed participatory democracy in an area 
the size of Cincinnati, devolving decision-making power down to street level. And it 
intensified the problems the community corporation — itself the result of an elaborate 
democratic exercise — was facing in its efforts to coordinate area-wide policies.54   
 Orr’s replacement in the executive director’s office at Youth in Action was Walter 
Pinkston, the same man who, as a Youth Board worker in the late 1950s had helped to 
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spur the formation of the Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council. Under Pinkston, Youth 
in Action’s first task was to turn itself into a “broadly representative” community 
corporation. This was, in Pinkston’s words, a “tedious” process that took the better part 
of eight months. (Sviridoff’s guidelines mandated that the process be complete by 
December 31, 1966.) The first step was a series of October meetings between YIA staff 
and 25 pre-existing community organizations, followed by the formation of an ad-hoc 
committee chaired by Almira Coursey and made up of YIA people and representatives of 
various grassroots organizations. Next, YIA hosted open meetings at P.S. 21 to explain 
the purpose and structure of the community corporation to local residents. After several 
weeks of further planning and discussion, YIA hosted a public meeting on December 8, 
at which some 500 Bedford-Stuyvesant residents crammed into the auditorium of P.S. 
258 to endorse a plan for the election of a new board of directors. There followed a series 
of public hearings hosted by each of the neighborhood boards, after which a plan was 
submitted to the Council Against Poverty for ratification. The plan was approved in 
March, but it was not until May 20, 1967, that elections took place.55  
 By February1967, Youth in Action had 40 board members, of whom 16 were 
classified as being members of the “target population” (a new euphemism for what had 
previously been dubbed the “indigenous” group). Strikingly, 13 of those 16 were women, 
many of them mothers. At a time when the National Welfare Rights Organization was 
heralding the arrival of low-income black women as a national political force, Youth in 
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Action reflected a similar impulse. Still, the group strove for even greater representation. 
The May election saw 75 new members join YIA’s board — 15 from each of the five 
sub-areas into which Bedford-Stuyvesant had been divided the previous year. The vote 
followed two weeks of campaigning and months of preparatory efforts that monopolized 
meetings and occupied a large portion of staffers’ time. Of the 154 candidates running for 
75 positions, most were new to the game of community action, and few had any 
experience working within government. In an effort to preserve an element of stability, it 
was decided that the outgoing board could select a dozen “at-large” directors for the new 
community corporation. This latter group included politicos like Thomas Fortune and 
Shirley Chisholm, along with such longtime directors as Sylvia Shapiro (a school 
teacher), Don Watkins (a professor of sociology at Brooklyn College), and Oliver 
Ramsay, who represented Bedford-Stuyvesant on the citywide Council Against Poverty. 
Still, most of Youth in Action’s institutional memory had vanished. 
 All told, only two of Youth in Action’s 20 original board members remained with 
the group from July 1964 until May 1967. The group had cycled through three executive 
directors and three board chairmen in three years. Meanwhile, the board had ballooned to 
an absurd size: almost 90 members. (By comparison, only 94 people sat in the New York 
State Senate and the New York City Council combined in 1967.) Meetings became 
chaotic. The new chairman, the Rev. Walter Offutt, tried to organize orientation sessions 
for new directors needing to familiarize themselves with the board’s responsibilities and 
functions. Many had no experience at all running organizations. Those who did felt 
compelled to pass motions calling on their colleagues to respect Robert’s Rules of Order. 
Instituting community control had become rather time-consuming — and YIA would 
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have to do it all over again less than a year later, when OEO ordered a further 
reorganization following passage of the “Green Amendment” to the Economic 
Opportunity Act, which required that boards of designated community action agencies 
have no more than 51 members, of which at least one-third were to be drawn from the 
“target population.”56 
While YIA was converting into a community corporation, it simultaneously faced 
increasing scrutiny by the various funding bodies that oversaw it — the city’s Human 
Resources Administration (HRA), the Council Against Poverty, and the federal Office of 
Economic Opportunity. An evaluation carried out by the Human Resources 
Administration in February 1967 found that the Brooklyn agency had failed to develop 
systematic objectives or formulate long-term goals. According to the HRA report, part of 
this resulted from the intense public scrutiny focused on Youth in Action and to the 
“atmosphere of urgency surrounding the War on Poverty,” which had inspired the agency 
to launch a variety of experimental programs without adequate planning. Management 
also posed a significant challenge. By 1967, YIA had 300 full-time and contract 
personnel in addition to some 1,300 training aides. Many new staff had been recruited 
from among Bedford-Stuyvesant’s “target population” — poor, poorly educated youth — 
as a way of simultaneously providing on-the-job training, dispensing services, and 
mobilizing community energies. Those impulses proved difficult to reconcile with proper 
managerial and accounting practices. Getting the new recruits up to speed necessitated 
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what the HRA report called “a step-by-step, trial-and-error approach” — but that was a 
tough thing to pull off in an atmosphere of urgency. As a result, minutes and records were 
poorly kept, program functions overlapped, and program coordinators lacked copies of 
their budgets. YIA services were being dispensed from some 33 locations around 
Bedford-Stuyvesant. While that helped the agency reach out to great numbers of people, 
it also increased the difficulty of coordinating efforts and direct them toward a common 
goal. Most worrisome, opaque accounting procedures betrayed signs of rampant 
incompetence and possible fraud.57 
 During the early months of 1967, another challenge to Youth in Action was 
appearing on the Bedford-Stuyvesant scene. It was still unclear what Robert Kennedy’s 
antipoverty initiative, the Restoration Corporation (about which more in Chapter 6), 
would be able to accomplish or how it would be funded. But its powerful patrons had 
begun to throw their weight around. Youth in Action, led by board chairman Offutt, 
demanded to know how existing antipoverty initiatives would be affected if a new 
agency, this one backed by CEOs instead of social workers, began to draw federal funds. 
Seen from outside Bedford-Stuyvesant, such worries could easily be dismissed as petty 
parochialism: indistinguishable factions fighting Byzantine battles for chump change. But 
they took on special urgency as a new session of Congress began debating whether to 
jettison the poverty program altogether. Protecting Youth in Action, warts and all, 
became an overriding goal for the people who had invested the better part of three years 
in building a community-run poverty program. They argued, reasonably enough, that 
Youth in Action, having converted into a community corporation as per city directives, 
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was now the legal body charged with representing community sentiment and instituting 
poverty policy. Despite being starved for funds and political support, it was organizing 
community action with extensive participation by the poor. What would it say about the 
poverty program if Bobby Kennedy and a bunch of white businessmen could just waltz 
into Bedford-Stuyvesant and trump the whole thing?58 
  To Offutt, all this was a source of frustration and alarm. An associate minister at 
William Jones’s Bethany Baptist Church, Offutt in 1967 stepped into Jones’s shoes as the 
chairman of YIA and thus the official mouthpiece of community sentiment about the 
poverty program. He was twenty years older than Jones, less famous as a civil-rights 
activist, and politically moderate. Yet Offutt was also growing increasingly radicalized 
by what he perceived as a massive betrayal of the poor in the War on Poverty.  
 Offutt, himself the son of a clergyman, had done graduate work at the University of 
Pennsylvania, graduated from Union Theological Seminary in Manhattan, and later 
married the pioneering lawyer Jane Bolin. Prior to their marriage, Bolin had become the 
first black woman to graduate from Yale Law school; later, she became the first black 
woman judge in the country when Mayor Fiorello La Guardia appointed her to the 
Domestic Relations Court. Beginning in the late 1940s, Offutt had emerged as a figure of 
some national prominence, leading desegregation struggles in Kentucky before serving as 
the national church secretary of the NAACP. In the latter role, he quietly helped to 
galvanize the support of preachers for the growing assault on the legal edifice of 
segregation. (In 1947, for instance, Offutt had traveled the county urging religious leaders 
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to “assist us in translating the American ideal into complete realization.”) By the late 
1950s, Offutt had turned most of his attention to Harlem, where he’d organized voter-
registration drives, lobbied for a new hospital, and publicized incidents of discrimination 
against black workers. In 1960, when some three-dozen organizations — city agencies, 
civic groups, neighborhood associations, settlement houses, and politicos like Percy 
Sutton — came together to plan a common assault on poverty and social disorder in 
Harlem, Offutt got involved. Later that year, a committee of Harlem ministers including 
the formidable Eugene S. Callender joined up with the Negro American Labor Council to 
launch a national campaign publicizing racial bias against black workers; Offutt’s voice 
was among the loudest in this campaign. Disturbed by growing black unemployment and 
a paucity of training opportunities for black youths, Offutt and his colleagues planned a 
Harlem rally for jobs, starring A. Philip Randolph, on New Year’s Day, 1961.59 
 Offutt’s activism, while eclectic and sustained, was not particularly exceptional 
among New York’s cohort of crusading African-American ministers at the time. If 
anything, he’s worthy of note today precisely because his name lives on only in the sepia 
tones of old Amsterdam News clippings. Offutt was just one among many New York-
based civil-rights leaders who figured prominently in setting up and running the Great 
Society apparatus. Like many of his generation, he had harbored hopes that the civil-
rights movement might bring about transformational change through a tactical alliance 
with the northern wing of the Democratic Party. But he found himself running to keep up 
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as the politics of the black freedom struggle veered sharply leftward in the 1960s. Like 
his more famous colleague in the Bethany Baptist pulpit, Bill Jones, Offutt adapted to the 
new climate by promoting the political empowerment of poor people, largely through 
Youth in Action.  
 Offutt took over the chairmanship of YIA’s board in January 1967, a time of 
mounting frustration in Bedford-Stuyvesant, in African-American neighborhoods around 
the country, and among left-leaning activists of all stripes. Civil-rights activists, after 
years of racking up legal victories, looked around their neighborhoods and saw things 
getting worse. The totalizing effects of residential segregation in Northern cities now 
seemed a greater threat than the likes of Bull Connor or Orval Faubus or George Wallace, 
and there didn’t seem to be much anybody in power could or was willing to do about it. 
The Vietnam War was sapping people’s faith in the goodness of a President and a 
Democratic Party in which they’d vested immense faith only three years earlier. As for 
the War on Poverty, initial optimism had soured; community-action groups, for whom 
maximum feasible participation was a legal requirement, were beginning to wonder what 
the point was with money so scarce. Increasing numbers of black urbanites were prepared 
to heed the calls of nationalists and turn inward.  
  Offutt, however, continued to insist that the War on Poverty represented the best 
hope for African Americans. In March 1967, he penned a column in the Youth in Action 
newsletter insisting that, in a sense, all black Americans were poor, because none had 
sufficient wealth not to worry about their next paychecks and, in any case, almost all 
lived in close proximity to dire poverty. Even among the black middle-class, he wrote, 
none could buy into the argument that their low-income neighbors were somehow 
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undeserving. “When we look at our unemployed neighbor we say prayerfully, ‘there but 
for the grace of God go I.’” The poverty program had yet to evolve into anything more 
than a “skirmish,” Offutt admitted — but where else but government could communities 
like Bedford-Stuyvesant look for the desperately needed infusion of outside capital?60 
 “YIA is learning from its experiences as well as its errors,” Offutt wrote. “If you 
have a dirty house, you don’t burn it down, you clean it out. The various branches of the 
municipal, state and federal governments which have had a role in the poverty program 
are not without fault; they too are faced with working through problems and correcting 
errors. One thing we are all sure of without argument, the poverty program must go on. If 
we destroy it, we destroy ourselves — and as dramatic as it may sound, this country.”61 
 On May 9, 1967, Offutt appeared before the Senate Subcommittee on Employment, 
Manpower, and Poverty. Others appearing that day included Mitchell Ginsberg, 
commissioner of the city’s Department of Welfare; Carl McCall, chairman of the city’s 
Council Against Poverty (and a founding member of the YIA board); and a dozen other 
officials at various levels of the social-welfare bureaucracy. It was an explosive moment. 
That summer, Detroit and Newark would burst into flames as riots-cum-uprisings shook 
the cities to their foundations. Brooklyn would ultimately be spared that summer, but the 
spring of 1967 had witnessed rising tensions over the direction of the poverty program. 
Offutt had grown concerned about the mounting anger he detected all around him. 
 “I am not here to make any threats,” Offutt told Senator Joseph S. Clark of 
Pennsylvania, the chairman of the subcommittee. “but … when you started this 
legislation, you started people from Tobacco Road to 115th Street in Harlem and Fulton 
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Street [in Brooklyn] on a march that nobody will be able to stop irrespective as to how 
they may try to court and get and mislead the people in power.”  
 The poor of Bedford-Stuyvesant, Offutt explained, had been able “to get a taste of 
ice cream for the first time in their lives, to realize that in this democracy there is a 
chance to vote, there is a chance to find a better life, there is a great opportunity.” 
Through the Community Action Program, thousands of Brooklynites had enrolled in 
Head Start and homework-study groups, in youth-leadership programs and the 
Neighborhood Youth Corps, in the Young Mothers Program and other family-planning 
initiatives, in on-the-job training and consumer-education courses. Hundreds of jobs had 
been created, countless lives improved. More significant still, at least as far as Offutt was 
concerned, agencies like Youth in Action had stirred people from their apathy and begun 
to do just what the Community Action Program had been tasked with doing in the first 
place: encouraging self-help and community resilience among the poor and the 
powerless. Offutt wrote in a statement for the record:  
 
Housewives, teenagers, old -people, the unemployed, small businessmen, 
school drop-outs and laborers have worked to improve their lot. These 
people held meetings, conferred, formed block associations, read reports, 
prepared reports, held elections and made plans. They expect these plans 
to come to fruition. To tell them now that those plans will come to nothing 
because no funds are available is to destroy months and months of long 
arduous work.62 
 
 Walter Offutt was in his mid-50s in 1967 and had spent his career working in a 
relatively conservative civil-rights organization. He believed in integration. His wife was 
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a judge who had seen door after door open to her within the corridors of power. In other 
words, he was hardly the kind of man who might’ve been expected to speak in the 
language of the incipient revolution unfolding within the country’s poorest places. But 
that’s exactly what he did, on one of the biggest stages in the land. “All this energy 
channeled into constructive planning can now only burst out in frustration, rage and 
disaster for this area ,” he warned.63  
 The subtext to Offutt’s testimony was the threat that the new Kennedy-sponsored 
project in Bedford-Stuyvesant might draw poverty funds away from YIA. If Offutt had 
needed any more indication of the way things were going, he had received it the day 
before when Civil Court Judge Thomas R. Jones, an ally of Kennedy’s, had appeared 
before the Senate subcommittee — on which Kennedy sat — and misleadingly presented 
himself as the chairman of the “Bedford-Stuyvesant Community Corporation.” When 
Offutt’s turn to speak arrived, the committee members felt they’d already heard all they 
needed to hear about Bedford-Stuyvesant and limited Offutt’s testimony to a few off-the-
cuff remarks, declining to hear the speech he’d prepared. It was clear to Offutt that these 
Senators, uninterested in the internecine conflicts playing out among people they’d never 
heard of in an area they barely knew of, would ultimately defer to Kennedy for guidance 
— to the detriment of Youth in Action. Offutt conceded that Judge Jones was “blessed 
with the power that we do not have.” But, he warned, it would cause a “great hue and cry 
from the target population” if Youth in Action were dismantled as a result.   
                                                
63 Another erstwhile moderate who was turning to militant rhetoric was YIA’s executive director, Walter 
Pinkston, a man who had spent the previous 15 years employed by New York City’s social-welfare 
bureaucracy. In August, 1967, Pinkston wrote that in view of the “years of oppression, discrimination and 
other forms of second class status imposed upon the Afro-American” as well as the “deaf ears that have 
been turned toward the community by the superstructrues of city government,” there was no conclusion to 
draw than that the “time has run out for appeasement.” (He did, however, issue an official disavowal of 
violence and vandalism.) Walter Pinkston, “Position Statement,” YIA Monthly Newspaper, Aug. 3, 1967. 






Things Fall Apart 
 
 
 Despite Offutt’s fears, several YIA initiatives had begun to make an impact. The 
Young Mothers Program, in particular, was thriving. By late 1967, 175 women were 
enrolled in what had become a 20-week program that included a counseling service, free 
lunches, pre-natal care, infant and post-natal care, and job training. Meanwhile, YIA’s 
consumer-education program was earning praise for its efforts, and the agency also 
proposed to initiate a Legal Services program that would help familiarize victims of 
police brutality with their rights, provide legal counsel to indigent residents, advocate for 
tenants’ rights, and train a corps of neighborhood legal aides. Like Head Start, Legal 
Services was a national program initiated by OEO and which would prove among the 
most popular and enduring initiatives undertaken during the War on Poverty.  
 However, most YIA programs, and especially its community-organizing functions, 
suffered from the geographic dispersal of decision-making processes. After the 
reorganization of Youth in Action into five distinct community districts, infighting 
increased markedly as staffers and directors alike lobbied to fund their respective 
parochial interests.64 
 Worse, findings of managerial incompetence within YIA by the Human Resources 
Administration led to the first of many crackdowns by the antipoverty bureaucracy. In 
early 1967, a joint ruling by OEO, the Council Against Poverty, and New York City’s 
Community Development Agency imposed “special conditions” on the embattled 
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Brooklyn agency. On March 7, 1967, McCall, a onetime YIA board member who now 
chaired the Council Against Poverty, threatened to withdraw funds from YIA unless it 
engaged in systematic evaluations of its programs and staff and completed the “spin-off” 
process by which YIA programs would be delegated to other, independent groups. (One 
such spin-off, mentioned earlier, would eventually put the Young Mothers Program under 
the supervision of Community Sponsors, Inc.) In the interim, the agency would not be 
permitted to hire any staff or fund new programs without approval from above.65  
 The Office of Economic Opportunity, after conducting a separate investigation, 
drew even harsher conclusions about the Brooklyn agency: that various people on payroll 
weren’t working, that administrative chaos was the rule, that the aide training program 
was rewarding cronies rather than placing youths in paying jobs. A scathing report issued 
in May 1967 declared YIA to be rife with hidden agendas and undermined by the 
competing goals of various elements of the community. The agency, the report stated: 
 
is a classic example of a program that was pulled together very rapidly 
amidst a crisis with a mandate to spend a lot of money, to employ large 
numbers of people, and to keep the ghetto ‘cool’. All of the inherent 
strengths and weaknesses of such an approach to meeting the needs of the 
community are present in the YIA program. ... Confusion reigns, charges 
and counter-charges are made; and miraculously some good is being 
accomplished.66  
 
 This was particularly true at the neighborhood level, according to the report. 
Although one of the five neighborhood centers had initiated a wide array of community-
                                                
65 Carl McCall to Walter Offutt, Mar. 7, 1967, Watkins papers. 
66 D.S.W., Incorporated, “Consultation and Review: The Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth in Action Program,” 
May 22, 1967, Watkins papers, p. i. 
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action activities and social services, the others seemed to be largely inert. The Centers’ 
directors complained of having no say in the hiring of staff members; budgets, minutes, 
and other basic files seemed to be missing; very little in the way of programs had been 
initiated; none of the centers had any trained social-work or management professionals on 
staff; and, in the case of Area 2, which had roughly equal populations of African 
Americans and Puerto Ricans, ethnic strife was crippling YIA’s street-level work. Most 
of the training aides (who hailed from among the low-income “indigenous” population) 
seemed neither to be learning any specific skills nor moving into permanent jobs. The 
one universally agreed-upon function for the neighborhood centers was to engage in 
community organizing — but to what end?67  
 Many of these flaws arose directly from YIA’s efforts to ensure maximum feasible 
participation. The agency struggled at all times to harmonize big thinking about big 
problems with the intensely parochial day-to-day concerns of its core constituents. It was 
hard to put forth a comprehensive vision for Central Brooklyn’s transformation while 
also making a fetish of ultra-local decision-making. It was even harder to run a competent 
agency while also serving as an employment service for dropouts, gang members, and the 
unemployed.68 YIA was also hampered by the challenges it faced from above — the 
funding delays, the multiple supervisory bodies, the forced reorganizations. For two 
years, the agency had had to operate on the assumption that its existence was imperiled. 
When funds finally trickled in, heated arguments erupted over how to spend them. In a 
                                                
67 D.S.W., Incorporated, “Consultation and Review.” 
68 The OEO report from 1967 found that there were no college graduates or experienced managers on staff 
at any of the neighborhood centers. According to the report, this not only created a deficit in 
administrative capacity; it also meant that there was no one around to offer the kind of training and advice 
that might have helped the administrative aides employed in the community-action program graduate into 
permanent jobs, either with Youth in Action or in outside jobs. “Community Action Aide positions 
became a dumping ground for many who had completed their training for jobs outside Youth in Action,” 
the report stated. D.S.W., Incorporated, “Consultation and Review,” pp. 92-93. 
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resource-starved community now estimated to contain almost 400,000 people, $5 million 
was barely enough to accomplish much of anything concrete. But it was enough to touch 
off vicious power struggles.  
 Shortly before his death in 2004, Sviridoff wrote that one of the fatal flaws 
of the War on Poverty’s “maximum feasible participation” mandate was that it 
ended up “balkanizing” local communities into rival camps fighting over 
relatively small pieces of a pie much smaller than initially promised: “The War on 
Poverty, like several Gray Areas sites before it, quickly succumbed to an 
‘empowerment’ fetish, in which everyone had to be represented in the governance 
structure, but no one actually had to do anything. Years were lost while groups 
fought over their place in the hierarchy, scarcely remembering what it was they 
wanted control over, or why.”69 
Nonetheless, the agency’s budgets continued to grow. During the 1967-68 fiscal 
year, Bedford-Stuyvesant, the most populous of any New York City “poverty area,” 
would receive $6.4 million (almost 20%) of the $33.5 million in community-action funds 
doled out by the New York City Council Against Poverty. These monies funded an array 
of popular programs, the best of which catered to young people. By 1968, Youth in 
Action ran the second-largest Head Start program in the city, surpassed only by the Board 
of Education itself; the Young Mothers Program, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, and 
vocational-training programs each promised to improve hundreds of individual lives.70 
                                                
69 Mitchell Sviridoff, “Conclusion,” in Sviridoff, ed., Inventing Community Renewal, p. 242. 
70 New York City Council Against Poverty, Annual Report, 1966–67, Columbia University Social Work 
Library Agency Collection; List of New York City Head Start sponsors [1968, prob. May], Papers of the 
Lindsay Administration, Microfilm Roll 44, Folder 1644, NYCMA.  
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Above and two previous pages: posters circulated by Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth in 
Action in 1967 and 1968, when it was holding elections for the new community 
corporation and its delegate neighborhood boards. (Don Watkins papers.) 
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 Yet Bedford-Stuyvesant’s community corporation was on the brink of imploding. 
After three years of planning, waiting, and restructuring, the agency now found itself 
facing disciplinary procedures imposed by the city and federal poverty bureaucracies. 
Internally, factionalism was seriously hampering YIA’s ability to establish goals and 
communicate them to the public, let alone pursue innovative courses of action. Several 
rival camps had emerged within the agency’s orbit. The board, led by Offutt, formed one 
camp, which accused executive director Walter Pinkston and the professional staff 
surrounding him — a second camp — of gross mismanagement.71 Pinkston in turn 
blamed Youth in Action’s woes on a group of disaffected staffers within the agency. This 
third camp, closely allied to the street radicals of Bed-Stuy, included many of YIA’s 
neighborhood workers and youth leaders; they were drawn from among the “indigenous” 
population and complained of low pay, poor working conditions, and a lack of benefits 
such as paid sick days and vacations. Finally, there were the area’s elected officials, 
whose numbers were rapidly increasing and who recognized in the fledgling antipoverty 
apparatus a potentially valuable source of patronage.72 
 The Community Action Program had originally been conceived as a tool for 
“achieving maximum institutional change,” as one War on Poverty planner put it. But it 
was a stretch to expect that groups like Youth in Action might wield enough political 
power to overturn social structures or reform the values and aspirations of the young. 
There were contradictions lurking in the weeds. On one hand, communities were held to 
                                                
71 Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth in Action, Minutes of the Board of Directors (October 19, 1967), Watkins 
Collection. The Board’s minutes for the period from October1967 to April 1970 are replete with details 
about the dispute between Pinkston and the YIA Board. The Board attempted on several occasions to fire 
him, and he finally left the agency in 1970. “Boro YIA Board Fires Pinkston,” NYAN, Sept. 13, 1969; 
“Pinkston Ouster Demanded by YIA Dissidents,” NYAN, June 7, 1969; “YIA Discord Cause for Dismissal 
of Director,” NYAN, Oct. 25, 1969. 
72 B-S YIA, “Community Action Area I’s Questions and Grievances,” June 21, 1968, Watkins papers. 
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be damaged by the legacies of segregation, poverty, and blocked opportunities; on the 
other, they were assumed to possess within them sufficient intellectual resources and 
political unity to take on the established structures that were supposedly blocking their 
opportunities. On one hand, these communities were judged disorganized, lacking in 
competence, and rife with pathologies; on the other, they were expected to promote self-
help through effective organization. The men within the Kennedy-Johnson administration 
who came up with this theoretical framework can be forgiven their inconsistencies. The 
civil-rights movement had shown just how potent the organizing power of the oppressed 
could be; in 1964, as the War on Poverty was ramping up, the Mississippi voting-rights 
drive was providing an object lesson in what “local people” could accomplish when they 
came together. Further, the War on Poverty was crafted at a historical moment when 
formerly marginal groups around the globe were finding within their own communities 
the strength, intellectual leadership, and moral authority to take on structures of authority. 
Such developments clearly affected the architects of the Great Society.73  
For all that, it was enormously difficult for any given community group to bring 
about structural change. The problem with the theory of community action was that it 
assumed that the oppressed and marginalized might improve their condition through 
neighborhood-level activism, without attempting to take on entrenched power structures 
at the national (or international) level. True, community action was part of a national 
narrative, but the enemy — poverty — was diffuse and largely undefined. Youth in 
Action’s aim was not to help eradicate poverty in America, nor really even to eradicate 
poverty in Brooklyn. Its mandate was to increase the opportunities of local youth and, in 
                                                
73 Task Force on Urban Areas, Preliminary Report, Apr. 8, 1964, “President Committee File, 4/64,” 
Richardson White Papers, Box 4, JFKL.  
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the process, to empower the people of Bedford-Stuyvesant to change their circumstances. 
But there was little the people of Bedford-Stuyvesant could do to counter the larger 
forces that came to be arrayed against them.  
 The discrepancy between Lyndon Johnson’s soaring rhetoric and the limited tools 
at the disposal of community groups like Youth in Action bred disillusion and cynicism. 
Sonny Carson, for instance, dismissed Youth in Action and other “organizations created 
to handle the many social needs and grievances of the Black citizens” as thinly veiled 
efforts to “pacify, train, analyze, propagandize and organize depraved areas to make them 
more contiguous [sic] with the rest of American society.” Despite all the well-paid 
administrators, college graduates, and social-work professionals in their orbit, the 
purpose of such agencies remained nebulous. “The task of social reconstruction has been 
delegated to the Community Corporation,” Carson wrote in Youth in Action’s monthly 
newspaper in August 1967. “But who takes care of the immediate problems of Black 
people? Who cares when they are driven to delirium by the many bureaucratic processes 
one has to penetrate in order to acquire one’s rights in this great metropolis?”74 
 The Community Action Program, at its heart, was a political mechanism designed 
to link communities in need with the people possessing the knowledge and resources to 
do something about those needs. Hence the emphasis on empowering the poor, if not 
necessarily helping them get more money. The poverty warriors in Washington, D.C., not 
only predicated that this process might lead to political clashes; they embraced that 
possibility. As one of them wrote in a 1964 memo:  
 
                                                
74 The answer, according to Carson, was CORE — “the sole group who unselfishly, untiringly and without 
material reward is champion of the plight of the oppressed.” Robert “Sonny” Carson, “Brooklyn Core,” 
YIA Monthly Newspaper, Aug. 3, 1967, Watkins papers. 
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A central mechanism which creates such unaccustomed bedfellows (as 
those possessing the problem and those with the power to do something 
about it) and then plans to engage in action seeking changes in 
organizations rather than (or in addition to) individuals, must produce 
conflict. The community action program shakes up existing arrangements 
and demands a rethinking of traditional definitions of the problem. Such 
conflict must be anticipated. It is not only normal but indicative that key 
community forces are finally dealing with problems which have become 
all too ‘invisible.’”75  
 
 Conflict, then, would be a necessary and proper part of community action. But how 
to harness the energies unleashed during such conflicts? That remained something of a 
mystery. In Bedford-Stuyvesant, those energies tended to be turned inward.  
 A public board meeting on August 9, 1967, gave a glimpse of things to come. The 
purpose of the meeting, held in the auditorium of P.S. 21, was to inform the community 
of YIA’s recent activities. But it quickly devolved into a political slugfest. The opening 
round involved the dispensation of part-time jobs in the Neighborhood Youth Corps, an 
OEO-funded program meant to provide teenagers with useful, remunerative work 
experience while encouraging them to stay in school. In economically depressed 
Bedford-Stuyvesant, these jobs made for valuable currency in the marketplace of 
neighborhood influence. Yet it was often unclear to YIA directors and staffers alike how, 
exactly, the positions were being filled or how many were available. Given the high 
proportion of YIA monies expended on such hires — during the 1966-67 fiscal year, YIA 
devoted 42% of its total budget ($5.6 million) on trainees and aides and spent another 
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Richardson White Papers. Box 6, JFKL.  
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22% on clerical staff — the opaque process caused much controversy.76 
 At the August 9 meeting, a board member, Carson Wright, explained that to date 
only 2,400 of 3,600 available positions with the Neighborhood Youth Corps had been 
filled, and that incompetent staffers had been mishandling files. Part of the problem, 
Wright argued, was that the program’s director, Stuart Lewis, held insufficient power to 
dismiss his staff; as a result, Wright recommended that board members be allowed to 
pick new Youth Corps recruits. As Pinkston rose to comment, a group of irate youths 
rushed the stage, led by Timothy Vincent, director of YIA’s Youth Leadership Institute. 
After a long shouting match and some near-scuffles, Lewis eventually took control and 
demanded that the meeting move onto a discussion of financial reports.  
 Those too were explosive. Now the women in the audience began to raise their 
voices. As Ralph Ward, YIA’s bookkeeper, delivered the figures for Head Start, one 
woman rose and impatiently asked what had happened to $4,000 allocated for “parent 
activities.” After yet another period of tumult, the meeting resumed only to devolve once 
again into chaos when a young woman grabbed the microphone and demanded to know 
where YIA’s money was being spent. At this point, Vincent again barged onto the stage: 
What was the agency doing with “all the money”? This prompted the always-bombastic 
Isaiah Lewis, representing Brooklyn CORE (and who, like Vincent, was on the YIA 
payroll), to accuse Pinkston of fraud. Further screaming, swearing, and sweating ensued. 
The meeting eventually broke up, amid chaos, at 10:30 p.m. Community action was 
undeniably at work — but to what end? Three years into the War on Poverty, the 
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ambitious visions of societal change articulated by Lyndon Johnson and Robert Wagner 
and Dorothy Orr seemed a long way off.77  
 In the years that followed Youth in Action’s reorganization as a community 
corporation, the agency bounced from crisis to crisis. Board meetings were routinely 
disrupted by protestors, professional agitators, or simply ordinary citizens wanting to air 
their grievances. Staff at the various local agencies used their positions to build 
constituencies and employ friends. Added to this was the challenge of maneuvering 
within a set of municipal, state, regional, and federal regulations so complex that even the 
most well-informed of activists and planners found the bureaucracy difficult to navigate. 
It made sense that the professional politicians should take over and turn YIA into a 
patronage mill. In an era of deindustrialization and capital flight, the jobs created by the 
poverty programs amounted to a veritable goldmine.78 
 For all its woes, the Bed-Stuy community corporation would become one of the 
best-funded CAAs in the country during the early 1970s, receiving $8 million a year in 
city and federal funds. Its delegate agencies by that point included a housing development 
program, job training, a computer-education project, a community-owned supermarket, a 
senior citizens council, an auto service center that doubled as a job-training program, 
various public-health initiatives, legal services, and … a bicycle racing program.79  
 At the same time, the agency was turning into a den of crooks and thieves. 
                                                
77 B-S YIA, Minutes of public meeting with the Board of Directors, Aug. 9, 1967, Watkins papers.  
78 The archives abound with examples of planners’ confusion about how exactly funds flowed from OEO 
to local agencies. For instance, in 1968, the Council Against Poverty held a marathon orientation session 
to walk new board members through what the chairman, Edwin Greenidge, called the “Rube Goldberg” 
structures tying various federal, state, regional, and local policy-making bodies. “Try not to be snowed by 
it all,” Greenidge told council members as they received briefings from an OEO regional administrator 
and various city officials. Minutes of the New York City Council Against Poverty, Apr. 18, 1968, New 
York Public Library: Science, Industry, and Business Library. 
79 New York City Community Development Agency, Program Directories for Years G, H, and I 
(November 1971; January 1973; January 1973), NYPL-SIBL. 
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Scandal after scandal rocked YIA in the mid-1970s. In 1974, executive director Maurice 
Chessa was arrested on charges of loan sharking, illegal gun possession, and attempted 
murder; he served five years in jail. It soon emerged that the entire agency had been 
under FBI investigation for months before Chessa’s misdeeds came to light, and in 1975, 
the feds raided the agency and seized its records. Both the city and a federal grand jury 
launched investigations of the agency, and funds were cut to under $4 million the 
following year. In 1977, Chessa and his board chairman, a nightclub owner named 
Richard Habersham-Bey, were found guilty of fraud and embezzlement.80 With more 
charges of fiscal mismanagement pending, the entire YIA board was dismissed and 
control taken over by the citywide Council Against Poverty. The agency had gone 
through 10 board chairmen and seven executive directors in its 13-year history. 
 Very little that Youth in Action touched did not at some point go sour. Even the 
best-run and most successful of YIA’s initiatives ran into difficulties. For instance, the 
Young Mothers Program though lauded on all sides, faced a desperate problem in the late 
1960s: inadequate classroom facilities. In 1967, the Board of Education refused to 
accredit the program on grounds that its cramped, shoddy quarters constituted an 
unsuitable educational environment. Olga DeFreitas, began a frantic search for an 
adequate building in which to house the program — but the best option, which DeFreitas 
described as “a slight ray of hope,” was an abandoned church on Monroe Street in need 
of “a vast amount of renovating and face-lifting.” Help would eventually come from a 
coalition of DeFreitas’s many admirers around Bedford-Stuyvesant, and the popular 
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program got its building in 1971.81 But the issue would come back to haunt her. In 1977, 
DeFreitas would find herself indicted on charges of fraud and embezzlement connected 
with an abandoned building she had rented for the Young Mothers Program in 1969. She 
was eventually acquitted — she had been an unknowing dupe in a real-estate fraud 
orchestrated by a friend of hers — but her career lay in shambles. “I’m finished caring,” 
she said.82 
 A lack of expertise among staffers, the disorganization born of a constantly 
revolving leadership group, a paucity of community resources, and the legacies of 
maximum feasible bureaucratization all played into such problems. But good old-
fashioned corruption made its mark too. Two men in particular helped to destroy 
community action in Bed-Stuy: City Councilman Sam Wright and State Senator Vander 
Beatty, both of them African Americans closely tied to the Kings County Democratic 
machine of Meade Esposito. In the 1970s, the two men together controlled an archipelago 
of community institutions; Wright’s main power bases were the Ocean Hill-Brownsville 
school board and the Brownsville Community Corporation, and Beatty’s was Youth in 
Action. Beatty orchestrated a hostile takeover of YIA in 1971, organizing a muscular get-
out-the-vote campaign in the community-corporation elections. He gradually sidelined 
other local politicians with ties to the agency — among them Thomas Fortune of the 
Unity Democratic Club and Waldaba Stewart, a former YIA staffer who’d gained 
election to the state legislature — before installing his cronies in high places. Millions of 
dollars in public funds went missing, and anyone remotely associated with the old guard 
was forced out. Wright went to jail in 1977 for fraud, but Beatty had by then consolidated 
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his power over the local poverty apparatus. In 1983, he too would end up in jail, having 
mounted a massive campaign of voter fraud during his campaign for Congress against the 
reformer Major Owens. (Beatty was murdered in 1990, while trying to stage a political 
comeback.) By that point, Youth in Action was gone as well, abolished by new mayor 
Edward I. Koch soon after he took office in 1978.83 
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The Power to Act 
 
 
“We must maintain our commitment to act, to dare, to try again. The 
plight of the cities, the physical decay and human despair that pervades 
them, is the great internal problem of the American nation, the challenge 
which must be met.”  









                                                
1 Robert F. Kennedy, Statement before the Annual Conference on Community Development in Bedford-
Stuyvesant, hosted by the Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council, Dec. 10, 1966, Don Watkins Papers. 
Senator Robert F. Kennedy mingles with Brooklynites including State  
Senator William C. Thompson, Sr., right, at a meeting of the Bedford-
Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, circa 1967. (BSRC.) 
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“I have a feeling this might turn out to be a very auspicious occasion,” William 
Paley, the chairman of CBS, told some two dozen men assembled in his Manhattan 
boardroom on the evening of January 12, 1967. “This project that was initiated by 
Senator Kennedy is creating a good deal of interest and if all goes well, this might be the 
beginning of something very, very important.”2 
So began the inaugural board meeting of an unusual antipoverty group. The 
directors Paley was addressing included some of corporate America’s best and brightest: 
André Meyer of the investment-banking firm Lazard-Frères, former Treasury Secretary 
C. Douglas Dillon, I.B.M.’s Thomas Watson, and George Moore of First National City 
Bank. Two of the country’s most prominent urbanists — Mitchell Sviridoff of New 
York’s Human Resources Administration and Edward Logue, the master builder of 
Boston — joined them, as did the celebrated architect I.M. Pei. Brought together by the 
junior senator from New York, Robert F. Kennedy, their task was to revitalize Bedford-
Stuyvesant. Other than Sviridoff and Logue, these men had little experience fighting 
poverty or planning urban initiatives, yet they agreed with Kennedy that special times 
called for special efforts. They believed that something ought to be done for the city’s 
poor neighborhoods — and especially those inhabited predominantly by blacks — if for 
no other reason than to avert urban chaos. And they agreed that the War on Poverty had 
been a disruptive and wasteful use of taxpayer dollars.3   
Kennedy had managed to convince these deep-pocketed elites that their taxes 
could still be well spent fighting poverty, if combined with private-sector grants and 
                                                
2 Bedford-Stuyvesant Development and Services Corporation (B-S D&S), Minutes of the Board of 
Directors, Jan. 12, 1967, “Planning 1966–1967, Vol. 1,” Box 44, Burke Marshall Papers, John F. Kennedy 
Library (JFKL). 
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sound management principles. Urban programs, the senator argued, must not limit 
themselves to “community action.” They must also funnel capital into the “ghetto,” 
encourage business initiative, and foster homeownership. Most of the men Kennedy had 
assembled were Republicans who harbored a deep mistrust not only for government 
programs but also for Kennedys. But when the senator talked to them about Bedford-
Stuyvesant he “sounded like a Republican” (his own words). His newfound allies in the 
corporate and banking sectors found his ideas promising.4  
Their main worry was that the new project would lack for tangible, immediate 
results. It could easily devolve into yet another chaotic tangle of recrimination and red 
tape. Kennedy himself fretted that the undertaking would fail unless it remained sheltered 
from the antipoverty bureaucracy; all the more reason, then, to tap the private sector for 
planners, managers, and fundraisers. At the same time, the senator realized that his 
coalition would fall apart were it perceived on the streets of Bed-Stuy as the pet project of 
rich white men. To square the circle, Kennedy created a novel oversight structure. The 
project would answer to two boards rather than one. On one hand, the Bedford-
Stuyvesant Renewal and Rehabilitation Corporation (R&R), brought together prominent 
Brooklyn politicians, civic leaders, and community organizers, almost all of them black. 
Under the leadership of Thomas R. Jones, R&R’s board would take charge of program 
design and implementation while managing community participation. Meanwhile, the 
men who were meeting for the first time in William Paley’s boardroom would form the 
Bedford-Stuyvesant Development and Services Corporation (D&S), which would offer 
logistical support, business acumen, and — most important — fundraising clout.  
                                                
4 “Redevelopment Plan Set for Bedford-Stuyvesant,” NYT, Dec. 11, 1966. 
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Further, Kennedy had deftly enlisted the support of his Republican colleague, 
Senator Jacob Javits, along with New York’s Mayor, John V. Lindsay (another nominal 
Republican). As a threesome, they provided the project with impeccable bipartisan 
credentials and political heft. “We have never seen a coalition … with such potential 
power,” was Sviridoff’s excited assessment. Together, this coalition would, in Kennedy’s 
words, “combine the best of community action with the best of the private enterprise 
system.” Not only would they circumvent the funding difficulties, bureaucratic obstacles, 
political pressures, and whiff of corruption that were hampering War on Poverty agencies 
like Youth in Action — they aimed to revolutionize urban policy in America.5 
Before they could start, they would need to figure out how, exactly, they should 
set about reinvigorating Bedford-Stuyvesant. The whiz kids on Kennedy’s staff were 
bursting with ideas about how to stem capital flight, create jobs, and promote 
homeownership; the businessmen had their theories, too. As the project gained steam, 
Kennedy’s minions would fan out across America, drawing inspiration from the hodge-
podge of big ideas and grand experiments that were emerging in response to the national 
“urban crisis.” But the people of Bedford-Stuyvesant had spent years ruminating on 
solutions, and they were meant to be leading the way. As it turned out, the most 
important of the programs implemented by the Kennedy group after 1967 were largely 
homegrown. Though bold and innovative, the new project grew out of a pre-existing 
conversation, one that dated back to the postwar years and which gathered together a 
familiar group of Brooklyn community activists, advocacy planners, social workers, 
                                                
5 B-S D&S, Minutes, Jan. 12, 1967, JFKL; Robert F. Kennedy, Statement, Dec. 10, 1966, Watkins Papers. 
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homeowners, and municipal bureaucrats. Rather than a reaction against the War on 





Advocacy Planning for Brooklyn 
 
 
 The Pratt Institute for Design sits in Clinton Hill, a quiet enclave of Brooklyn on the 
northwestern edge of Bedford-Stuyvesant. Founded in the late 1880s, when industrialists 
flocked to the area and lined its streets with high-ceilinged mansions, the school’s 
campus stands as an elegant, leafy testament to that bygone era. By the 1960s, Clinton 
Hill’s once-aristocratic airs had long since faded; the neighborhood’s housing stock was 
growing decrepit, and the great engine of working-class life in the area, the Brooklyn 
Navy Yard, was on the verge of shutting its gates. Against this backdrop of poverty and 
disinvestment, Pratt, which offered degrees in art, architecture, and urban planning, also 
emerged as a clearinghouse for new ideas about how cities might be revitalized. It was 
there that the trail was blazed for Kennedy’s journey into Brooklyn.6   
 In 1963, the chairman of Pratt’s Department of City Planning, Professor George 
M. Raymond, founded a small institute called the Pratt Center for Community 
Improvement.7 The hopeful name belied a deep feeling of frustration. A partner in a 
                                                
6 The borders of Clinton Hill are a matter of dispute. In the 19th century, the wealthy area known as “The 
Hill,” centered around majestic Clinton Ave., included much of the former town of Bedford, as well as 
most of what are today known as Clinton Hill and Fort Greene. It was home to several titans of finance 
and industry, including Charles Pratt, the director of the Standard Oil Trust and founder of Pratt Institute. 
Today, Clinton Hill is defined as the rectangle bordered by Vanderbilt Avenue, Bedford Avenue, Myrtle 
Avenue, and Atlantic Avenue. During the 1960s, this area was usually considered a part of Bedford-
Stuyvesant, especially as its population came to include a majority of African Americans. Brian Merlis, 
Brooklyn’s Historic Clinton Hill and Wallabout (Brooklyn: Israelowitz Publishing, 2011), pp. 22-26.  
7 The Center was known until 1965 as the Community Education Program, and in 1968 it was renamed 
the Pratt Institute Center for Community and Environmental Development (PICCED). Today the 
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prominent urban-planning firm, Raymond had for years worked as a consultant to the 
New York City Planning Commission and had helped to design dozens of urban-renewal 
projects up and down the East Coast. But his career had recently hit a roadblock. The 
neighborhood revolt against urban renewal, along with the 1961 publication of Jane 
Jacobs’s The Death and Life of Great American Cities, put planners in a tough spot. Not 
only had Jacobs undermined their wisdom and expertise; she’d vociferously denounced 
the very existence of their profession. With her followers proliferating and growing 
increasingly strident, Raymond concluded that it was becoming “almost impossible to 
make progress because of serious friction between the city and neighborhood groups.” 
How could an honest planner work in such circumstances?8  
 In fact, Raymond himself had been criticizing New York’s urban-renewal efforts for 
years. He’d decried the city’s disregard for the creation of “well-planned, integrated 
residential neighborhoods”; he thought there had been insufficient follow-through in 
neighborhood-rehabilitation programs; and he worried about the descent of public 
housing into “deadly project monotony.” Even during the heyday of Robert Moses, he’d 
advocated the involvement of non-elites in urban renewal. In the early 1950s he’d been 
among the founders of the avant-garde Metropolitan Council for Planners, which hoped 
to make “citizen participation a regular part of the planning process.”9  
                                                                                                                                            
organization is known as the Pratt Center for Community Development. Pratt Center for Community 
Development, “The Pratt Center Story” (2008), www.prattcenter.net/pratt-center-story. For more on the 
Pratt Center, see Laura Wolf-Powers “Expanding Planning’s Public Sphere: STREET Magazine, Activist 
Planning, and Community Development in Brooklyn, New York, 1971-1975,” Journal of Planning 
Education and Research 28 (2008), pp. 180-195.  
8 “New Center Aids Area Replanning,” NYT, July 31, 1966; George M. Raymond and Ronald Shiffman, 
“The Pratt Center for Community Improvement: A University Urban Action Program,” Pratt Planning 
Papers 4:4 (Jan. 1967), pp. 27-40.  
9 “Aide Says City Clears Slums But Fails to Improve Environs,” NYT, Dec. 29, 1960; George Raymond, 
“Successful Rehabilitation Calls for New Approach: ‘Continuous Renewal’,” Journal of Housing 17:4 
(Apr. 1960), pp. 135-137; George M. Raymond, “Editorial: Seward Park Extension,” Pratt Planning 
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 In the era of Jacobs, Raymond suddenly found neighborhood groups unwilling to 
accept even the most sensitively crafted proposals for the revamping of their turfs. He’d 
experienced the backlash firsthand in a slice of Brooklyn wedged between downtown and 
the Gowanus Canal, where in 1962 he had collaborated with citizen outfits to come up 
with an urban-renewal plan. This was an area where a new wave of “brownstoners” — 
white, middle-class, creative types — had begun to settle. Eager to lend their new 
stomping grounds a whiff of historical cachet, they’d renamed it Boerum Hill. Many 
were instinctively suspicious of government-sponsored urban renewal, and Jacobs herself 
helped them to mobilize against the plans drawn up by Raymond and supported by the 
area’s more established ethnic groups and community organizations. The project was 
eventually scuttled. What irked Raymond was not merely that his work had gone for 
naught; it was that the Boerum Hill activists seemed to be rejecting planners and urban 
renewal in general, regardless of whether they might benefit the community. Raymond 
thought this a dangerous trend. The professor refused to concede that urban renewal had 
been invalidated wholesale by the pernicious effects of federal Title I programs. He 
insisted that renewal could be benevolent, as long as governments stood up to developers 
seeking “maximum development for maximum profit” and hired planners enlightened 
enough to collaborate with community advocates.10  
 “History is full of examples of revolt against well-meaning men brought on by an 
accumulation of grievances against their predecessors,” Raymond wrote in the inaugural 
                                                                                                                                            
Papers 1:2 (May 1962), p. 6; Marci Reaven, “Citizen Participation in City Planning: New York City, 
1945-1975” (PhD Thesis, New York University, 2005), pp. 177, 211. 
10 George Raymond, “Needed: A Vote of Confidence,” Pratt Planning Papers 1:1 (Feb. 1962), p. 8. See, 
also, Jennifer Stern, “Pratt to the Rescue: Advocacy Planning Is Alive and Well in Brooklyn,” Planning 
(May 1989), pp. 26-28. On the creation of Boerum Hill, see Suleiman Osman, The Invention of 
Brownstone Brooklyn: Gentrification and the Search for Authenticity in Postwar New York (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). 
Chapter 6: The Power to Act  349 
 
issue of Pratt Planning Papers, a journal he founded in 1962. He continued:  
 
“It is to be hoped that the forces unleashed by recent revolts against specific 
renewal proposals will be brought under control before they succeed in 
undermining the very principle of delegation of power by the people and their 
faith in democratic processes. Already, one hears that the function of 
neighborhoods is to be big and powerful enough to fight city hall, and that the 
neighborhoods should be given the veto power over any of the city’s plans which 
may affect them.”11  
 
 In theory, Raymond did not object to planning with what he called “maximum 
community participation.” (He was writing two years before the Economic Opportunity 
Act of 1964 coined the term “maximum feasible participation.”) But participation was 
being elevated into an end in itself — at the expense of tangible improvements to the 
quality of residential neighborhoods. As Raymond saw it, citizen participation risked 
become undemocratic if it prevented municipal governments from making the kinds of 
citywide planning decisions needed to modernize infrastructure and preserve what 
Raymond called the “social balance.” Yet even city fathers had begun chanting 
participatory slogans as part of a public-relations campaign aimed at defusing challenges 
to the established political order. Raymond thought this cynical. And he worried that the 
very idea of community participation was becoming meaningless in a hurry. Citizens 
with no grounding in land-use regulations, city politics, or housing laws could easily 
make bad decisions or have their opinions diverted into routinized channels. As a result, 
Raymond wrote, “meaningful citizen participation in the process, while universally 
                                                
11 Raymond, “Needed: A Vote of Confidence,” p. 8.  
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deemed to be essential to its constructive unfolding, is almost impossible to achieve.”12 
 That’s where Pratt’s new Center for Community Improvement came in. Through 
it, Raymond and his students would arm “legitimate, broadly representative citizens’ 
organizations” — as opposed to special-interest groups defending parochial causes — 
with the tools they needed to make smart planning decisions. Raymond hoped to show 
that progressive planners and grassroots activists were not natural antagonists but 
potential allies. Done right, planning could harness the impulse toward participatory 
democracy and all the while improve neighborhoods. It was a powerful idea in sync with 
the time and place.13  
 Raymond’s new center sprung to life thanks to a grant of almost $100,000 from 
the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. (Another $160,000 in foundation money would arrive in 
1964-65.) The Rockefeller money was earmarked for a demonstration program aimed at 
educating poor communities on how to use government agencies. Raymond assigned his 
star graduate student, Ron Shiffman, to do the legwork, which meant canvassing Pratt’s 
backyard in search of community partners. Shiffman’s outlook, it turned out, differed in 
significant ways from his teacher’s. (“George made the mistake of hiring me to do the 
project,” he joked decades later.) Raymond was a old-style progressive who hoped to 
educate communities about the importance of planning so they would be more amenable 
to the advice of experts; Shiffman was a man of the New Left who foresaw a process of 
mutual learning. He was sympathetic to Jacobs’s critique, and he approached his task 
humbly, listening as much as he spoke. Only 26, he’d been active in the civil-rights 
movement, and he believed that planners and architects should answer to the grassroots. 
                                                
12 Raymond, “Needed: A Vote of Confidence,” p. 8; Raymond, “Pratt Institute Planning Department 
Recipient of a $94,000 Rockefeller Brothers Fund Grant,” Pratt Planning Papers 1:4 (Jan. 1963), p. 1. 
13 Raymond “Pratt Institute Planning Department Recipient […],” p. 1. 
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As Shiffman saw it, planners could offer technical expertise: statistical analysis, mapping, 
tips on how to navigate bureaucracies, regulations, and zoning ordinances. But they 
should not pretend to know what was best for local people. To give the voiceless a voice, 
planners much listen, collaborate, and advocate. “We always tried to work in such a way 
that we didn’t carry the flag,” Shiffman later remarked of the projects he undertook under 
Pratt auspices. “The community groups were the leaders and we were just helping them 
think things out.”14 
 This approach put Shiffman at the forefront of a fledgling movement that would 
soon become known as “advocacy planning.” The concept was formalized in a 1965 
article by planner Paul Davidoff in the Journal of the American Institute of Planners. 
Davidoff addressed the basic dilemma facing planners in the mid-1960s, one that applied 
not only to urban renewal but also to social-welfare provision (and which encapsulated 
the difficulties the Community Action Program was just beginning to face):  
 
Urban politics, in an era of increasing government activity in planning and 
welfare, must balance the demands for ever-increasing central bureaucratic 
control against the demands for increased concern for the unique 
requirements of local, specialized interests. The welfare of all and the 
welfare of minorities are both deserving of support: Planning must be so 
structured and so practiced as to account for this unavoidable bifurcation of 
the public interest.15 
 
                                                
14 Ronald Shiffman, interview with Sady Sullivan, Feb. 4, 2008, Brooklyn Historical Society/Bedford-
Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation Oral History Project (BHS/BSRC); Ronald Shiffman, “Strategy for a 
Coordinated Social and Physical Renewal Program: Bedford-Stuyvesant” (draft edition, 1966), New York 
State Public Library; Ronald Shiffman, interview with Todd W. Bressi, in Places 12:2 (1999), p. 53; 
Stern, “Pratt to the Rescue,” Planning. 
15 Paul Davidoff, “Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning,” Journal of the American Institute of Planners 
31:4 (1965), p. 546. 
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 For Davidoff, it was imperative that planners explicitly spell out their values and 
advocate “courses of action” that exemplified those values. Planners should stop 
portraying themselves as value-neutral technicians devoted only to the physical 
dimensions of urban change. Rather, Davidoff insisted that they commit themselves to 
the struggle against racial discrimination and economic inequality by putting their 
expertise in the service of poor communities and pursuing more inclusive planning 
processes. This meant helping ordinary citizens to understand the complex language of 
planners and to voice their concerns about planning decisions. Not unlike Raymond, 
Davidoff complained that citizen participation, while desirable, could not be an end in 
and of itself. “The difficulty with current citizen participation programs is that citizens 
are more often reacting to agency programs than proposing their concepts of appropriate 
goals and future action,” he wrote. In effect, Davidoff was prescribing that the planning 
profession follow the lead of the various other professionals who’d enlisted to help fight 
the War on Poverty: sociologists mapping out demonstration projects, social workers 
fostering community action, lawyers staffing legal-services offices, doctors and nurses 
working in neighborhood health clinics.16 
 Though Shiffman’s work fit in with the new model of advocacy planning, it was 
Paul Ylvisaker, a planner with the Ford Foundation, who directly inspired the Pratt 
Center. In the late 1950s, Ylvisaker had called for an urban equivalent to the rural-
extension agents that land-grant colleges had long been assigning to work with farmers in 
                                                
16 Davidoff, “Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning,” p. 545. For assessments of Davidoff’s thinking and 
impact, see Allan David Heskin, “Crisis and Response: A Historical Perspective on Advocacy Planning,” 
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the surrounding areas. Ford followed up with an experimental program of “urban 
extension” run through several universities around the country, including Rutgers and 
Berkeley. The federal government would endorse urban extension in the Higher 
Education Act of 1965, and in 1966 the Pratt planners received a modest federal grant of 
$15,000 for their urban-extension work. The idea of urban extension struck a chord with 
the Pratt planners because it assumed that academics had a responsibility to serve the 
communities in which they worked.17 
 In Bedford-Stuyvesant, Shiffman discovered a community alive with ideas, 
organizations, and political ferment. He’d grown up in a family of Russian Jewish 
immigrants in the Bronx, and he was fresh to Brooklyn. (As it turned out, Shiffman 
already knew some of the local activists, whom he’d met on a bus ride from Harlem to 
the March on Washington in August 1963.) The first group to step forward and request 
Pratt’s help was Church Community Services, which coordinated the social-outreach 
endeavors of a various black churches in Brooklyn. The group was led by H. Carl 
McCall, a young clergyman from Boston who would later chair the Council Against 
Poverty under Mayor Lindsay; it also included some of Stuyford’s most visible civil-
rights leaders, notably Milton Galamison and Sandy Ray. Church Community Services 
took on many campaigns, including voter registration, political education, and youth 
programs. But what the ministers asked of Raymond and Shiffman was help in retaining 
Bedford-Stuyvesant’s shrinking middle-class.18  
                                                
17 Shiffman, interview with Todd W. Bressi, p. 53; Ford Foundation, “Urban Extension: A Report on 
Experimental Programs Assisted by the Ford Foundation” (Oct. 1966), accessed via www.eric.ed.gov; 
“New Center Aids Area Replanning,” NYT, July 31, 1966.  
18 “Church Unit Surveys B-S Housing Ills,” NYAN, July 25, 1964. The Church Community Services 
initiative originally received funding from the New York City Mission Society and the Taconic 
Foundation, and it was run out of the Bedford Avenue branch of the YMCA, where CBCC held many of 
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 The issue of urban renewal loomed in the background. In the post-Robert Moses 
era, New York’s urban-renewal program was no longer synonymous with “Negro 
removal.” Many Bed-Stuy activists, including the ministers who approached Raymond 
and Shiffman, believed that renewal needn’t mean demolition: it could instead fund the 
rehabilitation of historic districts, action against slumlords, aid to homeowners, and much 
else besides. Such activists saw renewal as the best hope for injecting government funds 
into their neighborhood at a time when private capital was drying up. On the other side of 
the issue stood those Brooklynites, many of them poor, who had themselves been 
displaced and continued to regard urban renewal as a symbol not of a benevolent state but 
of an overbearing, destructive one. In 1964, both the hopes and the fears were justified. 
 That April, the City Planning Commission announced that it was done atoning for 
past sins. Selective slum clearance would resume — but this time with a human face. 
According to the Times, the new program “would tear down some of the worst slums 
without tearing apart the lives of the occupants. In part, the program would mean a return 
to the bulldozer — the only way of dealing with the hard-core slums, in the opinion of 
most experts. But […] that would be buffered by a wide range of techniques for 
relocation and social aid developed in recent years.” The city chose three majority-black 
areas, including a section of Bedford-Stuyvesant south of Fulton Park, as testing grounds 
for the new ideas. “In these areas,” the Planning Commission announced, “blight and 
deterioration are so advanced that much of the recommended renewal treatment is likely 
                                                                                                                                            
its meetings. Members of the group also partnered with a coalition of Harlem ministers to plan a summer 
youth-outreach program that received city and federal antipoverty funds in 1965. “Churches Start 
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to be redevelopment.” In other words: bulldozers.19 
 The men of Church Community Services worried that such moves would displace 
people from the renewal area into nearby Stuyvesant Heights, thus “tipping the balance 
toward its deterioration and driving out community leaders.” In the spring of 1964, the 
group commissioned a team of Pratt students led by Shiffman (by now an assistant 
professor) to conduct a housing survey around Fulton Park, with an eye toward designing 
alternatives to the city’s renewal plan. The surveyors received a cold welcome. “We very 
quickly encountered a lot of opposition to the idea of Pratt Institute and of the ministers 
— many of whom didn’t live in the community — making decisions about Fulton Park,” 
Shiffman recalls. The Pratt Institute had chosen the wrong partner in Bedford-Stuyvesant, 
but the next partnership would bring different results.20 




Urban Renewal, Renewed 
 
 
 The controversy surrounding urban renewal brought George Raymond and Ron 
Shiffman into close contact with the Fulton Park Community Council, a group made up 
of tenants and homeowners of modest means. These people worried less about the flight 
of Stuyvesant Heights’s bourgeoisie than about seeing their own community obliterated 
by bulldozers. They asked Pratt to help halt the city’s plans. The Pratt men counseled 
patience, insisting that a program of urban renewal, if it were well thought-out and 
sensitive to local wishes, was “the community’s best available chance of launching it on a 
                                                
19 Worst City Slums Due for Renewal in New Program,” NYT, Apr. 14, 1964; “Plan Urban Renewal,” 
NYAN, Apr. 25, 1964. 
20 Shiffman, interview with Sady Sullivan, Feb. 4 2008, BHS/BSRC; “Church Unit Surveys B-S Housing 
Ills,” NYAN, July 25, 1964; “New Center Aids Area Replanning,” NYT, July 31, 1966.  
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course toward the changes it so obviously needed.” (Among other things, the city had 
mooted the idea of building a community college on cleared land near Fulton Park.) The 
locals balked. “Because of the city’s almost incredibly poor and insensitive performance 
in recent years,” Raymond and Shiffman would write in 1967, groups like the Fulton 
Park Community Council “were suspicious of the renewal program and were highly 
skeptical of the city’s motivation.”21 
The Fulton Park Community Council, by itself, wielded little clout. But it 
belonged to the CBCC and as such could join forces with a much larger federation of 
civic groups, churches, block associations, politicians, and civil-rights bodies. CBCC in 
the summer of 1964 was in the midst of launching Youth in Action, the first Community 
Action Agency in Brooklyn to gain the city government’s stamp of approval and, 
eventually, federal funds through the Office of Economic Opportunity. If this undeniably 
represented a coup for CBCC, few saw it as anything more than an opening volley in the 
fight against poverty. YIA in its early iteration specifically targeted juvenile delinquency. 
But what about the broader spectrum of problems facing Bedford-Stuyvesant?22  
 In the early 1960s, CBCC activists like Elsie Richardson, Shirley Chisholm, and 
Robert Palmer had worked toward varied goals: improving failing schools, desegregating 
workplaces, attracting urban-renewal monies, rehabilitating depressed blocks, combating 
youth crime, and strengthening black political power. By 1964 they’d achieved a measure 
of success on several fronts — yet they worried that “uncoordinated, piecemeal attempts 
                                                
21 Raymond and Shiffman, “The Pratt Center for Community Improvement,” pp. 30-31. 
22 After the city granted CBCC the contract to form Youth in Action, the executive director of the Youth 
Board, Arthur Rogers, commented that it was “just another indication that the Youth Board has 
recognized the stability and the potentials of the Council’s leadership, and we know that through such 
leadership the ‘little man’ will find a medium of expression.” “Community Council Dedicates H. Q.,” 
NYAN, Feb. 15, 1964. 
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at social and physical renewal” would ultimately fall short. In other words, Youth in 
Action was not the culmination of CBCC’s work but a promising beginning. Even as they 
were launching YIA, Richardson and company were laying the groundwork for a 
“comprehensive” program of government-funded community revitalization.  
 A common historical argument about the War on Poverty is that the theoretical 
framework in which the Community Action Program was embedded ultimately limited 
the range of policy outcomes. According to this argument, the tendency among poverty 
planners to view economic want as a cultural condition foreclosed the possibility of 
tackling inequalities embedded in the political economy. As the story goes, 
unemployment and systemic racism were ignored in favor of less tangible goals such as 
community cohesion and the transformation of youth behavior. Combined with the 
overheated rhetoric of the president and OEO, such flawed theoretical premises led not 
only to bad policy but also to great disillusion.  
 As a macro-interpretation of the War on Poverty, this line of argument has merit. 
But it overlooks the openness of policy dialogue at the local level. The ways in which 
local groups adapted social-scientific discourse to fit their own needs was discussed in 
Chapter 4. There are two further points to be made here. First, there was nothing to 
prevent local activists from doing two or more things at once. They could simultaneously 
seek federal poverty funds for theoretically based juvenile-delinquency programs and 
pursue efforts to create jobs and fight discrimination. Second, the very fact that a War on 
Poverty had been declared encouraged such activists to think big, to push beyond the 
kinds of programs being sponsored by OEO and the city agencies. The discourse 
surrounding the Great Society set off a “crackle of hope,” in the words of Johnson’s main 
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domestic-policy assistant, Joseph Califano. “What the poor and black once accepted as 
inevitable became intolerable when LBJ showed them there was light at the end of the 
tunnel of their oppression,” Califano writes.23 
 CBCC activists intended to hold politicians to their promises. The War on Poverty 
was failing to live up to expectations, but it nonetheless provided local activists with an 
arsenal of rhetorical and institutional weapons with which to tackle the challenges 
surrounding them. This was a supposedly unconditional fight — why settle for youth-
oriented Community Action Agencies? The early War on Poverty had aimed to uplift 
poor communities by solving psychosocial problems; urban renewal, meanwhile, had 
tackled physical problems. CBCC hoped to attack both simultaneously. As it turned out, 
solving social and physical problems would remain impossible until a third set of 
problems — political ones — were solved.  
 In the meantime, CBCC began to work closely with the Pratt planners in an effort 
to formalize their vision. The pivot point for this partnership was Elsie Richardson. In 
1964, Richardson was emerging as the most forceful voice within CBCC and its most 
energetic organizer. She also reflected a changing of the guard and a shifting mood in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant. Richardson didn’t hail from an established family or from the ranks 
of the striving professional class. Nor did she harbor political ambitions, in contrast with 
the likes of Maude Richardson, Robert Palmer, Thomas Jones, and Shirley Chisholm. She 
had made her name as an activist by organizing tenants at Albany Houses, the Crown 
Heights public-housing project where she and her family lived in the early 1950s; she 
first came to CBCC as a representative of the Stuyvesant Community Center, which did 
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Chapter 6: The Power to Act  359 
 
youth-outreach work around the projects. She and her husband had since become 
homeowners, having bought a brownstone on Prospect Place. In the early 1960s, she 
dedicated the bulk of her activism to block associations, PTAs, and CBCC’s Housing and 
Urban Planning Committee, of which she became chair in 1964.24  
Richardson, then in her mid-40s, was famous for approaching problems with the 
straight-ahead, forthright manner of a working mother who had no time to waste on 
halfway measures. Unlike her friend Shirley Chisholm, another famous straight-talker, 
Richardson had little patience for political niceties. She often stunned men, especially 
powerful ones, by refusing to flatter them. Often enough, she issued orders instead. On 
the public stage, she was relentless, domineering. But at street level people knew her as a 
community builder who blessed her neighbors with magnificent smiles and every year 
remembered everybody’s birthday. 
As Pratt’s Ron Shiffman began navigating Central Brooklyn’s palimpsest of block 
associations and civic groups, he encountered Elsie Richardson everywhere. The two 
soon struck up a working partnership that would turn into a lifelong friendship. Fifteen 
years Shiffman’s senior, Richardson took the young planner under her wing and 
mentored him in the subtleties of community organizing. Shiffman’s task in Bedford-
Stuyvesant was to educate the locals, but he learned from Richardson a lesson few 
outsiders in the 1960s were prepared to assimilate. “Elsie Richardson taught me that 
Bedford-Stuyvesant wasn’t a ghetto,” he later recalled. “It was a community.” 
Meanwhile, Shiffman lent her his professional insight whenever she asked for guidance. 
                                                
24 At different times, Richardson served as the representative to CBCC for either the Parkway-Stuyvesant 
Civic Council or the Brower Park Civic Council. Both groups acted as umbrella organizations for the 
block associations of Crown Heights. She also served on the executive board of the PTA at P.S. 83, which 
her children attended, and eventually became a Vice-President of the citywide United Parents Association.  
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“He has served as my right arm,” she declared in a December 1966 speech. “When we sit 
in meetings, I’m fine until it comes right down to the technicalities, and when it does, I 











In keeping with the prior thrust of Pratt’s work, CBCC asked Shiffman to explore 
ways of retaining Central Brooklyn’s middle-class and protecting its brownstone districts 
— to wit, a thorough housing study of Stuyvesant Heights carried out at CBCC’s behest. 
As the collaboration deepened, Shiffman joined the boards of both CBCC and of YIA. 
                                                
25 Shiffman, interview with Sady Sullivan, Feb. 4 2008, BHS/BSRC; Proceedings of Central Brooklyn 
Coordinating Council Conference on Community Development in Bedford-Stuyvesant, Dec. 10, 1966, 
BHS/BSRC. Shiffman and Richardson continued to profess their mutual admiration almost a half-century 
after they first met. In a eulogy delivered at Richardson’s funeral on March 20, 2012, Shiffman said: “I 
earned my degree from Pratt, but my education really began when I met Elsie.” 
CBCC leaders meet with Brooklyn Borough President 
Abe Stark and advocacy planners from the Pratt 
Institute, ca. 1964-66. From left: Lucille Rose, Donald 
Benjamin, Shirley Chisholm, Stark, George Raymond, 
Elsie Richardson, Ruth Goring, Ron Shiffman.  
(Pratt Center for Community Development.) 
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The Pratt men also took dozens of Brooklyn activists, including the CBCC leadership 
group, to New Haven and Baltimore, two cities that had earned national attention for their 
urban-renewal programs and neighborhood-conservation techniques. Shiffman helped to 
launch a monthly newspaper, The Central Brooklyn Coordinator, which provided news 
and views about housing, poverty, and policy. Shiffman and Richardson also sent out 
feelers to city, state, and federal officials, inviting them to join community leaders in 
conversations about what lay ahead for Bed-Stuy. The Pratt men, Richardson would later 
recall, “taught us a lot about organizing the community .”26 
On November 21, 1964, CBCC and the Pratt Center co-hosted the first of several 
annual conferences about Brooklyn’s War on Poverty. Some 500 people attended, 
including activists from around the city and representatives of several local and federal 
agencies. They joined a series of workshops, brainstorming sessions, and panels about 
how to revitalize Bedford-Stuyvesant, and what role governments should play in that 
process. The result was a hodge-podge of proposals, some eminently practical and others 
                                                
26 Shiffman, interview with Sady Sullivan, Feb. 4 2008, BHS/BSRC; Elsie Richardson, interview with 
James Briggs Murray, Feb. 2, 1990, Community Development Corporations Oral History Project, 
(CDCOH), New York Public Library, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture (NYPL-Sch). At 
this time, Shiffman was simultaneously working with a group of activists in Fort Greene and Clinton Hill, 
who linked up in 1964 as the Pratt Area Community Council (PACC). Its founders included ministers, 
small businessmen, and residents of the many public-housing projects in the area, which had become a 
seedbed of activism. Shiffman later recalled that while the Pratt Center had served as a “catalyst” to 
PACC’s formation, he and Raymond “felt that it was important that they be independent of Pratt as an 
institution, since too many town-gown efforts have been dominated by the institutional partner.” PACC, 
which exists to this day, focused its efforts on tenant organizing, revitalizing abandoned properties, and 
maintaining a supply of affordable housing in the area. In future decades, the Pratt Center under Shiffman 
would expand its reach to Williamsburg, Red Hook, East Harlem, and the South Bronx — all areas where 
elements of the community-development approach pioneered in Bedford-Stuyvesant were appropriated. 
Brian Merlis, Brooklyn’s Historic Clinton Hill and Wallabout (Brooklyn: Israelowitz Publishing, 2011), 
pp. 45-46; Pratt Institute, “The Pratt Center Story” (2008). 
Chapter 6: The Power to Act  362 
 
wildly ambitious. (The latter category included a scheme to organize Bedford-Stuyvesant 
into 100 five-block sectors and assign seven trained caseworkers to each unit).27  
The conference also gave CBCC a platform for the release of a working paper 
titled “Program for Total Rehabilitation and Renewal of Bedford-Stuyvesant and Central 
Brooklyn Area.” The paper had been drawn up by CBCC’s Housing and Planning 
Committee, which Richardson chaired, with Shiffman’s help. It laid out for the first time 
CBCC’s vision of “comprehensive” community development: 
 
Present urban renewal proposals are token and meaningless in the context of 
the problems facing the community. Of prime necessity in any meaningful 
program for the elimination of poverty and the culture it sustains is the need 
for a total and coordinated commitment to its eradication. Central to this 
program is the elimination of slum conditions, the creation of job 
opportunities and other economic and social improvements which will 
undoubtedly result in decent, sanitary and safe housing.28 
 
Block-by-block organizing would be a key component, as would Youth in 
Action’s programs. But the time had come for bricks-and-mortar projects that would 
create jobs. CBCC proposed to demolish burnt-out buildings, clean up vacant lots, plant 
trees, maintain sidewalks, and create vest-pocket parks on abandoned land. Brownstone-
renovation projects would also be a focus, especially on pilot blocks where a certain 
number of abandoned townhouses would be rehabilitated and transformed into social-
service centers or, in some cases, new housing for large families. Crucially, each of these 
                                                
27 “Poverty Fighters Back Street Plan,” NYT, Dec. 20, 1964; “$5 Million Poverty Plan,” New York World-
Telegram, Dec. 17, 1964; CBCC, “Program for Total Rehabilitation and Renewal of Bedford-Stuyvesant,” 
presented at CBCC War on Poverty Conference, Nov. 21, 1964; CBCC, Recommendations of the Housing 
and Planning Workshop, Nov. 21 1964, both published as appendices in Shiffman, “Strategy for a 
Coordinated Social and Physical Renewal Program.” 
28 CBCC, “Program for Total Rehabilitation and Renewal of Bedford-Stuyvesant,” Nov. 21, 1964. 
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projects would create jobs. Builders contracted to work in the community would be 
induced (through various fiscal incentives) to hire young, unemployed black men and use 
the building sites to train them in the construction trades. Thus did CBCC propose to 
address the problems of jobs, skills, physical blight, and wayward youth, all in one shot 
— in other words, to marry the New Deal and the Great Society.29  
These proposals reflected CBCC’s longstanding belief that historic housing stock 
could anchor redevelopment efforts. In some ways, this thinking lined up with the 
brownstone-revitalization movements that were unfolding elsewhere in Brooklyn at this 
time. In nearby Park Slope and Boerum Hill, for instance, groups of homeowners were 
cleaning up parks and empty lots, planting trees, and restoring historic blocks, one façade 
at a time. Though most such activists were white and relatively affluent, they fought 
many of the same battles as did the block-based activists of Bedford-Stuyvesant: against 
redlining, against declining city services, against clubhouse politicians. Yet as historian 
Suleiman Osman has argued, the white brownstoners harbored an anti-state impulse that 
reflected their self-perceptions as pioneers in an urban wilderness. The homeowners who 
formed the core of CBCC held no such romantic notions. They eyed the state warily. But 
given the speed with which private capital had fled their community since World War II, 
they also saw governments as their principal ally in the fight against further deterioration, 
discrimination, and ghettoization.30 
“Public funds and public initiative to encourage private contribution will be 
essential if substantial total renewal is to take place,” CBCC argued in the 1964 
proposals. For instance, the city must push to integrate building-trades unions and to 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
30 Osman, The Invention of Brownstone Brooklyn.  
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desegregate housing by enforcing open-occupancy laws. Municipal authorities would 
also do well to convert rehabilitated brownstones into public housing, rather than placing 
more clients in already overcrowded high-rises. More low-rent housing was needed; but 
it should be integrated into the fabric of middle- and high-income areas rather than 
concentrated in grim surroundings. Crucially, CBCC also called on governments to 
address the legacy of redlining, demanding that “plentiful loans, on liberal terms, be 
made available to homeowners and small landlords to rehabilitate their property.” If large 
financial institutions refused to cooperate, the community would create a “rehabilitation 
pool” from public funds and savings cooperatives to stimulate development and 
investment in Bedford-Stuyvesant.31  
This was the other side of the poverty war, an effort to repair the physical 
resources of the “ghetto” where the community-action approach sought to revitalize its 
psychic resources. Taken together, the CBCC proposals represented a set of assumptions 
about Bedford-Stuyvesant that would prove appealing to Kennedy and the businessmen 
he brought with him two years later: that the chief obstacles facing Bedford-Stuyvesant 
were joblessness and the inaccessibility of investment capital (rather than, say, apathy 
and pathological behaviors, as per the architects of the Community Action Program); that 
the presence of a relatively large group of homeowners could be a source of strength and 
stability; and that Bedford-Stuyvesant’s building stock, made up in large part of stately, 
sturdy brownstones, offered a leg up in the rehabilitation game.32 
                                                
31 CBCC, “Program for Total Rehabilitation and Renewal”; CBCC, Recommendations of the Housing and 
Planning Workshop.  
32 Ford Foundation (R.B. Goldmann, author), “Performance in Black and White: An Appraisal of the 
Development and Record of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration and Development and Services 
Corporations,” Feb. 1969, Box 1, Ford Foundation Papers, JFKL, pp. 4 & 92; Shiffman, “Strategy for a 
Coordinated Social and Physical Renewal Program,” pp. 6-12.  
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 That all this was presented at a “War on Poverty” conference in Bedford-
Stuyvesant demonstrates the complexity of the thinking that Lyndon Johnson’s crusade 
touched off at the local level. It also shows that the War on Poverty was not so much a 
fixed set of programs legislated in 1964 (and doomed to fail soon thereafter), but a 
process that inspired local activists to think through new ways of accessing state 
resources, despite the limitations of governmental action.  
 Shiffman, Richardson, and their allies in Brooklyn were hardly alone in promoting 
a model of neighborhood action that aspired to tackle physical, social, and economic 
rehabilitation simultaneously. In 1963, for instance, the Citizens Housing and Planning 
Council of New York (whose high-powered board of directors included George 
Raymond) asked Mayor Wagner to fund a demonstration program in Brownsville aimed 
at achieving “total community development” by harnessing both public and private 
resources.33 Grassroots activists around the country were also experimenting with such 
initiatives. The best-known was led by the Reverend Leon Sullivan of Zion Baptist 
Church in North Philadelphia. Through a for-profit corporation named Progress 
Investment Associates, the group began building low- and middle-income housing in the 
mid-1960s and in 1968 erected the first black-owned shopping center in the country; 
another Sullivan initiative was the Opportunities Industrial Center, which offered training 
for young African Americans and put them to work on local construction projects.  
                                                
33 The proposal submitted by the Citizens Housing and Planning Council encapsulated the integrated 
approach that Shiffman and CBCC were just being to contemplate in late 1963 and early ‘64: “The 
problem of such a section — the slum problem, in a word — is, as has been said for years, a problem of 
the physical deterioration of buildings. Yet it is not simply the problem of buildings. It is a social problem, 
growing out of and contributing to the deterioration of families and individuals. Yet it is not simply a 
social problem. It is an economic problem, growing out of the lack of economic investment in slum areas, 
the lack of job opportunities, and the shortage of government funds.” Michael Coffey, “Proposal for a 
Demonstration Program in Total Community Development” (Apr. 1963), p. 1, Folder 11, Box 060239, 
Robert F. Wagner Papers, La Guardia & Wagner Archives online.  
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 Such ideas were also beginning to percolate up to federal policymakers. In 
October 1965, President Johnson appointed the Task Force on Urban Problems, which 
would lead to the Model Cities program. The goal: to wield overwhelming resources in a 
select number of depressed urban areas. In a sense, this was Johnson’s rejoinder to 
mayors’ complaints about community action — and at the same time an implicit response 
to mounting criticism of the Community Action Program as a chaotic, directionless 
program. On the first count, Model Cities would placate mayors by sending federal funds 
not to community groups but to municipal governments, which were then given 
remarkable leeway in their choice of programs. On the second count, the program would 
focus on “comprehensive solutions,” including physical rehabilitation, housing, and 
social services. That said, Model Cities would emphasize citizen participation as a key 
component of the planning process, thus making it of a piece with other fronts in the 
poverty war.34  
 Similarly, in 1966, New York’s Council Against Poverty stressed that community 
corporations should focus not only on community action and anti-poverty activities but 
also education, housing, jobs, and physical planning. Later, the Council defined its twin 
goals thus: “to eliminate the physical blight of poverty neighborhoods as well as the 
human deterioration of the people who inhabit them.” This, the Council argued, justified 
including middle-income neighborhoods among the city’s target areas in the War on 
Poverty (which numbered 26 in 1967, as opposed to 16 two years earlier). Blight 
                                                
34 Elsie Richardson would later insist that the ideas picked up in the Model Cities program were largely a 
restatement of the plans hatched by CBCC and Pratt in 1964. Richardson, interview with James Briggs 
Murray, Feb. 2 1990, CDCOH, NYPL-Sch; Elsie Richardson to Robert F. Kennedy, Mar. 27, 1967, 
“Correspondence, 1/10/67-4/4/67,” Box 1, Johnston Papers, JFKL. 
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ultimately affected the poor and non-poor alike, and arbitrary boundaries could not 
always be drawn between “deteriorated” and non-deteriorated areas.35 
 Even so, the CBCC proposals made barely a ripple in 1964. Partly, this neglect owed 
to the strong emphasis poverty planners placed on tackling juvenile delinquency; it also 
reflected the institutionalization within OEO of opportunity theory and the “culture of 
poverty” thesis, both of which stressed the psychosocial roots of urban problems. 
Bedford-Stuyvesant activists also lacked the political clout needed to effect major policy 
changes. The struggle to gain urban-renewal funds, which had been ongoing since the 
late 1950s, proved as much; so did the 18-month fight to gain funds for Youth in Action. 
 Richardson, Shiffman, and other members of CBCC’s influential Urban Planning 
and Housing Committee met repeatedly with lawmakers over the course of 1965. They 
failed to extract much more than good words and pledges to study the situation. One 
possible solution to the political problem was to push for a new, majority-black 
congressional district in Central Brooklyn, where gerrymandering had so far kept white 
Democratic regulars in power. But that campaign wouldn’t bear fruit until 1968. In the 
meantime, Brooklyn leaders bitterly complained that Harlem had become the “glamour 
ghetto” and was drawing more than its fair share of urban-renewal and poverty funds, 
thanks to the outsize influence of Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. “We were 
rebuffed constantly,” Shiffman recalled. “We didn’t have political power.” A patron 
would have to be found.36 
                                                
35 New York City Council Against Poverty, Guidelines for the formation of Community Corporations 
(Approved on Oct. 27, 1966). Watkins papers; New York City Council Against Poverty, “New York City 
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36 Paul R. Screvane, Speech Before the Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council, Aug. 30, 1965, Folder 10, 
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Tribune of the Underclass 
 
 As 1965 drew to a close, Robert F. Kennedy was completing his metamorphosis 
from jutted-jaw anticommunist to what Arthur Schlesinger called the “tribune of the 
underclass.” This was no sudden transformation. Kennedy’s reputation as a “tough guy” 
and a ruthless political operator was well-earned: he’d ferreted out communists for 
Joseph McCarthy, fought Jimmy Hoffa during the McLellan Committee hearings, and, in 
the words of historian Joseph Palermo, “unleashed his innate aggressiveness in political 
combat” while promoting his brother’s political ascendancy. Yet a strong sense of moral 
purpose underscored such episodes and would carry through to his late-career crusades. 
Further, as historian Edward Schmitt argues, Kennedy had long nurtured a 
communitarian vision that “sought the commitment of the powerful to and their 
cooperation with the powerless in an attempt to strengthen local communities and link 
them to the central government in a new form of federalism.”37 
Like his brother, Kennedy had been deeply touched in the early 1960s by Michael 
Harrington’s “other America” thesis — though it’s unclear whether he ever read the book 
— and by visceral encounters with human misery in the coal country of Appalachia and 
on the streets of Harlem and Lower East Side. Through his oversight of the President’s 
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Committee on Juvenile Delinquency (PCJD), he sponsored some of the earliest federally 
funded community-action experiments. Kennedy and his acolytes, principally his friend 
David Hackett, the executive director of PCJD, also provided a bridge from the programs 
undertaken by the PCJD to those that defined Johnson’s War on Poverty. In particular, 
the PCJD’s emphasis on localism, self-help, and organizing the poor were incorporated 
into the Community Action Program. According to Richard Boone, a PCJD staffer and 
early champion of community action, Kennedy’s “representatives on the anti-poverty 
task force were the strongest champions of maximum involvement of the poor.”38 
In the realm of civil rights, Kennedy’s tenure as attorney general, from 1961 to 
1964, proved transformative. Once an aloof observer whose engagement (and lack 
thereof) with the black freedom struggle primarily reflected political concerns, Kennedy 
was forced to take a stand by the controversy over James Meredith’s admission to the 
University of Mississippi. By the end of 1962, the attorney general had fashioned himself 
the strongest civil-rights advocate within the administration’s inner circle, though the 
Justice Department frequently rebuffed pleas for federal protection from embattled 
Southern activists. (Kennedy also authorized the wiretapping of Martin Luther King, Jr., 
that same year.) The president himself would hold the movement at arm’s length through 
the first half of 1963, a time of mounting protest and grotesque reaction; it was not until 
June, with less than six months to live, that he finally unveiled the landmark civil-rights 
bill that would eventually meet Lyndon Johnson’s pen, in July 1964. While his brother 
prevaricated, Robert Kennedy had begun to earn praise among influential African 
Americans. “We still believe that Robert Kennedy has the right idea and the courage of 
                                                
38 Richard W. Boone, “Reflections on Citizen Participation and the Economic Opportunity Act,” Public 
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his convictions, the determination to bring the force of law to bear on the civil rights 
dilemma,” Jackie Robinson wrote in his “Home Plate” column in the Amsterdam News. 
“We hate to admit it, but we are not convinced that the Attorney-General’s brother has 
the same courage, although he may have the same convictions.”39  
The younger Kennedy, like the country, was forever transformed on November 
22, 1963. His brother’s assassination touched off a period of grief and reassessment. 
Reporter Jack Newfield, a Kennedy confidante and biographer, has described this period 
as a moment of inner turmoil similar to what most people encounter in adolescence. 
Kennedy seemed to re-emerge from his post-assassination crisis a born-again 
existentialist. He tore through the works of Camus, quoted liberally from Aeschylus, and 
increasingly adopted the language and tone of the New Left as his own. One biographer, 
Evan Thomas, has written that Kennedy in his final years was “always on the lookout for 
real-life existential heroes” — Cesar Chavez, for instance.40 
Kennedy also maintained a mistrust of Lyndon Johnson that verged on loathing. 
In their personal and political tempers, the two men were dramatically different, and they 
had developed a strong mutual antipathy during John F. Kennedy’s lifetime. Following 
the assassination, Kennedy viewed Johnson as a usurper; Johnson saw Kennedy as a 
threat. LBJ biographer Robert Caro has called their relationship “perhaps the greatest 
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blood feud in American politics in the 20th century.” Yet in early 1964 both men agreed 
on the importance of bringing the dead president’s major domestic initiatives to fruition. 
To Kennedy, the War on Poverty was a major component of that legacy, despite 
Johnson’s efforts to brand it with his own presidential stamp.41  
Lyndon Johnson’s special assistant, Jack Valenti, once mused that, “In every area 
where the poor, the black and the uneducated suffered indignity and neglect, President 
Johnson and Bobby Kennedy thought alike.”42 On a broad ideological plane, that was 
true. But their assessments of what should be done to address that suffering — and what 
was politically feasible — diverged substantially as the War on Poverty unfolded. 
Kennedy’s distaste for Johnson disposed him to challenge the foundations of Great 
Society liberalism. But neither did he bow reverentially before the ghost of FDR. “The 
inheritance of the New Deal is fulfilled,” Kennedy would declare in 1966. “There is not a 
problem for which there is not a program. There is not a problem for which money is not 
being spent. There is not a problem or a program on which dozens or hundreds or 
thousands of bureaucrats are not earnestly at work. But does this represent a solution to 
our problems? Manifestly it does not.”43 
Kennedy’s thinking about poverty in 1964 reflected some of the ambiguities 
lurking within the new federal program. On one hand, he distrusted bureaucracies and 
was hostile to the kind of centralized, alphabet-soup planning he associated with the New 
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Deal. In a letter to Johnson written on January 16, 1964, he warned against “building 
another level of government” in the form of an anti-poverty super-agency, complaining 
that existing poverty programs were “always planned for the poor — not with the poor.” 
This explained his emphasis on self-help and his endorsement of localized community-
action experiments taken up by the PCJD. But Kennedy correctly anticipated the local 
obstructionism that would hamstring War on Poverty programs, and he urged Johnson to 
ensure cabinet-level coordination in planning durable, centralized, and “comprehensive” 
programs in the fields of education, employment, housing, retraining, health, and welfare. 
That the drive for community self-help might run at cross-purposes to centralized 
planning was a lesson waiting to be learned.44 
Another contradiction resided in the widely accepted idea view that, as Kennedy 
put it in a 1964 speech, “the impoverished American lives in a crippled community — 
one which does not provide opportunity and promote individual initiative, but which 
stifles and exploits people.” Kennedy insisted that the best way to promote self-help was 
to foster local responsibility. On June 26, 1964, Kennedy testified before Congress in 
favor of the Economic Opportunity Act. Among the legislation’s major attributes, he 
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said, was Title II, which mandated community action and would ask poor communities 
“to prepare long-range and far-sighted programs — based on the belief that local citizens 
understand their communities best — based on the conviction that they will seize the 
initiative and provide sustained vigorous leadership.” But if those communities were as 
“crippled” as Kennedy suggested, how could they possibly solve all their problems on the 
basis of self-help?45  
 Kennedy himself had expressed doubts from the start. In 1964, he wrote Johnson 
that unless the poverty program were carefully planned at the federal level, it “could 
actually retard the solution of these problems.” As a good New Frontiersman, Kennedy 
held an optimist’s faith in the ability of experts to design solutions to social problems. 
But he would sour on the War on Poverty as newly minted agencies bogged down in 
bureaucratic processes and as the urban political machines kicked into gear to co-opt 
community action.46  
By the time he was elected to the Senate in 1964, Kennedy had already begun to 
explore new ways of fighting poverty. On the campaign trail, he pledged to introduce 
legislation that would help “break the tragic pattern of decayed neighborhoods, slums, 
and poverty” by providing improved housing and good jobs for those whom automation 
had shunted from the industrial economy.47 He also sought to draw connections between 
poverty and racism. For instance, in a June 1964 speech he warned that, “The fight for 
civil rights will not be won merely by ending discrimination. It does little good to give a 
child the right to attend school outside the slums if he has no carfare to get there. Fighting 
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discrimination requires that we also fight the effects of discrimination.”48 By early 1965, 
Kennedy had grown concerned that entire sections of American cities were becoming 
vistas of despair. In such places, he remarked, poverty could not be calculated merely in 
dollars and cents. To live in dismal surroundings, to face the deprivations of segregation, 
to feel the sting of government neglect, to sleep in rat-infested bedrooms, to deal daily 
with shoddy grocery stores, indifferent principals, hostile cops — all these factored into 
what it meant to be poor.49  
 From 1965 onward, much of Kennedy’s thinking about poverty developed in 
concert with a “brilliant and imaginative” young assistant named Adam Walinsky.50 A 
former Marine who routinely worked 110-hour weeks, Walinsky took on all manner of 
portfolios in the senator’s Washington, D.C., office. Like his boss, he was brash, 
idealistic, and possessed with an almost messianic urge to save America. He relentlessly 
pushed Kennedy to denounce the Vietnam War and come out in favor of civil rights and 
antipoverty programs. He penned the bulk of the speeches that made Kennedy an aspiring 
spokesman for the poor and the dispossessed. Even in inter-office memos, Walinsky’s 
zeal came through. America was “slipping,” he told his boss in 1966. “I have the sense 
that everywhere, people feel themselves and their world spinning off into chaos, unable 
to affect the course of events; and [...] the cities, the center of our nation, are going down 
the drain, seemingly irreversibly.”51 
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The project that later germinated in Bedford-Stuyvesant reflected what another 
Kennedy staffer dubbed “the pet Walinsky theory” about urban poverty.52 From the 
outset of the War on Poverty, Walinsky had emphasized the importance of job creation 
and physical rebuilding. In July 1964, he wrote a combative New Republic article 
critiquing the Economic Opportunity Act for its emphasis on opportunity, training, and 
pilot programs. According to Walinsky, poor people would remain poor as long as the 
middle-class majority wanted them to remain poor. And at a time when many in the 
middle class suspected that their security and status might soon be threatened by 
automation and urban strife, they were unlikely to support for long a program meant to 
lift the poor to their level. Any government program aimed at removing class distinctions, 
Walinsky wrote:  
 
will encounter resistance which increases in direct proportion to its size and 
probable effectiveness. Indeed, I would argue that the program thus far advanced 
has been received quietly because its fundamentally middle-class principles can 
be used by the middle class to prevent more significant action. Thus its 
concentration on opening up the opportunity structure could be used to justify 
inaction on government employment programs tailored to large numbers of the 
un- and under-employed. Similarly, the emphasis on job training could be used to 
justify class segregation in education […]53  
 
 Walinsky believed that only a massive public-works program would solve 
unemployment, which he called the “master problem” that all federal antipoverty 
programs should address. “The great failing of the community action program, in my 
own judgment, was that it never had very much to organize about,” he wrote in 1969, 
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“and there is no question that the organizing should have been around programs to deal 
with the depression-level unemployment rates that still prevail among the urban poor.”54 
 Walinsky’s ideas proved influential after the Watts riots of August 11-16, 1965, 
which provoked an overwhelming police response that left 35 people dead. Some of 
Kennedy’s closest aides felt that Watts marked the moment when he finally began to put 
his brother’s assassination behind him. The senator was among the first national figures 
to speak sympathetically about the residents of Watts; and he offered a stern rebuttal to 
the parade of politicians lining up behind ex-President Dwight D. Eisenhower to blame 
the violence on what Ike dubbed “a policy of lawlessness.”55  
 “The law to us is a friend, which preserves our property and our personal safety,” 
Kennedy told an all-white gathering in Spring Valley, N.Y., on August 17:  
 
But for the Negro, the law means something different. Law for the Negro in the 
South has meant beatings and degradation and official discrimination; law has 
been his oppressor and his enemy. The Negro who has moved North with this 
heritage has not found in law the same oppression it meant in the South. But 
neither has he found a friend and protector. … The laws do not protect them from 
paying too much money for inferior goods, from having their furniture illegally 
repossessed. The law does not protect them from having to keep lights turned on 
the feet of children at night, to keep them from being gnawed by rats. The law 
does not fully protect their lives — their dignity — or encourage their hope and 
trust in the future.56  
 Later that fall, Kennedy would visit Watts and chat informally with its residents; 
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again and again, they told him that the main problem facing them was the lack of jobs. 
By that point, however, he had already come to the conclusion that the flames of discord 
were being fuelled by crisis-level unemployment. This was not only a black problem, he 
argued in his August 17 speech: Watts embodied a national failure to come up with ways 
to give poor, jobless people a real stake in the decisions that affected their daily lives.57  
 In advancing this “root causes” diagnosis, Kennedy deliberately positioned himself 
to the left of mainstream political discourse. Yet he also anticipated the emerging right-
wing critique of the Great Society:  
 
A way must be found to stop this waste of human resources and the resulting 
financial drain on the rest of the community. We cannot afford to continue, year 
after year, the increases in welfare costs which result when a substantial segment 
of the population becomes permanently unemployable. We cannot afford the loss 
of the tax revenue we would receive if these people were jobholders. We cannot 
afford the extra police costs that slums bring. Our slums are too expensive; we 
cannot afford them.58  
 
 In the months that followed, Kennedy grew increasingly obsessed with the so-
called “urban crisis.” He wouldn’t focus his attention on Bedford-Stuyvesant until early 
1966. But already in the summer of 1965 his staffers were reflecting on how they might 
intervene in a New York ghetto to be determined at a later date. In late August 1965, the 
chief of staff of Kennedy’s New York office, Thomas Johnston, co-authored a 
confidential memo with the director of the PCJD, David Hackett, warning that Bedford-
Stuyvesant and Harlem could go the way of Watts, despite ongoing summer programs 
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and attempts in each neighborhood to spark community action. Hackett and Johnston 
observed that the unfulfilled promises of the Great Society were exerting a radicalizing 
effect in black neighborhoods; action must start soon. Foreshadowing the broad-based 
coalition Kennedy would forge in Brooklyn the following year, they called for a tripartite 
commission uniting labor, civil rights, and business leaders to deal with problems of both 
Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant.59 
 Two weeks after the eruption in Los Angeles, Kennedy asked Walinsky and 
another young aide, Peter Edelman, to begin charting out a new antipoverty approach. 
Edelman had previously worked under the top civil-rights lawyer in Kennedy’s Justice 
Department, Burke Marshall, and the senator asked him to examine segregation in 
Northern cities. Walinsky, meanwhile, set to work fleshing out his proposal for a massive 
program of urban reconstruction with job-creation as its core aim. Their work resulted in 
a trio of speeches Kennedy on successive days in January 1966. The addresses, Kennedy 
biographer Edward Schmitt has astutely observed, “blended liberal and conservative 
ideas in a communitarian vision that would serve as the broad framework of Kennedy’s 
approach” in the months to come.60 
The first speech, delivered on January 20, 1966, to a luncheon of the Federation 
of Jewish Philanthropies, was mostly Edelman’s work, and it called for a renewed federal 
push to combat segregation. Blacks must be given the freedom to live where they wished, 
Kennedy argued in the speech; the ghettos must eventually be dismantled. Otherwise, 
“we can expect continuing explosions like Watts.” The speech fell flat, as Edelman later 
recalled: “Walking into a chicken à la king lunch at the American Hotel in New York and 
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standing up and giving this very long, very serious, very heavy speech really threatening 
all of them … it was just a bomb, and he was really very irritated with me afterwards.”61  
The following day brought different results. Kennedy spoke at a conference in 
Harlem hosted by the Manhattan Borough President, Constance Baker Motley. The 
address, drafted by Walinsky, was tailor-made for the audience, which included a good 
portion of New York’s black elite. Kennedy touched on themes at once conservative, 
liberal, and visionary. He lamented failing schools, daily injustices, and declining job 
opportunities; at the same time he decried a welfare system that was breeding 
dependency, sapping individual initiative, and destroying families. He demanded that 
policymakers “stop thinking of the people of Harlem — the unemployed, the dropouts, 
those on welfare, and those who work for less than the minimum wage — as liabilities, 
idle hands for whom some sort of occupation must be found. Let us think of them instead 
as a valuable resource, as people whose work can make a significant contribution to 
themselves, their families, and the nation.”  
 That contribution would be to rebuild American cities. Kennedy argued for a 
brand of community action in which bricks and mortar would supplement social services, 
leading to “a total effort at regeneration within the entire slum community.” Kennedy 
insisted that jobs in such areas must go to the people who lived there. Programs should 
aim to create neighborhoods in which residents would take pride; this could mean 
offering condominium ownership to the people who had helped build them, or else 
enlisting the participation of locals in rehabilitating sound building stock. 
And what of costs? Kennedy never quite answered the question. He believed 
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much of the funding could be recouped by phasing out inefficient urban programs and 
banking on the diminution of welfare payments. At the same time, he called for “active 
participation of the business community in every aspect of the program, in a partnership 
of shared costs and effort with government.” He also saw universities and labor unions as 
indispensable allies of such an initiative, especially in the realm of on-the-job training. In 
short, Kennedy’s vision implied “an effort to mobilize the skills and resources of the 
entire society, including above all the latent skills and resources of the people of the 
ghetto themselves, in the solution of our urban dilemma.”62  
 That said, the White House was not about to embrace a massive new poverty 
program, especially one pitched by Johnson’s nemesis. The Demonstration Cities 
program (later known as Model Cities) was already in the works, and it, too, would take 
aim at rebuilding urban areas. On January 26, 1966, Johnson unveiled the new program, 
promising to promote large-scale urban renewal married to local energies. LBJ declared 
1966 “the year of rebirth for American cities.” The president’s speech echoed many of 
Kennedy’s themes, along with arguments put forth by CBCC in years past. “I propose 
that we combine physical reconstruction and rehabilitation with effective social programs 
throughout the rebuilding process,” Johnson said.63  
To Kennedy’s mind, the obstacles hampering the poverty fight were bureaucratic 
and political. At a time when many Americans were turning against government solutions 
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to socio-economic problems, Kennedy believed the state could be a force for good — so 
long as power was removed from sclerotic big-city machines, the chaotic structures of the 
OEO, and, most important, LBJ. Though disillusioned with the way the federal campaign 
against poverty had unfolded, the senator nonetheless hoped to find a way of salvaging 
and institutionalizing the commitment the federal government had made to fight poverty. 
He believed Americans could still be rallied to that campaign, and that he might forge a 
bipartisan, biracial coalition around it. However, the escalation of American intervention 
in Vietnam — which Kennedy now opposed — all but guaranteed that federal funding 
for antipoverty programs would remain severely limited in years to come. For any new 
approach to succeed, Kennedy believed, the private sector would have to participate.  
Kennedy also clung fast to the idea that antipoverty programs should harness the 
energies of the poor themselves. Following the scandals that had besieged the 
Community Action Program, few national figures were prepared to defend the 
“maximum feasible participation” mandate. Watts and other episodes of urban violence 
were also offering whites an excuse to turn away from efforts to aid blacks, particularly 
the Community Action Program. Disaffection with the Great Society agenda would 
contribute to historic Republican gains in the 1966 elections, when 47 Congressional 
Democrats were voted out of office and right-wing governors were elected from Georgia 
to California. Kennedy, though, believed that the poverty program had suffered from too 
little funding, too little community participation. He blamed bureaucratic structures and 
ill-considered planning, rather than the poor themselves, for the failures of community 
action. Bedford-Stuyvesant’s activists shared that diagnosis, especially after the travails 
of YIA; many within the CBCC orbit had spent the first two years of the War on Poverty 
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simply trying to pry loose enough government funds to get projects off the ground. “The 
crumbling of the anti-poverty constituency’s power over the bureaucracy caused many 
people to look for new means of financing independent programs,” Geoffrey Faux, an 
OEO official in the 1960s, later wrote. “One such means, the possibility of generating 
independent funds for anti-poverty programs, provided a partial reason for the 
attractiveness of community-based economic development.” As Faux suggests, people 
long involved in local antipoverty programs expressed doubts quite similar to those of 
Kennedy and his staff — though they were not yet speaking the same language.64  
Kennedy acknowledged that community-action programs and existing job-
training efforts had their uses. But in light of maximum feasible bureaucratization, he 
believed that only new institutions could bring his vision to fruition. On January 23, 
1966, the day after he delivered the third of his three poverty speeches, Kennedy 
summoned Walinsky and Edelman. “Now listen,” he said. “I don’t just want to talk about 





“We have never seen a coalition … with such potential power.” 
 
 
Following the trio of speeches, Kennedy turned his attention to Bedford-
Stuyvesant. Ron Shiffman had heard from a friend on the City Planning Commission that 
Kennedy was about to nominate a neighborhood in which to unveil an antipoverty 
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experiment, and he reached out to Kennedy’s office.66 Soon Thomas Johnston, Adam 
Walinsky, and others were traipsing through Central Brooklyn, meeting with activists and 
surveying the area’s political and economic landscape. The terrain seemed promising. 
But they had underestimated the intensity of local feelings. On February 4, 1966, as 
described in the Prologue to this dissertation, Kennedy alighted in Bedford-Stuyvesant, 
met Elsie Richardson, and explored the area’s streets. The former attorney general was no 
stranger to the landscapes of urban poverty or to the frustration that smoldered there. 
What impressed him in Bedford-Stuyvesant was the cadre of leaders — eloquent, 
impassioned, angry — who greeted him. Despite his ire at being criticized so openly, 
Kennedy decided to act.  
Kennedy asked Thomas Johnston to team up with Pratt and CBCC and draft 
designs for a new poverty program. Johnston, a 30-year-old from Kentucky who had 
worked in advertising, ran the senator’s New York office, where a kinetic, chaotic 
atmosphere prevailed. Kennedy’s staff included a cohort of bright, highly motivated men 
in their twenties and early thirties: Edelman, Walinsky, and Johnston, plus Carter Burden 
and Earl Graves. Ideas bounced around like super balls. Egos competed for the Senator’s 
attention and affection. Overlapping responsibilities accumulated. Johnston would run the 
Brooklyn project, but Graves, as a Bedford-Stuyvesant native and the sole African-
American staffer, became the on-the-ground fixer.67 Walinsky continued to supply 
strategic advice and grand visions, devoting half his time to the Bedford-Stuyvesant 
project. He and Johnston traveled widely during the spring and summer of 1966, 
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researching their new portfolio and, in Newfield’s description, “picking the brains of 
black militants, university urbanists, Federal administrators, journalists, mayors, 
foundation executives, millionaires from the banking and business communities.”68  
By that time, the Kennedy team had come to believe that job creation and 
affordable housing would be the two key elements in any plan of urban revitalization, and 
that both issues should be addressed in tandem. Their reasoning on this score resembled 
what Shiffman and Richardson had been saying. Granted, a paternalist streak ran through 
Kennedy’s thinking. For instance, in 1966 he wrote to his old friend McGeorge Bundy 
(who had just left his post as LBJ’s national security advisor to become president of the 
Ford Foundation), that “fundamental social change” would necessitate “the integration of 
the slum Negro into the ethos of private property, of self-government, of doing what is 
necessary instead of asking the government to do it.” Such an interpretation would not 
have gone over well in Bedford-Stuyvesant had Kennedy voiced it in public. But the 
senator did share a basic premise with the CBCC group: that young, unemployed, African 
Americans, especially men, ought to be given skills and jobs, and that community-led 
efforts to build housing and infrastructure could fulfill that purpose. Crucially, all 
involved agreed that whatever efforts they pursued must nourish feelings of community 
empowerment and, in Kennedy’s words, “hold the middle class.”69 
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Robert F. Kennedy and the executive director of the Central Brooklyn Coordinating 
Council, Donald Benjamin, meeting with the children of Bedford-Stuyvesant on 
February 6, 1966. (Dick DeMarsico/World Telegram & Sun, via Library of Congress.) 
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On February 22, members of CBCC’s housing committee, flanked by Shiffman, 
met with Kennedy’s people at the senator’s office near the United Nations. The 
Brooklynites had done their homework. They showed up armed with a 13-point program 
that at once reflected their long-term priorities and demonstrated a familiarity with 
Kennedy’s recent thinking. Their vision included stepped-up government programs — 
they asked that Bedford-Stuyvesant be designated an “Urban Demonstration Area” under 
the fledgling Model Cities program, and they asked for an immediate amendment to the 
federal Housing Act earmarking urban-renewal funds to Central Brooklyn — as well as 
community-based initiatives.70 They foresaw setting up a non-profit Community 
Development Corporation, which would allow CBCC to administer privately funded 
rehabilitation efforts as well as government renewal programs. In the latter category, they 
emphasized the renewal of the Fulton Park area (which remained in limbo), the 
demolition of abandoned buildings, and the construction of a community college. The 
Brooklynites also proposed that contractors hired to work on the projects be obliged to 
operate with integrated crews while employing residents of Bedford-Stuyvesant; that 
locals be provided with seed monies to set up construction firms; and that locals receive 
training in the building trades, urban planning, architecture, finance, real estate, and 
social services. Finally, CBCC proposed to set up cooperatives that would pool local 
resources to compensate for the lack of available mortgage capital and insurance in Bed-
Stuy. The overarching goals would be to build more and better housing, set up job-rich 
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industrial facilities, and rehabilitate declining brownstones.71 
 Such ambitious aims captivated Kennedy and his staff. The senator asked 
Richardson and the chairman of CBCC, Lionel Payne, to form a special committee 
dedicated to laying the groundwork for the new corporation. (Payne worked as a city 
housing inspector and was also among the leaders of the Paragon Progressive Credit 
Union.) This became the Bedford-Stuyvesant Renewal and Rehabilitation Corporation, 
which brought together a clutch of local notables assembled by CBCC. Indeed, Kennedy 
and his staff worked exclusively with CBCC through the fall of 1966, insisting that all 
parties keep the project a secret and that only an intimate group surrounding Richardson 
and Shiffman contribute directly to the planning process.  
 There were good reasons to hush up: Kennedy feared that any publicity about his 
work in Bed-Stuy would raise hackles in Harlem; that it would force him to involve 
Mayor Lindsay, whom Kennedy disliked and saw as a lightweight; that it would leave the 
senator vulnerable to accusations of pursuing personal glory in the ghetto; that it would 
touch off a flurry of pork-barrel politics in Congress and turn the Special Impact Program 
into a balkanized mess. (The latter process was just then afflicting the Model Cities 
program.) So committed were the Brooklynites to accommodating Kennedy’s wishes on 
this score that Mayor Lindsay was kept in the dark about the project until October, eight 
months after the first policy discussions between CBCC and Kennedy’s staff. When 
Lindsay finally did find out (from Kennedy himself), he assigned his top poverty man, 
Sviridoff, to act as a liaison but otherwise agreed not to interfere. Senator Javits knew 
even less about the progress of Kennedy’s work in Bedford-Stuyvesant; he later claimed 
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that the first time Kennedy personally briefed him about the project was only days before 
he publicly announced its launch, in December 1966.72 
 For the CBCC activists, frustrated by the “interminable lag between promise and 
performance” in Bed-Stuy, Kennedy’s interest held out the tantalizing prospect of action. 
As planning progressed behind closed doors in weekly meetings, Richardson, Payne, and 
the CBCC group assumed that the Kennedy project, as it evolved from plans to action, 
would also be their project. That faith would turn out to be misplaced. By the summer of 
1966, Kennedy had grown concerned by what he saw as an increasingly difficult political 
environment. Against the backdrop of Youth in Action’s funding woes, and with radical 
sentiment growing more palpable in the community, Kennedy staffers working in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant — particularly Johnston and Graves — fretted about the political 
risks of making CBCC their sole partner. In a sticky situation, would CBCC be able to 
manage community sentiment? Was the group as representative as it claimed to be?  
 Graves suggested that Kennedy call on Civil Court Judge Thomas R. Jones to see 
if he would help manage the project. Jones who as leader of the Unity Democratic Club 
had defeated the Kings County Democratic machine in 1962, said yes. The former 
assemblyman remained widely, if not universally, respected in Bedford-Stuyvesant. 
Though he had been among the speakers who confronted Kennedy following the 
senator’s tour in February, Jones no longer played an active role with CBCC and knew 
nothing about the emerging renewal plan. That appealed to the Kennedy people, who 
thought the judge embodied the kind of neutrality, competence, and political integrity 
they hoped would define the new project as it became known across America. But Jones 
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remained a keen behind-the-scenes political operator. He was not without enemies in 
Bed-Stuy, and few of the main movers within CBCC thought he shared their views or 
interests. When the senator proposed that Jones chair R&R, the CBCC activists were 
surprised. Kennedy insisted, and they accepted — grudgingly.73   
 Around the same time, Kennedy set Walinsky to work on drawing up a legislative 
framework for the new poverty initiative. At a time when it looked like the poverty 
program might soon be scuttled, Kennedy refused to abandon the idea that the federal 
government must take the lead in providing for the disadvantaged. But a new set of 
institutions would have to be devised. As a start, Kennedy called for non-profit 
Community Development Corporations, which would wield both government funds and 
private monies to “carry out the work of construction, the hiring and training of workers, 
the provision of services, and encouragement of associated enterprises.”74  
 A new political coalition would also have to be forged. As a first step, Kennedy 
cemented his alliance with Jacob Javits, New York’s senior senator. A moderate 
Republican, Javits had been working on legislation for something called the National 
Technical Assistance Corporation, which would tap private-sector funds and talent and 
put them to work on “ghetto problems.” Walinsky and Javits’s assistant, Robert Patricelli, 
decided to team up on a bill that would combine their pet projects. The vehicle for 
turning their vision into policy was an amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act of 
1964 — the War on Poverty law — that Kennedy and Javits quietly spirited through the 
Senate in November. The Kennedy-Javits amendment, known as the Special Impact 
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Program (SIP), took as its premise that previous efforts had done too little to create jobs 
or involve private enterprise in the fight against poverty. The new program would fund 
“comprehensive” approaches to urban development, laying special emphasis on business 
development, construction, and job growth. The Senators proposed that the new program 
be run out of the Department of Labor and not OEO, ensuring that the entire municipal 
antipoverty apparatus, including Community Action Agencies, would be frozen out. (As 
it turned out, the SIP and the Community Development Corporations it funded would be 
housed under OEO’s roof as of 1968.) An initial appropriation of $75 million passed the 
Senate, but the House later cut that figure to $25 million.75  
 The SIP legislation stipulated that programs “must be of sufficient size to have an 
appreciable impact in the problems of the area, be conducted where appropriate in 
conjunction with a city-wide plan for reorganization intended to coordinate all programs 
of social development, and be coordinated with community action programs.” In other 
words, the new community-development effort was conceived to supplement rather than 
replace existing CAAs. Projects receiving SIP funds were directed to “train and employ 
area residents to assist in economic, social, and physical rehabilitation of the areas.” 
Bedford-Stuyvesant would be the first testing ground. SIP promised to put local activists 
in touch with people who, in Thomas Jones’s words, “could unlock the doors and break 
the logjams that were keeping us from achieving democratic rights.” Yet for all the talk 
of private-sector involvement that surrounded the Kennedy initiative, the $7 million in 
SIP funds earmarked for Bedford-Stuyvesant in 1967 dwarfed the contributions made by 
either private foundations or the business community. And despite the subsequent arrival 
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in Bed-Stuy of an all-star cast of urbanists, architects, and corporate leaders, the ideas 
that would define the future project emerged from the discussions undertaken in 1966 
between Kennedy’s staff and the Pratt-CBCC alliance.76  
In September 1966, Thomas Johnston asked George Raymond and Ronald 
Shiffman to summarize the major ideas being put forth by the community group. The 
ensuing memo summarized most of the significant community-development initiatives 
that would be undertaken in Bedford-Stuyvesant during the late 1960s and early ’70s. 
Among other things, the Pratt professors called for a mortgage cooperative to assist 
potential homebuyers and underwrite home renovations; seed money for the bonding of 
small local construction firms; new retail facilities to be run as community cooperatives 
and used for on-the-job training; the establishment of industrial on-the-job training 
programs at the Brooklyn Navy Yard; brownstone-rehabilitation programs that would 
“add grace and character to the area”; the establishment of a four-year college and a two-
year community college in the area; construction of a cultural center and a hospital; the 
demolition of abandoned buildings deemed beyond repair; and their replacement with a 
network of parks, study centers, health clinics, child-care centers. Finally, they called for 
redistricting to create a majority-black Congressional district in Central Brooklyn. An 
internal memorandum circulated in Kennedy’s office shortly thereafter endorsing most of 
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Raymond and Shiffman’s proposals, many of them reiterated word-for-word.77  
 Ideas, then, abounded. But what about funds? Kennedy remained convinced that 
the project would quickly falter unless it gained private-sector support. It would fall to 
him to woo the city’s financial elites and, more importantly, to secure commitments from 
them that went beyond routinized channels. Established philanthropies — the Ford, 
Astor, and Rockefeller foundations — would all lend their support. But Kennedy also 
wanted to convince high-profile businessmen that they should devote their own time and 
expertise to the project. Johnston recalls:  
 
You had to get people who were white and who had something to bring to 
it, and get them to really give to it more than just money. There had to be 
all sorts of confidence and political help [...] Then you had to have them 
own the land, so that if it failed, it was their failure.78 
 
 The first recruit was a Kennedy family friend, André Meyer of the investment-
banking firm Lazard-Frères. Over the months to come, Meyer would personally invest a 
great deal of time, money, and goodwill in the project. With his help and with an assist 
from a 29-year-old investment banker named Eli Jacobs, who had roomed with Johnston 
at Yale, Kennedy scheduled a whirlwind tour of Wall Street and Midtown Manhattan. 
Kennedy knew he was unpopular in the business community, and he articulated a simple 
message: “The basic purpose of the program is to create jobs. There isn’t enough money 
to solve the problems of the ghettos. Private enterprise must be brought into this area.” 
According to one Kennedy associate quoted by biographer Evan Thomas, the senator 
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tapped into the deep fears of disorder that prevailed among elites in the post-Watts 
climate. “It wasn’t a moral obligation. It was: look at the chaos we’re going to have if we 
don’t do something.”79 
 The corporate titans Kennedy signed up included William Paley of CBS; C. 
Douglas Dillon, who’d served as Treasury Secretary in the Kennedy administration; 
Thomas Watson, chairman of IBM; George Moore, chairman of First National City Bank 
(later Citibank); the former head of the Tennessee Valley Authority, David Lilienthal, 
now a private consultant; Roswell Gilpatric, a partner at the Wall Street law firm of 
Cravath, Swaine, and Moore and a former Defense Department undersecretary in the 
Kennedy administration; and Benno Schmidt of J.H. Whitney and Company. (According 
to Jack Newfield, David Rockefeller was the only man to turn Kennedy down.) Together, 
they began holding brainstorming sessions with men from Pratt, the Department of 
Labor, and the Citizens Crusade Against Poverty. This group, a Kennedy aide wrote, 
would “assure prospective foundations and businessmen that this idea for aiding a sick 
community is sound. […] Perhaps for the first time a slum community will not have to 
suffer from the lack of managerial and administrative competence.”80 
Other than Meyer, the businessmen initially greeted Kennedy with skepticism, if 
not scorn. As Republicans, most eyed the senator’s leftward turn warily; and, like many 
New Yorkers of all political stripes, they saw him as an opportunistic carpetbagger. (RFK 
had never lived in New York as an adult prior to his run for the Senate seat in 1964.) 
“There was a large body of thought to the effect that Bob was arrogant, that he was 
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unduly ambitious, that he was vindictive,” Schmidt later recalled. Further, suspicions 
lingered as a result of President Kennedy’s confrontation with U.S. Steel, which Schmidt 
and others saw as evidence of the Kennedys’ hostility to business. But the senator’s 
interest in Bedford-Stuyvesant came across as sincere. That he’d earned the seal of 
approval of Republicans Lindsay and Javits (the latter of whom maintained especially 
close ties to Wall Street) boosted his cause. According to Jacobs, a strong Republican 
who had “militantly opposed” Kennedy in 1964, “Kennedy’s motivations could not be 
narrowly political, for the chances of failure in Bedford-Stuyvesant were far greater than 
the chances of success. I therefore saw his decision to become involved there as an act of 
political courage.”81 
 Still, Kennedy remained a Kennedy. In 1966, he had yet to decide whether he 
would run for the presidency two years later. But as Jack Newfield observed, RFK was in 
effect a presidential candidate from Nov. 22, 1963, onward. Everything Kennedy did and 
said carried political repercussions, and there were political opportunities to be exploited 
everywhere he went. In Bedford-Stuyvesant, people assumed as a matter of course that 
the senator’s sudden interest in their plight reflected presidential aspirations — regardless 
of his feigned diffidence. Since gaining his seat in the Senate, Kennedy had routinely 
taken up causes and made appearances more befitting of an aspirant to the Oval Office 
than a freshman senator from New York: touring Watts, speaking at the University of 
Mississippi, visiting farm workers in California. Foreign trips — to South Africa, to Latin 
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America — had gained him favorable media coverage. By the fall of 1966, however, his 
staffers were encouraging Kennedy to make Bedford-Stuyvesant the centerpiece of a 
long-term strategy leading up to a possible presidential run in 1968. Walinsky urged 
Kennedy to put off his next high-profile trip (preferably to the Soviet Union or China) 
until late 1967, “which would keep the memory of the trip fresh.” In the meantime, 
Walinsky wrote, there was a “preferable alternative — a job which desperately needs 
doing, a job which only you can pull off, a job which will pay dividends to you and 
others for some time to come.” And that job was to bring together a Community 
Development Corporation in Brooklyn.  
 “The point is not to have more meetings or talk or exchange of views, all of which 
I suspect are surplus goods in the ghetto,” Walinsky wrote to his boss. “The point is to 
build an organization which […] will begin to make demonstrable progress toward 
rebuilding Bedford-Stuyvesant, hiring people, training, educating, etc. [...] If you make 
this work, it will be the ‘Kennedy plan’ everywhere.” But, he warned, “This will be a 
difficult and costly venture — in time, in sweat, and in the penalties for failure.82 
 The potential political advantages for Kennedy were manifold. To begin with, the 
project could be a first step in improving his relationship with the business community, 
which Walinsky dubbed a “sore.” Further, his work in the heart of Brooklyn would help 
to shore up Kennedy’s New York credentials and make him seem like less of a 
carpetbagger. If the project succeeded, it would put Kennedy in a position to 
magnanimously share credit with Lindsay (whom, Walinsky wrote, was “desperate for 
help”) while at the same time drawing a favorable contrast between the bold new stroke 
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in Bed-Stuy and the city’s clumsy efforts to reorganize the poverty program. Drawing 
such a contrast was all the more important in light of Johnson’s flagging commitment to 
OEO. “There is now a complete vacuum in the poverty leadership — black or white,” 
Walinsky wrote. “You can seize the lead.”83 
Certainly there were many both in Brooklyn and on Wall Street who initially 
assumed Kennedy was using them to position himself for a presidential run. The 
Washington Post commented in September 1966 that Kennedy “seems to be making the 
healing of the slums a key plank in his long-range run for the Presidency.” There was 
also reason to suspect that Bedford-Stuyvesant was an extension of Kennedy’s personal 
vendetta against Lyndon Johnson, who by 1966 had decided that his former Attorney 
General was not only a “little fart” but also “the enemy.”84  
Despite it all, Kennedy was able to convince both conservative financiers and, 
later, black nationalists to join his emerging coalition in Brooklyn. No doubt there were 
many who signed on precisely for political reasons: Kennedy’s star was rising, and it 
made sense to forge links with a future presidential candidate. In resource-starved Bed-
Stuy, the real possibility that Kennedy might endow the area — or, more to the point, 
certain groups in the area — with unprecedented political and fiscal capital was enough 
to convince people like Jones and Richardson to lay aside their initial suspicions that they 
were being used. Meanwhile, Kennedy seduced the businessmen by promising to cut the 
Gordian knot of the urban crisis. Schmidt later explained that Kennedy’s initial appeal 
rested on his insistence that “this was a problem to which we had to find some better 
solution [than the federal programs] or it would destroy the nation.” According to 
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Schmidt, there was “a very strong and almost universal feeling in business that the urban 
problem, the urban ghetto problem and the racial problem […] must receive greater 
attention.” Surely this was an exaggeration — only four years later, Republican President 
Richard M. Nixon, the darling of the country’s businessmen, would contemplate a policy 
of “benign neglect” toward black urban neighborhoods — but the mere fact that Kennedy 
was able to inspire such feelings made his project unique.85 
 Kennedy finally decided to go public with his project on Dec. 10, 1966, at the 
plenary session of the third annual War on Poverty conference co-sponsored by CBCC 
and the Pratt Institute.86 That evening, close to a thousand people packed into the 
auditorium of P.S. 305 on Monroe Street, jostling for position in the back, shouting to 
one another over a sea of heads, craning their necks expectantly at the star-studded-
entourage Kennedy brought with him. The room grew still as the master of ceremonies 
— Elsie Richardson, of course — strode to the podium to open the proceedings. Pausing 
for a second, she glanced behind her at the people arrayed on the stage. The group 
included local bigwigs (Thomas Jones, Lucille Rose, Ron Shiffman, State Senator 
William C. Thompson) alongside a battery of powerful outsiders: Javits, Kennedy, 
Lindsay, Meyer, Robert C. Wood of the federal Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), and two of the foremost urbanists in the country, Mitchell Sviridoff 
and Edward Logue. In the front row facing her were other luminaries including 
Brooklyn’s three black Assemblymen, Shirley Chisholm, Samuel Wright, and Bertram 
Baker. Everyone was there — except New York’s governor, Nelson Rockefeller, though  
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he did send an advisor, civil-rights leader Wyatt Tee Walker, to voice his support.87 
 It was a multifaceted coalition. In his speech, Kennedy offered his first public 





                                                
87 Proceedings of CBCC Conference, Dec. 10, 1966, BHS/BSRC; “Redevelopment Plan Set for Bedford-
Stuyvesant,” NYT, Dec. 11, 1966. 
Images, above and next page, from the January 1967 issue of the 
Central Brooklyn Coordinator, the monthly newspaper published by 
CBCC and the Pratt Institute. (Don Watkins papers.) 




Chapter 6: The Power to Act  400 
 
major role in the physical, social, and economic development of the community.” He also 
spoke glowingly of his business advisory group, which would soon incorporate as the 
Bedford-Stuyvesant Development and Services Corporation; the group had already hired 
Logue, currently employed as the Development Administrator of Boston, as a consultant. 
Further, the city administration, through Sviridoff, pledged its full cooperation, as did 
HUD. Finally, Kennedy announced that the Ford Foundation, the Stern Family Fund, and 
the J.M. Kaplan Fund had pledged to fund the projects. (Start-up grants were small, 
totaling $40,000, but Ford promised another $500,000 to $1 million in the new year.)88 
Together, Kennedy hoped, they would create a national model of urban rejuvenation: 
 
The power to act is the power to command resources, of money and mind 
and skill; to build the housing, create the social and educational services, 
and buy the goods which this community wants and needs and deserves. 
The regeneration of the Bedford-Stuyvesant community must rest, 
therefore, not only on community action — but also on the acquisition and 
investment of substantial resources in this area. […] If we here can meet 
and master our problems, if this community can become an avenue of 
opportunity and a place of pleasure and excitement for its people, then 
others will take heart from your example, and men all over the United 
States will remember your contribution with the deepest gratitude.89 
  
Following Kennedy’s speech, endorsements quickly piled up. One by one, the 
dignitaries in the room paraded up to say their piece, each offering full support for 
Kennedy’s vision and complementing it with ideas of their own. The speeches continued 
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deep into the evening, and headlines the next day heralded Brooklyn’s new dawn. The 
Times expressed hope that the Bedford-Stuyvesant project could become the country’s 
“most exciting endeavor to give the people in racial ghettos meaningful participation in 
reviving their decaying neighborhoods.” The Amsterdam News was exultant: “Santa 
Arrives in Boro 15 Days Before Christmas,” blared one headline. Jackie Robinson, in his 
Amsterdam News column, called the new program a “giant step in the right direction.”90 
 Still, there were skeptics aplenty. Elsie Richardson, true to form, continued to apply 
pressure on Kennedy. Writing in the Central Brooklyn Coordinator in January, she 
echoed what she’d told the senator when they first met, almost a year earlier:  
 
Our Conference on Community Development was described by many as 
“terrific,” “magnificent,” “inspiring,” and “a new day for Bedford-Stuyvesant.” 
We cannot deny that there was movement on December 10, 1966. However we do 
not recognize a bit of evidence that anything is going to be different in Bedford-
Stuyvesant in the near future. There is movement. A lot of papers have been 
shuffled back and forth, a lot of phone calls have been made, a lot of telegrams 
have been sent, and a lot of meetings have been held. We will never starve for 
meetings in the Bedford-Stuyvesant community. [...] I will not be satisfied until 
the words become action.91 
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Whose Community, What Action? 
 
 
“We knew we had to get started immediately to demonstrate to the 
community that something different, something important, something 
new, something exciting was going to happen as the result of this 
partnership. And the people themselves of the community would be an 
integral part, not only in conceiving what would happen to their 
community but in the actual implementation of those ideas.”  
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It was Robert F. Kennedy’s singular innovation in Bedford-Stuyvesant to figure 
out how “words become action,” as Elsie Richardson put it. For a start, his very presence 
injected political capital into the ideas of the Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council and 
the Pratt planners. In Congress, Kennedy found a creative way to fund the Brooklyn 
project and to shelter it from the pressures bearing down on other federal antipoverty 
programs. Kennedy also brought with him close ties to the Ford Foundation, which 
provided critical funding from the outset. Meanwhile, the senator’s insistence on 
bipartisanship gave the project valuable breathing room at a time when anti-liberal 
backlash was endangering the Great Society; so did Kennedy’s often conservative tone 
when discussing work, welfare, and private enterprise. Finally, Kennedy convinced Wall 
Street to support the initiative and provide the kinds of resources the citizens of Bed-Stuy 
had desperately been pursuing since the 1950s.  
 There were strings attached, to be sure. The “power to act” would be contingent, 
partial, conditional. A project premised on the support and oversight of corporate elites 
could only pursue certain paths toward community economic development; its analysis of 
political and economic power must tend toward incremental reform. The Brooklyn 
project also carried serious political implications for the senator, his protestations of 
disinterestedness notwithstanding. With a presidential run looming as soon as 1968, 
Kennedy’s aides strove to keep tight control over events in Bed-Stuy. Nor were the high-
profile urbanists Kennedy brought with him content to sit back and take their cues from 
Elsie Richardson, Ron Shiffman, and the rest of the CBCC coalition. On the contrary: 
Edward Logue and his ilk viewed Bed-Stuy as an open laboratory in which to carry out 
“macro-scale” experiments in urban engineering.  
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 For all that, the community-development model that would eventually emerge in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant reflected local priorities more than anything else. The Restoration 
Corporation, as it became known in 1967, adopted as its first major campaign a block-
based program of brownstone rehabilitation; the animating principle was that small-scale 
yet highly visible improvements to the area’s housing were the surest path to building 
community cohesion and creating jobs. The corporation also set its sights on long-term 
goals — building a shopping center, amassing a cooperative mortgage-financing pool, 
nurturing local businesses, building a college in Central Brooklyn — which promised 
both to empower individuals and grow the local economy. Many such programs would 
self-consciously target Bed-Stuy’s middle class, whose continued presence and 
investment in the area were seen as bulwarks against community breakdown. This 
marked a break with Youth in Action, which tended to target the very poor and which 
was moving increasingly toward a protest-based model of community action.  
 Before Restoration could even gain its footing, however, the fledgling organization 
found itself beset by rancor, rumor, and recrimination. In the early months of 1967, the 
Kennedy project became the focal point of a passionate and multisided debate about the 
contours of political power in Bedford-Stuyvesant. The central questions echoed the ones 
that were just then being asked of Youth in Action: Who should speak and plan for 
Bedford-Stuyvesant? How should the community structure its relationships to outside 
political and economic systems? For that matter, was it even possible to speak of Bed-
Stuy as a “community” anymore? And what did all this have to do with fighting poverty? 
 Within the business-led Development and Services Corporation (D&S), serious 
questions soon arose about the propriety of crafting grandiose plans from on high; within 
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the Renewal and Rehabilitation Corporation (R&R), power struggles among different 
community factions threatened to scuttle the initiative entirely. Meanwhile, the very 
structure Kennedy had devised to manage affairs in Bed-Stuy came in for criticism. 
Franklin A. Thomas, who later headed the project, quipped that the dual-board setup was 
put in place “to insure that at the first meeting of the board, if somebody said 
‘motherfucker,’ the white guys wouldn’t all get up and run.”2 That struck many as a 
symbol of the paternalistic attitudes embedded in the enterprise. Which of course raised 
the question of who stood to benefit within Bedford-Stuyvesant. Was this yet another 








Despite Kennedy’s careful attention to the politics of the new initiative, he almost 
blew it up by bringing Ed Logue on board. A headstrong urban planner, he was 
characterized in a 1969 Ford Foundation report as “brilliant, dynamic, impatient with 
what he deems unnecessary and irrelevant questions.” Logue had gained fame for his 
renewal work in Boston and New Haven; more recently, he’d completed an extensive 
study of New York City’s housing programs commissioned by Mayor Lindsay. In 
December, Kennedy announced that Logue had been hired by the Development and 
Services Corporation to “take on a principal responsibility for the overall development 
effort, recruitment of staff, and preparation and execution of programs.” That came as a 
surprise to community leaders, who had been under the impression that they would be the 
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ones plotting the “overall development effort.” Nonetheless, Logue pledged to devote a 
quarter of his time to Brooklyn, even while retaining his planning and development job in 
Boston. He quickly began ruffling feathers.3 
 In January, Logue recruited the well-regarded Philadelphia planner David A. 
Crane to help direct the project and also hired the modernist architect I.M. Pei, public-
works consultant William R. McGrath, and the planning firm of George M. Raymond, 
who was had advised CBCC in his guise as director of Pratt’s Center for Community 
Improvement. This high-powered group put 20-odd draftsmen, researchers, engineers, 
and designers to work on a “physical development plan” for Bedford-Stuyvesant. The 
plan, first submitted in February and revised in April, proposed extensive surveys and 
research prior to getting underway with urban renewal on a grand scale.4  
Logue saw the Bedford-Stuyvesant project as the opening salvo in a much wider 
transformation of Brooklyn. He defined Bed-Stuy even more expansively than had 
previous efforts and claimed to be planning for more than 450,000 people in a 4,000-acre 
district, which approximated the size of Manhattan from river to river, from 34th Street to 
125th. Logue touted his plans as “the largest scale and the most promising piece of 
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physical development and planning work of its kind that has ever been undertaken 
anywhere in this country.”5  
For an amuse-bouche, he commissioned Pei to design a network of superblocks, 
which would stand as the project’s early signatures. The superblocks were designed as 
urban oases, in which through-traffic would be blocked, playgrounds and wading pools 
built, and green space privileged. Pei’s goal, he told the D&S directors, was to “make 
Bedford-Stuyvesant a garden spot of Brooklyn” by “reclaiming” 75 acres of parkland at a 
total cost of $15 million. His superblocks would be offset with traffic “supergrids,” which 
according to the architect would speed traffic in and out of the area while separating cars 
from pedestrian walkways and parks. Impressed, the Astor Foundation donated $700,000 
to build the first two such spaces, which Pei hoped would be the first of several dozen; 
Astor also pledged $300,000 to Logue’s broader plans.6 
Logue also proposed to build “a multi-story lineal pattern complex” along a long 
corridor of Fulton and Atlantic Avenues — a $40 million project complete with sunken 
highways, office towers, and rerouted rail lines. The corridor plan, designed by Crane, 
called for “satellite cores” at each end, including commercial and community centers, as 
well as a “core” in the middle, where various educational, government, and office 
buildings would be clustered together. To carry out this vision, along with Pei’s proposed 
network of pedestrian walkways and green spaces, Logue estimated that 10% of all 
buildings in Bedford-Stuyvesant would have to be “cleared.”7 
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In some ways, Logue’s vision encapsulated everything Jane Jacobs decried about 
planning in 1960s New York. But he and Pei also presented superblocks as means to 
Jacobsean ends: building community and street life. “Now our endless, endless streets are 
basically parking lots,” Pei told the Times in March 1967. “The superblocks will give the 
community a focus it now lacks. They should foster block organizations, self-reliance, 
and pride. The social idea is definitely more important than beautification.”8  
The planners, then, hoped to give Bedford-Stuyvesant more than just a physical 
facelift. As Logue explained at a January 1967 meeting of the D&S board, he would 
integrate an array of cultural programs, educational initiatives, and health services into 
his plans for physical renewal. If he had his way, the two corporations would function as 
a “quasi-government” for an area that, according to Logue, was desperately lacking in 
effective political leadership. There was one small problem, however. As Logue admitted 
during a heated exchange with skeptical D&S board members, “It’s quite clear that even 
as distinguished a group as this can’t put something like that over in that community.”9  
 He was right. The few community leaders who caught wind of Logue’s plans scoffed 
at them as hopelessly out of touch. The directors of D&S worried that Logue’s sweeping 
vision wouldn’t allow for the kind of short-term, readily achievable projects that would 
promote goodwill within the community and demonstrate the new group’s seriousness. 
“Just as a group of this sort inspires great hope,” said Benno Schmidt of J.H. Whitney 
and Company, one of the most active members of the board, “nothing coming out of a 
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group of this sort, by the same token, results in equally greater frustration.”10 But Logue 
refused to start small. Nor did he wish to run his plans by R&R, which ostensibly spoke 
for the people of Bed-Stuy.11  
 Logue was quick to underline the subordinate position of the local group. According 
to the plans his team submitted in February, three types of “community liaisons” would 
work with planners in shepherding the project through its early stages: people from the 
City Planning Department, people from D&S, and people from the city’s Human 
Resources Administration. Representatives from R&R — and of black Brooklyn more 
generally — were conspicuously lacking. George Raymond later said it had been 
“indisputably clear” from the start that the planners’ relationship was with D&S and not 
with the community corporation. Logue was particularly keen to get Ford Foundation 
grants earmarked exclusively for D&S use, so that he could support projects of his 
choosing and avoid having to consult the community group. 
 During this time, the chairman of R&R, Thomas Jones, repeatedly found himself 
excluded from important meetings and often heard second-hand about decisions made on 
behalf of his group. Jones complained to Kennedy aides that D&S was “planning for the 
community without being in the community, without hearing from the community.” A 
particularly egregious example was a March 3 policymaking meeting with Mayor 
Lindsay; among the 10 men present, there had been not a single African American. As a 
result, Jones warned that the dual-board set-up was causing “unnecessary political 
damage” to RFK. “Certain individuals in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant have begun to 
                                                
10 B-S D&S, Minutes of the Board of Directors, Mar. 8 1967, “Board of Directors: Rehabilitation 
Committee Meeting, 3/8/67,” Box 1, Thomas M.C. Johnston Papers, JFKL; B-S D&S, Minutes, Jan. 12 
1967, JFKL. 
11 “A Proposal for Planning and Design Services: Preliminary Physical Development Plan,” Apr. 11, 
1967, “Planning, 1966-1967, Volume 1,” Box 45, Marshall papers, JFKL. 
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raise questions about the role of the R&R Corp., and its chairman,” Jones wrote in a 
memo to Kennedy’s chief assistant in New York, Thomas Johnston. “It has been 
suggested that we will not be consulted except in a limited way.”12  
Logue deserved only partial blame for the state of affairs. Though Kennedy’s 
aides had early on maintained a close collaboration with Elsie Richardson and the CBCC 
activists, they were loath to let the Brooklynites guide the project through its formative 
phases. The locals should be “provided as early as possible with a comprehensive 
development strategy,” one planning memo stated. The “massive infusion” of outside 
funds and planning expertise was dubbed “a kind of ‘foreign aid’ to the under-developed 
country of the ghetto.” (Not incidentally, one of the first firms Kennedy’s office 
consulted was simultaneously working on economic development projects in 
Indonesia.)13 In fact, Johnston, the Kennedy aide most responsible for managing the nuts-
and-bolts of the senator’s commitment in Bedford-Stuyvesant, agreed with Logue’s 
contention that grants should be kept far from R&R’s control. Once Astor and Ford 
foundation monies began coming in during the early months of 1967, they were cleared 
through the Pratt Institute and then sent on to Logue and Pei. “Do we now want to start 
them [R&R] spending money of this kind?” one memo asked. “I think not.”14  
 The problem with Logue was that he lacked discretion. He explicitly brushed 
aside community concerns and aimed to make the project his personal fiefdom. “Logue 
                                                
12 George Raymond to Eli Jacobs, Oct. 3, 1967, “Planning, 1966-1967, Volume 1,” Marshall papers, Box 
45, JFKL; Franklin A. Thomas, interview with Roberta W. Greene, JFKL; Thomas R. Jones to Thomas 
Johnston, Mar. 10 1967 & March 19, 1967, “Memoranda, miscellaneous, 8/27/65-1/16/68 and undated,” 
Box 2, Johnston Papers, JFKL. 
13 Bryant George, Purpose and Structure: Bedford-Stuyvesant Renewal and Rehabilitation Corporation, 
Feb. 14, 1967, “Bedford-Stuyvesant: Memoranda,” Box 2, Walinsky papers, JFKL; Memo [1966, possibly 
Edward Logue], “Bedford-Stuyvesant: Memoranda,” Box 2, Walinsky papers, JFKL. 
14 Memo re. Tasks immediately ahead in Bedford-Stuyvesant [Dec. 1966, likely Adam Walinsky or 
Thomas Johnston], “Bedford-Stuyvesant: Memoranda,” Box 2, Adam Walinsky papers, JFKL.  
Chapter 7: Whose Community, What Action?  411 
 
came in and bowled us over,” Jones recalled. “He was the expert and brooked no 
interference. We were supposed to accept the Gospel according to Saint Logue, and we 
weren’t prepared to do that.”  
 Even Eli Jacobs, the investment banker who served in 1967 as interim executive 
director of D&S and who had no particular love for the community-planning process, was 
repelled by Logue’s behavior. “One of the premises of this project was community 
decision making, diffuse decision making, community participation, and clearly that was 
at variance with Ed’s notion of how you deal with these problems,” Jacobs, recalled. 
“And therein were highly incendiary conditions.”15 Worse, Logue adopted a know-it-all 
tone while addressing the D&S board and reacted defensively to criticism. He sealed his 
fate during a tense board meeting on March 19 when he clashed with directors and gave 
the impression of having cut corners in his work. After the meeting, Kennedy took Jacobs 





Matriarchs Against the Man 
 
 
 If the Development and Services Corporation got off to a rocky start, the Renewal 
and Rehabilitation Corporation turned into an all-out brawl. Most of the people involved 
shared an acute sense of urgency. Having labored for years to attract government 
                                                
15 Jones quoted in Ford Foundation (Goldmann), “Performance in Black and White,” p. 40, JFKL; Eli 
Jacobs, interview with Roberta Greene, Oct. 27, 1976, RFKOH, JFKL. 
16 Eli Jacobs, interview with Roberta Greene, JFKL. Following Kennedy’s decision, Logue’s role was cut 
down significantly, but he remained affiliated with the project through the summer of 1967. Though he 
periodically protested the marginalization of his plans during this period, the final by D&S to cut him 
loose in fact came as something of a relief to Logue, who by that point was running for Mayor of Boston 
and had little time to devote to Bedford-Stuyvesant. Edward J. Logue, Memo, Aug. 7, 1967, “Planning, 
Volume 1, 1966-1967 (6),” Box 45, Marshall papers, JFKL. 
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resources for community development, they saw the senator’s interest as their last, best 
chance to fulfill the promises of the Great Society in Bed-Stuy. None wanted to blow that 
chance. But neither did they want to see rivals take credit for the project’s success or turn 
it into a political stronghold. A multi-sided struggle for control erupted in early 1967, 
with the major fault line pitting Jones against a faction of R&R led by Richardson and 
closely tied to Shirley Chisholm.  
 By 1966, CBCC represented more than 100 organizations. Its backers, at least on 
paper, included Brooklyn’s most influential black ministers (Milton Galamison, Gardner 
Taylor, William Jones), along with every black Brooklynite serving in elective office: 
State Senator William C. Thompson, State Assemblypersons Shirley Chisholm and 
Bertram Baker, City Councilman J. Daniel Diggs, Judge Franklin Morton, and Thomas 
Jones himself. Given the group’s influence, as well as its strict nonpartisanship, it made 
sense for Kennedy to entrust CBCC with the task of setting up the community 
corporation. But Kennedy’s staff also fretted about the council’s ability to speak as the 
unified voice of Bedford-Stuyvesant. Indeed, CBCC was struggling to shore up its 
legitimacy. For one thing, Youth in Action now carried a governmental stamp of 
approval as the community’s official antipoverty agency. Further, a rising chorus of 
radical young voices was transforming the tone of black politics, in Brooklyn and across 
the country. The summer of 1966 was when the civil-rights movement officially moved 
“up south” with the Chicago Freedom Summer campaign; when James Meredith was shot 
during his march against fear; when Stokely Carmichael of the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee adopted the slogan “Black Power”; when black nationalists 
associated with Sonny Carson took control of Brooklyn CORE; when the Black Panther 
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Party came together in Oakland. At such a time, CBCC’s leadership group found it 
increasingly difficult to sell its reform agenda, which was predicated on working within 
the boundaries of the welfare state.  
 Thomas Jones, R&R’s chairman, worried that his group would face a similar 
crisis of legitimacy. After all, the group was itself an outgrowth of CBCC — and an 
unelected one to boot, conceived in secret at the behest of the white power structure. In 
early 1967, when R&R had still yet to hire any full-time staff, Jones urged the board to 
expand its membership from 20 to 50; specifically, he wanted to complement the old-
guard community leadership with representatives from unions, the Puerto Rican 
community, CORE, and the radical African-American Teachers Association. But board 
members were skeptical of Jones’s motives. The old-guard CBCC women — Richardson, 
Lucille Rose, Ruth Goring — suspected that he simply wanted to dilute their influence by 
installing a group of cronies he could control. In theory, they were willing to broaden the 
board’s reach, but at a time when Logue was running roughshod over community 
sentiment, their most pressing priorities lay elsewhere. The issue would fester unresolved 
for three months, sowing the seeds of division.  
 Jones also clashed with the board over who should direct the project. The judge, 
urged on by Kennedy staffer Earl Graves, had decided on Franklin A. Thomas, a 
Bedford-Stuyvesant native and Deputy Police Commissioner. Thomas was a 32-year-old 
lawyer who had no prior experience in community development. To longtime community 
organizers, he seemed at first blush like just the kind of man who could be controlled by 
Jones and, by extension, the Kennedy group. Instead, the CBCC veterans lobbied hard for 
one of their own: Donald Benjamin, a congenial social worker who had recently stepped 
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down as executive director of CBCC to take the helm of the new Brooklyn Small 
Business Development Opportunities Corps. Benjamin and his former assistant, 
Constance McQueen, who replaced him as executive director in 1966, had provided quiet 
leadership and organizational acumen at the moment when CBCC was becoming a 
political force. For that reason, there was “a tremendous amount of loyalty” to Benjamin 
within the Renewal and Rehabilitation Corporation.17 
 In many ways, CBCC’s weaknesses stemmed from its greatest strengths. The 
council’s tireless organizing efforts had allowed it to emerge as the foremost community 
group in black Brooklyn. Claims to representing the “total community” had made the 
group an attractive interlocutor for two generations of New York Democrats, from Mayor 
Robert F. Wagner, Jr., to Kennedy; CBCC also provided a useful venue for cementing 
alliances among Bedford-Stuyvesant’s eloquent, ambitious, and politically astute leaders. 
But with so many organizations congregated under one tent, CBCC was of necessity a 
loose coalition. When latent splits within that coalition came to the surface, it became 
difficult for any faction to legitimately speak for “the community” — especially as the 
fight for control over the Kennedy project heated up. 
 Another source of CBCC’s strength had been its women. In a male-dominated 
society, CBCC put forth a public image of itself — and, by extension, of Bedford-
Stuyvesant — as being planned and run, in the main, by smart, forthright women who 
were self-consciously “unbought and unbossed,” in the words of the most famous among 
them, Shirley Chisholm. Most were middle-aged, most were mothers, and their power 
                                                
17 Bedford-Stuyvesant Renewal and Rehabilitation Corporation, Insert for Minutes of Meeting of Board of 
Directors, Mar. 31, 1967, “Board of Directors: Renewal and Rehabilitation Corporation,” Box 1, Johnston 
Papers, JFKL; Shiffman, interview with Sady Sullivan, Feb. 4 2008, BHS/BSRC; “McQueen Heads 
Coordinating Unit,” NYAN, Apr. 30, 1966. 
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base lay in networks of block associations, civic clubs, and PTAs.  
 A case in point was Lucille Rose. Born in 1920 in Richmond, Va., she moved to 
Brooklyn as a child. Her mother, a widow, ran a small restaurant and also worked as a 
seamstress to support her kids. Lucille helped out in the restaurant, joined the NAACP in 
her teens, and worked as a welder at the Brooklyn Navy Yard during World War II. She 
went on to earn a B.A. from Brooklyn College and a Master’s in Manpower Planning and  
 
 
Economics at the New School for Social Research. Elegant, endearing, and energetic, 
she’d won the NAACP’s “Miss Brooklyn” contest while in her 20s and would become 
known as the “Lady Dean of Black Politics in Brooklyn” in her 50s. Per the Amsterdam 
News, “the strength of her quiet political influence came not so much from politics as 
from the respect gained from her volunteer work in a myriad of civic and religious 
organizations.” Her resume was dotted with memberships in a dizzying number of 
Lucille Rose in the 1970s. 
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groups: block associations, the Salvation Army, St. Francis College, the Catholic 
Interracial Council, the New York Urban Coalition, the National Association of Negro 
Business and Professional Women, the One Hundred Black Women, and many more. In 
1964, Wagner hired her to take over as director of Bedford-Stuyvesant’s Department of 
Labor field office; thus began a long career in city government that saw her serve as the 
Commissioner of Employment and become, under Mayor Abraham Beame, the first 
black woman to hold the post of Deputy Mayor.18 
 In years past, CBCC had maintained something of a separate-spheres structure. 
Women, despite their organizing efforts, receded into the background when key meetings 
with public officials took place.19 That had changed by 1966. Though CBCC’s president 
remained a man, Lionel Payne, Elsie Richardson was the public face of the organization 
and Lucille Rose an important leader. For the first time, the executive director was a 
woman, Constance McQueen. Chisholm, meanwhile, was articulating a new brand of 
black feminism, which she would soon carry onto the national stage. Women took up 
eight of the 20 seats on the R&R board; among them were government officials such as 
Rose and Ruth Goring (who had been elected district co-leader alongside Thomas Jones 
in 1962, and in 1964 became an assistant to Brooklyn Borough President Abe Stark), 
along with popular block organizers like Sybil Holmes and Louise Bolling. At the 1966 
event where Kennedy unveiled the Bed-Stuy initiative, Richardson called upon a half-
                                                
18 “Lucille Rose Captures NAACP Title,” NYAN, Jan. 13, 1945; “Lucille Rose dead at 68,” NYAN, Aug. 
22, 1987; “Introducing Mrs. Lucille Rose,” NYAN, Oct. 21, 1961; “NAACP Credited,” NYAN, Mar. 16, 
1963; “Woman Director Sworn In,” NYAN, Oct. 3, 1964; “Lucille Mason Rose, First Woman Named as a 
Deputy Mayor,” NYT, Aug. 18, 1987; Ruth Edmonds Hill, “Lucille Mason Rose,” Notable Black 
American Women, Book II, (Detroit: Gale Research, 1996), pp. 573-74.  
19 For instance, in February 1963, when Mayor Wagner hosted a “united front” of 10 Stuyford leaders at 
City Hall, Chisholm was the only woman among them. Similarly, most of the 1963 meetings between 
CBCC and officials from the Neighborhood Conservation Program and the City Planning Commission 
had been all-male affairs. “Leaders Question Mayor on Unemployment,” NYAN, Feb. 16, 1963; CBCC, 
Minutes, Feb. 7, 1963 Sydney J. Moshette Papers.  
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dozen women to say a few words from the podium.20  
 This accumulation of female clout often made men uncomfortable. In the summer 
of 1966, Kennedy aides complained that the CBCC women were difficult to work with — 
hence the decision to hand over control of the project to Jones, whom they thought they 
could manage.21 But the judge was a prickly personality, someone who could at times be 
“impossible to work with,” as the preternaturally calm Franklin Thomas put it. He had a 
tendency to invoke the most noble of principles while playing petty politics. Further, in 
Ron Shiffman’s words, Jones “really had a problem with strong black women.”22  
 Not surprisingly, the power struggles that erupted in the early months of 1967 
unfolded in gendered terms. Jones dubbed the women who dominated CBCC “middle-
aged matriarchs.” At times he accused them of wielding undue power in a community 
desperately in need of masculine role models; at others, he belittled them. “I don’t know 
how some of them, you know, cooked a meal or took a child to school,” he said in a 1971 
interview. “They had all the time in the world.” When Richardson, Rose, and McQueen 
led the campaign for Donald Benjamin to become chairman of R&R, Jones dismissed 
Benjamin as a “ladies man.” Kennedy aide Carter Burden later recalled that during the 
debate over the composition of R&R’s board, Jones on a few occasions “just went 
berserk about [how] these women were cutting off his balls.” The CBCC women, 
meanwhile, resented Jones for having interposed himself between them and Kennedy, 
                                                
20 Proceedings of CBCC Conference on Community Development, Dec. 10, 1966, BHS/BSRC. 
21 Jones later recalled Kennedy telling him that he had “never been dealt with as rudely” as he had been 
“by some of the women of Bedford-Stuyvesant.” It seems unlikely that Kennedy would’ve made such a 
remark, and Jones’s recollections on this score lack credibility given the self-serving tone that pervades 
the interview. But there’s no doubt that Kennedy’s team found the CBCC women, especially Richardson, 
difficult to manage. Thomas R. Jones, interview with Roberta W. Greene, Nov. 26 1971, RFKOH, JFKL. 
22 Franklin A. Thomas, interview with Roberta W. Greene, JFKL; Carter Burden, interview with Roberta 
W. Greene, Feb. 13, 1974, RFKOH, JFKL; Ron Shiffman, interview with Sady Sullivan, BHS/BSRC. 
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Chapter 7: Whose Community, What Action?  418 
 
whom they respected and whose patronage they coveted.23  
 The battle for access to Kennedy also reflected pre-existing political rivalries. 
Two years earlier, Jones had retired from the State Assembly to run for a Civil Court 
judgeship. It was something of a mystery as to why such a bright, ambitious, combative 
politician, who had fearlessly campaigned against the Kings County Democratic machine 
in 1962, would suddenly give up his hard-won seat after a single term in office and at the 
relatively young age of 51. His official explanation was that being a judge paid a better 
salary — money he desperately needed after running a self-financed campaign for the 
assembly seat. At the same time, Jones had also found himself painted into a political 
corner, in open conflict with Democratic regulars while also doubting the viability of his 
Unity Democratic Club as a long-term political base.24  
The bench was no place to park political ambitions. Kennedy’s arrival seemed to 
breathe new life into the judge’s career. Jones, according to Franklin Thomas, was “an 
articulate visionary who espoused great dreams and hopes for black people … [and] at 
the same time a dispenser of patronage, a kind of ward leader.” Jones retained a 
substantial following in Brooklyn, where memories of his work as a crusading lawyer and 
                                                
23 Carter Burden, interview with Roberta W. Greene, JFKL. In using such imagery, Jones was hardly 
alone: calls for black empowerment in the late 1960s were often imbued with a discourse of masculinity 
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“Performance in Black and White,” p. 31, JFKL.  
24 Thomas R. Jones, interview with Jeffrey Gerson, June 10, 1993, La Guardia & Wagner archives. See, 
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civil-rights leader remained fresh. His sudden proximity to Kennedy promised to make 
him the top dispenser of patronage in the area.25   
 Things could easily turn sour. Any whiff of corruption would destroy Jones’s 
reputation as a jurist. On the streets of Bed-Stuy, his alliance with the white establishment 
was tough to defend — and it would spell political doom if the project flopped. Jones saw 
the “matriarchs” as a self-interested, parochial group whose unwillingness to compromise 
could scuttle the project; no doubt he also worried about CBCC’s intimate ties with 
Youth in Action, which was just the kind of poverty agency the Kennedy men derided. 
Jones himself believed strongly that the new project must be inoculated from the “mau-
mauing” that had come to define the Community Action Program. This meant not so 
much shunning the likes of Sonny Carson and Isaiah Lewis as giving them a seat at the 
table of influence, and carefully controlling the distribution of power. “We must give the 
best people who are here in Bedford-Stuyvesant an incentive to stay here,” he said two 
years later. “If the people who take pride in their work aren’t able to hold up their heads 
and don’t get a chance to participate, if the last guy who shouts ‘pig’ and knows best how 
to goldbrick gets rewarded, then the good workers give up. If you really mean business 
about a transfer of power, you need to work with people who can handle power.”26 
Jones’s misogynistic statements about the CBCC women were also in some way 
aimed at Shirley Chisholm. It wasn’t until 1968 that Brooklyn’s electoral map would be 
officially redrawn, resulting in the first majority-black Congressional district (the 12th). 
But the rapid growth of Bedford-Stuyvesant’s black population, along with a court 
decision that ruled Brooklyn’s gerrymandered districts unconstitutional, had put the 
                                                
25 Franklin A. Thomas, interview with Roberta W. Greene, JFKL. 
26 Quoted in Ford Foundation (Goldmann), “Performance in Black and White, p. 13, JFKL. 
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writing on the wall. By 1967, everyone knew that Bed-Stuy would have a black 
Congressman — or woman. Jones may have been contemplating a run for Congress at 
that point; if he was, he saw Chisholm standing in his path. The CBCC people were 
Chisholm people. She’d taken an active involvement in the group’s expansion and policy 
formulation; despite her political ascendancy, she maintained close ties to community 
organizers like Elsie Richardson. In 1967, CBCC and Youth in Action spearheaded a 
group calling itself the Committee for a Negro Congressman From Brooklyn, which 
would endorse Chisholm for Congress in 1968.27  
Chisholm took umbrage at Kennedy’s choice of Jones as his surrogate. Back in 
1962, Chisholm had rapped her knuckles raw canvassing for Jones. But their alliance had 
since ruptured. In 1964, Chisholm had inherited both the leadership of the Unity 
Democratic Club and Jones’s State Assembly seat, which she then defended twice. 
(There had been a by-election in 1965 due to redistricting.) By 1967, her star was rising 
thanks to her reunion with Wesley Holder, the political strategist who had once upon a 
time mentored both Chisholm and Jones within the insurgent Bedford-Stuyvesant 
Political League. Holder helped “Fighting Shirley” build a clubhouse filled with 
passionate supporters, especially women. Chisholm proudly called herself “the top vote-
getter” in Bed-Stuy. But Kennedy rarely consulted her as he laid the groundwork for his 
intervention in her backyard.28  
                                                
27 “Call Celler Traitor to Afro-Americans,” NYAN, May 20, 1967; “Bed-Stuy Launches Afro-Congress 
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28 Brownmiller, “This Is Fighting Shirley Chisholm,” NYT Magazine. 
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The dispute over control of R&R exploded in March. Thomas, Kennedy’s pick to 
become executive director of R&R, provided the spark. While he was considering 
whether to take the job, Thomas went with several CBCC leaders on a group tour of New 
Haven, where Logue showed the Brooklynites some of his greatest hits from his time as 
the city’s urban-renewal chief. During the trip, Thomas felt as if Elsie Richardson and the 
CBCC women went out of their way to make him uncomfortable, peppering him with 
pointed questions. Did Thomas have other masters? What was in it for him? What made 
him think he was qualified for the job? Back in Bedford-Stuyvesant, an hour-long job 
interview with the R&R board also turned confrontational and bitter. Though Thomas 
had grown up in Bed-Stuy, the Richardson faction pegged him as an outsider; no doubt it 
hurt his cause that Jones was promoting him as the only acceptable choice for the job. 
Allegedly, Kennedy called Jones after hearing about the interview and advised the judge 
to shake things up. “I think you’ve got a hell of a problem in getting someone who has 
something to lose to come into this and take it on, given that kind of hostility that’s 
there,” the senator said.29 
 Earl Graves, Kennedy’s point man in Bed-Stuy and a Jones backer, recommended 
that the senator’s team stop trying to collaborate with those who opposed the judge. 
“They cannot be reached,” Graves wrote about a group of R&R board members that 
included Richardson, Louise Bolling, Lionel Payne (CBCC’s president), and Oliver 
Ramsay (YIA’s man on the citywide Council Against Poverty). The Kennedy team began 
trying to split off the pro-Jones members of the board from the pro-Richardson faction.  
                                                
29 Franklin A. Thomas interview with Roberta W. Greene, JFKL.  
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 Jockeying aside, the CBCC activists were again growing impatient with the lack of 
on-the-ground progress in Bedford-Stuyvesant. In March, the Lindsay administration 
announced that urban-renewal funds for Fulton Park had once again been put on hold. 
“We now no longer ask politely for assistance,” Richardson wrote in a March 27 
telegram to members of Brooklyn’s Congressional delegation, including Kennedy. “We 
demand that the years of effort and anguish which we have invested in the future of our 
community not be used as justification for denying us what is rightfully ours.”30  
 Matters came to a head on the night of March 31, when the R&R board met to 
decide its future. Rumors swirled that the Richardson faction would move to unseat Jones 
and force a vote to elect Benjamin executive director. The judge showed up ready for 
combat. He opened the meeting by demanding votes on four resolutions he knew the 
members would almost certainly reject: first, that the board be expanded to 50 people; 
second, that a meeting be held three weeks later to elect new members; third, that he be 
put in charge of compiling the slate of names to be presented for election at that meeting; 
and fourth, that no further meetings take place in the interim. On each point, Jones 
demanded two-thirds approval, by way of forcing the issue. The board duly voted them 
down. Jones resigned on the spot and stormed out.31  
 Graves and Johnston had earlier discussed divide-and-rule strategies with Jones 
vis-à-vis the community board. But they were sideswiped by the sudden manner of the 
judge’s exit, and neither Lindsay nor Javits had any inkling that a split was imminent. 
That night, with the entire project on the verge of collapse, Johnston gained Kennedy’s 
                                                
30 Earl Graves to Eli Jacobs and Thomas Johnston, [March 1967], “Community, Undated,” Box 1, 
Johnston Papers, JFKL; Elsie Richardson to Robert F. Kennedy, Mar. 27, 1967, “Correspondence, 
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permission to dissolve R&R and form a new corporation called the Bedford-Stuyvesant 
Restoration Corporation. It was a risky maneuver, but Jones promised to bring half the 
old R&R board with him and to pull together a new coalition within days. Kennedy 
staffers scrambled through the night to gain telegrams endorsing the new corporation 
from Javits and the Lindsay administration. (Lindsay was away on business and it was 
Mitchell Sviridoff who made the decision to lend the city’s support to the Jones faction of 
the community group.) On the morning of April 1, they went public with the news of 
Restoration’s founding and began a frenetic public-relations campaign. Jones, 
meanwhile, set about lining up community support.32  
The judge’s palace coup left many Brooklynites bitter. The “matriarchs,” shunned 
and stunned, lashed out. At the moment of their greatest success, just as they were finally 
gaining access to Washington, to outside capital, to the levers of substantive change, they 
suddenly saw it all slipping out of their hands. Supporters of CBCC and YIA began 
arming themselves for a fight. To Kennedy’s dismay, his Bedford-Stuyvesant initiative 
was again making front-page headlines from Capitol Hill to Clinton Hill — no longer as 
a grand urban experiment but as an exercise in just the kind of petty politics Kennedy had 
promised to transcend.33  
 The fight over representation reprised a familiar theme. Like Youth in Action, the 
fledgling Restoration Corporation provided a prism through which people defined the 
meanings of community and debated how that “community” should pursue its political 
and economic self-realization. The CBCC leadership faction led by Richardson 
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vociferously opposed Jones’s new group, accusing it of stealing their ideas and 
marginalizing the people who had made it possible in the first place. From Richardson’s 
perspective, there was little immediate satisfaction to be gleaned from seeing her ideas 
finally gaining official support and funding. The brand of place-based politics that CBCC 
had been practicing for a decade was not only about drawing outside resources; it was 
also a way of ensuring that those resources be implemented in a way that reflected local 
preferences and control. Her definition of community was not merely a question of 
geography. (She herself lived in what she jokingly called the “Crown Heights section of 
Bedford-Stuyvesant.”) It was enmeshed in questions of leadership, of past exclusion, of 
aspiration. Would the enactment of her ideas henceforth depend on the good graces of 
Bobby Kennedy and his surrogates? Would the task of defining the terms of community 
participation fall to Thomas Jones and his allies in the white establishment? Or, as Walter 
Offutt, chairman of YIA, asked soon after Restoration’s founding, “Can an outside force 
enter into a community and dictate to it who its leaders should be?”34 
 It should be recalled that all this was unfolding at the tail end of a years-long 
debate over what “maximum feasible participation” should mean in Bedford-Stuyvesant. 
While Logue was making grandiose claims about setting up a “quasi-government,” 
thousands of local citizens had been participating in the drive to do just that, through 
Youth in Action. As per city and federal rules, YIA had duly applied and reapplied for 
grants, restructured its programs several times, and set up neighborhood boards. By the 
spring of 1967, the agency was holding elections in efforts to make community action as 
democratic as possible. YIA thus formed a crucial link in a governmental chain stretching 
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from the block association to the White House. Clearly, the agency had serious flaws, and 
even its supporters expressed disillusionment with the War on Poverty. But in April 1967 
all factions of YIA, including the radical youth wing led by Timothy Vincent and Isaiah 
Lewis, briefly came together to attack the Restoration Corporation as a bait-and-switch.35  
Kennedy and Thomas were not imprudent enough to present their project as a 
direct assault on Youth in Action itself. But the Restoration Corporation and the federal 
Special Impact Program through which it would draw its funding were deliberately 
structured to evade the bureaucratic structures through which community action had been 
administered. While Restoration captured $7 million in federal antipoverty funds in 1967, 
YIA was undergoing a complex and disorienting process of democratic reinvention, all to 
prove itself a legitimate recipient of lesser funds. In the eyes of people like Walter 
Pinkston, the executive director of YIA who had formerly directed CBCC and before that 
coordinated Youth Board programs, the disjuncture represented a violation of an implied 
social contract, signed between reformers like himself and the state. That contract was 
structured around painstakingly laid-out participatory structures, funding channels, and 
ideas about community competence. Viewed from the perspective of Pinkston and others 
like him, the Kennedy project offered proof that the debate “maximum feasible 
participation” in the War on Poverty had been an elaborate charade.36 
Ironically, Kennedy’s staff answered critics by appropriating the participatory 
language of the War on Poverty. Responding to frantic telegrams from Richardson and 
Payne, in which the CBCC leaders demanded that Kennedy explain his support of Jones, 
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Thomas Johnston invoked “this principle of maximum involvement of all interested 
individuals and groups in Bedford-Stuyvesant.” Johnston scolded R&R for blocking 
meaningful community participation by refusing to expand its membership from 20 to 50, 
thus forcing Jones’s hand. “It is this principle which is clearly far more important than 
any other single issue or difference in personality in the entire development effort,” he 
wrote. A year later, the Restoration Corporation would have only 22 board members, all 





Return of the Native 
 
 
 On April 5, 1967, more than 800 people joined in a passionate protest rally 
organized by the rump Renewal and Rehabilitation Corporation. Led by Elsie Richardson 
and Lionel Payne, the dissidents teamed up with Youth in Action’s leadership to issue a 
petition denouncing Thomas Jones and calling for community elections to select the new 
Restoration Corporation’s board. Lucille Rose framed the issue in stark terms: “Shall we 
choose our leaders,” she asked, “or shall they be chosen for us?” The anti-Jones group 
hoped to gain a vote of confidence “from the man in the street.” But the street was in a 
volatile mood. Who constituted the “we” in Rose’s formulation? The old guard, fractured 
and weakened, had lost the power to make that determination.38 
 The rally took place at P.S. 305 on Monroe Street, in the same auditorium where, 
only four months earlier, all parties had gathered to hear Kennedy speak. On this night, 
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many arrived carrying hastily scrawled signs:  
 “The Black Cat Is Back, So Lookout Black Rats”  
 “Go Home Mr. K., We Don’t Need Your Kind of Help”  
 “Black Power Is Black Togetherness and You’re Not With Us, Uncle Tom Jones”  
 “Stop Making Deals With Outsiders Against Your Brothers”  
 The protestors squeezed into every seat of the auditorium, spilled into the halls, 
and stood shoulder to shoulder in the cafeteria, straining to hear speeches over the 
school’s P.A. system. The place crackled with intensity. YIA’s Walter Offutt warned in a 
fiery speech of a “movement afoot to put Negroes in their place.” When Mayor Lindsay’s 
envoy, James Smith, rose to deliver a message of support from City Hall, a cacophony of 
catcalls and sneering laughter sent him back to his seat. Then the head of YIA’s radical 
youth-leadership wing, Timothy Vincent, took the floor to denounce CBCC, arguing that 
the War on Poverty neighborhood boards were the real repositories of democracy in the 
community. The speech devolved into a shouting match between Vincent and CBCC’s 
chairman, Payne. The crowd again erupted.39  
 Even Richardson had lost the ability to command the stage. When she tried to 
speak, Sonny Carson and his followers from CORE shouted her down. The young men, 
cheered on by the audience, rushed the stage and seized the microphone. Richardson had 
no right to make demands on their behalf, they proclaimed. After all, she spoke for an 
unelected organization that had done nothing but spin off more unelected organizations 
and call it community action. Now CBCC was suddenly invoking the “man in the street”? 
What a hustle. The CORE activists called Kennedy a “colonialist” and Jones a “Tom,” 
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and they denounced the “black bourgeoisie [trying] to make it uptown on the backs of the 
brothers.” But they also directed invective at the women of CBCC, whom they accused of 
“emasculating the community and denying us our models of black manhood.” An 
Amsterdam News headline summed up the scene: “Bed-Stuy Blight Bedlam.”40 
 It fell to Franklin Thomas to heal the wounds. Thomas, one of five children born 
to immigrants from Barbados, had gown up poor in Bed-Stuy. His father, a laborer, died 
when Thomas was just 11; from his mother he inherited the work ethic he would later 
credit for his successes. At Franklin K. Lane High School, the 6-foot-4-inch teenager 
became a star in the classroom and on the basketball court. (Among his teammates was 
Albert Vann, a future sparring partner and sometime ally in the struggles of the 1960s.) 
Several colleges offered Thomas basketball scholarships, but he instead accepted an 
academic scholarship at Columbia after his mother insisted he should earn his keep with 
brains not brawn. He joined the hoops squad anyway, becoming its captain and setting 
school single-season and career rebounding records that would still stand more than a 
half-century later. Thomas then spent four years in the Air Force before returning to 
Columbia for law school. A whirlwind tour in government followed: a year with the 
Federal Housing and Home Finance Agency, a brief stint as an assistant U.S. Attorney 
for the Southern District of New York. By the time Kennedy alighted in Bedford-
Stuyvesant, Thomas was working under Mayor Lindsay as the Deputy Police 
Commissioner in charge of legal affairs.41   
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 Thomas had not played a part in the planning effort that preceded Restoration’s 
founding. Earl Graves urged him to join the effort in late 1966, and he quietly attended 
several meetings with Kennedy and the business group. Despite a personal request from 
Kennedy that he sign on as R&R’s executive director, Thomas demurred after meeting 
the board. But as he watched the project unravel, he reconsidered. Kennedy assured him 
he would have his unconditional support, and several of the businessmen told Thomas 
they would “take care of him” should the project fail. In early May, a month after the 
founding of the new Restoration Corporation, he agreed to helm it. A new Cadillac and a 
salary of $30,000 a year helped smooth his transition.42  
 The Manhattan men saw in Thomas someone they could work with. “Without 
Frank Thomas the project would not have gotten launched, wouldn’t have been credible,” 
Eli Jacobs later said. Only 32, Thomas exuded gravitas that belied his youth. Towering, 
fit, and preternaturally composed, he spoke with a soft yet assured voice that somehow 
had the power to convince even inveterate foes of his good intentions. He had the rare 
ability to roll out one perfect sentence after another, expressing his thoughts in complete 
paragraphs — complete essays, even. He was a keen listener, too, constantly soliciting 
others’ opinions and nodding gently as they spoke. Yet beyond the accommodating 
demeanor, Thomas possessed an unshakeable confidence, a ferocious drive to succeed, 
and an underrated temper. He was an ideal Kennedy type.43 
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He was also a “counter-revolutionary” — or so said some of his detractors. If 
Restoration was an attempt to demonstrate that a new approach to community 
development could succeed, it was also an attempt to breathe new life into the dream of 
an integrated society. “What we were doing was consciously, openly, and aggressively 
asserting that the future for development was a future that involved black and white 
people working together,” Thomas later recalled. “We were prepared not just to articulate 
that but to demonstrate that.”44 
Many black Brooklynites, living through a dark hour in the history of American 
race relations, raised their eyebrows at such aspirations. Even Thomas Jones, the public 
face of Restoration, wondered privately whether his efforts at accommodating the 
“ghetto” to the structures of American capitalism were holding back a revolution that 
must some day come. “For now, I’m trying to do what I can, where I am,” a friend 
recalled him saying of his work with Restoration, “but I know that sooner or later I’ll be 
useless, that they’ll have to push me aside to advance further. […] Am I helping my 
people or am I obscuring the true solutions to their problems?”45  
Through the spring and summer of 1967, as Detroit and Newark burst into flames, 
Thomas held a series of public meetings in which he heard a litany of complaints, smiled 
patiently, and politely yet firmly answered each one. He pledged to take “whatever steps 
are necessary” to reconcile feuding factions. Mayor Lindsay also helped to defuse 
tensions by calling on the Commissioner of the city’s Equal Employment Commission, 
Samuel Jackson, to carry out a community-wide mediation process that summer.46 
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Thomas recognized that behind the overheated rhetoric and the talk of “Toms,” 
there lay a legitimate set of grievances about how policy had been implemented — and 
not implemented — in Bedford-Stuyvesant. He also suspected that the likes of Ramsay, 
Rose, and Richardson resented Jones far more than they did Kennedy. Behind the scenes 
Thomas and Kennedy aide Earl Graves plotted ways of changing minds. From their 
perspective, the stranded members of R&R represented not only a political danger but 
also an untapped wealth of expertise and leadership that must eventually be diverted into 
Restoration if the overall project was to succeed. “They must be flattered, coerced, 
courted,” Graves wrote to Johnston in May. Meanwhile, bigwigs like Gardner Taylor and 
Milton Galamison, who had until then remained on the sidelines, should be “courted 
through cocktails, lunches, private visits, phone calls from the Senator, etc.”47  
 Thomas and the Kennedy staff calculated that once funds began to flow into the 
community (as they did after mid-1967), the wounds opened up by the founding of 
Restoration would heal. The parties to the dispute shared much in common. Franklin 
Thomas and Elsie Richardson, Thomas Jones and Shirley Chisholm: all had grown up in 
a multiethnic neighborhood populated by a strong cadre of homeowners. All four were of 
West Indian descent and had inherited strong political inclinations from their immigrant 
parents. They belonged to a self-consciously reform-minded middle class, and they all 
pursued social change through government structures. The held different opinions about 
how to negotiate with the outside establishment — about how to balance confrontation 
with cooperation, about how much trust to invest in the corporate sector — but they 
collectively articulated a common vision for Bed-Stuy’s future, premised on the infusion 
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of massive government resources to preserve the middle class and increase opportunities 
for their low-income neighbors. They had not yet given up on the Great Society. It was 
their “beautiful woman” as much as it was Lyndon Johnson’s. And without their 
commitment to forging a coalition dedicated to community rehabilitation, Kennedy’s 
vision would not have come to fruition.  
At the same time, the discourse among younger African-American activists in the 
neighborhood — and nationwide — was growing more radical. Kennedy and Thomas 
made a concerted effort to woo Brooklyn’s black nationalists. In the long run the most 
important of these men (and they were all men) was the leader of the African-American 
Teachers Association, Albert Vann, who also sat on the YIA board. But the headline-
grabber for Kennedy was Sonny Carson, leader of the Brooklyn branch of CORE.  
 Carson, a former member of the Bishops youth gang who had also served in the 
Army and worked as a drug dealer, emerged in the mid-1960s as one the most divisive 
public figures in Brooklyn. Under his leadership, Brooklyn CORE had fully repudiated 
its pre-1965 past as an integrationist group dedicated to nonviolent direct action. Carson 
preached black pride, community self-determination, and self-defense in the face of 
police brutality. He overtly disrespected the bastions of middle-class authority in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant. Though he held no official position within the local antipoverty 
apparatus, no group could afford to ignore him. He wielded special influence within 
Youth in Action: he was known to crash the agency’s meetings flanked by a posse of 
spear-toting followers, whom journalist Jack Newfield described as “proud, goateed, and 
very masculine.” Carson was brash and bombastic, and he flaunted his criminal 
affiliations. He would earn national notoriety in 1968 for his role in the Ocean-Hill 
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Brownsville school controversy, and in 1975 he went to jail for kidnapping. “Much of 
what Carson did,” historian Brian Purnell has written, “was to use his persona as a tough 
guy [and a] street hustler to mix intimidating theatrics with strong arm tactics and intense 
community organizing efforts. His face, of the younger, militant, uncompromising black 
man, was the new image of black leadership in the nation at that time.”48  
 In some ways, Carson was a natural ally for Kennedy. Both men were gifted in the 
art of political theater, and they understood each other’s language. Like Bobby, Sonny 
was alienated, impulsive, existential. Though already on the wrong side of 30, Carson 
appealed most of all to the young; ditto Kennedy.49 Most of all, Carson was a dealmaker. 
One minute he was dismissing the Restoration Corporation as a hustle cooked up by the 
black bourgeoisie and the white power structure; the next minute he was sitting down 
with Franklin Thomas to iron out the details of their alliance.  
 The political scientist Kimberley Johnson argues that a fundamental tension 
existed at the heart of early Community Development Corporations, most notably the one 
in Bedford-Stuyvesant. “On one hand,” Johnson writes, “they were supposed to work 
with and within the preexisting economic and political structure. On the other hand, they 
were meant to act as a sort of permanent opposition — a community’s attempt to control 
its own destiny against ‘outsiders.’” Carson straddled this contradiction. The ideology of 
community control, at least as it was articulated in Brooklyn during the 1960s, was 
fundamentally about the relationship of black Americans to the state. It was not a 
separatist ideology (though the failure of experiments such as the Ocean Hill-Brownsville 
                                                
48 Newfield, Robert Kennedy, p. 103; Abubadika, Mwlina Imiri (aka Sonny Carson). The Miseducation of 
Sonny Carson (New York: Norton, 1972); Purnell, “A Movement Grows in Brooklyn,” p. 440. 
49 Jack Newfield writes: “Emotionally, Kennedy’s sympathies, with their bias in the direction of the 
young, the activist, and the powerless, were with the more militant sections of the black community.” 
Newfield, Robert Kennedy, p. 75.  
Chapter 7: Whose Community, What Action?  434 
 
school district would eventually lead disillusioned proponents of community control to 
draw inward). Control depended on the prior existence of resources to be controlled, and 
Restoration promised resources. By tying himself to the project, Carson signaled that 
community control could be pursued in a roundabout way, by first ceding an element of 
control. Of course, he was also eager to take a seat at the table of influence. Either way, 
his decision to join Restoration’s board instantly infused it with street cred.  
 Opposition lingered. The remnants of R&R held together for a time, continuing to 
collaborate with Raymond and Shiffman on proposals that went unnoticed. Richardson 
would complain for years that the Kennedy people were appropriating as their own ideas 
that had sprung from within the community. She was right — but time passed. In years to 
come, dozens of former staffers and board members from CBCC, R&R, and YIA found 
their way to Restoration. Owen Hague, the former YIA treasurer, took up a similar 
position at Restoration; Timothy Vincent, onetime head of youth-leadership programs for 
YIA, joined the Restoration board, as did Albert Vann, Lucille Rose, Almira Coursey, 
Oliver Ramsay, and Cybil Holmes. By the late 1970s, Restoration would be the only 
game in town.50  
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 In the meantime, Thomas struggled to work within the institutional structure 
Kennedy had imposed on the project. He strongly objected to the sequestering of the 
community corporation from the businessmen’s group, which maintained a substantial 
staff and continued to hire various outside consultants. “It was stupid to have a system 
operating that purported to be a partnership based on trust and confidence, but operated 
as though you had a father-son relationship, or a mother-daughter — whatever your 
choice is — master-slave,” he said in 1972. But the structure was hardly accidental. The 
Kennedy people had initially withheld funds and control from R&R because they didn’t 
trust the community group. Even with Thomas in charge, they fretted that the 
corporation, because of local pressures, would be inclined “simply to initiate a series of 
worthy projects on an ad-hoc basis.” According Eli Jacobs, “Tom [Johnston] had the 
feeling that you couldn’t trust Restoration, that they were not at a level of financial 
sophistication and maturity that you wanted to trust them with grants.” In large part this 
owed to previous episodes of financial mismanagement among inner-city antipoverty 
programs. It also arose from the prevailing image of Bedford-Stuyvesant as a damaged, 
leaderless community. “You might say there were residues of a colonial outlook,” Jacobs 
said. “Benevolent colonialism, but colonial nonetheless.”51  
 From the start, Thomas got the impression that the white men associated with the 
project, however well-intentioned, simply couldn’t conceive of the possibility that 
Bedford-Stuyvesant would come up with enough qualified people to run the Restoration 
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Corporation efficiently and properly. The businessmen, Logue, Kennedy’s staff — all 
seemed to think the job would be better done by whites, and they assumed Thomas would 
realize this sooner or later.52 He refused to concede the point. He set about hiring his own 
staff and insisted that funds flow directly into Restoration’s coffers. 
 The dual-board structure would continue to irritate Thomas for years, sparking 
several “knock-down-drag-out fights” with John Doar, the former civil-rights attorney 
who served as executive director of D&S. But the business group finally phased out its 
staff in 1973 and assumed a purely advisory role. According to Thomas, this represented 
a long-overdue recognition that Restoration’s staff was the more competent of the two — 
a hard realization since, in Thomas’s words, “ostensibly your purpose in being there is to 





Brick by Brick, Block by Block 
 
 
 When Thomas took the reins of the Restoration Corporation in the spring of 1967, 
a posse of hired guns — planners, consultants, architects, lawyers — was already at work 
in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Though Kennedy had decided to sideline Logue, “macro-scale” 
thinking continued to define the project. The planning juggernaut assembled by D&S 
threatened to submerge local aspirations in a tidal wave of proposals, memos, and 
program outlines, all conceived by outside experts keen to contribute to the master plan 
                                                
52 One example of such thinking came from Thomas Watson of IBM. “I think [Kennedy] realized that the 
application of the Negro to the higher levels or middle levels of the economic society was going to be 
very difficult,” Watson said in 1970. “I don’t think he thought for a minute that you could take the 
average Negro and compete against the average white person and come off with the Negro holding his 
own.” Thomas J. Watson, Jr., interview with Roberta W. Greene, Jan. 6, 1970, RFKOH, JFKL. 
53 Franklin A. Thomas interview with Roberta W. Greene, JFKL.  
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for saving America’s cities. Pei remained dedicated to superblock construction. From 
California came Paul O’Rourke, a former Health Commissioner and OEO administrator, 
who prepared a report on health facilities in Central Brooklyn. The NYU psychologist 
Frank Riessman was hard at work on educational plans for the area. Eli Jacobs was 
pushing a plan to build a massive new commercial center at Broadway Junction, where 
Brooklyn bordered Queens. Architect James Polchek produced designs for a mega-
recreational and community center, dubbed COMCEN.54 
 Kennedy, though, was impatient for results, and so were some of the board 
members, notably Benno Schmidt. Many months had been tied up in bickering. Aside 
from one superblock, nothing of substance had been started. Kennedy’s impatience 
dovetailed with Thomas’s vision. The new boss wanted to take up projects with 
immediately visible results, to put Restoration (literally) on the map. A 1968 report 
described Thomas’s thought process:  
 
The residents of Bedford-Stuyvesant, like residents of similarly 
disadvantaged areas throughout the country have suffered for years from 
unfulfilled promises. Programs to date have failed to touch the lives of 
those who live in these areas. For these reasons, the Restoration 
Corporation, in the spring of 1967, faced major skepticism on the part of 
the residents of Bedford-Stuyvesant. Residents who came together at 
community meetings were no longer impressed by long-range 
sophisticated plans for improving their community. They wanted tangible 
examples of progress. In view of this the Restoration Corporation in 
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conceiving its initial programs sought to develop a program component 
which was highly visible and which would quickly and importantly affect 
the lives if the residents. Only after such a project was completed, would 
faith and confidence in this new effort be established.55  
 
 Though the Restoration Corporation was explicitly modeled as an alternative to 
the chaotic, bureaucratized, ad-hoc way the War on Poverty had functioned to that point, 
there was much in Thomas’s thinking that incarnated both the community-action efforts 
of Youth in Action and the CBCC proposals of previous years. For one thing, he hoped to 
unleash the energies of Bed-Stuy’s block organizations and to harness them for 
neighborhood-wide improvement efforts. He also honed in on construction projects that 
might train the poor, the young, and the unemployed by putting them to work. An 
Opportunities Industrialization Center, run by Milton Galamison and modeled on the 
programs started by the Rev. Leon Sullivan in Philadelphia, opened with $1.2 million in 
SIP funds and attempted to provide job training to thousands of young people. Though 
business development was an important part of Restoration’s mission, so too were social 
services and street-level outreach programs that mimicked the ones launched by Youth in 
Action. And while the Restoration Corporation itself was not a democratic organization, 
Thomas hoped to evince the spirit of community control by tailoring programs to the 
wishes of local people.  
Even if Thomas had possessed the inclination and the funds — both of which 
were lacking — to pursue the kind of macro-scale planning Logue advocated in 1967, it 
would have been hard for him to do so without losing support on the streets of Bed-Stuy. 
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Instead, he unveiled programs designed to tap into the kinds of networks and 
participatory spirit his predecessors had fostered. All this meant starting small. “Thomas 
constantly moved from the big-picture, long-term objectives of community renewal to the 
need for incremental, sometimes symbolic actions that would engage residents directly in 
the work of development,” one scholar, William P. Ryan, has observed.56  
Soon after Thomas came on, Restoration spawned what was known as the 
“Community Rehabilitation Program.” Like many early initiatives, it had a triple 
purpose: to accomplish a specific goal, to provide job training in the process, and in so 
doing put the corporation in touch with the grassroots. In the summer of 1967, 
Restoration hired the Center for Urban Education to oversee a study on community 
attitudes in Bedford-Stuyvesant, carried out by on-the-job trainees. A total of 80 locals 
were given training in planning, organizing, and surveying techniques; many of these 
trainees later took jobs as paraprofessionals working at Restoration’s neighborhood-
outreach centers or within Youth in Action. The study itself found that “decent housing” 
was the top priority for local people, followed by jobs, “better schools,” and clean 
streets.57 That came as no surprise — a slew of studies had come to similar conclusions. 
But the very process of surveying did put Restoration in direct contact with more than 
3,000 households, it created jobs, and it offered a solid basis for action. 
                                                
56 Ryan, “Bedford-Stuyvesant and the Prototype Community Development Corporation,” p. 83. 
57 This resonated with other efforts carried out in late 1960s New York City to determine what the city 
dubbed “poverty areas” wanted government to do for them. The highest priority for people surveyed in 
one study after another was housing. Be it in poor, majority-black areas or in so-called “transition 
neighborhoods” where low-income blacks and Puerto Ricans coexisted with white middle-class residents, 
people insisted that they needed better housing conditions and help from government in attaining them. “It 
is evident that the public wants a real thrust behind the construction of low and middle income housing,” 
one survey noted. “Solid majorities of the public also want the city to help builders and landlords on 
renovation.” Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. “Transition Neighborhoods in New York City: The 
People’s View of Their Housing Environment,” Dec. 1969, Folder 40, Box 060279, RFW, LGW online. 
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At first, Restoration lacked the resources to build new housing on a significant 
scale. In any case, the Central Brooklyn Model Cities program was just then being set up 
with federal and city funds, and it envisioned building 70,000 new units and 
rehabilitating 16,000 more. (Such goals would turn out to be wildly optimistic.) Instead, 
the corporation focused on the more modest goals of rehabilitating existing buildings, 
lending an air of stability to the neighborhood, and promoting homeownership. The 
process started in June 1967 with the Community Home Improvement Program (CHIP). 
More than anything else associated with Restoration (other than the Kennedy name), 
CHIP branded the new corporation. This was because it managed to address in one fell 
swoop many of the concerns expressed by local residents: youth crime, unemployment, 
dilapidated housing, poverty, a frayed sense of community, filthy streets. It also evoked 
past efforts of block associations, dating back decades, to rebuild from the ground up; in 
other words, CHIP tapped into deep wellsprings of local pride.  
 It was a simple idea: recruit young, unemployed men and put them to work fixing 
up façades. Homeowners would be asked to contribute $25 each for the repairs and to 
pledge that they would at some future date hire local contractors to perform renovations 
of similar value on their interiors. The recruits, working under the supervision of a select 
group of craftsmen, would learn specific skills and, perhaps more important, gain the 
experience of holding down a regular paid job that gave them pride in their work. At the 
end of the summer, those who stuck it out would be provided with referrals to employers 
willing to hire them for permanent jobs. In many ways, this model resembled some of 
Youth in Action’s on-the-job-training programs, and it also harked back to CBCC’s 
Teens in Industry program of the late 1950s.  
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 The Restoration Corporation also justified the program in language reminiscent of 
the early War on Poverty. For instance, in discussing the causes of unemployment in 
Bed-Stuy, one Restoration report argued that beyond a generalized scarcity of jobs that 
matched the skills of the local labor pool, “the problems of unemployment also result 
from years of frustration and lack of opportunity for many minority group citizens. […] 
Failure to experience success and reward from work destroys those values and 
motivational forces which ordinarily encourage people to meaningfully participate in our 
work-oriented society.” In this light, CHIP loomed as something not dissimilar to the 
“barrier eradicators” in the Cloward-Ohlin opportunity theory — though Restoration 
never adopted the explicitly theoretical tone of earlier juvenile-delinquency programs. 
Training in home-improvement skills for the “hard-core” young men of Bedford-
Stuyvesant was both a tool for creating jobs and a way of providing, in the words of 
Restoration, “the opportunity to experience steady, full-time and rewarding work that 
contributes to one’s personal well being and to one’s environment.”58 
In July, Restoration hired 28 craftsmen — painters, masons, ironworkers, 
carpenters, landscapers — of whom half were union workers and many had been 
unemployed. Together they underwent a training period and were evaluated based on 
teaching ability, communication skills, and their potential as supervisors. The corporation 
then enrolled 294 trainees, of whom three-quarters had not completed high school and 
90% were unemployed (though most had previously held jobs). As some dropped out of 
the program, others were recruited; in total, 430 people received some on-the-job training 
by December 1967, most for periods of six weeks or more.  
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Chapter 7: Whose Community, What Action?  442 
 
Deciding where to put all these trainees to work was not easy. Thomas insisted 
that the first blocks to see such improvements would be ones already organized into 
formal block groups. Through those associations, Restoration would mobilize enthusiasm 
among homeowners and use façade renovations as a springboard for other beautification 
efforts. (One stipulation of the program was that each house receiving renovations would 
have to place two green garbage pails painted with Restoration’s logo out front.) But the 
effort initially met with indifference. The chaos and cynicism surrounding Restoration’s 
birth made it the object of widespread suspicion on the streets of Bed-Stuy; despite 
Kennedy’s personal popularity, the project was easily dismissed as a top-down effort. On 
the first street selected for improvement, the leader of the block association had to wage a 
spirited publicity campaign and host a block party before he could convince any of his 
neighbors that they should fork over $25 to Restoration.59 
Once work got started, the program was a hit. All it took was a stroll to the 
grocery store or the bar or the laundromat for people to see what was happening. And 
Restoration had money to spend. A SIP grant of $500,000 funded activities in the 
summer of 1967, and the Rockefeller Foundation contributed a further $250,000 for 
1968. With Restoration pouring about $1,000 into each house it took on, the 
corporation’s employees soon found themselves deluged by calls, letters, and petitions 
from homeowners. Restoring 19th-century masonry, ironwork, and sculptural details was 
painstaking work, and expensive. By the end of 1967, more than 200 block associations 
had contacted Restoration in some way or another, and 71 had submitted written requests 
for assistance. The bulk of these requests came from the affluent heartland of brownstone 
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Bed-Stuy — Decatur, Halsey, MacDonough, Macon Streets — though some of the first 
blocks to be rehabilitated were in the area surrounding Tompkins Park. In general, the 
early efforts were aimed at Bed-Stuy’s most comfortable blocks. Restoration planners 
assumed that only on stretches where owner-occupants made up the majority would 
residents become active participants in revitalization efforts.  
Restoration thus linked up with long-established networks and evoked a long 
tradition of neighborhood pride. The home-improvement program echoed the efforts of 
the Bedford-Stuyvesant Neighborhood Council to beautify the area during the 1940s and 
’50s, and in the process, Restoration gave new energy to the many block associations 
whose enthusiasm had flagged during the 1960s. On blocks where no associations had 
previously existed, residents banded together, printed their own stationery, and fired off 
letters to Restoration, accompanied by dozens of signatures.  
“Dear Sir,” one letter read, “We are a newly organized block association, namely 
‘The Hancock-Lewis-Stuyvesant Block Association.’ We are aware of the program for 
home improvement, whereby for a nominal sum of $25 a homeowner can have the 
outside paint and trim done on his home by young men hired for this purpose. We have 
observed the improvement this has made in Halsey Street, and we would like to take 
advantage of this program.” Even tenants got in on the act, petitioning landlords to sign 
up for the program on blocks with low owner-occupancy rates. The program soon gained 
such popularity that Restoration held an annual lottery — which itself turned into a major 
community event — to decide which blocks would be next in line for the treatment. This 
in turn spurred the formation of dozens more block associations.60   
                                                
60 Dozens of letters are reprinted as appendices to Final Report of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration 
Corporation Home Improvement Program,” Mar., 31, 1968, “Housing: Exterior Renovation Program,” 
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The job-placement component of the CHIP program was less successful, at least initially. 
Resistance by unions, whether due to discrimination or perhaps because of Restoration’s 
propensity for doing business with non-union subcontractors, posed a problem. Most 
trainees did manage to find jobs, though not necessarily construction jobs. The 40 
companies that offered placements ranged from the Hudson Hotel to the Ocean Casket 
Company to the Doubleday Book Shop to the Brooklyn Jewish Hospital. But only a third 
of the jobs obtained by the first batch of trainees paid more than $90 a week.  






Above and two following pages: letters sent to the Restoration Corporation by block 
associations, asking to participate in the Community Home Improvement in the 
summer and fall of 1967. The Hancock Street Block Association was organized in 
1941 by the future chairman of the Restoration Corporation’s board, Thomas R. Jones, 
and his father, Thomas S. Jones. (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.) 
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significant goodwill and positive publicity during its first year of existence. It signaled 
that Bed-Stuy was an attractive place in which to live and to invest. It also earned upbeat 
press coverage, especially from the New York Times. Meanwhile, money was coming in. 
The Department of Labor pledged a total of $7 million to Restoration under the SIP 
legislation, though funds were disbursed on a monthly basis and came in slowly. 
(Restoration and D&S together spent $2.2 million in federal funds during their first year 
of operation.) The Ford Foundation donated $1.65 million by October 1968; other 
foundations, banks, and corporations put up over $2 million more.61  
In the early part of 1968, the dual corporations unveiled several significant 
initiatives: a mortgage pool to support local homeownership, an IBM plant in Bed-Stuy, 
and a major shopping complex and community center on Fulton Street. The 
announcements got good press and amounted to political gold for Kennedy in the midst 
of a presidential campaign. Each was a statement of noble aspirations and immune to 
criticism since no concrete action had been taken and no mistakes had yet been made. 
Here was Kennedy not as a ruthless partisan but as a practical-minded coalition builder.62 
The mortgage pool marked the corporate board’s most significant contribution to 
the project. Thomas officially announced the pool’s creation on April 2, 1968, just as 
Kennedy was beginning to campaign in Indiana ahead of that state’s presidential primary. 
The program had quietly been taking shape for six months beforehand. George Moore, 
chairman of First National City Bank, took the lead in raising the funds, assembling a 
large coalition of potential contributors in the fall of 1967. Some 80 commercial lenders 
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and insurers — including First National, Chase Manhattan, Dime, Equitable, Prudential, 
and Metropolitan Life — pledged support. Total contributions surpassed $75 million.63  
 Thomas heralded the program as one that would “help restore health and vitality 
to the Bedford-Stuyvesant housing market.” The mortgage pool would offer loans for 
three purposes: to underwrite renovations, to assist in home purchases, and to help 
owners holding multiple mortgages and on onerous terms — a common situation in Bed-
Stuy — to consolidate their debts. “We have absolutely no doubt,” Thomas and Doar 
wrote in April 1968, “that mortgage loan money in any volume at moderate cost will not 
be available in Bedford-Stuyvesant without a program of this sort. [...] We cannot 
overemphasize the critical nature of this program and the urgency of getting it started.” 
Loans would be insured by the Federal Housing Administration and available at the 
going rate of 10% down payment and a 25-year term — far more generous that anything 
then available to the majority of Bed-Stuy homeowners. Thomas explained that before 
the existence of the pool, the typical buyer of a $17,000 home would have had to take out 
a first mortgage for $10,000 and a second mortgage for $5,000, each of which would cost 
several “points” up front but also hold relatively high interest rates. In order to make up 
the cash deficit, most such families put off needed renovations and rented out rooms (or 
entire floors) of their newly bought homes. These practices, per Thomas, typically 
contributed to the “ruining of sound housing.”64   
In its effects, the mortgage pool dovetailed with the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 
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which banned housing discrimination. It also mimicked valued community institutions, 
such as the Paragon Progressive Credit Union, and served as yet another indicator of 
Restoration’s commitment to protecting Bed-Stuy’s middle class. The area already 
boasted an owner-occupancy rate of 20-25%, and Restoration’s founders believed that 
encouraging homeownership would foster stability in the midst of crisis. But Restoration 
faced a conundrum: any efforts to improve housing in the area would run up against the 
reality that most local residents had low incomes, significant debt, and little access to 
financing on all but the most usurious terms. These were the effects of redlining.65  
 The mortgage pool provided the beginnings of a response to redlining. But change 
came slowly. Within the first year, Restoration closed just 152 loans, at a total value of 
$2.5 million. Of those loans, only 34 facilitated a purchase, and the rest went to 
refinancing. Restoration staffers assigned to the mortgage program also helped 88 
underwater homeowners obtain discounts on second mortgages they had previously taken 
out. Only $235,000 of the refinancing money contributed to rehabilitation, though it was 
realistic to expect that in the future homeowners with their heads above water would be 
more likely to carry out renovations. Either way, it was clear that the program tended to 
benefit existing homeowners — the very people who already possessed equity, however 
small. While such assistance was no doubt valuable to such individuals, it offered little 
appreciable impact on the community at large. Still, the very existence of the mortgage 
pool promised to transform the credit market in Bed-Stuy and contribute to the area’s 
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beautification; its long-term impact would take time to play out.66 
 On June 5, 1968, Robert Kennedy fell to the floor of the Ambassador Hotel in Los 
Angeles, where he’d been delivering a campaign speech. His assassination traumatized a 
generation of young liberals who’d counted on a second Kennedy administration to end 
the war in Vietnam, win the war on poverty, and heal gaping wounds in the American 
soul. In Bedford-Stuyvesant, Kennedy’s death would force Thomas and the Restoration 
Corporation to redefine the scope of what they hoped to accomplish. According to Jack 
Newfield, “[t]he theme of many of the eulogies delivered immediately after Robert 
Kennedy’s murder was that the Bedford-Stuyvesant project would be his greatest 
monument.” Yet with the senator gone, outside interest slowly waned. RFK’s personal 
appeals and the prospect of his election as President had accounted for much of the 
business community’s commitment to Bedford-Stuyvesant. His death dramatically 
decreased the likelihood that Restoration might spur the kind of large-scale investment 
and job growth needed to bring about Bed-Stuy’s long-term economic transformation.67 
 In the meantime, Restoration got down to brass tacks. The agency printed and 
distributed 20-page booklets containing phone numbers and useful information about 
every imaginable service in the area: how to apply for food stamps, whom to contact for 
legal aid, which agency to call about building-code violations, where to get pre-natal 
classes, and so on. Restoration also funded a television show, “Inside Bedford-
Stuyvesant,” which featured the voices of everyday people and sought to counter 
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negative stereotypes perpetrated in the press about the “ghetto.”68 Through its small-
business program, the corporation offered loans to dozens of local entrepreneurs and, 
later, helped to fund black-owned franchises of major national chains. Finally, 
Restoration opened a network of five neighborhood centers, which hired trainees from 
other programs as well as people whom the director of the program, Benjamin Glascoe, 
described half-jokingly as the “least employable” elements of the community: ex-
convicts, drug addicts, sundry misfits. Together with social workers and paraprofessional 
counselors, the recruits offered the kinds of street-level services that the Youth in Action 
neighborhood centers had been designed to provide: advice on how to navigate the 
welfare bureaucracy, youth counseling, tenant advocacy. They also ran sanitation drives, 
helped to organize block associations, organized baseball leagues, and spearheaded 
clothing drives — in other words, community action minus the political protests.69  
Increasingly, Restoration overshadowed Youth in Action. Kennedy’s death 
touched off a slew of journalistic follow-ups on his antipoverty work in Brooklyn. The 
Times ran long pieces, and CBS aired a multi-part investigation of urban turmoil, with a 
special focus on Bedford-Stuyvesant.70 To some local activists, the sudden wave of 
outside attention rankled. YIA staffers loudly complained that the CBS broadcast had 
neglected even to mention their agency, giving the impression that Restoration was the 
only thing standing between order and chaos in Central Brooklyn. The coordinator of 
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YIA’s Community Development and Services Division took particular issue with 
comments made to CBS by Restoration staffers, whom he savaged as “pompous, 
pretentious traitors who never miss an opportunity to represent themselves to the white 





 In many ways, Restoration did define itself in stark contrast with Youth in Action 
and the Community Action Program. Where YIA hired social workers to oversee its staff 
and finances, Restoration hired lawyers and MBAs. Where YIA specialized in papering 
Bed-Stuy with incendiary, handcrafted posters, Restoration produced slick brochures. 
Restoration’s newsletters were carefully edited and cleanly designed (complete with a 
monthly “box score” tabulating the corporation’s achievements) where the YIA 
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publications abounded in typos. Technocratic visions of progress replaced grassroots 
protest. Above all, Restoration strove to neutralize the dual pressures that had so 
hamstrung YIA during its early years: the impulse toward participatory democracy 
emanating from below and the welter of bureaucratic constraints bearing down from 
above. This meant proceeding independently of city bureaucracies as well as OEO (at 
least at first); it also meant carefully recruiting a board that would be stable and 
competent. As one Restoration staffer put it in 1973:  
 
The problem with the ‘antipoverty’ program to date has been the three-year 
tenures for the community members of the boards. This is seen by many as a sure 
road to failure, since by the time unsophisticated community residents begin to 
acquire some expertise and understand what the program is all about, they have to 
step down, to be replaced by an inexperienced board. This ensures that any such 
program will never come of age.72 
 
 For all that, it was undeniable that the War on Poverty had laid the groundwork for 
Restoration and the community-development approach it pioneered. Restoration was not 
only a reaction against Great Society liberalism but also a vindication of it. The efforts of 
CBCC and YIA to unify Bedford-Stuyvesant from within went a long way toward 
drawing Kennedy to Brooklyn. Through War on Poverty agencies, local activists had 
yoked new ways of thinking about community development to the spirit of the civil rights 
movement, creating a new social movement dedicated to neighborhood revitalization. 
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Further, the ways in which Restoration went about community development reflected the 
middle-class outlook on neighborhood change that had informed much of Bed-Stuy’s  
War on Poverty in the first place. As Thomas took control of the project and pushed back 
against the visions being put forth by Logue, Pei, and Jacobs, he gained more and more 
support from within the community. He was being pushed, too — to respect the spirit of 




A College in the Streets 
 
 
In the quarter-century following the Brown v. Board of Education decision, no 
issue so galvanized the civil-rights struggle as did education, nor were there many issues 
that proved as combustible in the larger scope of American cultural and political life. 
Brooklyn in the late 1960s was a central battleground for struggles over education. In 
1967, Mayor Lindsay and the Ford Foundation provided funds for an experimental, 
community-controlled school board in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville school district, on the 
southeastern edge of Bedford-Stuyvesant. Made up largely of low-income African-
American parents and supported by the African-American Teachers Association 
(AATA), the board soon clashed with the white-dominated United Federation of 
Teachers. The dispute climaxed in the fall of 1968 with a citywide teachers strike that led 
to the ultimate defeat of the community-control movement. The strike (the details of 
which are outside the scope of this study) looms in popular memory as a watershed 
moment in the history of New York City. The historian Jerald Podair, among others, has 
argued that it represented the final breaking point of the old New Deal coalition, a 
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shattering of the hallowed alliance between left-liberal Jews and African Americans. On 
the other hand, there’s an argument to be made that the strike was a symptom as much as 
a cause of disillusionment with liberalism, especially among black Brooklynites in whose 
eyes the New Deal and Great Society had promised too much and delivered too little.73  
Even as the Ocean Hill-Brownsville conflagration was attracting national 
attention, local activists were quietly waging another campaign for community control of 
educational resources. This second struggle focused on bringing a college to Central 
Brooklyn, and it involved many of the same players who had been active in the War on 
Poverty agencies. They insisted that the college be funded through the City University 
system (CUNY) and that control over curriculum design, personnel, and administrative 
policies be vested in the black citizens of Central Brooklyn. The Board of Higher 
Education, which oversaw CUNY, had different ideas but was prepared to negotiate. In 
the debate that ensued, a singular coalition came together.  
According to Don Watkins, a Brooklyn College professor and a member of Youth 
in Action’s education committee, the college campaign was “a catalyzing element in the 
community that brought together the Tom Jones types and the street.”74 Bedford-
Stuyvesant’s War on Poverty agencies, each in its own way, helped to drive the process. 
CBCC first dramatized the issue in the mid-1960s, Restoration generated creative ideas 
about how the college should be structured, and Youth in Action helped organize 
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grassroots support for the campaign. If the various groups could agree on anything, it was 
that fixing failing schools was intimately related to fighting poverty. 
 At the time, catastrophic failure rates prevailed among young African Americans 
attending the city’s public schools. In a 1965 report drafted for YIA, Watkins observed 
that integrated classrooms were disappearing at a rapid pace and that black students were 
dropping out at alarming rates. Those who stayed in school were falling far behind their 
white counterparts. In 1962-63, for instance, the average sixth grader in Bed-Stuy read at 
a level 1.4 years behind the national norm; eighth graders lagged 2.2 years behind. Not 
one of 14 junior high schools in the area had taught its eighth graders to read at a level on 
par with the average sixth grader in middle-income, predominantly white areas of the 
city. “One may well ask whether the Bedford-Stuyvesant children are becoming 
functional illiterates as they pass through the public schools,” Watkins wrote.75   
 At the time, ninth graders in the city’s public schools were awarded either an 
academic diploma or a “certificate,” depending on their grades. Only students receiving 
the academic diploma automatically became eligible to attend an academic high school 
— as opposed to a technical or vocational school — and only students at academic high 
schools were eligible to apply to the city’s public four-year colleges. In 1964, only 52% 
of Bed-Stuy ninth graders earned academic diplomas, whereas the figure for ninth 
graders elsewhere in Brooklyn was 81%. Among the Stuyford teens who did manage to 
qualify for academic high schools, few used them as a springboard to higher education. 
Whereas 65% of graduates from academic high schools citywide went on to study in 
colleges or technical institutions, only 26% of seniors surveyed at one academic high 
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school in Bed-Stuy had even applied to such institutions. All told, at most 2% of Bed-
Stuy’s young people were graduating high school with the qualifications to attend the 
four-year city colleges. Watkins summed it up: “The educational profile of Bedford-
Stuyvesant youth reveals a tragic waste,” he wrote.76 
 These grim realities inspired various responses. Milton Galamison’s movement 
for integration reached its high point with the massive boycott of February 1964. That 
same year, two middle-school teachers, Albert Vann and Les Campbell (later known as 
Jitu Weusi) founded the Negro Teachers Association, which soon changed its named to 
the African-American Teachers Association and began lobbying the city to hire more 
black teachers and principals.77 Under Mayor Lindsay, experimental school districts such 
as the one in Ocean Hill-Brownsville were another response. The War on Poverty, too, 
attempted to alleviate the effects of educational segregation. For a time, Galamison 
himself chaired Youth in Action’s education committee, and the agency took up a variety 
of remedial efforts directed at different stages of the educational system: Head Start, 
homework-study workshops, Young Mothers, the Women’s Talent Corps. Meanwhile, 
the citywide Council Against Poverty mandated in 1968 that 20% of all community-
corporation funds be dedicated to “education action.”78  
 Still, such measures would take years to make a difference, if they worked at all. In 
the meantime, an entire generation of black Brooklynites was being condemned to what 
Jonathan Kozol, in reference to the Boston school system, dubbed “death at an early 
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age.” Surely more than 2% of black students in the public schools possessed the 
intellectual skills to attend college. Instead of waiting for the entire school system to shift 
so that such students could earn the proper qualifications, it made sense to unlock more 
opportunities for them to attend college, regardless of qualifications. The open-
admissions regime that would be instituted throughout CUNY during the 1970s followed 
this line of thinking. But open admissions were not yet a reality in the mid-1960s. 
 It was CBCC that launched the campaign for a college in Central Brooklyn. In 
January 1964, the Board of Higher Education announced that it was seeking a location in 
Brooklyn for a new school, to be named Kingsborough Community College. News soon 
broke that the college would likely be built in Manhattan Beach, on the former site of a 
U.S. Air force base. Tempers flared in Central Brooklyn. CBCC organizers decried the 
fact that the new college would be built in an almost all-white neighborhood that took 
more than an hour to access by subway from the heart of Bedford-Stuyvesant. Instead, 
they argued, the college should open in a place where it might serve the bulk of the 
borough’s black population — and where the attendant jobs would make an especially 
strong impact. John L. Procope, Elsie Richardson’s predecessor as chairman of CBCC’s 
Urban Planning and Housing Committee, urged organizations and individuals affiliated 
with CBCC to write to city officials and speak out on the issue at public meetings of the 
city’s Site Selection Board.79  
 “We want another cultural institution in Bedford-Stuyvesant,” Thomas R. Jones, 
then still a State Assemblyman, said at one meeting in February 1964. “A massive dose 
of culture and education and new things should be given to people who have been 
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deprived of opportunities.”80 A week later, at an epic nine-hour hearing, the Rev. Walter 
Offutt, future chairman of Youth in Action’s board, argued that a college in Central 
Brooklyn would strike a blow against segregation. “Gentlemen, you’re not kidding 
anybody,” he jabbed at Borough President Abe Stark and City Comptroller Abe Beame, 
both in attendance. “Segregation comes from well-planned, calculated efforts. In order to 
satisfy the educational needs of both black and white children and keep this school from 
being racially segregated, I implore you to build it in Bedford-Stuyvesant.”81 In response, 
a Brooklyn College dean quipped, “Why send students to areas of degradation and 
blight?”82 His comments touched off an uproar — but the college ended up in Manhattan 
Beach anyway. 
 The issue simmered for the next two years. Both CBCC and Youth in Action 
continued to press CUNY to build a junior college in Central Brooklyn, and the idea 
came up in various urban-renewal proposals floating around at the time. Somewhere 
along the way, Stark had a change of heart, thanks to CBCC lobbying. In October 1966, 
the borough president announced his support for the group’s proposal that a college be 
placed in the area of Fulton Park and that it offer, in addition to a regular curriculum, 
adult education and remedial programs “to enable the under-educated and the dropouts to 
have a second chance.” The college, according to Stark, should also stimulate economic 
development by drawing businesses to the surrounding area.83 
 In the meantime, CBCC and the Pratt Center for Community Improvement were 
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laying down plans for a “college of the streets.” This became known as the Central 
Brooklyn Neighborhood College: a cooperative institution with a flexible curriculum, no 
entrance requirements or fees, and no degree-granting capacity. It opened its doors in 
time for the spring 1967 semester, with a student body of 150. Enrollees included gifted 
high schoolers, unemployed dropouts in their twenties, and middle-aged laborers who’d 
never had a chance at an education. Classes took place in church basements, community 
centers, storefronts, and whatever space the Pratt Institute could spare; students chose 
from among 28 course offerings, ranging from traditional Humanities to African History 
to Computer Science. Volunteer instructors at the college included professors from Pratt, 
NYU, and Long Island University, as well as journalists, photographers, and writers. 
Some students learned job skills, some gained High School Equivalency Diplomas, and 
others used the Neighborhood College as a springboard for acceptance to CUNY. 
Various classes also piggybacked on existing War on Poverty programs; for instance, the 
Neighborhood College sent English professors from Pratt to teach reading and writing to 
women enrolled in the Young Mothers Program. Several other community groups — 
including the Tompkins Park Area Services office and Community Action Agencies in 
neighboring Bushwick, Brownsville, and Fort Greene — stepped up to provide space, 
equipment, and paraprofessionals. The model proved so popular that enrollment tripled to 
almost 500 students in the fall of 1967.84 
 The Neighborhood College, according to its director, Rudy Bryant, challenged the 
“white established order” and its standard policy of “turning a deaf ear to the cries of 
oppressed people.” Bryant lobbied degree-granting CUNY institutions to lower entrance 
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requirements for students who had taken courses at the neighborhood college, and in 
some cases he was successful. Such arrangements undoubtedly increased the educational 
opportunities available to Bed-Stuy students. But the neighborhood college aspired to a 
higher purpose: to provide a model of how minority groups could “effect meaningful and 
ongoing changes in a decrepit situation,” in Bryant’s words. Clearly, meaningful change 
would require more than a non-accredited, underfunded archipelago of night classes.85  
 The Restoration Corporation took up the issue in 1967. Kennedy strongly supported 
the idea of a college in Bedford-Stuyvesant, and he recruited the former provost of Long 
Island University, William Birenbaum, to lead the campaign. (Birenbaum lived in 
Brooklyn Heights and had been among the volunteer professors at the Neighborhood 
College.) Birenbaum, a self-styled visionary, then assembled a study group dubbed the 
Educational Affiliate; it included James Farmer, former national director of CORE, and 
Vann, leader of the AATA. 
The Educational Affiliate made no small plans. The group soon proposed a brand-
new model of urban education that would integrate “an educational concept of what a 
college in Bedford-Stuyvesant should be and a physical interpretation of that concept.” 
This meant, first of all, eschewing plans for a unitary campus that might require large-
scale demolition. A new college must belong to the “urban mix,” and construction of its 
facilities must mesh seamlessly with ongoing efforts to rehabilitate residential streets. As 
for the students, they should experience “no separation between knowledge and action” 
— meaning that liberal-arts education, professional skills, and internships would be 
fused. In order to ensure maximum access, the college would offer substantial counseling 
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and remedial courses; classes would run 12 months a year, day and night. Admissions 
standards would be lowered to accommodate most students who had graduated high 
school or passed a series of equivalency tests. 
The Educational Affiliate, reflecting Vann’s influence, also took on the issue of 
community control. The proposal insisted that the new college must evoke a “clear sense 
of local responsibility and control,” both in its physical plant and its curriculum, and that 
students and community organizations should assume an important role in governance. 
The Educational Affiliate also rejected the CBCC strategy of soliciting a two-year 
community college in Bed-Stuy. That solution, it was argued, would only perpetuate 
inequalities and mediocre outcomes for black Brooklynites. Instead, Birenbaum, called 
for a comprehensive four-year college capable of enrolling up to 8,000 students.86  
The Board of Higher Education had no intention of sponsoring a four-year college 
in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Characteristically, the Kennedy group hoped to gain enough 
corporate donations and Ford Foundation grants to open the college as a private, tuition-
free institution. But it soon became clear that no significant private-sector funds would be 
forthcoming unless a commitment from CUNY was secured first.  
In November 1967, the Board of Higher Education announced plans to place a 
junior college in a yet-to-be-determined “poverty area” of Brooklyn. Everyone assumed 
this meant Bedford-Stuyvesant, and word circulated that Kennedy had exerted backroom 
pressure on CUNY’s chancellor, Albert Bowker. Indeed, several aspects of the CUNY 
proposal resembled ideas the Educational Affiliate had been exploring. Community 
College #7, as it was temporarily known, would open in the fall of 1969. The new college 
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would have flexible admissions standards and provisions for community input in 
planning curriculum. Though only a two-year institution, it would give students the 
option of transferring into a four-year program after only one semester of study in a 
“comprehensive” curriculum.  
On February 1, 1968, Bowker announced that the college would indeed open in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant, backed by $32 million in city funds. It would initially enroll 500 
students and eventually take 5,000. Kennedy heralded the announcement as a “far-
reaching commitment to the educational needs of the area,” while Lindsay declared his 
hope that the college might become “a model for the whole nation.”87 Community leaders 
in Bedford-Stuyvesant were less impressed. Members of Youth in Action and CBCC, in 
particular, felt that Kennedy had made an end-run around them by negotiating directly 
with CUNY. Even close Kennedy allies such as Thomas Jones expressed disappointment 
that College #7 had been conceived and announced without direct input of Brooklyn’s 
African Americans.  
Youth in Action provided crucial organizing capacity in helping to articulate a 
local response. On February 10, 1968, YIA hosted an “emergency mass meeting” about 
the college. Some 500 people attended — but Lindsay and Kennedy, who’d been invited 
to address the meeting, stayed away. Bowker also declined to attend, instead sending two 
representatives who had not been given permission to speak on his behalf. Tensions soon 
mounted, and the usual succession of incendiary speakers took the stage. But an 
impassioned speech by Jones changed the mood. To general surprise, the judge put 
himself and Restoration’s board squarely on the side of the dissidents. Don Watkins, who  
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A poster produced by Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth in Action in February 1968, 
after the city’s Board of Higher Education announced that it would sponsor a 
community college to be placed in Central Brooklyn. (Don Watkins papers.) 
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attended the meeting, later wrote that “a variety of persons and groups, some regarded as 
‘Uncle Toms’ and political conservatives, others regarded as the most ‘radical militants,’ 
persons who had not worked together in the past, indeed had been public opponents, were 
now speaking with one accord.” On the spot an alliance of 25 groups came together: 
Restoration and CBCC each signed up, along with CORE, the Urban League, several 
Puerto Rican groups, a variety of PTAs, representatives of the Central Brooklyn 
Neighborhood College, and the many factions of Youth in Action.88  
The Bedford-Stuyvesant Coalition on Educational Needs and Services, as the 
alliance called itself, functioned as CBCC had in the early 1960s. As an organization of 
organizations, it was run by a steering committee of 25 to 30 people, each representing 
one outfit. Meanwhile, it routinely staged large public meetings at which anyone who 
cared to show up could air any and all grievances. The broad-based character of the 
coalition was crucial given the debate that had erupted a year earlier over control of the 
Kennedy project. It also flew in the face of Kennedy’s argument that he had negotiated 
the best possible deal for Bedford-Stuyvesant in his talks with Bowker. According to 
Watkins, Kennedy was widely seen as having tried to co-opt the broader movement for 
community control, which was at that very moment hurtling toward a confrontation with 
the teachers union in Ocean Hill-Brownsville. Despite Kennedy’s assurances that College 
#7 was a promising step, several of the senator’s allies joined in a grassroots effort to 
control the new college and force CUNY to the negotiating table.  
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Within the coalition, two broad factions materialized, each pushing for a different 
kind of institution. On one hand was a group that included Jones, who wanted a 
counterpart to baccalaureate colleges like City College or Brooklyn College. On the other 
hand was a group led by Sonny Carson, who floated vague proposals for an Afrocentric 
curriculum. Whatever the case, the coalition’s leaders could agree that they wanted a 
four-year college with full degree-granting authority. Their main worry was that College 
#7 would be established primarily as a vocational-training institution “to provide 
industrial workers for newly proposed industries slated to enter the Bedford-Stuyvesant 
area.” At best, this would be an unnecessary duplication of what the War on Poverty 
agencies were already doing; at worst, it would be yet another signifier of colonialism. 
“We reject a two-year college as inherently inferior, and any offer which ends only in 
that, as grossly insulting,” a coalition document stated.89 
The coalition also insisted that it, rather than people named by the Board of 
Higher Education, should be the dominant voice in running the new college, designing its 
curriculum, determining its site, and choosing its staff. Each of these demands fell far 
outside the realm of established CUNY policy. But in April, following a flurry of street 
protests and meetings with representatives from Bedford-Stuyvesant, CUNY announced a 
set of remarkable concessions. First, the Board of Higher Education would expand its 
presidential search committee to include five members of the community coalition in 
addition to the five members of the Board already in place. Second, the Board agreed to 
give the search committee considerable leeway in recommending a site for the college, 
designing its curriculum, and exploring the possibility of conferring four-year degrees.  
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At a public meeting held on May 2, 1968, the Bed-Stuy coalition elected a seven-
person team to negotiate directly with the Board. (Two of the seven were named as 
“alternates.”) Jones and Vann headlined the team. Joining them were Carson; Herman 
Patterson, a professor with ties both to CUNY and to the Central Brooklyn Neighborhood 
College; Jack Pannigan, head of a club called Brothers and Sisters for Afro-American 
Unity; Ella Sease, a veteran PTA activist; and Isaura Santiago, a youth worker in the 
Puerto Rican community. “A more representative group of Black people would be hard to 
find anywhere in the world,” Vann wrote the following year. It was clear that this would 
be a hard-nosed group: Carson, Vann, and Pannigan were all regarded as “non-
establishment militants,” in Watkins’s words. Yet the Restoration Corporation was also 
well represented. Like Jones, Carson sat on Restoration’s board; Vann had worked 
closely with the Educational Affiliate and would soon join Restoration board, as well.90  
 Vann proved the key player. A teacher and assistant principal at Junior High School 
271, in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, he was quickly emerging as one the most respected and 
eloquent advocates of community control in Brooklyn. Tall, bearded, and grave looking, 
Vann had a fondness for dashikis and a politician’s ease with words. Like his former 
basketball teammate, Franklin Thomas, he belonged to a new generation of leaders, born 
during the Depression, who stood between the old-guard CBCC activists and the radical 
youth. He tended to sympathize with the latter, but he could speak the language of the 
former. He would later serve almost four decades in the State Assembly and City 
Council, and in the 1970s he would help to organize a cohort of young black reformers 
who shook up Brooklyn politics. In the 1960s, though, his base was in the public school 
                                                
90 Watkins, “Initial Negotiations,” (Chap. 4 of unpublished study, 1970), Watkins Papers; Al Vann, “Is, or 
Was There, a Community College in Bedford-Stuyvesant?” Black News 1:8 (Jan. 1970), BPL. 
Chapter 7: Whose Community, What Action?  468 
 
system, where admirers called him Mwalimu, the Swahili word for “Great Teacher.” As 
leader, along with Les Campbell, of the ATAA, he’d helped to organize a key 
constituency within the educational system in support of the efforts by black parents and 
civil-rights activists to achieve equity for their children.  
 Campbell and Vann at first looked to Milton Galamison as a mentor and an ally. By 
1966, however, they’d broken with the older activist by repudiating the goal of 
integration and articulating a black power critique of both the teachers union and the 
public school system. “Our philosophy is based on three concepts: self-control, self-
determination, and self-defense,” Vann said in 1967. AATA loudly denounced the 
dominance of whites, especially Jews, among the mainstream union leadership and 
highlighted various forms of racial bias in the school system. (A particular sore point in 
1967 was a union demand that teachers be given more leeway to remove “disruptive 
children” from classrooms; AATA charged that such disciplinary measures would 
disproportionately affect black and Puerto Rican students.) After the launch of the Ocean-
Hill Brownsville experiment in 1967, Vann and the AATA had taken a lead role in 
escalating the conflict between black parents and educators, on one hand, and the 
overwhelmingly white teachers union, on the other.91  
Even as tempers flared in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, the parties to the community-
college debate sat down at the bargaining table.92 Structured negotiations between the 
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community coalition and the Board of Higher Education began in June 1968. At first, 
compromise seemed possible. Vann’s group agreed to accept a two-year college for a 
trial period, and the Board of Higher Education promised to “explore the possibility” of 
funding four-year baccalaureate programs in the future. Meanwhile, the sides agreed on a 
nebulous plan by which a community board would oversee the budget, curriculum, and 
personnel of the future college, but would only exert as much autonomy “as is possible 
under the University system.” The sides also agreed that the college would relax 
admissions standards for black and Puerto Rican high school graduates. CUNY even 
agreed to supply the community coalition with office equipment and a planning budget. 
The community coalition then hired a consultant to help develop a curriculum in African-
American and Puerto Rican Studies. Vann lauded the Board of Higher Education for 
being “sincere and honest” and optimistically trumpeted the progress being made. “A 
revolution in higher education is underway — a community controlled junior college 
rising in the heart of an educationally-economically deprived ghetto,” he wrote in 
September 1968.93 
But the relationship soon soured. Vann began to lose faith after finding out about 
several planning decisions the Board had made without consulting the community 
coalition. These were small matters — for instance, the Board had neglected to inform 
Vann of a grant application being submitted to the Ford Foundation to help plan the 
college — but to Vann, they represented a breach of trust. In the fall of 1968, even minor 
slights loomed as mortal sins. The Bed-Stuy group began to push harder on the issue of 
community control. Negotiations broke down entirely when it came time to decide on a 
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principal. The community coalition preferred Rhody McCoy, the school administrator 
who’d overseen the Ocean Hill-Brownsville district and had touched off a firestorm of 
controversy by firing several white teachers the previous May. McCoy was a nonstarter 
as far as the city government was concerned. Vann, Campbell, and Carson, wounded by 
their defeat in Ocean Hill Brownsville, dug in. Soon charges of racism and anti-Semitism 
poisoned the negotiations.94 Jones quit the negotiations and heaped blame on both sides:  
 
It is my opinion that some of the representatives of the Board of Higher 
Education with whom the negotiating team has been dealing for almost 
one year do not yet comprehend what community control and participation 
must be to overcome the ravages of educational deprivation suffered by 
the youth of Bedford-Stuyvesant. These officials persist in planning for 
our community without consultation with our representatives. I also 
believe that Central Brooklyn organizations do not yet fully understand 
that the proposed College No. 7 involves a 34 million dollar investment of 
public funds and that the educational center will shape the lives and future 
of our ablest young men and women.95 
  
By the summer of 1969, with no agreement in sight and the deadline for the 
school’s opening long since past, CUNY began threatening to allocate its funds 
elsewhere. In Bedford-Stuyvesant, meanwhile, community meetings were becoming 
increasingly ugly. The coalition split. Vann said he’d rather have no college at all than 
one without community control. A group of moderates including the NAACP and the 
various War on Poverty agencies (CBCC, Youth in Action, Restoration) condemned 
Vann’s “inflexible position” and, claiming to represent “the silent majority in Bedford-
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Stuyvesant,” called on Bowker to find new negotiating partners.96 Eventually, four of 
Brooklyn’s six black elected representatives — Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm, State 
Senator William Thompson, and Assemblymen Sam Wright and Waldaba Stewart — 
swooped in to resolve the issue and hammer out a compromise. To lose the college 
altogether was an unacceptable outcome, especially when so much progress had already 
been made. The Board of Higher Education declared a final impasse with the Vann group 
in September 1969. From that point forward it was the politicians who would negotiate 
on behalf of the people of Central Brooklyn.97  
Some months later, Richard Trent of Brooklyn College emerged as a consensus 
choice for president of the college. The Brooklyn branch of the NAACP hailed Trent’s 
appointment in March 1970 as a victory over “these forces in our community who would 
enslave the rest of us.” Vann, meanwhile, denounced Chisholm and the rest of the 
politicians as “niggers waiting in the wings to ‘do their thing’” and found little good to 
say about Trent. “Unfortunately for Black people,” Vann wrote, “it was real easy to 
divide and conquer.”98  
In the end, the college took on some of the features proposed by the Restoration 
Corporation’s Educational Affiliate and subsequently endorsed by Vann and the 
community coalition. Situated in Crown Heights, near the former site of Ebbets Field, it 
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combined two- and four-year programs, offered innovative courses for paraprofessionals, 
and included some provisions for community input. Even the name was a compromise. 
Initial plans called for the school to be named Martin Luther King College, but King’s 
widow balked and it was another slain civil-rights leader, Medgar Evers, who received 
the honor. Over the next four decades, Medgar Evers College would serve as a valuable 
educational resource for Brooklyn’s African Americans — and it would also be the scene 
of repeated disputes over the meanings and legacies of community control.99  
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 On October 13, 1977, the Brooklyn bureau of the Amsterdam News hosted a 
brainstorming session. At the paper’s behest, two-dozen influential Brooklynites came 
together to “speak very candidly about apathy among the Black masses and about the 
community’s seeming inability to find solutions to the nagging social problems.” It was a 
dark time. New Yorkers of all stripes seemed to be losing faith in their fellows; angry 
tribalism tore at the city’s social fabric. Arson and abandonment were transforming entire 
The brownstones of Bedford-Stuyvesant, 2011. (Author’s photo.) 
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neighborhoods into landscapes of doom. Looting during that summer’s blackout had 
seemed to affirm a nihilist streak in the collective unconscious — that is, if any kind of 
collective unconscious still existed. The fiscal crisis had brought New York to its knees; 
every year tens of thousands of citizens and hundreds of businesses had quit on the city. 
Garbage piled up, gangs roamed the streets, firehouses shuttered. The post-fiscal crisis 
regime tightened the screws. Hushed talk of planned shrinkage was heard. Local and 
national elites, it seemed, were going to let the city destroy itself in order to save it.1  
 The mood in the Amsterdam News conference room was suitably gloomy. Elsie 
Richardson was there, along with Lionel Payne; so too were Al Vann, William Jones, and 
William Thompson, as well as representatives of Youth in Action and Restoration. In the 
1960s, all had taken up the campaign to capture state resources and wield them in a 
program of neighborhood-based revitalization. Their methods had differed, as had their 
definitions of community. Yet they had embraced a common form of place-based politics 
that defined power at the intersection of race and urban space. Theirs had been an 
activism of incremental reform, in pursuit of transformational goals. They had bought 
into the premises of the community-planning and decentralization initiatives launched by 
the Wagner and Lindsay administrations; they’d taken up the refrains of the Great 
Society and sung them with gusto.2 
 To what end? What had come of it all? Thirty years earlier, in 1947, the Brooklyn 
Council for Social Planning had spawned its first gang-outreach program; a decade later, 
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to Real Estate: Regime Change in New York City, 1974 to the Present (New York: The New Press, 2007).   
2 On the long legacies of War on Poverty programs, see Robert Clark, The War on Poverty: History, 
Selected Programs, and Ongoing Impact (Lanham: University Press of America, 2002). 
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the Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council had come together; another ten years after 
that, the Restoration Corporation had been founded — and now, in 1977, life in Bedford-
Stuyvesant looked bleaker than ever. Three decades after Jackie Robinson broke in with 
the Dodgers, two decades after the city’s first-in-the-nation law banning housing 
discrimination, a decade after the first community-controlled school boards had launched, 
many African Americans felt more marginalized than ever within the city’s body politic.  
 As Richardson, Jones, and the rest met that day in October 1977, Edward I. Koch 
was poised to become the city’s next mayor. On the campaign trail, he’d promised to take 
on “poverty pimps” and to dismantle once and for all the city’s poverty agencies. Koch, 
whose power base lay among the city’s middle-class and, especially, its white ethnic 
population, charged that in places liked Bedford-Stuyvesant, Crown Heights, the Lower 
East Side, and Harlem — the very seedbeds of the War on Poverty — the city was 
wasting taxpayer money on antipoverty programs. The new mayor accused the 
community corporations of having become old-style patronage mills dedicated to 
defending ethnic (read, black) turfs and political privilege. Exhibit A was Youth in 
Action, which had proven low-hanging fruit for corrupt politicos like City Councilman 
Sam Wright and State Senator Vander Beatty, along with the petty criminals in their 
entourages. Asked how he might respond to pressure from African-American politicians 
eager to maintain the poverty program, Koch replied, “I don’t give a damn.”3 
 Koch was not the only one taking aim at the city’s black leaders. They were turning 
on themselves. Community organizers like Elsie Richardson expressed dismay at the lack 
                                                
3 “Democratic Mayoral Rivals Hold Debate Filled With Recriminations,” NYT, Sept. 2, 1977; “Owens 
Blasts Koch; Claims He Polarizes City Into ‘Ethnic Camps’,” NYAN, Sept. 17, 1977; “Koch warns 
Blacks,” NYAN, Dec. 31, 1977. For a surprisingly nuanced take on Koch as a “backlash” politician, see Al 
Sharpton, “The Ed Koch I Know,” in New York Comes Back: The Mayoralty of Edward I. Koch (New 
York: Powerhouse Books, 2005).  
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of clout wielded by Brooklyn’s growing cohort of African-American officeholders. “We 
have more black elected officials than we’ve ever had and yet we’re less effective that 
we’ve ever been,” Richardson told her fellow brainstormers at the Amsterdam News 
summit. Not everyone agreed: Sylvester Leaks, Youth in Action’s executive director and 
a Beatty crony, blamed the old-guard community leadership — people like Richardson, 
in other words — for buying into the Great Society in the first place. “I think the worst 
thing to happen to black people in my lifetime is this concept of integration,” he said. “It 
has done more to confuse us and to mislead us than any other single item.” Civil rights 
leader William Jones, once the chairman of Youth in Action’s board and a close ally of 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in the 1960s, cast a pox on all houses. “Most of the people in 
this room are plantation managers,” he declared. As for the executive director of CBCC, 
Charles Joshua, his was the voice of despondency. “We’ve practically given up,” he said. 
“In the 1950s and ‘60s we fought the establishment; we were successful. We had 




 Charles Joshua was right to wonder what had happened. Only a few years earlier, 
an optimist might have turned up signs of progress in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Between 1960 
                                                
4 “Amsterdam News Hosts Community Leaders Confab,” NYAN, Oct. 22, 1977. A doctoral thesis written 
in 1977 by Ernest Quimby backed up Jones’s claim, grouping together the leadership segment of Bed-
Stuy’s poverty programs as “black managers in the ghetto.” According to Quimby: “These managers 
constitute an informal network of professional, civic, media, religious, political, and business elite which 
acts as “representatives” and “leaders”. They portray themselves as articulators of “the community”. Their 
perceptions are heralded by the media as legitimate, accurate and typical. Poverty programs both ushered 
in and silenced different styles of leadership. Restoration, for instance, stresses college-trained managerial 
expertise. YIA and Model Cities, on the other hand, focus on the so-called “grass-roots” Sometimes 
conflicting, almost always overlapping, organized “leadership” spheres in Bed-Stuy had one common 
variable: avoidance of tactics, values and programs that threatened what little institutional stability that 
existed in Bed-Stuy. None bit the hands that fed them.” Ernest Quimby, “Black Political Development in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant as Represented in the Origin and Role of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration 
Corporation” (PhD Thesis, City University of New York, 1977). 
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and 1970, the median number of school years completed by local residents had jumped 
from 7.9 to 10.3, thanks in part to Youth in Action’s remedial-education efforts. 
Graduation rates, though still weak, were almost 30% higher than they’d been a decade 
earlier — and the opening of Medgar Evers College promised to put more of those 
graduates through college in the 1970s than ever before. The 1960s had seen a 50% 
reduction in the number of Bed-Stuy women employed as domestics; War on Poverty 
initiatives directed at low-income black women had helped bring about a corresponding 
rise in the number working in professional or paraprofessional positions. Thanks largely 
to Great Society programs, the portion of black workers in the city employed by 
governments had doubled, reaching 20% in the 1970s — and that figure would continue 
to rise, especially among women, in decades to come. 
 While the median family income of $6,300 in Bedford-Stuyvesant in 1970 was 
only 7% higher in real terms than it had been in 1960, and still just 70% of the city 
average, even modest growth was notable given the increasing numbers of children and 
single mothers living in the community. (The median age in Bed-Stuy dropped from 28 
to 23 between 1960 and 1970, and 43% of Stuyford residents were under age 20 by the 
latter year.) The percentage of Bed-Stuy families with incomes above the city median had 
increased by 80% in a decade, a stunning figure that no doubt reflected some of the 
efforts made by CBCC and the Restoration Corporation to consolidate the area’s middle 
class and increase its purchasing power.5 By 1973, the Restoration Corporation estimated 
that close to 60% of the 450,000 people living in its official project area could be 
                                                
5 In 1964, Bedford-Stuyvesant’s residents made up 3.5% of New York City’s total population, but pulled 
in only 0.9% of the city’s total income; despite a slight drop in the area’s population, that figure improved 
by a third in 1970, to 1.2% ($584 million). Mary H. Manoni, Bedford-Stuyvesant: The Anatomy of a 
Central City Community (New York: Quadrangle, 1973), p. 28. 
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qualified as “middle-class.” For those living below the poverty line, a slew of Great 
Society measures — Food Stamps, Medicare and Medicaid, Head Start, expanded access 
to welfare — promised to make life marginally more humane. Bed-Stuy’s official 
unemployment rate in 1970 stood at a mere 6%.6  
 As the 1970s dawned, then, the War on Poverty appeared to be working. 
Seemingly against all odds, Bed-Stuy’s population was better educated, more affluent, 
healthier and better served than it had been a decade earlier. Poverty was nowhere near 
licked, clearly — but many lives had been improved. That counted for something, 
especially in a city where millions of poor people had settled since World War II. 
Nationally, the official poverty rate had dipped sharply and would continue to fall even 
after Richard Nixon officially ended the War on Poverty in 1974 by dissolving the Office 
of Economic Opportunity and initiating the Community Development Block Grant. 
(Most former OEO initiatives, including the Community Action Program, lived on under 
various other federal jurisdictions and often, as in New York City, with an increasing 
share being paid by municipalities.) In 1978, the federal government reported that only 
11.4% of Americans were living in poverty — an all-time low. That figure was less than 
half what it had been when John F. Kennedy took office. Further, if one took into account 
the various forms of non-cash income (Food Stamps, Medicaid, Head Start, etc.) the 
Great Society programs had offered low-income families, the real poverty rate sat closer 
to 7% or 8%.7 
 But that was hardly the whole story. The optimism of the Great Society years 
                                                
6  “The State of the Community,” Restoration, Jan/Feb 1974, “Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corp. I,” 
BPL. 
7 John E. Schwartz, America’s Hidden Success: A Reassessment of Twenty Years of Public Policy (New York: 
Norton, 1983), pp. 26-27, 211-12 n11. 
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lingered as little more than a painful memory in Bed-Stuy, where most residents in the 
late 1970s would’ve scoffed at the idea that things were getting better. What had 
happened? Thirty-five years on, historians are still debating the issue. Embedded in 
Charles Joshua’s remark are some of the key questions about the last third of the 20th 
century: Why did American liberalism collapse in the wake of the Great Society? What 
was the long-term significance of the civil-rights movement? What caused New York’s 
fiscal crisis and what did the ensuing restructuring of its economy look like? What 
happened to the welfare state in an era of conservative ascendancy? Why did some urban 
spaces revive and others decline? 
In assessing the afterlife of the War on Poverty, it’s tempting to conclude that the 
fate of places like Bedford-Stuyvesant in the 1970s was ultimately decided by forces so 
overwhelming — deindustrialization, the fiscal crisis of the state, the lingering geography 
of racism — that there was nothing much any community organization could have done 
to alter conditions on the ground. Indeed, the very basis on which power had been 
constituted during the 1960s, namely the neighborhood, proved a remarkably weak 
fortress from which to fight against the economic and political restructuring of New York 
and the United States. In that sense, the War on Poverty had disempowered the poor 
rather than empowering them. It had codified the institutions and processes through 
which low-income communities would gain concessions from local and federal 
governments, while at the same time ensuring that those institutions and processes were 
largely symbolic. If anyone had been empowered, it was members of the African-
American political class, which had successfully consolidated access to government 
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structures and begun laying down their own version of what Ira Katznelson has called 
“city trenches.”8  
 Perhaps that had been the point of the War on Poverty all along. After all, men 
like Robert F. Wagner, Jr., and Robert F. Kennedy had said time and again that the 
poverty program must serve as a buffer against rioting and disorder. Programs like 
CBCC, Youth in Action, Restoration — each was conceived to defuse unrest, to absorb 
the energy of the civil-rights movement, and to incorporate African Americans into the 
political structures of the Democratic Party. It was foolish, then, to expect such agencies 
to counterbalance macroeconomic trends, let alone eradicate poverty itself.  
On the other hand, social policy does not spring from the minds of Wagners and 
Kennedys alone. Viewed from the local level, the War on Poverty reflected a series of 
clearly articulated demands issued in the late 1950s and early 1960s by grassroots 
activists and neighborhood-based community leaders. They embraced the sweeping 
rhetoric of the Johnson administration, but their goals were more prosaic and more 
practical. They, too, wanted to preclude future riots, channel the energy of the civil-rights 
movement (they were the civil-rights movement), and integrate the Democratic Party — 
but they wanted to do all those things as a way of protecting, structuring, and preserving 
the environments in which they lived. Theirs was a vision bounded simultaneously (and 
oftentimes contradictorily) by class, space, and race. Within a given neighborhood, they 
aspired both to black political power and to an ideal of community stability defined by 
homeownership, liberal aspirations, and participation in middle-class causes. When 
presented with government-funded institutions through which to pursue national goals 
                                                
8 Ira Katznelson, City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the United States (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1981). 
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(fighting delinquency, waging war on poverty), they assented, but never without seeking 
to pursue ultra-local goals simultaneously. Seen from that perspective, things in Bedford-




 That year also saw the end of an era for the Restoration Corporation. After 10 
years on the job, Franklin Thomas was calling it quits and going into private law practice. 
Unlike the half-dozen executive directors who had walked away from Youth in Action 
during that time, Thomas departed a hero. Under his guidance, Restoration had offered 
tangible proof that not all War on Poverty programs — a category to which the 
corporation clearly belonged, despite efforts by its patrons to distance themselves from 
Lyndon Johnson’s legacy — were failures. After its rocky start, Restoration had managed 
to insulate its programs from political strife, bickering, and corruption. “While the 
Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth-in-Action program has been plagued with multiple probes of 
alleged fiscal improprieties, firing and jailing of top personnel, etc., the corporation has 
run like a well-oiled machine,” the Amsterdam News wrote upon Thomas’s departure.9 
 Restoration had scored tangible successes. By 1977, it had made 1,080 loans from its 
mortgage pool, totaling more than $22 million; funded the exterior renovation of 3,682 
homes on 96 blocks and trained more than 3,835 local residents in masonry, carpentry, 
and other construction trades; built 500 new units of housing and done gut renovations on 
342 formerly abandoned townhouses. Restoration also offered a wide array of health and 
social services: for instance, it had performed 10,792 screenings for lead poisoning and 
offered housing advice and assistance to 35,335 local residents. Through its efforts, 8,037 
                                                
9 “Who Will Be Restoration’s New President?” NYAN, Jan. 1, 1977. 
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people had been placed in jobs and 512 recruits hired for on-the-job vocational training. 
Beyond that, the corporation had carried out street renovations, built parks, and led 
cleanup drives in empty lots. Restoration’s massive new headquarters and shopping 
center on Fulton Street, built almost entirely with local labor, promised to serve as an 
anchor for a chronically depressed shopping district.10 
 By 1980, Restoration had spent some $83 million — the vast majority of it from 
federal funds — to improve Bedford-Stuyvesant. The dollar figures dwarfed what any 
other Community Development Corporation (CDC) or Community Action Agency had 
received. In its heyday, Restoration claimed to be the second-largest landowner in  
 
 
                                                
10 Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, Restoration newsletter, September 1977; Haskell Ward, 
“Bedford-Stuyvesant: An Assessment,” The Journal of the Institute for Socioeconomic Studies 5:4 
(Winter 1980), pp. 45-54. 
Franklin Thomas with a colleague at Restoration Plaza in Bedford-Stuyvesant in 1977. 
The commercial center on Fulton Street, which also housed the Restoration 
Corporation’s offices, a skating rink, and a theater, was completed in 1972.  
(Image from the Restoration newsletter, Don Watkins papers.) 
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Brooklyn (after the city of New York itself), and envisioned building and renovating 
thousands of housing units in years to come. To many of Bed-Stuy’s community 
activists, Restoration loomed as singular evidence that they had not been tilting at 
windmills all along. 
 This was a mitigated success, of course. While Bed-Stuy partly escaped the death 
spiral of arson and abandonment that afflicted nearby Brownsville and Bushwick, the 
neighborhood’s rejuvenation would be a long time coming. Bed-Stuy in 1980 was poorer 
than it had been in 1970. Despite the substantial gains of the 1960s, there were profound 
weaknesses in the local economic structure. A study carried out by the Restoration 
Corporation in 1973 found that local “subemployment” — a category inclusive of people 
the Census overlooked, those who had dropped out of the workforce, those in extremely 
low-wage jobs, and those working part-time — was so high as to render meaningless the 
official unemployment rate in Bed-Stuy. According to Restoration, a third of local 
residents of working age had “a serious labor market problem.” Meanwhile, Brooklyn 
was hemorrhaging industrial jobs and its economic development was being hampered by 
chronic weaknesses in other areas. Whereas in 1945, some 4,000 retail and service 
businesses had called Bedford-Stuyvesant home, less than 2,000 were operating in the 
community a quarter-century later. Only liquor stores had increased their dollar sales 
between 1950 and 1970.11  
 Restoration’s business-development program had tackled these issues in as 
comprehensive a manner as could be expected from a neighborhood-based agency. 
Kennedy had made that a centerpiece of his vision. Marshaling federal monies, bank 
                                                
11 “The State of the Community,” Restoration, Jan/Feb 1974, “Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corp I,” 
BPL. 
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loans, and equity investments, Restoration threw $20 million at 128 local businesses 
through the late 1970s. These ranged from mom-and-pop stores (a laundromat, a grocery) 
to a recording studio called The Platinum Factory, financed jointly by Restoration and 
CBS. Through its various building and home-improvement projects, Restoration had 
helped to fund 32 construction-related firms; it had also financed 20 manufacturing firms 
and a similar number of retail outlets. In addition, it helped to create black-owned 
franchises of national chains: Baskin-Robbins, Nathan’s Famous, car dealerships. Finally, 
the corporation had spun off several subsidiaries, which assumed economic risks the 
private sector was unwilling to take on. For instance, after a long and frustrating effort to 
attract a supermarket for the newly built Restoration Plaza, the corporation created a 
subsidiary, the Restoration Supermarket Company, to jointly manage and share risk with 
whatever supermarket chain would be willing to take the plunge. Only at that point did 
the Supermarkets General Corporation jump in and agree to place a Pathmark store in 
Restoration Plaza. The supermarket, set in the middle of what later generations would 
dub a “food desert,” served a vital need and employed 150 community residents to boot.12  
 All these gains, though, were only so many drops in the bucket. The small-
business program suffered from a lack of affluent consumers. The major effort to attract 
large-scale industry to Central Brooklyn proved an almost total failure. Other than IBM, 
no major corporation stepped up to invest in the area. The business board offered little 
help. As one CEO had warned Kennedy back in 1967, “Senator, the afternoon I walk into 
my board of directors and tell them that Bobby Kennedy was here today, and he thinks 
we should put a plant in Bedford-Stuyvesant, that is the afternoon they’ll have me 
                                                
12 BSRC, “The Restoration Story” (Jan. 1980, unpublished), Watkins Papers; BSRC, Restoration 
Boxscore Through Sept. 1979, Watkins Papers; Barron Tenny, interview with author, Jan. 2012. 
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committed.”13 Kennedy managed to induce individual businessmen to support 
Restoration’s efforts, but he could not alter capital flows. After his assassination, interest 
in Bedford-Stuyvesant within the business community diminished even further.  
 One notable assessment of Restoration’s activity came from Haskell Ward, the 
Commissioner of Community Development under Mayor Koch. Ward wrote in 1980 that 
it was “valid to assume that the Bedford-Stuyvesant community would look more like the 
South Bronx today if it had not been for the funding received by the Restoration 
Corporation.” On the other hand, he pointed out:  
 
Bed-Stuy is therefore in the classic bind of the depressed urban area. With 
very few exceptions, manufacturers are unwilling to risk plant development 
in poor urban areas; taxes are high, land is limited and expensive, the labor 
pool is unskilled and unpredictable, and the community is not attractive to 
high-salaried managerial and technical staff. On the other hand, the 
opportunities for retail businesses are limited by the surrounding poverty. 
[…] The result is that Restoration has had to make equity investments from 
its own resources to attract business to the area and ensure that they are 
managed properly.”14  
 
 In retrospect, it seems desperately naive to have thought that the tides of 
deindustrialization might be turned thanks to the efforts of a plucky community group, 
however many corporate titans it arrayed to its side. The trends underlying such 
circumstances lay largely beyond Restoration’s control. But the corporation also came 
under fire for things it could control — namely the impression it gave of being a program 
designed by and for the middle class. The mortgage pool, for instance, continued to direct 
                                                
13 Newfield, Robert Kennedy, p. 98; Ward, “Bedford-Stuyvesant,” p. 51. 
14 Ward, “Bedford-Stuyvesant,” pp. 51-52. 
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more than 60% of its loans to refinancing efforts, leaving the agency vulnerable to 
charges that it was, in the final analysis, mostly aimed at protecting and preserving the 
investments made by the homeowners who had pushed hardest for its establishment in 
the first place. The same could be said for street renovations and exterior-rehabilitation 
programs, most of which were undertaken on already elegant streets whose block 
associations pushed hardest for such things.  
 One of Restoration’s most incisive critics was Jitu Weusi (formerly Les 
Campbell), who along with Vann had founded the African-American Teachers 
Association in the mid-1960s. In a 1982 Amsterdam News column, Weusi argued that 
Thomas’s main accomplishment was to have “constructed a facade of peace and progress 
amid the many contradictions that existed.” To Weusi’s mind, Restoration remained an 
“agency built on paternalism,” notable for its insularity and its inability to gain legitimacy 
among the poor of Bed-Stuy. Looking back on the past 15 years, he wrote that:  
 
Restoration was accused of building and restoring housing that charge 
community residents excessively high and often unaffordable rents, 
constructing a shopping mall that had store rents so high that neighborhood 
merchants could not rent stores in it, and showing consistent disregard for 
community input and involvement in decision making. .... On a large scale, 
many community residents raised the broader question of who Restoration 
was really restoring (preparing) the community for. Many wondered aloud 




 Thirty years on, a walk through the streets of Bedford-Stuyvesant would seem to 
                                                
15 Jitu Weusi, “Which Way for Bed-Stuy Restoration?” NYAN, June 19, 1982; See, also, Quimby, “Black 
Political Development in Bedford-Stuyvesant.” 
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vindicate Weusi’s concern that gentrification — and its evil twin, displacement — would 
be among the long-term consequences of Restoration’s brand of community 
development. Amid the foreclosure crisis, enduring poverty, and the mass incarceration 
of black men, swathes of what was once “America’s largest ghetto” today appear 
decidedly comfortable, if not affluent. Townhouses in the area hit the market for $1.5 
million, and increasingly the buyers are white. The equation of the late 1970s has 
reversed itself. In 1977, the national poverty rate was reaching historic lows just as Bed-
Stuy was plumbing the depths of its despair; 35 years later, Bed-Stuy is in the midst of an 
unprecedented boom even as national poverty rates reach levels unseen in a half-century.  
 As Weusi’s remark indicates, and as recent scholarship has shown, the seeds of 
gentrification were planted in the midst of the urban crisis. In 1978, for instance, two 
Restoration staffers founded a group called Brownstoners of Bedford-Stuyvesant, which 
began holding annual brownstone tours to publicize the quality of housing available in 
the area; the tours continue to this day, with homeowners displaying parquet floors and 
ornate moldings to the curious, this writer among them. The group’s original motto — 
“Come on home to Bed-Stuy” — was directed at the prodigal sons and grandsons of 
Brooklyn’s first generation of black brownstoners, but today many members are 
newcomers, black and white.16 Even further back, in 1968, the Brooklyn chapter of the 
Victorian Society of America, led by the godfather of Park Slope’s gentrification, Everett 
Ortner, organized its first brownstone tour of “the former Bedford and Stuyvesant 
neighborhoods.” None other than the Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council helped to 
provide publicity for the follow-up tour, in the fall of 1969. “The conviction of this group 
                                                
16  For more on the Brownstoners of Bedford-Stuyvesant, including information about their annual house tour, 
see www.brownstonersofbedstuy.org.  
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that Bedford-Stuyvesant has some of the finest architecture in the city is backed up by the 
reactions of the people who took the tour last November,” the CBCC’s newsletter 
reported. “Most were surprised, if not amazed in view of the horrible image of the 
community painted by the media.”17 Conversely, in 1970, Black News, the publication 
edited by Jitu Weusi (then still known as Les Campbell), ran a series of articles on “the 
great land grab” occurring in Brooklyn. “There is currently a frantic run on brownstone 
houses by white people in the housing market,” Weusi wrote. “In the quaint jargon of the 
white man, brownstones are ‘In.’ […] Presently white people are buying brownstone 
houses in Bed Stuy for outrageously low prices and the trend will accelerate.”18   
 The full implications of Weusi’s prophecy are becoming more apparent by the day 
on the streets of Brooklyn. What part did Restoration play in all this? Given its 
diminished effectiveness after 1981, when it lost federal funding amidst a wave of 
Reagan-era cutbacks, it’s hard to say. Perhaps future studies will provide clearer answers 
about the linkages between CDCs and gentrification. But it seems clear enough that 
Restoration at least helped to create a mood conducive to gentrification. In some ways, 
million-dollar townhouse sales in the environs of Tompkins Park are a logical conclusion 
to its efforts. 
Whatever the case, Restoration also resonated well beyond the borders of Bed-
Stuy — and particularly in places where the prospects of gentrification would have 
seemed outlandishly remote in 1980. With its emphasis on homeownership, job creation, 
physical rehabilitation, small-business development, and neighborhood pride, Restoration 
                                                
17 “Second Brownstone Tour of Bed-Stuy Sold Out,” Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council News 
Briefs, May 17, 1969, CBCC Papers, BPL. See, also, Osman, The Invention of Brownstone Brooklyn; 
Lance Freeman, There goes the ‘hood: Views of Gentrification from the Ground Up. 
18 “The Great Land Grab Continues,” Black News 1:7 (Jan. 10 1970), BPL; “The Priceless Land Value of 
Bed. Stuy.,” Black News 1:8 (Jan. 25, 1970), BPL. 
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became a model for the CDCs that were popping up in some of the country’s poorest 
places in the 1970s. Restoration blazed a trail for many other communities frustrated by 
the Community Action Program and eager to establish new footholds in federal funding 
structures; it also provided an example of how to marry the spirit of the civil-rights 
movement to a mode of development that Richard Nixon dubbed “black capitalism.” 
 At first, critics alleged that Restoration could not — and ought not — serve as a 
model for other CDCs. It had been born in exceptional circumstances, they said; it owed 
its existence to white outsiders; it was nothing more than a front for corporate interests in 
“the ghetto.” For instance, Geoffrey Faux, a former OEO official who worked on a major 
nationwide study of CDCs in 1971, argued that the dual-board structure “appears to limit 
both the independence of the Restoration Corporation and the extent to which it can serve 
as the black community’s vehicle for economic development.” Others charged that 
Bedford-Stuyvesant’s large corps of owner-occupants, an uncommon feature of urban 
black neighborhoods, invalidated the portability of the Restoration model.19 
Restoration also frustrated its critics by punting the political questions that had so 
bedeviled the Community Action Agencies. Many in Bed-Stuy believed that the 
economic development of black communities could never occur if they didn’t 
simultaneously pursue their own political empowerment; that had, after all, been one of 
the central premises of the entire poverty program. But Thomas had no interest in 
fighting over questions of citizen participation or political power. For this, he was often 
                                                
19 Geoffrey Faux, “Background Paper” in CDCs: New Hope for the Inner City (New York: Twentieth 
Century Fund, 1971), p. 71. Scholars in subsequent years have sometimes backed up this assessment. John 
R. Chávez insists that Kennedy’s pro-business orientation favored an “elitist, ‘top-down’ approach” that 
“would compromise the claims of self-determination made by the Bedford-Stuyvesant project and other 
CDCs.” John R. Chávez, Eastside Landmark: A History of the East Los Angeles Community Union, 1968-
1993 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 40. Ernest Quimby wrote in 1977 that Restoration 
was merely an “administrative gatekeeper” that embodied “past dependency.” Quimby, “Black Political 
Development,” p. 1. 
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accused of adopting what William Jones dubbed a “plantation manager” mentality. 
Indeed, in its disavowal of political organizing and single-minded pursuit of economic 
development, Restoration in some ways echoed the old accommodationist mindset of 
Booker T. Washington. But just as there were radical implications to Washington’s 
thought, there was a radical insight embedded in Restoration’s philosophy: that black 
Americans, no matter how well organized, could not hope to gain improvements in their 
quality of life through politics. In an electoral democracy, the “black vote” was simply 
too weak, the conservative tendencies of the country’s white middle class too strong. 
Community action, per Restoration, was a form of political theater — one that ultimately 
turned local energies in counterproductive, fratricidal directions. Better, then, to turn 
inward, and create new bases of power through community economic development.20  
 As the 1970s progressed, and as black mayors took office in cities around the 
country only to find that they’d inherited a “hollow prize,” activists in African-American 
neighborhoods increasingly relied on CDCs as vehicles for planning and managing 
change at the local level. In this context, Restoration emerged once again as a model. The 
business community’s involvement in Bed-Stuy had long since ebbed, and Restoration 
now appeared less of a sell-out to the white power structure and its corporate puppeteers 
than a pragmatic effort to carve out a small arena of local initiative within the confines of 
hegemonic neoliberalism. During the 1980s, as the Reagan administration slashed away 
at the remnants of federal support for poor urban neighborhoods, CDCs like Restoration 
                                                
20 For an assessment of how future CDCs would attempt to balance, on one hand, their efforts at 
promoting economic development and, on the other, the radical impulses that emerge from their political 
organizing, see Joyce Mandell, “CDCs and the Myth of the Organizing-Development Dialectic,” in 
Comm-Org Papers, The On-Line Conference on Community Organizing, Vol. 15, 2009.  
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were often among the few bulwarks left guarding against further collapse.21  
 A Ford Foundation report from 1987 argued that the CDCs had helped to create 
“new economic bases in troubled communities.” The CDC movement:  
 
[…] mirrors the qualities of our society that so impressed Alexis de 
Tocqueville in the 1830s: our penchant for innovative civic action, our 
belief that individuals can bring about change, our openness to risk taking 
and bridging lines of class, ideology, and party. CDCs, in their quiet way, 
have become a major component of corrective capitalism; in this free-
enterprise nation they are finding ways to open doors to classes and 
individuals otherwise excluded from the American dream.22  
  
It was no surprise that the Ford Foundation should be lauding the CDC 
movement: the foundation’s president was Franklin Thomas. After taking over in 1979, 
Thomas had pushed Ford to take up the CDC approach and turn it into a nationwide 
movement. A major institutional tool for this effort was launched in 1980 by another old 
poverty warrior, Mitchell Sviridoff, who once upon a time had headed New York City’s 
Human Resources Agency and had participated in the planning for the Restoration 
Corporation. Sviridoff remembered asking Thomas at one point during the mid-1970s 
what he would do if he were given $20 million to spend how he wished on a community-
development project. Thomas had replied that he would give a million bucks to each of 
                                                
21 On the long-term influence of the Restoration model, see Lawrence F. Parachini, A Political History of 
the Special Impact Program (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Community Economic Development, 1980); 
Ronald F. Ferguson, ed., Urban Problems and Community Development (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 1999); Neal R. Peirce and Carol F. Steinbach, Corrective Capitalism: The Rise of 
America’s Community Development Corporations (New York: Ford Foundation, 1987); Stewart E. Perry, 
“Federal Support for CDCs Some of the History and Issues of Community Control,” in Review of Black 
Political Economy, 3:3 (Spring 1973); and Kimberley Johnson, “Community Development Corporations, 
Participation, and Accountability: The Harlem Urban Development Corporation and the Bedford-
Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
Vol. 594 (July, 2004), pp. 109-124.  
22 Peirce and Steinbach, Corrective Capitalism, p. 9. 
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20 CDCs and ask them to launch an experimental program with the money — the idea 
being that out of those 20 initiatives, at least one brilliant idea would be born. It was a 
classic 1960s insight, and under Thomas and Sviridoff, the Ford Foundation would apply 
it to helping CDCs navigate the age of Reagan.23  
 To that end, Ford spawned the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) and 
brought together a national network of funders to help prop up CDCs, many of which, 
like Restoration, lost federal support after the early 1980s. Within a decade LISC would 
be providing funds and expertise to almost 800 CDCs nationwide, a good number of 
which had emerged during the heyday of the Great Society. By some counts, there are 
4,000 active CDCs in the United States today. In New York City, the LISC network alone 
includes 33 groups, most of them born sometime between the late 1960s and the early 
1980s.24 In the intervening years, success stories have abounded: in New York, across the 
U.S., and even in other countries.25  
 The best-known tale comes from the South Bronx, where CDCs such as Banana 
Kelly and Nos Quedamos emerged from the rubble in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The 
groups gained funding from LISC and logistical support from Ron Shiffman of the Pratt 
Institute, who brought with him many of the ideas he’d lent to the Restoration 
Corporation at its founding. Then, in the late 1980s and early ‘90s, the Bronx CDCs 
                                                
23 Sviridoff, Inventing Community Renewal. 
24 LISC New York City web site, www.lisc.org/nyc . On the legacies of the CDC movement, see The 
Urban Institute, The Impact of Community Development Corporations on Urban Neighborhoods 
(Washington, D.C., 2005); Peter Dreier, John Mollenkopf, and Todd Swanstrom, Place Matters: 
Metropolitics for the Twenty-First Century (Lawrence, Ks.: University Press of Kansas, 2001); and Paul 
S. Grogan and Tony Proscio, Comeback Cities: A Blueprint for Urban Neighborhood Revival (Boulder, 
Co.: Westview Press, 2000). On community-based organizations in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, see Nicole 
P. Marwell, Bargaining for Brooklyn: Community Organizations in the Entrepreneurial City (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007).  
25 On the impact of CDCs in Canada, see Stewart Perry, Reinventing the Local Economy: What 10 
Canadian Initiatives Can Teach Us About Building Creative, Inclusive & Sustainable Communities 
(Centre for Community Enterprise, 1994).  
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partnered with the city government under Mayors Koch and David Dinkins to carry out 
the largest program of public housing and urban renewal undertaken anywhere in the 
country since the 1960s. Slowly, an area that had once been devastated began to revive. 
It’s a model that, like Restoration’s in the 1970s, has proven attractive, especially in New 
York City. As a recent article in the policy journal City Limits put it, “In New York since 
Moses’ fall and Jacobs’ departure, and especially since the nadir of the fiscal crisis, the 
greatest engine of resurgence has been small-scale community efforts to improve a lot 
here, a block there, all adding up to major movements.” It’s a legacy of which Elsie 
Richardson could be proud.26  
                                                
26 Jill Jonnes, We’re Still Here: The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of the South Bronx (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2002), Jarrett Murphy, “Moses, Jacobs, and You: The Battle for Gotham,” City Limits 
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